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The enactment of the Saenz Pena Electoral Law of

1912 and the election four years later of Hipolito
Yrigoyen, the Radical Party presidential candidate,

constituted notable achievements in the long struggle for

political refo3rm in Argentina. The Radical Party success,
however, represented only a partial victory for the reform

movement. Yrigoyen'

s

election in 1916 did not give his

followers simultaneous control of the provincial

governments as was to be the case with Peron'

s

triumph

thirty years later. Accordingly, the politics of the

Yrigoyen administrations revolved in great part around
intra-provincial power struggles and the relations between
the national administration and provincial authorities.

Much of what has been published about the Radical
Party and its dominance of Argentina from 1916 to 1930 has

been written from the viewpoint of national politics. The
present study directs attention to the provincial arena
elements
where the conflict between traditional and reform

1
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and between rival factions of the latter was a continuing
theme despite Radical dominance of the Casa Rosada,

In particular this study focuses on the two western
provinces of Mendoza and San Juan and on the transformation
of the Radical movement there from 1918 to 1930. As in no

other Argentine provinces during that period, Radicalism

in these two states displayed distinctive popular

characteristics. These were evidenced both in the personal

style of their undisputahle leaders

— Jose

Nestor Lencinas

and his son Carlos Washington, in Mendoza, and the brothers

Pederico and Aldo Cantoni, in San Juan

— and

in the principles

of social justice on which they based their political action.

These leaders generated two movements known as

Lencinism and Bloquism which produced a tremendous regional
impact. Their social accomplishments surpassed the moderate

approach of the Radical Party at the national level, and
because of their populist principles and procedures, they
distinguished Mendoza and San Juan from the rest of the
country during these years. This study analyzes the

populist characteristics, the authoritarian political style,
and the emotional strength which these two movements

assumed
forged within the patria chica from the time they
the degree to
power until 1930. This work also evaluates

fulfilled, as well
which the expectations they raised were
principles.
their role as defenders of the federalist
as

3

Since the policies of these regional leaders had great

impact beyond the geographical boundaries of llendoza
and San Juan, their relevance in the larger scene is

also analyzed. There they became involved in an almost

permanent conflict with the national authorities and
their political adversaries in Buenos Aires.

Because Lencinism and Bloquism were popular provincial
movements which offered an alternative to the traditional
rule of a local oligarchy, their reforms were a harbinger
of the changes which took place throughout Argentina in

the 1940* s and 1950'

s.

While Peronism was not consciously

modeled after Lencinism or Bloquism, it shared the same
fundamental characteristics of authoritarian political

behavior and a strong preoccupation with the welfare of
the masses. This study, therefore, while focusing on the

regional politics of an earlier era, provides a basis for

appraising the domestic roots of Peronism.

iv
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INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Saenz Pena Electoral Law of

1912 and the election four years later of Hipolito Yrigoyen,
the Radical Party presidential candidate, constituted

notable achievements in the long struggle for political

reform in Argentina. The Radical Party success, however,
represented only a partial victory for the reform movement.
Yrigoyen'

s

election in 1916 did not give his followers

simultaneous control of the provincial governments as was
to be the case with Peron's triumph thirty years later.

Accordingly, the politics of the Yrigoyen administration

revolved in great part around intra-provincial power
struggles and the relations between the national

administration and provincial authorities.

Much of what has been published about the Radical
Party and its dominance of Argentina from 1916 to 1930 has

been written from the viewpoint of national politics. It
is the purpose of this study to direct attention to the

provincial arena where the conflict between traditional
and reform elements, and between rival factions of the

latter was a continuing theme despite Radical dominance of
the Casa Rosada.

In particular this study will focus on the two
western provinces of Mendoza and San Juan and on the
transformation of the Radical movement there from 1918 to

vi

1930. As in no other Argentine province during that
period, Radicalism in these two states displayed

distinctive popular characteristics. These were evidenced

both in the personal style of their undisputable leaders

—Jose Nestor Lencinas

and his son Carlos Washington, in

Mendoza; and the brothers Federico and Aldo Cantoni, in
San Juan

— and

in the principles of social justice on which

they based their political action.

These leaders generated two movements known as

Lencinism and Bloquism which produced a tremendous regional
impact. Their social accomplishments surpassed the moderate

approach of the Radical Party at the national level, and

because of their populist principles and procedures, they
distinguished Mendoza and San Juan from the rest of the
country during these years. This study, which attempts

neither a history of Lencinism and Bloquism nor a biography
of their caudillos, will focus on the populist

characteristics, the authoritarian political style, and the

emotional strength which these two principal movements
they took
forged within the patria chica, from the time
to what
power until 1930. This work will also evaluate

fulfilled.
degree the expectations they raised were
geographical boundaries
As their impact beyond their
of Lencinism and Bloquism
was also significant, the role
will also be considered.
in the larger national scene
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There they became involved in an almost permanent conflict

with the national authorities and their political

adversaries in Buenos Aires. Finally, in an overall view,
the relevance of these movements will be analyzed in

conjunction with the issue of federalism and with their

historical significance as regional precursors of Peronism.

viii
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CHAPTER

I

GENERAL FEATURES OF MENDOZA AND SAN JUAN

BEFORE THE RISE OF THE RADICAL PARTY
Physical Framework
The provinces of Mendoza and San Juan constitute, together

with San Luis, a region known as Cuyo, located in western
Argentina, in the central part of the country on a north-south
axiSf Mendoza has always been the most important of the three

provinces, followed by San Juan and then San Luis.^
The area of the province of Mendoza is 58,239 sq. mi.,

similar to the size of the state of Michigan. From the physical
and economic viewpoint it can be divided into four main regions:
the mountains, the eastern plains, the fluvial oases and an

area called Payunia.
The region of the mountains, part of the cordillera of the

Andes, covers the western side from north to south. Because of

its natural characteristics, it has a very sparse population

and it is potentially rich in mineral resources.

On the eastern side of the province, from the border with
is
San Juan in the north to that of La Pampa, in the south,

west with the
the region of the plains, which borders on the
little
fluvial oases. This semi-desert plains area has very
taken from
^The general information for this topic was
La A££en|2Ji|.
Erancisco de Aparicio and Horacio A. Difrieri,
Vols. 1, ii,
Aires,
1963),
Suma de geografia (9 vols., Buenos
Inchauspe,
Osvaldo
and
fv^VII and VIII; and Miguel Marzo
1967).
Mendoza,
vols.,
Geograffa de Mendoza (2
1
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rainfall and very few human clusters of importance because of
the scarcity of water. Housing reflects the poverty of the

whole environment, and land communications are poorly
developed. Land tracts are not as much divided as they are in
the fluvial oases, but even the largest extensions cannot be

compared with the latifundia of Buenos Aires province, because
of their inferior agronomic value.

The most important region of Mendoza is the fluvial oases.

Here as in San Juan, water has been the fundamental factor for
the attraction and settlement of people. There is no cultivation

in either province which does not depend on artificial irrigation.

Because of it, men established roots on the borders of the
rivers and the whole life of the two states is conditioned by
the availability and improvement of hydrographical resources.

This absolute dependence on artificially distributed water has

created exemplary working habits in the people of the region.

While in the Humid Pampa the fields are watered by generous
rainfalls, the agricultural life on the west depends entirely

upon human labor, which has to provide the irrigation that
nature denies. In this region land ownership is greatly divided,
a pattern which began developing late in the nineteenth century.

Because of this Mendoza deserves to be called the country of
the small landowner.

There are two important oases, one in the north, formed

by the Mendoza and Tunuyan rivers; and the other in the south,
oasis
formed by the Diamante and Atuel rivers. In the northern

province and its
the Mendoza river is the most useful for the
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area of influence embraces the largest
population. Together
with the Tunuyan, it forms an oasis where most
of the

economic, cultural and administrative activities
of the

province take place, and the largest number of intensively
cultivated crops exists.^ The southern oasis has the same

characteristics although in lesser scope, and its main
urban center is the city of San Rafael.

Payunia is the remaining region of Mendoza, and is
located south of the oasis formed by the Diamante and Atuel
rivers. It is a semi-desert area sparsely populated; its

main center is Malargue and this region still must be
considered as a promise for the future. It differs

ecologically from the rest of the province because it

represents a penetration of Patagonia into Southern Cuyo,

with its volcanic geological structure and saline and
gypseous soil. Rainfall in the province is always
insufficient, especially in wintertime. Hail and frost are

constant threats to the crops and there are no departments
free from these severe natural calamities.^
The province of San Juan has an area of 33 f 257 sq. mi.,

comparable in size to the State of Maine. It is more

^The capital city, Mendoza, is located in the
proximity of the Mendoza river, at 2,467 feet above sea level.
^The provinces of Mendoza and San Juan are
politically divided into districts called departamentos
They are the equivalent of counties in the United States.
The Cordillera influences air currents moving from
the west. This gives rise to a phenomenon of the region,
the famous Zonda, which blows periodically in San Juan and
Mendoza.
.
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mountainous and arid than Mendoza but shares with it
most of
its physical characteristics. San Juan can be divided
into
three regions. One is the western part, which covers
one

third of its territory. It contains the high mountains
of
the Cordillera, the parallel ranges of the pre-cordillera

and between them, the productive but not very populated

valleys of Rodeo, Iglesia, Calingasta and Barreal.
The central region is under the influence of two

fluvial oases. The one in the north centers around Jachal and
is irrigated by the river of the same name. Its trade with

Chile was important for many years, but toward the end of the

nineteenth century the area suffered from lack of adequate
development and communications. In comparison to other
sections of the province, Jachal remained in a state of near
stagnation. In the south is located the most important
economic, social and administrative center of the province.

Here is San Juan's capital, also called San Juan, and the
departments surrounding it are intensively cultivated. This
entire area belongs to the oasis formed by the San Juan river,
the most important and the only one which can be compared in

significance with the four principal rivers of Mendoza.
Eastern San Juan, the third region of the province, is
an area less mountainous than the others. While its northern

section enjoys a sub-tropical climate and is artificially
irrigated, the southern part is arid and mostly uninhabited.
San Juan has a mild climate during winter, but summer is

very hot and dry, and the low humidity allows for permanent

5

clear skies and a radiant sua; its annual rainfall averages
less
than four inches, quite insufficient and only half of what

Mendoza gets. This type of climate, providing enough water is
available through artificial irrigation, is ideal for the
development of viticulture.
The physical characteristics of Mendoza and San Juan

described above existed during the early decades of this
century. But irrigation development and land cultivation were

much less significant than at present. The only important
areas in Mendoza centered then in the northern oasis; the

southern one, focusing on San Rafael was insignificant, but

began a rapid development during the 1920'

s.

In San Juan the

center of activities was in the areas around the capital and
Jachal. By 1917 land communications in both provinces consisted
only of dirty roads or mere cart paths, and the means of
4
transportation depended entirely on the use of animals.

What influence did the particular geography of these

provinces exert on their inhabitants? What kind of habits and
customs were shaped when instead of huge extensions of land
the campesino had to concentrate on a few acres and was forced
to irrigate them artificially? In colonial times the Spaniards

settled on the edges of the rivers and slowly evolved from a
society of farmers to viticulture. Over the centuries this

transformation has created an industrious community. Hence,
^The population of Mendoza in 1914 was 277,500; in 1972
it reached one million. San Juan had a population of 119,200
in 1914, and 388,000 in 1970.

^
6

the man working the land in Cuyo could not be compared with

the gaucho who was typical of the Humid Pampa.
As life in these provinces flourished in the oases, the

geographic and economic conditions developed an environment
conducive to social cooperation. The average campesino was
not an expert horseman as was the gaucho; he preferred the

mule to the horse because the former was easier to handle in
the rugged geography of the mountains and was a very valuable

aid dioring harvest time, when thousands of mules were used
to pull the carts filled with grapes. The paisano of Mendoza

and San Juan, the native as well as the immigrant, was rooted
to the land he worked; moreover, he tended to be a family man
5
living in an established community. The aridity of the land

posed a challenge that could only be overcome with hard work.

In Mendoza and San Juan this challenge was accepted.
A civilizing factor of prime significance for both

provinces was the building of the railroad lines through the
desert. Upon the completion of this communication with the
east, Cuyo experienced a thrust for progress. In 1875 the

railroad reached Mercedes, in San Luis province, and in 1885
the Perrocarril Andino began its services between San Juan and

Mendoza and Buenos Aires.
^Jorge I. Segura, Danzas f olkl5ricas ^ tradici onales
de Mendoza Panorama de cuatro siglos (Mendoza, 1971),
unpublished.
.

to
^Until 1910 San Juan was connected by railroad only
on
dependent
greatly
province
Mendoza, making the northern
the San Juanthe southern neighbor. The opening that year of
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Almost at the same time the conquest of the desert took
place under the command of General Roca. In 1879 the campaign

headed by Lt. Col. Napoleon Uriburu freed all southern Mendoza
of Indians for the first time.

Economic development to 1916
The economy of Mendoza and San Juan was, and still is,

basically founded upon the wine industry. Especially since the
1880' s, it has been their most important source of public and

private wealth. The agricultural-industrial backbone of the
entire grape-wine economic complex was constituted by the

vinateros

,

the owners and keepers of the vineyards, and by

the bodegueros

,

the owners of the wine-making establishments.

The vinateros were the largest group, ranging from the

small proprietor who worked a limited number of acres, to the

large landowner whose vineyards represented a substantial
7
capital investment and who had them worked by contratistas
.

Most of the vinateros cultivated the land to sell their
production because they did not own a bodega

.

The average

bodeguero did not own a vineyard; he made wine from grapes
which he bought from the vinateros. An important variation
was the combination of the two mentioned groups, that is, the

Serrezuela line, in the northwest of Cordoba, provided San Juan
with a new means of communication and trade, especially with
northern Argentina, so the province became less dependent on
the traditional hegemony of Mendoza.
they sign
"^They are named so because of the contract

when arranging the working rules with the landowner.

8

vinatero with bodega, or the reciprocal, the bodeguero who
processed the grapes from his own vineyards and those he

bought from other vinateros.
As the final decision regarding the seasonal price for

the grapes depended on the bodeguero, the vinatero was always

subordinated to the fluctuations of the market. His bargaining

position vis-a-vis the bodeguero was very limited because
once the grapes reach the proper stage of maturity they have
to be gathered within a short time. Any delay deteriorates the
Q

product and forces the vinatero to dispose hastily of it.
As the industry became more developed, its importance
to the economic vitality of the province increased. Fiscal

receipts depended to a very large extent on the wine industry,

forcing the provincial governments, in reality, to become a
subordinate partner of the bodegueros and vinateros.
The protection of the wine interests, like that of sugar

in northern Argentina, was an essential factor in the

consolidation of the industry. But in spite of the tariff
barrier, it experienced serious crises as a result of

fluctuations in consumption, adverse climatic conditions,
credit abuses, and the adulteration of wines, all of which

handicapped its development and impaired its reputation. The
shifts in prices quoted for wine at the bodega suggest the

^Another important factor which denoted the supremacy
quarterly
of the bodeguero was that he paid in four
time; but
harvest
at
bought
installments for the grapes he
wine from
regular
the
sell
to
starting each July he was able
most
finance
advantageously
the harvest. Therefore, he could
off
pay
to
year
whole
of his operations while taking the
the vinatero.

magnitude of the problem:

Year

Year

1900
1901
1902
1903

5

6
8

12

cents

1910
1911
1912
1913

Price
17 cents
17
20
16

Year

Price

1914

10 cents

1q;1^5

I9i6
1917

g
7

10

Source: Provincia de Mendoza, Sumario esta diatico. 1936
(Mendoza, 1937), p. 17Ti
The steps taken to remedy the crises affecting Mendoza and

San Juan at the beginning of the century, and again from 1914
to 1918, took into consideration the interests of the large

landowners and the wine-makers, usually referred to as
industrialists. Control of the executive and legislative

branches of the provincial governments was in the hands of
people directly or indirectly linked with those interests.
They used their power to enact legislation whose main objective
was to defend the patrimony of the bodegueros and vinateros by

revaluating the product. To accomplish this, in 1914, a large
number of acres with vineyards were uprooted and more than
7,242,000 gallons of wine, valued at 2,193,000 pesos were
Q

thrown away.
As the measures taken proved ineffective, in December
I9I6, Law No. 703 was enacted, rekindling the hopes for a

solution to the problems of the depressed industry. The law

encouraged the creation of cooperatives, but only one was
formed, the so-called Cooperativa Vitivinl cola. The policy of

^Leopoldo Suarez, La industria vitivinicola (Mendoza,
the building
1922), p. 28. The legislation enacted authorized
to make
vifiateros
of
legion
the
allow
to
of regional bodegas
regional
single
a
not
but
production,
wine from their own
bodega was built.
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elimination of grapes continued with such intensity that
those destroyed during 1916-1917 were valued at
3,753,000
pesos and in the season 1917-1918 amounted to 7,648,000
pesos,^^
The figures given above are indirect evidence that

another victim of these crises was the man whose work
depended on the prosperity of the vineyards and the bodegas.

In 1908, for example, a gatherer earned ten cents for each

basket of grapes. Thus, a man working with help from others
could earn from

8

to 9 pesos per day. In 1916, his wages were

less than half that amount because of the much smaller harvest,

which sunk the worker in a deep misery. The destruction of the
grapes, which were never gathered but destroyed at the vine

itself, left thousands of workers idle and countless families

impoverished. No legislation was enacted to solve this problem.
As water was the vital element for the economic development
of Mendoza and San Juan, its distribution was a matter of

paramount importance. To secure a satisfactory apportionment
of water for all the vinateros, a system of local juntas was

set up for the administration of its distribution. Moreover, to

avoid undesirable manipulations of any nature the juntas were

granted financial autonomy in order to meet their ordinary
expenses.

On paper, the legislation concerning all the irrigational
^^

Ibid . The tremendous magnitude of this figure appears
more viviHly when it is compared with the total fiscal receipts
pesos.
for the province during 1915, which amounted to 7,547,000

11

matters was entirely non-political and technically-oriented.
In reality, however, the handling of the distribution of
water became on several occasions an electoral tool,
popularly known as the torniquete del agua, the water
tourniquet. It meant a precious reward for the supporters of
the influential groups and an arbitrary punishment imposed

upon the political adversaries.^^
Provincial Currency
The issue of provincial money was a problem that

affected Mendoza and San Juan, as well as other provinces.

Part of the financial support for public works, and especially
for irrigation purposes, was obtained by issuing provincial
scripts, or letras de tesoreria

.

The first issue was made in

1892 in order to finance the building of a dam and intakes in
the Mendoza river. Although other public works were funded

through the years by the same means, financial difficulties

and lack of scruples in the enforcement of the laws transformed
the letras into ordinary income for the provincial treasury.
As the letras were issued in small values they soon

circulated as regular currency within the provincial boundary.
The national government took the position that the circulation
of the letras as currency violated Article 108 of the national

constitution which placed the right to issue currency
exclusively in the hands of the federal authorities.

^^Another facet of the favoritisms which the necessity
granted to irrigate
of water made possible were the concessions
paved
thousands of acres in isolated areas. These concessions
enrichment.
the way for land speculation and abusive

12

In defense of the provincial policy, the commercial
and industrial interests of Mendoza, grouped in the
Bolsa

Vitivinicola y Comercial, informed Governor Emilio Civit
in
1908 about their great financial requirements for carrying
on agricultural works, and the need to fulfill their
credit

obligations. They asked Civit, in the name "of the superior

ideal of preserving and protecting the public and private

well-being," to continue the issuance of letras, as he was

authorized to do by the provincial legislation. Responding
favorably to this statement, the governor affirmed in January
1909, that it was the duty of the province to participate

with its financial resources and its credit to promote the

activities of its commerce and industry. 12

Although rebuffed by a presidential order demanding the
immediate withdrawal of the letras, Civit stated weeks later
in a note to the Ministry of Hacienda, that the letras were a
very valuable auxiliary element to the national currency. The

governor's position was that the amount of currency circulating
in Mendoza was insufficient to cover the needs of its commerce
and industry. He affirmed that the public circulated the letras

without any impediment; that they were not subject to any
discount or depreciation; that the province received the letras

for tax payment purposes, and that the business community in
general was accepting them because of their certain and easy

^^Provincia de Mendoza, Las letras de tesoreria ante
pp. 25-28
la constitucion ^ leyes de la nacion (Mendoza, 1909)
,

13

convertibility. Furthermore, with respect to the
legal aspect
of the problem, he stated that
the fact that the letras are issued also in small
values, but not inferior to one peso, does not
affect at all their legal standing, because it
is not denied that it is an indisputable right
of the provinces to issue bonds backed by their
own credit. 13

Despite this defense of the use of letras, the customary
lack of responsibility on the part of the provincial

governments resulted in many cases of non-compliance with the
very conditions imposed by the provincial laws authorizing

their issuance.

14.

The Work in the Vineyards and the Impact of Immigration
The initial economic pattern of scattered small properties

worked by their owners with the help of relatives was

substantially transformed through the years with the emergence
of a system in which thousands of families took care of the
15
Most of the work in the
vines on lands owned by others.

vineyards was done, and still is done, by the contratistas.

But the term contratista, in fact, does not involve one person

^^Ibid.

,

p. 58.

^^As an example, on January 1st, 1912, there were
circulating in Mendoza 820,274 pesos in letras, which ought
to have been withdrawn two years before. Mario Arenas, Estudio
historico ^ critico sob re las finanzas de la provincia de
Mendoza en 1912 (Buenos Aires, 1913), p. 61.
"^^The growing number of acres of vineyards are an

indication of the expansion which took place in the fluvial
oases. In Mendoza there were 16,000 in 1890; 112,000 in 1910,
and 149,000 in 1916. In San Juan they increased from 20,000
in 1890 to 65,000 in 1915. This growth also led to a large
expansion in the number of bodegas.

14

but many, that is, the head of the family and by extension,
his whole family.
This agricultural system brought a permanent change in
the paternalistic relationship which had prevailed for many

decades between the patrones and their workers. With the

arrival of the immigrants in large number and the new systems
of agricultural-industrial exploitation, the traditional

pattern gradually vanished. European immigrants were a major

factor contributing to the progress and modernization of
Mendoza, although in much smaller scale to that of San Juan.

Until the 1880'

s

most of the economic activity centered

on the extensive alf alf ares where cattle graze before being

exported to Chile. This declined as most of the immigrants
were attracted to work in the vineyards, for which very

favorable climatic conditions existed. The flow of immigrants

into Mendoza became significant by the middle 1880 's and
remained strong until the beginning of World War I, as the

following table indicates:^^

Year

Number

Year

Number

Year

Number

1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905

1,183
4,160
1,521
757
1,255
11953

1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911

7,372
9,107
12,068
9,618
14,095
11,767

1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917

15,914
16,138
4,063
739
646

Source: Mendoza, Sumario estadistico

,

1936

,

439
p.

25.

^^Within a few years Mendoza and San Juan were placed
market. This
out of competition in the nation's livestock
experienced
they
changes
the
situation not only evolved from
also because
but
activities,
in their traditional agricultural
and the
Pampa
Humid
the
of
of the fast-growing development
littoral.
the
in
improved means of transportation
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European techniques began replacing the rudimentary

exploitation of the vines in Mendoza and San Juan, and after
1885 the agrarian and industrial transformation became more

evident with the end of the primitive transportation of wine

by carts to Cordoba, Tucuman and the littoral. The immigrant
farmer began working the lands on a small scale, simply with
the help of his family and some salaried peons. As the lands

became more divided the family constituted an important part
of the rural labor force. At the same time, the foreign-born

merchants, who were generally called turcos, dotted all
areas of Mendoza with their personal and laborious trading
style.
The national censuses indicate the extraordinary

influence of immigration in Mendoza, as well as the lesser
significance it had in the development of San Juan:
Mendoza
«

Census

Natives

Poreign-born

io

9^

Total

1869

59,269

99.1

6,144

.9

65,413

1895

100,231

86.3

15,911

13.7

116.142

1914

189,181

68.2

88,354

31,8

277,535

San Juan

1869

58,007

96.2

2,312

3.8

60,319

1895

78,929

93.7

5,322

6.3

84,251

1914

102,830

86.3

16,422

13.7

119,252
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The figures for the 1869 census require additional
clarification, because at that time the number of
Europeans was insignificant:

Mendoza
Chileans

5,774

2,059

29

18

341

235

6,144

2,312

Prom bordering countries

Other nations

San Juan

The foreign-born community, especially those from Italy,

made the largest contribution to the agrarian and industrial

prosperity of Mendoza and San Juan. In the former province,
in 1910, 60 per cent of the people working in the vineyards

were Italians, 30 per cent French, and the remaining 10 per
cent from other nationalities. Many of them were acquainted

with the wine culture in their native lands, and all brought

with them their skills in commerce and industry and their
hard-working habits. Through a constant process of
capitalization, many of the immigrants set up the vigorous

foundation of the grape industry, which in less than fifty

years would radically change that region in the Argentine
west.^'^ Especially in Mendoza, many immigrants acquired land

^"^Benito Marianetti, El racimo ^ su aventura. La
cuestion vitivinicola (Buenos Aires, 1965), p. 19. Apart

from the large foreign contribution, Mendoza attracted
migrants from other provinces. According to the censuses of
that
1895 and 1914, people from San Juan and San Luis, in
Mendoza,
to
migrating
order, were the largest domestic groups
Zulma L. Recchini de Lattes and Alfredo E. Lattes, Mig;racione3
internas e
en la Argentina Estudio de las migraciones
i^ternacionales basado en datos censales 1869-1960 Buenos
Aires, 1969), PP. 47-48, 291.
.

,

(

8
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to expand their operations or to become owners
instead of

mere contratistas. It was a slow but uninterrupted
process, which in less than a century placed the ownership
of most of the land in the hands of the immigrants or their
18

descendents.

This impressive shif in Mendozan land ownership from

the Creole to non-creole sectors was made possible after the

arrival of the railroad, which facilitated the transformation
of pasture lands into valuable vineyards. This process was

less evident in San Juan, where the native Creole upper class

continued to own a larger proportion of land than its

counterpart in Mendoza. In 1914, the natives owing real estate
1

The transfer of land from the native upper class to
European immigrants is revealed in a recent study of land
registers showing owners of irrigated lands in selected
areas in the fluvial oases. The study compares land
ownership in the latter part of the nineteenth century with
the situation as of I960. Although this latter date is
beyond the period of the present work, the information
submitted below indicates the transformation that was taking
place in the ownership of land:
I960 Register
Pirst Ownership
Area Influenced
Register
by the River
Creole NonNonCreole

Creole

Creole

Mendoza
Tunuyan
Diamante
Atuel

100
86
32
17

0
14
68
83

18

82

5

95
99
97

1
3

Luis Campoy, Grupos culturales criollo ^ no criollo
Disponibilidad para el cambio ^ niveles de movilizacion ^
desarrollo (Mendoza, 1971), pp. 45-62. Unpublished. Mr.
Campoy was in 1972 the chairman of the Institute of
Sociology at the National University of Cuyo, in Mendoza.

.

18

in this province were 67.9 per cent, while in San Juan
they
were 87.4 per cent."^^
To acquire small parcels of land was relatively easy,

if money or credit was available, because an acre of vines

with irrigation rights brought a very high price, making it
profitable for owners to sell off such parcels.

The large

majority of the immigrants, however, were not so fortunate as
to become captains of industry or big landowners. Most of

them and their families had to work all their lives on lands

which were not theirs.
Social Structure
The social configuration of Mendoza and San Juan in the

early decades of the century presented the classical pyramidal
composition. The upper class consisted of the traditional,
19 Tercer censo nacional

1917, IV, 44-49.

,

The following figures give the approximate value of
a hectare of land equivalent to two acres and a half around
1910, in a few selected departments of Mendoza:

—

—

Department

Vineyards

Alfalfares

Uncultivated Land
Without
With
Water
Water

$

$

$

Guaymallen

4,000

900/1,000

200/500

not given

Junln

2,500

1,200

300/500

not given

Rivadavia

3,000/5,000

400/1,000

200

5/10

San Rafael

2,500/3,000

400/600

150/400

2/10

Provincia de Mendoza, Su vida su trabajo su progreso, n.p.
Emilio
n.d. It was a special publication in homage to Governor
,

Civlt, c. 1910.

,
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Creole elements, whose family roots could be traced
to colonial
times or the era of the wars for independence. ?/ith
their

economic strength derived from land ownership, they
monopolized
the political control in both provinces. Even when they
began
to sell off their lands to immigrants, they were still able
to retain their upper class status within the society. They

continued to constitute an elite which supplanted prestige

based on landowning with that derived from the historical luster
of the family name, control of the higher bureaucratic positions

and professional credentials. In this way the social glamour
and the political power which had been exclusive assets of the

native upper class, persisted into the twentieth century.

Abelardo Arias, the noted novelist who was born in San
Rafael, Mendoza, has portrayed the arrogance and frustrations

experienced by the native creole upper class, when it had to
21
face the painful reality of seeing the gringo
gradually

taking possession of its lands. Arias' fiction projects a

vivid picture of the contempt felt by the traditional groups
toward the immigrants. These Creoles were extremely proud that
the lands taken from the Indians never had had other owners

but those bearing the traditional blood; they even hated to
put a wire fence around the fields because it was a thing of
gringos.

22

^^The name "gringo" in Argentina is given to an
Italian immigrant.

^^Abelardo Arias, Alamos talados (Buenos Aires, 1942).
All the symbolism connoted in these attitudes and the Creole
the
disdain for working in the vineyards is also evidenced in
muy
somos
no
criollos
words Arias assigns to a creole: "Los

20

The middle class consisted of creole elements engaged

in professional activities and small-scale commercial

occupations; small landowners and contratistas, mostly

immigrants; and the foreign-born merchants who practically

dominated their field in Mendoza.

During the times of large immigration, the average
foreign-born did not mix socially with the natives; and so,
for example, one Italian married another Italian. Non-creole

merchants and industrialists who prospered in their
business, however, married women from the creole upper
class. The lower segments were mostly composed of Creoles.

In general, they displayed less ambition and less
willingness to accept the discipline of continuous labor
than the average immigrant worker.

Social Conditions
The living conditions of the popular sectors early in
the century revealed a situation of general poverty, which

was reflected in the nature of their occupations as well
as in their habits of life.

In his report to Joaquin

V.

Gonzalez, then Minister of

the Interior, Juan Bialet Masse affirmed that the popular

segments in Mendoza were as far apart from the leading class
as they were during colonial times; that the leaders of the

guapos pa' estos menesteres, eso di' andar cortando
racimitos son cosas para los gringos y las mujeres. Ahora,
lidiar con los toros, jinetear potros, trenzar tientos de
cuero crude, marcar animales, eso son cosas di' hombre."
Ibid ., p. 157.
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society only took an interest in the people
to use it as a
"political masquerade," but that they never showed
concern
for their social betterment.

Bialet Masse considered alarming the debasement of the
working class, vitiated by drunkenness, gambling and
lewdness, which was partially mirrored in the large number of

illegitimate births and arrests of drunken people.

Especially

on Sundays many stayed until midnight in taverns, which

explained the large absenteeism of workers on Mondays. He also
compared certain social attitudes among the lower classes,

stating that
To save money is a principle which does not penetrate
the mind of the native worker, and so, while the
Italian and the European in general work hard and
enjoy soon a relative well-being, and many of them
even rise socially and economically, the creole
stands still amidst the poverty surrounding him.

On the social question, Bialet Masse observed that the
policy of employers was merely "to pay the smallest wage

possible and to make the laborer work as much as he can." The
wage of a temporary worker, a bracero

,

was 1,30 pesos per day,

without meals, which was very low. Among the municipal workers,
carters of sanitation crews earned 1,50 per day and garbage

burners 1,40. Servant girls, a very important occupational
source for the creole lower class, earned from 12 to 20 pesos

1910, for every 1,000 born alive in Mendoza, 263
were out of wedlock. In San Juan the figure was 440. Alejandro
E. Bunge, Una nueva Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1940), p. 168.
^"^In

24.
per month. ^

Recollecting conditions in his native city, Raul
Aguirre
Molina asserted that by the turn of the century housing
for
the poor in Mendoza lacked the essential sanitary
facilities;

that their earnings were very low and that they did not

receive any assistance from the government in case of need.

When these serious grievances became more noticeable, remarked
Aguirre Molina, the lower classes began their protest, and
eventually rebelled by adhering to Lencinism, and less than
two decades later, to Peronism.^^

No legislation aimed specifically to benefit the workers

had been enacted in Mendoza. The only piece of social

legislation was Law No. 371, of October 1906, which declared
Sunday a holiday, but it was effective only in a few urban
areas. No other law of this nature was enacted until 1918. The

constitution of Mendoza, as reformed in 1910 and later in 1916,

specifically authorized the legislature to pass laws regulating
the work of women and children and the sanitary conditions in

industrial establishments. But no legislation was enacted on the

basis of this new authority.

26

^^Juan Bialet Masse, El estado de las clases obreras
argentinas a comienzos de siglo (Cordoba, 1969) pp. 555-583.
The original appeared in 1904. The 1969 edition was published
by the National University of Cordoba.
f

^^Raul Aguirre Molina, Mendoza del 900 (Buenos Aires,
1966), pp. 14-15.
the
^^In July 1916, the Radical minority introduced in
of
maximum
a
establishing
bills
two
provincial' legislature
"English
eight hours for the working day and the so-called
noontime
at
cease
would
work
Saturday," meaning that normal
approval.
legislative
get
not
on Saturdays. But these bills did
La Prensa, July 24, 1916.
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IQ the more primitive scene of San Juan, by 1900 society
was considered to be simply the traditional group of leading

families of the oligarchy, who through the years had disputed

among themselves the attainment of political power. The rest
of the people, the small merchants, the artisans, the workers,

the servants and the poor peones

,

although they were part of

the community performed a permanently passive role. Many

people in the lower groups were called the rabble, the chinos

;

being mostly illiterates, they were totally subordinated to
the will of the patrones.^'^

Living conditions for the lower classes were similar to
those mentioned for Mendoza, that is, very poor housing, low

income and few prospects for any tangible material improvement.

Bialet Masse 's report stated that there was in San Juan a
general depression, with the cost of living so high that in

proportion wine was cheap, which explained the drinking habit
of the people. Most distressing, however, were the general

working conditions, which demanded excessive hours of labor
for an insignificant wage, to the extent that for some workers

alcoholism became an escape from the daily misery. A policeman
earned 40 pesos per month, but as he was paid in letras, his
net salary was only 35,40, and 40 per cent of the police force
was illiterate. It was customary for women of the lower class
to give away their children, which was evident in the large
"San Juan desde el punto de vista
social," Censo agricola . Estadisticas e inf ormaciones de la
provincia de San Juan (Buenos Aires, 1934), 116.

^"^Salvador A. Doncel,
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number of chinitaa working as servants for a salary of

8 to

12 pesos per month.

Popular Education and Civic Culture

According to the 1914 national census, the illiteracy
rate among children of school age was 38.1 per cent in

Mendoza and 29.8 per cent in San Juan. Equally unsatisfactory
was the school attendance record: in Mendoza 49.4 per cent
of all the children of school age did not attend classes, and

in San Juan it was 45.3 per cent.^^
The participation of the family in the rural chores

affected the non-attendance or the late attendance of children
in school, especially during harvest time. In other
circumstances, the negligence of their parents because of

their low cultural understanding, plus the indifference of the
State, contributed to the number of school drop-outs and the

illiteracy rate. The traditional poverty of many schools in
the countryside explained why in most cases a child was

considered literate who did not attend school for more than
two or three years.
The level of civic culture in both provinces was low.

The main source of information on public affairs for the

ordinary individual was the partisan political rally. Only
the literate could read newspapers and they were limited, with

^^Bialet Masse, El estado de las clases

^^Tercer censo nacional, III» 584-591.

,

pp.

585-615.
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the exception of Los Andes in Mendoza, to a few
modest sheets.

This explains to a large degree the historical justification
of
the rule by the few. When the freedom of suffrage was
made

effective by the Saenz Pena Law, however, the role of the

political caudillos became paramount in the process of guiding
the masses into political action.
The voter registration lists, or padrones , of Mendoza and

San Juan emphasize the significance of the number of illiterate
citizens, as shown in these examples:
1904
^

1916

Mendoza

42.3

42.5

San Juan

49.7

45.6

io

Source: Rodolfo Rivarola, La crisis politica argentina
Or£ genes causas soluciones (Buenos Aires, 1931),
.

,

p.

,

28.

What kind of political process and electoral contests could

be held when almost half of the electorate was illiterate? Were
there any means by which the masses could comprehend the issues
of the day if almost half of them could not read and write? The

relationships between the ballot box, the rate of illiteracy,
and the social conditions of the popular sectors were extremely

significant during the period under consideration in this work.
In a society with its majority confined to the lower
echelon, limited in its possibilities for economic improvement,

poorly and deficiently housed, scarcely protected to avoid
illness, without official aid to check the abuses of employers
or the misfortunes of life, with a high rate of illiteracy.

26

and without the material and intellectual means to
overcome
the unpretentious cultural circle in which they lived,
it

was not necessary for this majority to understand ideological

theories about class conflicts.

Within the submissiveness which characterized them, they
were class-oriented simply by nature, by emotion, by sentiment.

Amidst the material limitations surrounding them, they could

realize that there were some groups in the society who lived

much better, and who enjoyed the privileges that power yielded
to them. This contrast developed in the popular sectors a

psychology of resentment.

Before the Saenz PeKa Law was enacted, there was no
possibility for the masses to effectively reflect in the polls
their distrust of the ruling class. The electoral system did
not offer guarantees to the electorate to express freely its

political choice. This shameful reality was voiced in Congress

by Indalecio Gomez, the Minister of the Interior,
The civic spirit is dead; our democracy is nonexistent; people do not vote. In spite of the fact
that constitutional powers exist, that there are
governments in the provinces and in the nation,
that there are congress and legislatures filled
with the most distinguished men, the people feel
a deception about congress. . .why? because it was
not chosen through honest elections but by a
system corrupted and disfigured. 30

After the enactment of the electoral reform

— especially

in Mendoza, where the principles of the federal law were

incorporated into the provincial constitution in 1916

— the

^^Congreso Nacional, Camara de Diputados, Diario de
1911, HI, 14b
esiones (hereafter referred as Diputados
)

,

,
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conservatives found it more difficult to generate wide
electoral support from the popular groups, nor could their

leaders communicate persuasively with them. On the other
hand, the popular sectors gained political strength when

they became conscious of the value of their vote, freely
cast. By 1917, they were ready to channel their sympathy

to the party and the candidates who opposed the views of
the traditional landowner-industrialists political power.
The Political Scene. Mendoza:

Prom Oligarchic to Contested Politics
The governments of Mendoza after 1862 followed the

liberal traditions of the times, with their leadership in the
hands of a few, cultured, propertied men, who constituted the
oligarchy of that province.

^1

Although many of its members

were related by economic interests or family connections, they
did not constitute a cohesive group. Personal interests put

distance among many of them, and eventually the divergences

within the ruling groups paved the way for political
antagonisms which survived for many decades.
The economic power they represented is stressed by
the fact that in the 1870' s one per cent of all proprietors
54 out of a total of 5 203— possessed 26 per cent of the
lands under cultivation. Jose Luis Masini Calderon, Mendoza
hace cien anos (Buenos Aires, 1967), p. 46.
Standard reference works on the political developments
de Mendoza
in both provinces are: Jorge M. Scalvini, Historia
D. Anas,
Hector
and
Varese
(Mendoza, 1965); Carmen Penaloza de
Correas,
Edraundo
Historia de San Juan (Mendoza, 1966); and
"Historia"de~Mind3ii, " and Juan Romulo Fernandez, "San Juan
los pueblos. Vol.
1862-1930," in Historia de las provincias
Aires, iyo^
IV of Historia ar^entina contemporanea (Buenos
pp. 469-502 and 503-544, respectively.
^

,

The basic split among Mendozan conservatives was

between the followers of Emilio Civit, who was enrolled in
the Roquismo

,

and those of Benito Villanueva, who enjoyed

high political and economic influence in Buenos Aires. Both

clashed pertinaciously. In spite of the animosities that

pulled these groups apart, all their members were
participants in the oligarchical trenza

,

manipulated by the

Villanueva and Civit circles, which for many years were the
Capulets and Montagues of the Mendozan elite.

Basically,

until 1917, their intra-oligarchical frictions were

evidenced in the bitterness with which they fought for the

high national and provincial positions.
Besides these dominant groups, another future major

contender in the provincial political arena was Jose Nestor
Lencinas. He was born in 1859 in the village of San Carlos,

sixty miles south of the capital. After graduating from the

University of Cordoba in 1880, this young lawyer began his
professional career in Mendoza and became actively involved
in the political disputes of the day.

^^Roquismo was a political current led by General
the liberal forces
Julio Argentine Roca, representative of Argentine
so-called
the
which in the 1880" s shaped
but
oligarchy, politically and socially elitist
economically progressive.
political
^^Trenza is a term commonly used in the with the
braid,
process of a
iar^ron denoting the weaving
acc^^^^
^iealings,
Station o?^rregular in which suspicious
politicians oiten
and labyrinthine intrigue,
indulged.

29

His first biographer stated that
Lencinas became known
in time as the defender of "any
gaucho who was harassed by
the judges," and asserted that he
obtained the release from
jail of more than 4,000 under
prosecution, without charging
them any fee.^^ At a place and time
when a professional
degree was a certain indication of social
status, Lencinas'
crusade as the "lawyer of the poor" became
a very important
factor adding to his personal prestige.
The revolution of July I89O, in Buenos
Aires, attracted

little attention in Mendoza, but did provide the
opportunity
to create a provincial arm of the Civic Union. Its
initial

group was composed of individuals who until then had

sympathized with different political sectors, including
some who had had affinity with Roquismo and Juarismo,^^ as

well as others who had opposed both groups. With such
diverse origins, factions began to take shape within the
Civic Union; on one side were those who were more

accommodating to the traditional political groups, and on
the other side

— led

by Lencinas

— were

those more critical

of the policy of agreements within the elite.

At the opening of this century the Radical faction with
the closest ideological ties to the conservative wing

Julio Nieto Riesco, Lencinas I (Buenos Aires,
1926), p. 39. There is no explanation of how Nieto Riesco
arrived at this high figure.
"'

,

Name given to the groups supporting the personalist
rule of Miguel Juarez Celman, another prominent member of
the Argentine oligarchy in the 1880' s.
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commanded by Civit, founded the Partidos Unidoa,
which became
the political front that controlled provincial
affairs with
an iron hand, from 1901 to 1910. Political decisions
continued
subject to the agreements reached among the leading members
of these groups. The legislature was the stage from which
they exerted their influence; for the deputies constituted

half of the electors of the Electoral College who selected
the governors, and they also took part in the appointment of

national Senators.

Reflecting on the political reality of those days, a
keen Mendozan writer considered shameful the "criminal
indifference of the governments toward anything which is not
immediately quotable in hectares of vineyards or in cattle
reproducers." He deplored the fact that there was no other

alternative but to rely on the efficacy of an elite which
was able to impose its image upon the malleable sentiment of
the masses. "No man rises here," he added, "because he gains
the ballots of his constituents by virtue of a program and an

ideal of which he has to render account to the people.

"-^^

A reaction took place among some conservatives after

Rufino Ortega was elected governor in 1910, by the choice of
Civit, the outgoing governor. Ortega not only broke his

political ties with the Civitists, but formed a new political
force, the Partido Popular, in order to open an alternative

^^Julio Leonidas Aguirre, Cocina criolla ^ salsa india
(Mendoza, 1902), p. 12, 281.

s
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to the authoritarianism of those controlling
the province

since 1901. This rejection of the men and
procedures which

characterized an era in Mendozan politics, therefore,

brought other groups to power from 1910 to 1917. They were
also part of the elite, hut dissatisfied with the heavyhand with which Civit and his political associates ruled.
The election for governor held in December 1913,

brought a healthy change in the political situation. Besides
the two conservative segments, the Partido Popular and the

Concentracion Civica, the Radicals participated for the first
time in a gubernatorial election.

"^"^

Although there was more

electoral freedom than in the past, irregular procedures
still prevailed in this encounter. But the success of

Francisco

S.

ilvarez, the Partido Popular candidate, indicated

that within the traditional conservative groups there was room
to attempt some kind of political reform.-^

During his term, however, Alvarez had to meet one of the
most serious crises in the history of the wine industry, the
eventual solution to which was to pour wine into trenches and

In the three-cornered contest, Benito Villanueva'
candidate garnered the largest number of votes: Partido
Popular, candidate: Francisco S. Alvarez, 11,597 votes;
Concentracion Civica, supported by Emilio Civit, 8,644; and
Union Civica Radical, candidate: Jose Nestor Lencinas, 6,733.
La Prensa December 15 1913.
^

,

i

^^The National Deputy Lucio Funes asserted that Mendoza
was joining those provinces that were in favor of institutional
renovation and political integrity. And in a direct reference
to Civitism, he added that his province "was no longer a fief,
no longer the island of an obscure personage who until
yesterday ruled omnipotently." Diputados 1914, I, 371.
,
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destroy grapes in the vineyards in order to
revaluate the
products. A grave social problem confronted the
province,

with such massive poverty and unemployment that the

government had to set up, in the public square, the so-called
ollas populares —-poT:ular kitchens— to feed the poor people.

But since the men who governed Mendoza from 1910 to
1917 reacted only mildly against the traditional ruling
pattern, the Radicals, by 1917, were in good position to use
the most important weapons they had in their hands: the

guarantees of a secret ballot and the strength of their

growing number of supporters. Their resounding success in the
presidential election of April

1,

1916, in which they polled

14,900 votes against 10,500 of the conservatives, greatly
enhanced their possibilities to capture control of the

provincial affairs.
Fully aware of the seriousness of this challenge in the

election for the governorship scheduled at the end of 1917,
the antagonistic groups of Civit and Villanueva were forced
to forego their traditional enmity. They decided to confront

together the common enemy, in order to defend their paramount

political leadership in the province. Thus, during this
second stage of the primacy of the oligarchy, from 1910 to
1917, a confrontation began to take shape not between the

hostile groups of the same social and economic class, but

between occasionally united liberals and the Radicals. The
^^For this Alvarez was given the unpopular nickname of
Pancho Hambre.
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growing ascendancy of the latter, at the
national as well as
the provincial level, gradually changed
the political
atmosphere by challenging the hegemonic rule of

the oligarchy,

and promising to regenerate the virtue of the
ballot box.

Until 1917, as has been mentioned, political power
in
Mendoza rested mostly in the hands of Villanueva and

Civit. As

leaders of the oligarchy, what kind of men were they? About

Villanueva it has been stated that "he was a master at carrying
on unethical electoral schemes. He bought all he could using

any means available: money, influence, promises, and pandering
to the human ambitions and vanities. "^^ His ideas and actions were

the epitome of what the term Regimen came to symbolize. ^"^

But Emilio Civit left his name more indissolubly linked
with the regional history of the period. A few references
about him as a public servant will reveal the controversial

historical judgments he stirs up. A penetrating observer of
the recent Mendozan past acknowledged that Civit had been "a

representative of the first magnitude of our enlightened
despotism and the rising progressive bourgeoisie," and a
contemporary of Don Emilio stated that "he knew how to handle
to perfection the political puppets, and he had at his finger

tips the weakness and frailities of his friends and

Carlos Ibarguren, La historia que he vivido (Buenos
Aires, 1955), p. 135.

^^Regimen is the term applied by the anti-conservatives
to the governments which ruled until the ascent to power of
the Radical Party.

34

enemies." 42 While Edmundo Correas has considered Civit not
just a statesman, but a great statesman, Ricardo Rojas

expressed the view that although he modernized the city and

urbanized the countryside, "his heart was more that of a
municipal councilman than of a statesman. "^^
More recently, one of his critics praised his qualities
as a performer and admitted that this "born organizer" had

sometimes the dexterity of a visionary. But he insisted that
Civit lacked the heartiness of the caudillo who knows how to

reach his people; he was not touched by ethical considerations
or scruples of conscience, and in order to get what he
desired, he "accepted as valid all the trickeries and ruses

in which he was an expert."
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Nevertheless, Edmundo Correas, examining the oligarchical

regime in Mendoza, in which figures like Civit flourished, has
stated in explanation that

'

it could not have been otherwise in a society with
neither a democratic nor a republican experience;
accustomed to be ruled by fear; lacking education;
plagued by prejudices inherited in colonial times;
divided in a rigid social strata, and so limited
by the number and the quality of its leaders that
only a small group was relatively prepared to
govern the rest and take care of the administration
of the common interests. 45

^^Benito Marianetti, Problemas de Cuyo (Mendoza, 1948),
mendocinas (Mendoza, 1936),
p. 188; and Lucio Funes, Anecdotas
p. 137.

^^Correas, "Historia de Mendoza," pp. 490-491; and
(Buenos
Ricardo Rojas, Las provincias Vol. XVII of Obras
Aires, 1927), p. 225.
(Mendoza,
^^Dardo Olguin, Dos politicos ^ dos polfticas
1956), pp. 9-39.
^^Correas, "Historia de Mendoza," pp. 493-494.
.
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As acknowledged by this interpretation, the
series of

progressive rulers could only have governed in a very
stratified society, although it was precisely with the

family

governments that the distortion of the republican and

representative system began. Since the candidates were
selected by the governors, the popular verdict did not

represent the conscious will of the electorate, and as

explained by a contemporary politician, the people "was
excluded by evil means from the ballot box, or was led to it
as a docile flock. "^^

The existence of a backward society justified the fact

that the control of public affairs was in the hands of an

aristocratic minority, protected by claims of ancestry and
wealth. However, when the common man began to wave a new

and popular political flag, he judged quite differently the

role of those who had held power for almost sixty years. The

Radicals admitted that some members of the elite had
rendered valuable services by promoting the industrial
progress of the province. But they considered that by

monopolizing the high public positions, the elite had built
up a regime whose major concern was to serve the interests
of those within its own circle.

By 1917 the new voice of the popular sectors was

beginning to be heard more every day through the growing
^^Jose E. Aguilar, Mendoza en los
(Mendoza, 1957), p. 41.

aftos

1900 a 1916

.
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number of street meetings carried out by the
Radicals and
the Socialists. There, the common man was
told

that while he

was isolated from the mainstream of progress,
the official
machinery had been the vehicle to enrich the
traditional

landowners and many industrialists with money and
social
prestige. Three decades later, the history of Mendoza
and
San Juan, as well as that of the nation, would prove that
the

masses would prefer rulers with fewer virtues, perhaps, than
those who enjoyed the higher public positions until 1916, but

with a greater responsiveness to the political needs of the
lower segments.
An idea of how the popular sectors judged the Mendozan

past was given by a Radical newspaper which in 1917 analyzed
the "fifty years of the Regimen in Mendoza," voicing in this

way its partisan views:
these are the men, genuine representative of the
old regime, who ruled Mendoza by the design of the
Villanuevas and Civits during the time when the bayonet
was the only law and a great electoral tool of the
Roquism. .
...the people of Mendoza must search into their
memories and try not to forget the innumerable dubious
dealings in which these oligarchs have participated,
taking advantage of their official positions. .and
disposing of the legislators at their own will. During
thirty years Ellas Villanueva had the monopoly of
the slaughterhouse; then came Civit's streetcar
company; the central market owned by Civit and
Villanueva, as well as their gaslight company; the
concern for paving the streets in which almost
everybody had his share; the Provincial Bank where
eight million pesos were withdrawn by fourteen
members of this oligarchical family, and up to now
not even the interest on this huge amount has been
.

.

paid

^'^La

47

Palabra (Mendoza), September 14, 1917.
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The high honor of family traditions, of
cultural

ancestry, and economic supremacy, were distinctive
values
of the conservatives who in Mendoza had to face
first

political discord within their own ranks, and later the
challenge of a Radicalism rising vigorously. On the other
hand, the values of the common man were forged almost

entirely by the material conditions in which he lived and

by his lack of faith in a system in which he felt himself
an alien.
The Political Scene. San Juan:

A More Endurable Oligarchy

Political life in San Juan resembled that of Mendoza in
the closeness of its oligarchical structure. But the economic

and social conditions in the land of Sarmiento were much more

modest and primitive than in wealthier Mendoza.
The provincial governments since the 1860*3 "were all a

true image of the politica criolla,

"

as demonstrated in their

domestic practices as well as in their passive solidarity with
the different governments at Buenos Aires. The Radical

revolutions of 1890, 1893 and 1905 did not have any echo in
the provincial domain; the spirit and strength displayed in

other parts of the country by the romantic Radical movement

went little noticed in San Juan, and offered no challenge to
the solid power of the conservative Concentracion Civica.

4-8

^^Jose P. Barreiro, La provincia de San Juan. Su
transf ormacion politica social (San Juan, 1928), pp. 18-20.

38

The political disputes of this group made
up of

"patricians, the traditional elements and the
bodegueros "^^
were in essence personal feuds, and the rivalries
among them
,

did not improve either the civic qualities of the
ruling

oligarchy or the political education of the common man.
The Radicals constituted an association of men with

heterogeneous political backgrounds, and their lack of doctrinal
coherence fostered personal discords that widened in time. While
the movement was gaining strength in other areas of the country,

in San Juan it became assimilated to the prevalent mediocrity
of the political scene. Thus, instead of becoming a new force,

it was simply an addition to the old provincial structure,

"with

all the vices of the past reflected in the new movement. "^^

Their participation in the April 1916 presidential election

proved unsuccessful for they were defeated by the Civic
Concentration by 9,170 to 7,572 votes. Another setback for the

Radicals was the 1917 election for governor in which the
conservatives were able to keep their political preeminence by

electing Amador Izasa by 8,658 votes against 7,595 of the
Radicals.
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Then, early in 1918, when they had to select their

candidates for national deputies, the frictions which had

^^Varese and Arias, Historia de San Juan,
^^Barreiro, La provincia de San Juan

,

428.

20.

p.

^^Varese and Arias, Historia de San Juan
Prensa, January 12, 1917.

p.

,

p.

429; La

39

plagued the Radicals reached a climax. A few young
members
decided to challenge the leadership of the party
by forming
the Intransigent Radical faction, under the command
of an

energetic young physician named Federico Gantoni. For the
first time the Radicals of San Juan were promising a truly

political alternative to the permanent succession of

conservative rulers.

The economic, social and political conditions in Mendoza

and San Juan were paving the way for the accession of new

leaders and new policies, which were already taking shape by
1916. By then, Mendoza was on the threshold of experiencing a

reaction against a political way of life and a transformation
of the traditional social framework. San Juan would follow,

years later, in the same steps of the Mendozan populism.
The time had arrived for Mendoza to test the reality of
the promises and the values of the new popular force, the

Radicals, against a Regimen symbolized by the provincial
oligarchy. The next chapter will analyze the repercussion of
the "political regeneration" carried out by the national

government on the Mendozan situation, and the kind of
leadership which emerged in that province under the banner of
the Radical Party.
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CHAPTER

II

HIPOLITO YRIGOYEN, JOSE NESTOR LENCINAS,
^

AND THE QUEST POR POLITICAL REGENERATION IN MENDOZA
Yrigoyen and the Radical Party. The "causa."
The Radical Party had long regarded effective suffrage

as the instrument that could terminate fraudulent government
at the provincial as well as national level. With the enactment
of the Saenz Pena Law in 1912, a new chapter opened in Argentina's

political history; traditional ruling groups now had to face
the electoral challenge of those who had been seeking for

decades to test their strength in honestly conducted polls. To

Yrigoyen and his closest followers, however, the confrontation
between Radicals and entrenched groups was not simply a political
contest between "outs" and "ins"; rather, it was a crusade in

which they represented forces of good, the "Causa," arrayed
against an evil oligarchy, the "Regimen."
Yrigoyen, the supreme leader of the Causa, carried on his

mission and that of his party in favor of political reform,
with a religious devotion. He was convinced, beyond any doubt,
of his own capacity to carry out a profound civic transformation.

Likewise, he believed that the Radical movement, under his
aegis, was the only channel through which Argentine political

customs could be changed and improved.

Throughout his public statements, Yrigoyen unequivocally

displayed the messianic sense he attached to his political role
and that of his party. As an illustration, in his original

41

refusal to become a presideatial candidate, in
March 1916,
he evinced the intensity of his political faith
and
his

self-confidence. He asserted that his creed was to
vindicate
the honor of his country, adding, in his characteristically

obscure and enigmatic language
I am convinced that I would govern exemplarily,
but a government is only a tangible reality,
while in my apostolate it is the single thought,
a spirituality which will last through the times,
closing a cycle of infinite projections.!

In like manner, in his first administrative message to
Congress, in June 1917, Yrigoyen reiterated the basic

principles of his political thought: to restore the legitimacy
of the representatives of the people. Not to accomplish this

would destroy the highest hopes, because instead of opening
an era of "historical remembrances and everlasting examples,"
the Radicals would become a victim of the malady they were

trying to correct.

2

But in the uphill road to achieve this objective, the
electoral success of the Radicals at the national level in
1916, was only half a victory. They did not muster a majority

in Congress and most of the provincial governments were still

"'Hipolito Yrigoyen, Pueblo ^ gobierno Vol. I, Part II
(Buenos Aires, 1953), ?• 414. This reads in Spanish as
follows: "Tengo la conviccion de que haria un gobierno ejemplar,
pero un gobierno no es nada mas que una realidad tangible,
mientras que en mi apostolado es un pensamiento unico, una
espiritualidad que perdurara a traves de los tiempos,
cerrando un ciclo de proyecciones infinitas."
.

^

^Ibid.

,

Vol. II, pp. 87-88.

s
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in the hands of the Regimen.^ Yrigoyen, however,
interpreted
his own election to he a mandate from the people

he

referred to it as a plebiscite— to purify those provincial
governments he considered unrepresentative. If any came to

power by an irregular process, the national government had
the right and the duty to remove them and to arrange for the

proper election of a new one.
This was the basis of the regeneration

political program of civic restoration

— Yrigoyen'

— carried

out from

Buenos Aires through numerous federal interventions. Its
fundamental aim, at least in theory, was to replace minority

provincial governments by others more genuinely representative.
The Constitution and Federal Intervention

The constitutional norms which regulate the relationship

between the federal authorities and the provinces in Argentina,
have placed in the hands of the latter the administration of
their own affairs, on the condition that their constitutions

must conform to the basic principles adopted by the national
constitution. As stated by its Article

5i

Each province shall adopt for itself a constitution
under the republican, representative system, in
accordance with the principles, declarations, and
guarantees of the national constitution, ensuring
its administration of justice, municipal government,
and elementary education. Under these conditions,
the Federal Government guarantees to each province
the enjoyment and exercise of its institutions.
Congress, the Chamber of Deputies was formed by
Speaker
45 Radicals and 70 members from other parties; the
conservatives,
of
25
was a conservative. The Senate was made up
of 14 were
out
provinces
Eleven
Socialist.
1
and
4 Radicals
ruled by the Regimen.

^n
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The national authorities, nevertheless,
have the right
to intervene in the provinces if an anomaly
takes place,

seriously impairing the stability of their
established
governments. Article 6 of the national constitution

states

that
The Federal Government may intervene in the
territory of a province in order to guarantee the
republican form of government or to repeal foreign
invasions, and at the request of its constituted
authorities, to support or reestablish them,
should they have been deposed by sedition or
invasion from another province.

Constitutional theories, however, have not always been

matched by constitutional practices. A considerable gap
exists between the written clauses of the topic of

intervention or their interpretations by the students of
constitutional law, and the political abuses committed many
times by the national governments and lawmakers, under the

guise of resorting to a constitutional right. The interventions

were political measures aimed at redressing an assumed

constitutional violation. But on many occasions they were

undertaken merely to obtain political gains, or to serve the
interests of a specific group in an intra-party confrontation.
The difficulty of establishing limits to the use of the

intervention power lay basically in the ambiguity of the
national constitution itself. Under the assumption that the

republican system of government was seriously threatened or
annulled, the national government needed only to appeal to

Article

6

of the constitution to become the arbiter of any

provincial conflict. But what specific situations constituted

—
44

a threat to the republican system of
government? The

interpretation of that constitutional norm has
been,
throughout the years, as wide and vague as
demanded by the
political circumstances and the diverse
interests

involved.

Especially in the twentieth century, mere partisan
rivalries
often placed the provincial branches of government
on a
collision course, creating an impasse whose solution

ultimately rested upon the political convenience of the
central authority. Most often, the opposition parties in the

provinces sought intervention to displace a political
adversary from power. Besides, the lack of faith in the fair

enforcement of the provincial legal norms moved individuals
as well as a large variety of pressure groups to demand

intervention from the national authorities.^
Soon after taking office, Yrigoyen began to implement

his promises to regenerate politically the provincial

governments which, in his opinion, did not legitimately
represent the people. The thought that constituted the
avowed cornerstone of his regeneration policy was expressed
to Marcelino Ugarte,

the conservative governor of the Buenos

Aires province early in 1917: "The provincial rights to self-

government

autonomias

—belong

to the people and are for the

people, and not for the governments."

5

Upon this principle

^From 1862 until October 1916, there were 58 federal
interventions in the provinces, 27 ordered by decree and
31 enacted by Congress.
^Yrigoyen, Pueblo ^ gobierno

,

Vol. II, Part I, p. 131
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Yrigoyen set in motion partisan machinery
to eliminate the
local political oligarchies.
The "Gausa" and the "Regimen" in
Mendoza

Jose Nestor Lencinas was Yrigoyen'

s

right hand in

Mendoza. A fellow partyman from early times, he had
known
Leandro N. Alera and had assimilated his mystic partisan
fervor. Under the national leadership of Yrigoyen, he
led
the uprising in Mendoza in the ill-fated revolution of
1905,

and after 1906 he was the chairman of the provincial committee
of the Radical Party. According to Manuel Galvez, Lencinas was

the most important of the Radical caudillos after Yrigoyen.^

The personality of the Mendozan leader resembled that of
the president in his strong partisan feelings and in his

^Manuel Galvez, Vida de Hipolito Yrigoyen El h ombre
del misterio (Buenos Aires, 1939), p. 357.
In April 1916, Lencinas was elected National Deputy.
He obtained 14,958 votes against 10,524 for the conservative
Lucio Funes, and 1,072 for the Socialist Ramon Morey. This
circumstance put him closer to the most important political
center of the nation and helped him to plan the political
action in his province for the immediate future, with the
whole support of Yrigoyen. His first biographer stated
that as National Deputy he introduced several important
bills (Nieto Riesco, Lencinas I, p. 175). Many years later,
Dardo Olguin repeated the same statement ( Lencinas p. 249).
In fact, Lencinas played an insignificant role as National
Deputy, he did not take part in any committee, scarcely
attended half of the meetings during the two years of his
mandate, and took part in only one debate, affecting the
political situation of his province. He only introduced
one bill, concerning national guidelines for the wine
industry, but it was never reported out of committee.
.

,

,
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almost religious belief that the Radical movement
was
destined to shape a new political era. Lencinas,

just like

the old leader from Balvanera, had a sense of
predestination

in the mission he was determined to accomplish. Besides
their

resoluteness in their quest for justice and political decency
they also shared an unwillingness to compromise their

viewpoints.

7

Letters which each of them wrote to Pedro

C.

Molina, the

party leader from Cordoba, reveal the close similarity of
their thoughts on the missionary role of the Radical Party,
Yrigoyen, in the first letter of his famous polemic with

Molina, said in September 1909 that

never before has a popular movement occupied the
scene with greater qualities, more generosity or
more intense sacrifices. It will be a historical
institution of never ending radiations, ever so
resplandent because its action is eminently
national, carried out with the utmost selfishness
and inspired by the most generous purposes and
the noblest sentiments.
Similar fervor was conveyed in the words of Lencinas to
Molina, in 1908,
...I search for freedom and justice, and there I
stand and nobody will move me, even if hell
freezes over. And because these ideals are those of
the party, its life is for me so sacred and symbolic
that I love it so much; and before it men are
insignificant, and are dignified when they serve it

with their action or their thoughts.
'^Lencinas was very influenced by theosophic thoughts.
He believed profoundly that every person had a marked destiny

^Yrigoyen, Pueblo

y;

gobierno

.

Vol. I, Part I, p. 126.

^Homenaje de La Nueva Provincia (Bahia Blanca, 1928),
newspaper La Nueva Provincia, on
p. 83. Special issue"of the
occasion of the 50th anniversary of the city of Bahia Blanca,
Argentina.
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Mendoza had been ruled since 1914 by the Popular
Party,
a conservative group which disclaimed its
association
with

the Regimen by opposing the Civitists. Nevertheless,
in

anticipation of the election for governor scheduled for January
1918, the Mendozan Radicals acted to prevent it from being

held under the control of what they considered a fraudulent
administration. In May 1917 they appealed to Buenos Aires for

federal intervention,^^ accusing the provincial government of

interfering in the electoral process, and complaining of the
abject subordination of both the legislature and the judiciary
to the will of Governor Francisco S, Alvarez. Their petition

bitterly criticized the role of the police in harassing the
Radicals throughout the province. It also denounced, among
many other things, the decay in public education, the

considerable arrears in teachers' salaries, and the misuse of

public funds for the benefit of those within the governor's
circle.
A few days later Yrigoyen appointed Diego Saavedra

National Commissioner, to investigate the Radical accusations
in Mendoza. ^"^ Several weeks later, Saavedra delivered his

report to the President. In summary, his conclusions were:
(1)

that the republican system of government was being

properly observed in Mendoza; the three branches were
^^Yrigoyen, Pueblo ^ gobierno

.

Vol. II, Part I, pp.

322-

327.

^^The decree was dated May 10, 1917. It can be assumed
commissioner. A
that the President had high confidence in his
Federal
few days before, Saavedra had ended his mission as
was
conflict
Commissioner in Entre Rios. There, the provincial
two
the
resolved in favor of the Radicals with the election of
National Senators from that party.
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functioning according to the constitution and the laws;
(2)

that the government had not been engaging
in electoral

fraud, as demonstrated by the fact that the two most

important elections of 1916 were won by the opposition;
(3)

that the participation of public employees in partisan

activities was proven only in isolated cases; (4) that the
charges against the administrative functioning of the

government were groundless; and (5) that the accusations
made to the President, although sincerely felt, ought to
be considered the result of obfuscation derived from political

passions and the Radicals' belief in the lack of fair play
by the government. 12
What had been organized as a stepping stone for federal

intervention backfired, contrary to the President's and
Lencinas' expectations. Yrigoyen forbade disclosure of

Saavedra's findings, but this provided the conservatives with
heavy political ammunition. In July, the Chamber of Deputies

inquired about Saavedra's mission, without success. But the
inquiry touched off a heated debate between Lencinas and

Rafael M. Aguirre, another National Deputy from Mendoza, and
chairman of its Popular Party. Aguirre stated that the

Saavedra submitted his report to the President
early in July 1917, but it was not published until the end
of November, when it was made available unofficially (La
Prensa, November 27 and 28, 1917). On December 14, the
Chamber of Deputies approved a petition requesting from the
President the release of the findings. Eventually it was
made available by the government and published in Diputados
1917, VII, 177-192.

,
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government had opened all the records, so
Saavedra had been
able to investigate them properly. Lencinas,
on the
other

hand, accused the commissioner of having been
too lenient

and of lacking the required political acuteness
to realize
what was being done in the comites of the populares
.

notice the repressive behavior of the police.

and to

Aguirre

rejected these charges, and without revealing his source,
he added that he knew that the coming provincial election

would take place under federal intervention. He also lashed
out against the Radicals in Mendoza, with the exception of

Lencinas, whom he considered the only authentic Radical.
Aguirre, a non-Radical, thus gave expression to the view
that Lencinas in Mendoza symbolized the values and principles

for which Yrigoyen stood at the national level. "^^

Oligarchy versus Populism. The 1918 Election

After Yrigoyen'

s

victory in Mendoza in the 1916 presidential

election, it became apparent to the provincial conservative

groups that the 1918 election for governor would turn into a

fiasco unless they could consolidate their strength. Besides,
they were aware that a federal intervention was in the making.

^A

comite is the headquarters of a political party in
a ward, where political activities are performed at the rank
and file level.
•^^

Diputados 1917, II, 508-517. Manuel Galvez stated a
about the unique position of the President
viewpoint
similar
within his party. "Hipolito Yrigoyen is one thing, and the
Radicals, another. He is a moralist by temperament .. .he has
ambitions for moral perfection; but many of his supporters,
especially those not disciplined in ascetism, have only
ambition for power and public favors." Vida de Hipolito
Yrigoyen p. 276.
,

,
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This Radical threat was considered so
serious that

Civit and Villanueva decided to forget their
embittered
political rivalry, over a quarter of a century

old. At the

end of October 1917, the two conservative factions
cemented
a new political alliance in a convention presided
over by

Benito Villanueva which named Erailio Civit the candidate
for governor of the newly formed Conservative Party. It was
a rewarding moment for Civit, because he was able to gain

the support of politicians who until then had been his

permanent political foes. This conservative "family compact,"
however, was not painless. Governor Alvarez became openly

opposed to Civit, deepening the division of loyalties plaguing
the anti-Radical camp.

In the Radical sector, the undisputable leadership of
Lencinas spared them the painful, labyrinthic maneuvers of the
conservatives. Lencinas' arrival from Buenos Aires to organize
the campaign clearly demonstrated his popularity. A large

number of humble people gave him an enthusiastic welcome,
replete with bands and banners, showing that in his patria
chica Lencinas was also a candidate for political canonization.
As a candidate Lencinas possessed traits of physique and

personality that appealed to the average man. Lencinas was tall,

with the appearance of a distinguished and aristocratic man.
His dark brown hair was touched with gray at the temples,

contrasting with his neatly- trimmed silver-gray handle bar

moustache and goatee. His face was oval with a high forehead.
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high prominent cheek-bones and a straight nose.
His dark brown
eyes were wide and deeply-set giving him a
soulful,
trusting,

sympathetic, yet somehow melancholy expression.
As Benito

Marianetti recalls him, Lencinas had an imposing figure,

resembling an apostle, radiating warmth and respect. He kept
himself at a certain distance from those he addressed,
allowing his personality to symbolize authority and hierarchy.
In his slowly delivered political speeches he was wont to
assail the upper classes while extolling the values and
rights of the workingmen. His words were filled with energy
and reassurance, his discourse was that of a true believer.

He was called by some a gaucho, although despite a rural

upbringing in his native San Carlos, he neither dressed nor
lived as a gaucho. But calling him gaucho was a recognition
of his personal courage and generous sentiments.

15

For his

supporters the word "gaucho" signified the most noble
quality, and was pronounced by them with the greatest

affection. Calling him "el gaucho Lencinas," meant that he
was like them, that he was one of them. To his opponents,

however, this expression, in its political sense, was

associated with the lower sectors, the vulgar populace, a
kind of Radical canaille

.

On November 24, 1917, only a few weeks before the

^^Benito Marianetti, En la verde lejanla del recuerdo
(Buenos Aires, 1967), pp. 161^1^^.
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election, Yrigoyen finally intervened by decree
in the
executive branch of Mendoza's government, appointing

a loyal

Radical, Eufrasio Loza, as commissioner.^^ The reasons
given
in the decree indicated that the President, despite the

Saavedra report, extended full credit to the charges made by
the Radicals in their May petition.

Governor Alvarez protested at once to Yrigoyen, reminding
him of the conclusions of Saavedra'

s

investigation. Why had

not the President taken into consideration the unbiased

opinion of a commissioner whom he himself had appointed, asked
Alvarez, instead of accepting at face value the impassioned

voices from the comites? 17 Yrigoyen simply ignored this plea,

leaving in Loza'

s

hands the implementation of his policy of

political regeneration.
The popular welcome given by the Radicals to Loza when he

arrived at Mendoza, left no doubts that he was considered an
ally and not an impartial arbiter.
El Regimen

,

18

The following day,

the official spokesman for the conservatives,

spitefully branded those who greeted Loza so warmly as
descamisados

.

La Palabra, a Radical newspaper replied stating

that "these shirtless are the real people, angrily protesting

'•^Loza was the first Radical governor of Cordoba

(1916-1917).
^'^La

Prensa

,

November 27, 1917.

^^No member of the government was at the railroad
station to greet Loza. The official feelings toward the
intervention were also evidenced when the changeover took
place: Governor Alvarez was absent, and the Police
Commissioner transferred the power to Loza.
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against the Regimen and an epoch. "^^

Behind the Radicals' fervor was nurtured the feeling
that the intervention would enhance the possibilities of

their victory at the polls. This expectation was reflected
in a fiery bulletin issued by the Radical Provincial

Committee, warning those who labeled the Radicals as an

ignorant rabble, that they soon would have to submit
themselves to the verdict of the people; that
The pseudo conservative aristocracy, farcical and
ridiculous, which has built up its fame and fortune
protected by corrupted governments, has been
lowered from its muddy pedestal, has lost the
government, the arbitrary use of power and its
chances to abuse the public purse, and now reveals
to the people the real skeleton of its moral and
civic structure. 20

As was expected, Loza began at once the replacement
of personnel, intervening in the municipality of the capital,
a juicy provider of jobs, and suspending the members of the

Irrigation Board without following the constitutional
formalities. These actions deepened the antagonisms between

Radicals and conservatives, and confirmed the suspicions of
of the anti-Radicals about the partisan nature of the
^
intervention.
4

21

^^El Regimen November 29, 1917; and La Palabra
November 30, 1917. This journalistic exchange reveals an
early use of the term that Peron's adversaries applied to
his followers almost three decades later.
,

20

,

La Palabra, November 26, 1917.

^^Loza filled many vacancies with people he brought
fact
from Cordoba, whose number was estimated at 300. This

•
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Early in December the Radical convention chose
Lencinas
as their candidate for governor, and Delfln
Alvarez to share
the ticket with him. The candidate for deputy-governor

had a

reputation of being a humble, hard-working man, who had
served the party with loyalty.
This was perhaps the sweetest political hour for Lencinas.

The possibility of molding a society on the basis of the

equality and justice he had dreamed of now seemed opening

before him. It was a time when the political horizon was
still free from the chagrin of the days ahead. Lencinas

represented hope for a sector of the people who enthusiastically
followed and trusted him; it was as if all his promises were
already fulfilled. What was the quality of this leader and what

force moved that people? In the eyes of the Radicals
The name Lencinas means a whole life devoted to
sacrifices and civic pride. He represents thirty
years of intense laboring and constant, bold-daring
struggle. He symbolizes the best and most sincere
ideals of the people who have slept in the public
square and in the street, who had been hungry and
castigated by the police, the rude armed branch
of the oligarchy .... 22

provoked this caustic reaction, among many others, from his
opponents:
Son los Lozistas, son cordobeses^
que a un Nestor tienen por capitan
son rojos, negros, son radichetas,
son la langosta que hace gambetas
y al presupuesto se tragaran.
Son los Lozistas, son cordobeses,
que a un Nestor tienen por capitan.

La Tarde, January

8,

1918

La Palabra, September

3,

1917.
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These were the Radical voices of Mendoza,
portraying an
image of Lencinas almost bigger than life,
at a moment when
the party was on the threshold of taking
power. They echoed,
almost with religious fervor and in spite of
their vagueness,
the simple aspirations of the humble people.
Lencinas'

supporters extolled the virtues of their

leader as a blameless idol. Carlos M. Puebla, one of
his
closest political friends, and professional partner, asserted
that Lencinas' daily contacts with the impoverished masses

made him an apostle; that in his humanitarian concern for the
social betterment of the people, he asked for no other

compensation than moral reward. In the nation, added Puebla,
no man after Alem had been devoted to this task with greater

perseverance than Lencinas.

The untiring efforts of the

Mendozan caudillo at spreading the Radical creed, through
many years of travelling all around the province, gained for

him the solid and emotional adherence of the lower sectors.
In general, both urban proletariat and the rural workers
supported Lencinas, although a small number followed the
ably-led Socialist Party. The conservatives' strength focused
in the industrial and business groups, and most of the

professional and propertied class.

In so far as the development of the wine industry,
however, the differences between the Radicals and conservatives

were more rhetorical than substantial. In Mendoza the influence

^^bid.
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of the grape and wine industry transcended
class and party
lines. And as the general welfare depended

fundamentally

on those interests, they were in a
special way, everybody's

patrimony.
This was illustrated in the response of both

conservatives and Radicals to a problem which arose
a few
months before the election, a time when politicians
ordinarily
seek to emphasize their differences. Yrigoyen's budget
for
1918 called for an increased tax on wine. As could be expected,

Mendozan conservatives raised their voices in protest. But
lencinas also complained. In a petition to the President
opposing the tax increase, he praised the industrial progress
of the province which, he noted, was achieved through the hard

work of its people and the confidence of those who invested in
its future. He pointed out the example of the irrigation works
and the fact that the large number of landowners was a

safeguard against the evils of latifundia. Being neither a

vlnatero nor a bodeguero, Lencinas defended the wealth of the
province as something that should be preserved and improved,
for the benefit of all.^^
There was in Lencinas'

crusade a deep compassion for the

poor and the exploited. But he never advocated the
collectivization of lands and bodegas. In a Socialist fashion,
he proposed setting up cooperatives to solve the problems of
the more dependent economic groups, especially the viHateros.

His purpose was to achieve social Justice for all the workers.

^^Ibid.

,

September 8, 1917.
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under the prevailing economic framework, by means
of a
reasonable income and decent living and working

conditions.

The intense electoral campaign provided the
major

confrontation between the Regimen and the Causa in Mendoza.

Its tone was rough and partisan vehemency contributed to

hardening the opposing positions. Even items of dress lent
themselves to partisan use. Illustrative of this was the

popularization of the expression chusma de alpargata
rabble of alpargata

— given

to the Lencinists .

— the

The

alpargata was the traditional footwear of the poor, especially
in rural areas. It was made of canvas and a rope sole. The

alpargata was an important social indicator, no person of the

middle or upper class wore it. The association of the alpargata

with lower class status was absolute. Hence, the derogatory
sense with which it was used against Lencinas' followers

— the

rabble. That expression gained extraordinary currency and

became, in fact, an unofficial denomination of the Lencinists.

In the bitter exchanges between partisan newspapers,
La Palabra in turn assailed the conservatives as the chusma

with frock coat, a privileged caste which had monopolized power
as a birthright. The Civitists rejoined pointing out that when

they were referring to the chusma, they did not include the
"real" worker, but that

^^The coinage of this term was attributed to the
conservative leader Julio Cesar Raffo de la Reta, when he was
addressing a campaign rally. But there is no certainty over the
authorship of this expression.
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The shirtless, the stinkers, are the
arrogant
roughshods of the suburb who for a handful of and
money
refuge, on the other
hand, for that kind of men.... when we see
that
figure of the suburb, with his hat tipped to one
side, high heels, long hair, spitting through
the
eyetooth and using the most coarse language, it
should be known that our reprobations are against
that kind of men. 25

These harsh adjectives were symbols of the conflict

between the upper groups and the popular sectors. As stated
by the political scientist Murray Edelraan, political symbols

"bring out in concentrated form those particular meanings and
emotions which the members of a group create and reinforce in
each other." 27 The political symbols of Lencinism fittingly

served its popular consolidation. Among its propaganda devices
were a small alpargata used as a lapel badge; thousands of

Lencinas's pictures, massively distributed throughout the
province; as well as white alpargatas with blue ribbons, and

gourds

— mates — with

a heart engraved on it bearing the face of

the "gaucho Lencinas." These propaganda materials, small and

unimportant by themselves, served to provide the Lencinists
with visible symbols of their political identification.
The educational limitations of a large part of the

electorate did not allow it to comprehend the rationale of
some of the issues in dispute. It seems likely, however,

that the Mendozan masses read their own meaning into the
26

El Regimen

,

December

^"^Murray Edelman,

1,

1917.

The Symbolic Uses of Politics

(Urbana, 111., 1967), p. IT7

59

election, and responded to symbols that simplified
the
contest. In line with their populist orientation, the

Lencinists propagandized appealing political cliches, so
in
a simple and uncritical way, their followers could
grant
full faith and credit to the opinions of their leaders. In
consequence, any negative remark, vaguely stated against
the conservatives, served the propaganda purposes of the

Lencinists more effectively than any other concrete

reference they could have made about their adversaries. Very
often they referred to the conservatives as "the thieves and

bribers of Mendoza," without providing an additional
explanation for these accusations.
This kind of political language did not convey a meaning

by itself, but it was a part of the desires and interests of
the people for whom it had been written or spoken. Furthermore,

its purposes not only were to chastise the local adversary,

but to project the love-and-hate political views at the

national level as well, placing Lencinas in the local scene as
the political surrogate of Yrigoyen. Regardless of their

credibility, the Lencinists invectives against their opponents

were absorbed by the masses through a constant repetition in
rallies and in the partisan press. By exploiting the simple and

deceptive technique of "good guys versus bad guys" the^

Lencinists effectively convinced their large homespun
constituency that they could never expect anything positive
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from the ^ansos, the geese. ^8 Moreover, the
aggressiveness
of the political language attests to the
complete freedom of
expression, and for the press which existed
throughout
Argentina,

During the campaign the Radicals displayed a
new political
technique, aimed at reaching out directly to the
masses. It

consisted of the provision of social services, free of charge.

In the capital and all the departments, doctors and lawyers
made themselves available, and in some places advice was given
on agricultural and industrial matters. Hardly any other grass

roots-oriented, partisan measure, could have been more effective
in gaining the sympathy and adherence of the "chusma de

alpargata."

But in the structure of the political parties the comite
was still playing the most important role in the communication

process between the politicians and their followers. It was the

main center of activity during the political campaigns and
especially on election days, because it was customary for the
average voter to go to the comite first to pick up the ballot,
and then to the voting place. The traditional low reputation
of the comite resulted from being the visible symbol of the

highly questionable electoral practices of all political
parties, with the exception of the Socialists. Especially for
the Lencinists, the comite represented an effective center of

socialization. For many workers and peasants it assumed the
^^A popular, derogatory term applied to the conservatives
in the province of Mendoza.
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role of a boliche

— the

suburban bar, which in fact was

th(
Le

traditional social club of the poor—where at
election times
the game of tab a and drinking of wine became a
popular
pastime.
The coraite was also a center of social protection
for

its members; a place where they could talk with the "doctor"

— the

leader of the comite or the local area

— and

other

influential people; and where the rewards for political
patronage were usually dispensed. It also served as a

stepping-stone for the local leaders to build up their
electoral backing. Thus, because of their important electoral
role, the voices from the comites were often heard in

connection with the handling of public matters or provision
of jobs.

Because it engaged in politics at grass roots level, the
comite was an open door institution. To become a member did

not demand any personal or professional requirement, as was

necessary to belong to a social club or a trade union. Jorge
Calle explained it succinctly: "a national flag and four

chairs are enough to 'institutionalize' any room at any

provincial town."^^

This is why the comite earned high

political and social relevance as an institutional

phenomenon of an era. There the humble people found a familiar
^^Jorge Calle, Los iluminados (Buenos Aires, 1922), p.
159. Calle, a son of the founder of Los Andes was co-director
of that newspaper when Lencinas was governor of Mendoza.
,

.
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setting for their unpretentious relationships,
even as the
landowners and the bodegueros found theirs at
the Jockey
Club

But the role of the comite was bitterly criticized

for not improving either civically or socially the
personal
quality of its members or the prestige of the party. This

kind of criticism was made more acrimoniously by the middle
and upper classes, although the conservatives also

depended politically on the comites to reach their
followers. A contemporary Kendozan asserted that the comites

were "the gathering place of the lower class.

"-^^

If one

disregards any pejorative intention in this remark, it was a
correct one because the upper segments socialized in

exceedingly more refined settings. The Jockey Club, the Club
de Gimnasia y Esgrima, and the Circulo Italiano, were the

institutions where the more aristocratic and wealthy members
of the provincial elite socialized, and where gambling and

drinking were also

a

regular pastime.

Although at quite different levels, the Lencinist comite
and the Jockey Club fulfilled an important social and political

function. The fact that one was considered a place of

populacheras customs, while the other was reputed the most
distinguished institution of the province, reflected the

socio-economic extremes of the times, as was evident in many
•^^Luis Reyna Almandos, La demagogia radical

tirania, 1916 - 1919 (Buenos Aires, 1920),

p.

101.

^ la
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other activities.

During the final weeks of the campaign, a succession
of small, irritating episodes increasingly
alienated the

opposing groups. Isolated incidents paved the way for the

hardening of positions, and the electoral rhetoric was
replete with phrases and words of class conflict. On many
occasions the anti-Radical press referred to the Lencinist

propaganda as Maximalista and to Lencinas as the Soviet of
Mendoza. By the final days of the campaign there was

hardly an event or attitude that did not carry out with it

partisan overtones.
An example of the aggressive rivalry between the

conservative and populist sectors, was the decision of the
Federal Commissioner to celebrate New Year's Eve with a
social gathering. For the traditional groups it meant that
their social setting would be open to the personal

representative of Yrigoyen and his cohorts, which by
extension, meant the friends of Lencinas and his hated
chusma. How dare the interventor mingle the Mendozan society

with elements so alien to the provincial elite? It was
true that the popular sectors already had invaded the

traditional San Martin's Avenue, but it was unacceptable for
the capital, for example, some confiterias were
symbols of the social, economic and political divisions of
the society. The "Colon" and "La Cosechera," were
strongholds of the conservatives; "Los 20 Billares" and
"El Barquinazo," were places traditionally Lencinists.
^"'"In
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the cultivated people to have the Radicals
share their
refined social environment. The sharp-tongued
protest of
the conservative newspaper indicated
their indignation
No, the mob which has invaded Kendoza
will not
06 accepted beyond the vecinity of the
government house, the municipalities and the
police precints in the countryside. They will
not enter the homes and the elegant rooms to
scare the people with their howls of montonera
and the suburb. 32

These words exemplified the social values of a

segment of the society. Through them can be sensed the

basic issue between the forces clashing in the election of
the Summer of 1918. The cultured group was proud of the

traditions their families represented. In spite of their

internal differences, all of them were branches of the same
trunk, upon which the provincial grandeur was built. The

men had handled public business as a family monopoly,

preoccupied with their own progress, their lands and their
production. Likewise, the women of the elitist group were all

considered dignified representatives of those distinguished
women who contributed financially to San Martin's military
campaign. At the opposite end of the social spectrum was the
chusma, populachera and suburban, without tradition, dignity
or history.
The partisan newspapers and the street rallies served

mostly to further the resentment toward political adversaries.
El Regimen usually pictured the Lencinists as a drunk mob. Its

^^El Regimen, December 28, 1917.
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typical reference to a Radical rally was to call it a
parade
of clowns,

...totally drunk shouting their outrageous cries,
striking upon kerosene cans the rhythm of
candomberos while at the same time throwing
stones at the walls and the electricity poles.
,

With similar acrimony, Yrigoyen was called "a second
class, coarse politician, backstage manipulator, exalted by
the barbarian drive of his party f ollowers.

.
. .

"^^ The

Lencinists, using the same aggressive language, referred to
Civit as the old and crooked politician.
A manifesto of the Conservative Party labeled as

fallacies the populist promises of the Radicals. It

denounced as deceitful their campaigning for higher salaries
for the workers and the peasants, and contended that the

-

Radicals flattered the humble people solely to gain their
vote; that the simple solutions which they demagogically

proposed were only deluding the workers and public opinion.
The manifesto added that salaries could not be raised

capriciously by a ruler, nor public works become a reality

^^Ibid.

,

December

^^Ibid.

,

December 22, 1917.

6,

1917.

^^la Palabra, December 27, 1917. Many times the
campaign resembled a huge political payada a popular,
acute and cutting.
literary duel between two guitar players
praise of
At a Radical rally in San Carlos, it was said in with
Lencinas that he was a gaucho whose silver spurs,
while Civit,
sonorous wheels, were like the song of the land; whom Lencinas,
horse to
on the other hand, was like an untamed
and tame him. This
spurs
the
give
would
as a good gaucho,
few days later:
oratory received the conservatives' reply a
him, much
when the Creole has blood in his veins nobody can tame piola.
de
lazo
carton
y
less a "gaucho de feria con botas de
1918.
16,
January
El Regimen,

—

—
,
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oust because a decree was issued; and that the
cost of
consumer goods could not be decreased by a mere
administrative
order. Schools, highways, trade, and the
fruits of the land,

stated the conservatives, were not the work of
charlatans but
of superior men, educated and experienced.^^

Both sides eyed the election as if it were a decision
destined to shape the provincial future for many years to come.

Manuel Ceretti, a conservative leader, said at a rally that
the voters would have to decide between the Conservative Party,

that is, "the intellect, the cultured elements," or the Radical
Party,

"the incompetence, the abuse and the impudence.

"^'^

A series of partisan complaints and rebukes stepped up
the political tension, and personal incidents received a

significance out of all proportion. Thus, a large number of
telegrams was sent to Yrigoyen and the Minister of the Interior,

denouncing attacks against Conservative rallies and comites.
Radical followers were often pictured as the incarnation of
JQ

those who accompanied Pacundo Quiroga and El Chacho.
The most serious incident of the boisterous pre-election

weeks occurred in the capital, after a conservative rally.

Partisan effervescence and excessive police zeal resulted in a
tumult, in which the Police Commissioner, Comandante Espeleta,

^^El Regimen

,

December 18, 1917.

37-

Ibid.

Toward the end of the campaign, at the request of
the conservatives, the President ordered Loza not to provide
identification certificates from the military authorities,
to vote.
allowing citizens who did not have a libreta,
•^
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:

had a physical encounter with the Civits,^^
The Radicals,
nevertheless, were not to be blamed for
creating an

arbitrary, abusive security force. The
police rules had
be4n set up by the governments of the
Regimen to maintain
th^r authority; because of the intervention, the
political
positions were now reversed, and the conservatives
became
vi(5tim3 of the abusive system they had
created.

The episode gave rise to the exchange of a
number of

telegrams between Buenos Aires and Mendoza. It was
one more
evimt in which deep class animosities flared as election
da- approached. A large group of women in the upper
social
st;'atum telegraphed the President denouncing the police

bnitality and the assaults against their carriages, from
wh:.ch,

they said, all they were doing was showing their

patriotism by throwing flowers at the national flag. Another
group of women, who called themselves Radicals, also

expressed their views to Yrigoyen, rebuffing the statement
of the rival feminine group. Yrigoyen replied to the pro-

conservative damas

,

taking the edge off their criticism by

interpreting their reaction as an expression of their
sensitive feelings. These had been also the feelings of the
people who opposed the Regimen, added Yrigoyen, with the
no-

able difference "that the reason for your agitation does

no< have any foundation in this era of full guarantees,

-^^Such was the agitation provoked by this incident
that Espeleta resigned. At the same time, a group of members
of the Jockey Club, of Mendoza, demanded his expulsion from
that institution.
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while the evils that disturbed Argentina
during long years
"^^
caused a real distress.
The election which was held on Sunday,
January 20, 1918,
was free from serious disturbance. This
was the first direct
election of a governor since the adoption of
the constitutional

reform of 1916

Lencinas won by a margin larger than

expected by the Radicals; he carried the capital
and all the
departments, except one.'^^
The triumph of Lencinas over Civit was as significant

—within the provincial scope— as Yrigoyen's national success
had been in April 1916. In their post-electoral analysis, the

conservatives declared that the major cause for their defeat
was the feeble nature of the coalition between Civitists and

Populares. In its appraisal, the conservative newspaper La
Tarde criticized the unwillingness of the cultivated groups
to get actively involved in a political campaign, while the

Lencinists carried on uninterrupted electoral agitation. The

La Nacion January 13 1918; la Palabra, January 13,
1918; and la Frensa January 17, 1918. The term damas and
mu.jeres were, and still are, symbols of the social status of
women. Those in the upper class are generally referred as
damas.
,

»

,

41

The only problem arose after the election, when the
Conservative Party requested that the ballot boxes be deposited
in the Banco de la Nacion, an indication that they trusted the
national government more than that of the intervention. Loza
did not heed this petition, and the conservatives, in turn,
complained to the President. Yrigoyen at once censured Loza
for not satisfying the wishes of the Civitists, no matter how
unfounded their claim could have been.

^^La Prensa, January 6, 1922. Lencinas polled 18,300
votes against 12,695 for Civit.
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conservative elements, "lovers of the causerie
of the club,"
mistakenly believed that by campaigning for
a few weeks they
could offset the Radical propaganda, vigorously
waged for
many months/^ The conservative candidate,
moreover, was
somewhat outmoded in an election with such heavy
populist
overtones and where almost half of the electorate was
illiterate. Civit was neither a caudillo nor a ruler with

demagogic inclinations, affirmed a historian admirer of Don
Emilio; the people respected Civit but did not understand

him/^
Before the election Benito Villanueva had declared that
all the conservatives had forgotten their hatreds and were

now patriotically united to avoid the takeover of Mendoza by
the Radicals. On the same occasion, Civit had asserted that

in spite of having been Villanueva'

s

foe for three decades,

the time had come for them to shake hands and prevent the

province falling into one man's rule. 45 In spite of their
"brave words,

the election returns brought Civit and Villanueva

to realize how short-lived was the unity they had forged, and

in March Civit resigned as chairman of the Conservative Party.

^^La Tarde, February

6,

1918.

^^Edmundo Correas, "Discurso del Presidente de la Junta
de Estudios Historicos, el 22 de mayo de 1966," Revista de la
Junta de Estudios Historicos de Mendoza, VI, Segunda Epoca
(Mendoza, 1970)
631.
,

^^la Prensa, January 8, 1918.
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The conservative coalition, thus,
did not survive

electoral defeat. And indeed, not until the
1930'3, under
another leadership and different circumstances,
was it

possible to repair their political apparatus.
But no
matter how effective the conservative coalition

might

have been, their system in 1918 was unable to
withstand
the Radical tide. For to a majority of the people
of

Mendoza at least at this crucial time, the Radical Party
was the party of hope and the repository of their

confidence.

4-6

The electorate ratified its position when the
election for National Deputies was held early in March
1918. The Radicals obtained 17,850 votes against 4,582
for the Conservatives and 2,033 for the Socialists.
Popular support for the government was demonstrated again
in the election held on May 12, 1918, to elect a National
Deputy replacing Lencinas. The Radical candidate,
Francisco Rubilar, running unopposed, obtained 18,856
votes against 3,989 blanks. Only 40 per cent of the
registered voters cast their ballots. These figures
reflect the decline of the conservatives after the
January election.
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CHAPTER

III

THE FIRST RADICAL GOVERmiENT OP KENDOZA
The accession of Lencinas to the governorship
of Mendoza
represented, in terms of personalities, a sharp
break with
the past. But to what extent did the entry of
Mendozan

Radicalism to power mark a departure from the policies
and
practices of the Regimen? In what ways did Governor
Lencinas
live up to the expectations of those who voted for him?
This chapter will examine Lencinas' performance in office

by focusing on three distinct facets: his role as a pioneer

provincial ruler committed to enacting a program of social
legislation; his treatment of constitutional limitations,

especially in such fields as municipal and water administration,
fiscal matters and public education; and thirdly, his relations

with other branches of government and the controversies these
gave rise to. Por at stake in the conduct of his administration

was not only Lencinas' personal power and prestige but that of
the provincial Radical Party and even the political autonomy
of the province.

The Promises are Fulfilled

Prom the day of his inauguration, on March

6,

1918, it

was clear that Lencinas' administration represented a departure

from the practices of the past. On that day he inaugurated a
policy of maintaining close contact with the masses: the

government house opened its doors to the people, and a popular

2
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banquet was jubilantly held at a public
park.^ There was a
proud feeling among the Lencinists— as
the Radicals came
to be

known— because for

the first time the poor were

being honored by a provincial ruler. La Montana
characterized
thus the special joy of the lower classes:
That is why people rejoices with such hearty
enthusiasm for all that represents a triumph of
the people, of the humble; without ... aristocratic
exclusions and without demeaning it because it
comes from the lower sectors.
lencinas' appeals to the emotions and class feelings
of the humble people were denounced as demagoguery by

conservative elements. The opposition was especially
critical of the government for spending 5,000 pesos in
the inaugural celebration. The Lencinists retorted, in
turn, recalling the thousands spent in champagne by

the conservatives in their exclusive gatherings, while

The governor appointed Carlos M. Puebla as Minister
of Government, Eduardo Teisaire as Minister of Industries
and Public Works, and Dardo Corvalan Kendilaharzu as Minister
of Hacienda. Teisaire played an extremely important role in
Lencinas' government. He had been secretary of Emilio Givit
until the end of 1915 f and had been associated with the
conservatives for 17 years. Recently, he had supported
Lencinas enthusiastically, including assisting in the
financial needs of the campaign. A skilled journalist,
Teisaire founded Los Debates , in Mendoza, in 1890, and had
been a correspondent for Los Andes , of Mendoza, and La Prensa ,
of Buenos Aires. Immediately after Lencinas took office,
Teisaire established La Montana , a mouthpiece of the
provincial government during 1918 and 1919. As another
example of his untiring energies, Teisaire put out a Buenos
Aires edition of La Montana in 1919. It was the only case
in Argentina where a provincial paper was simultaneously
published in the Federal Capital.
,

^La Montana, April 6, 1918.

73

the people -were in their miserable
huts, forgotten, as
old trash.

Another indication of the new political
winds
sweeping Mendoza was Lencinas' decree
proclaiming

May 1,

the traditional day of the working class,
as a provincial

holiday. Besides, on several occasions the
government

organized popular festivals, collecting funds to
buy

clothing and blankets for the poor. In the departments,
there was sporadic official distribution of food
and

clothing, followed by popular dancing sponsored by the

local authorities. In these as in other instances, Lencinas
was showing his concern for the underdog. He was not the
only leader fostering these sentiments, but he was the

first in Mendoza to demonstrate such interest from the

highest position. This earned for Lencinas the unabated
loyalty of the common man, in spite of the fact that the
governor'

s

accomplishments were often short of what he had

promised,
A novel, populist measure of the governor was his

proposal for the building of a monument to the worker.^ No

precedent for such an action existed either at the national
or at the provincial level. The proposal identified "the

workers" with "the people," and sought to give public

^Ibid.
^A four-man committee, including a labor union leader,
was to be in charge of the project. The estimated cost of the
monument was 10,000 pesos, which were to be raised through
public contributions.
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recognition to those social segments that had
been neglected
in the past. "We have to mold in the bronze,"
declared La

Montana, "the character, the pride, the courage,
the

nobility of the worker, which is the nobility, the
courage,
the pride, and the character of the people."^

Perhaps no other phrase illustrated the symbolic

meaning of the proposed monument than the title of an
editorial in La Montana

:

"La dignificacion del pueblo."

Comparing Lencinas' attitude with that of previous governments,
the editorial argued that the inclusion of a worker in official

committees uplifted the labor groups from the low, fixed status
to which they had been relegated. If the provincial aristocracy

considered the worker worthy only of being manipulated at the
elections or serving in the army, Lencinas was placing him in
the respectable position he deserved in the society.^ Thus, it

would seem reasonable to expect, from

a

government so given to

expressing its worker sympathies, that once announced, the
proposed monument would have become a reality. This was not the
case.

7

Nevertheless, the proposal had given an opportunity to

sharpen the oratory of class conflict and to reaffirm the

government's social theories.

^La Montana
^

Ibid

. ,

May

,

May
4,

3,

1918.

1918.

Chairman of the Federacion Obrera refused to serve
on the committee, alleging that the working class needed other
kind of measures, that would benefit it more directly. A
public bid for the monument was announced in July 1918, and as
of early 1919 nothing was yet decided. The whole project,
finally, passed into oblivion.
"^The
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Lencinas' accomplishments in the
sphere of social
legislation were the real foundation of
his political and
personal prestige. In July 19I8, at the
initiative of the
Executive, the first Pension Act for
public employees was
enacted (Law No. 717).^ Eight months were
to lapse before
the employees started their financial
participation and
it was not until October 1919 that the
first retirement

benefit was paid, but the law significantly
marked the
initiation of a welfare system for the public servants

of

the province.
The principal achievement of the government in its

endeavor for the social betterment of the lower sectors
was the law establishing a maximum 8-hour working day and
a minimum wage. The principle underlying this law had
been

included in Article 45 of the 1916 constitution, but no

legislation had been enacted to enforce it. The workers
continued to be subject to the will of the patrones who,

unrestrained by any legislation, arbitrarily determined

working schedules and paid small salaries. Conservative
Governor Francisco Alvarez had himself taken the initiative
to obtain labor legislation but without success.^

Los Andes, November 23, 1918, published an extensive
article based on mathematical analysis, to demonstrate that
the financial arrangement of this bill was entirely inadequate
for it to be self-supporting.
q

/

In September 1916, Alvarez proposed to create a
General Department of Labor, but its functions should be
only to verify the enforcement of the national law on
Workmen's Compensation and the provincial law on Sunday
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Alvarez' proposal rested in the legislature until

Lencinas, with the able support of Radical legislator

Manuel

A.

Zuloaga, revived it and improved it significantly.

In September 1918 the Senate approved the first part of the
amended measure. Knovm as Law No. 731, it created an agency
empowered to verify compliance with labor legislation and
to gather pertinent statistical information. The second

part, embodied in Law No. 732, established an 8-hour maximum

working day for both public and private employees and
workers; it also provided for a minimum wage of 2,50 pesos a
day for state personnel, and

2

pesos for non-public workers;

with time and a half for overtime. This law became effective
on November 1, 1918, making Mendoza the first Argentine

province to enact wages and hours legislation."^^
holiday. It should also advise the government about the type
of legislation required to implement Article 45 of the
constitution. But no action was taken, by the legislature.
Almost a year later, in August 1917, Alvarez introduced
another bill, more comprehensive than the previous one, in
which the 8-hour clause was included for state personnel. In
case of overtime, the payment would be raised 35 per cent.
But the project stated that the length of the working day in
non-public establishments was to be determined by the patron.
^^One of the most difficult problems was to set up the
way the 8-hour rule could be applied to rural workers. It was
agreed that they should work an average of 8 hours a day over
the whole year. The arrangement established a peak of 11
hours a day during harvest time, and a maximum of 5 hours at
the time when the work was less demanding. The 50-cent
difference was justified by the fact that many private workers,
especially in rural areas, received some extra benefits. The
so-called English Saturday became effective in Mendoza in
April 1919. In Buenos Aires it began in September 1918.
The sources for the information provided on this topic
were the numerical files of provincial legislation, in the
Archives of the Legislature of the Province of Mendoza.
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Naturally enough provincial employers attacked the
new
laws as wasteful and unnecessary. Through the columns
of La
Opinion, their unofficial spokesman, they argued that when

outdoor work was done without physical effort, as happened

during a good part of the year in rural areas, there was no

need to authorize the peons to loaf at the expense of the
patron. It was also contended that workers who earned 30 to
40 pesos per month were satisfied with their income and

never complained or questioned the number of hours they
worked. But now, because of the law, argued La Opinion

,

"these peons whose wages were sufficient for their regular

needs if they did not use them to get drunk," began insolently

demanding the minimum wage. Los Andes also shared the view
that there was no real benefit for the worker, because the

increased salary and the reduced hours would be offset by a

higher cost of living and higher taxes. In essence, asserted
Los Andes

,

it was token social justice by the government,

with electoral strings attached.

"^"^

Per the workers, however, the benefits of the minimum
wage law were beyond dispute. The wage of a bodega worker,

for example, increased 150 per cent, from 80 cents daily to
2

pesos.

12

^^La Opinion February 10, 14, 19, and 28, 1919;
Los Andes March 18, and May 21, 1919.
,

,

^^Manuel A. Zuloaga, Salario minimo Inf orme presentado
al Poder Enecutivo Provincial (Mendoza, 1927), p. 113.
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Faulty Practices Nullify Avowed Principles
The vigorous thrust of the Lencinists in the field
of

social legislation was not matched by comparable zeal when
it
came to upholding constitutional clauses on matters concerning
the reinstatement of municipal autonomy; returning the

administration of water to its own users; the proper funding
of the school system, and the handling of fiscal affairs.

One of the electoral commitments of the Radicals had been
to return the municipalities to constitutional rule. But in

his inaugural address, in June 1918, Lencinas argued for a
delay in holding elections, pointing to the need for a new law

granting universal male suffrage. The governor purposely
ignored the legislation in force, because it only granted the
right to vote in municipal elections to the proprietors or
those paying a business franchise tax. In September Lencinas

submitted to the legislature a bill regulating all aspects of
the municipal structure, including the electoral franchise

reform. Allowing the masses to participate in the local

election was a step forward in the democratization of political
life. The fact that Lencinas had received his strongest

support from the propertyless sector and that the proposal

would pave the way for an increased control of the

municipalities by the Radicals, was not an unimportant
consideration.^^

—

the Socialist
in
legislature
the
to
proposal
Party had made the same
September 1917, to no avail.

—

^"^The Socialist Federation of Mendoza
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Whatever the merits of the bill, the
failure of the
legislature to take action meant that, as at
the end of

1918, Lencinas still maintained under intervention

thirteen out of Mendoza'

s

seventeen municipalities. This

in spite of the fact that Article 207 of the
provincial

constitution stated that once a municipality was intervened,
a new election should be called within 30 days. When
in

February 1919 a federal commissioner arrived at Mendoza,
the municipal reform project was still awaiting to be

included in the legislative agenda.
Lencinas' arbitrary decision not to respect the

municipal legislation in force, and the legislature failure
to set up new rules, benefited the Radicals because the

municipalities intervened by the governor were under his
absolute control. If elections were held, the Radicals would
risk losing the control of some departments and in all of

them the opposition would acquire a voice in the municipal
councils.

Governor Lencinas treatment of the laws concerning the
election of irrigation authorities was similar to his

handling of municipal elections. The provincial constitution
stated explicitly that on the first Sunday of each November,

elections should take place to

choose the local authorities

in charge of administering the distribution of water. However,

during the first days of his governorship, in March 1918,
Lencinas appointed ex-officio new authorities in all the
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province. He explained his action by the
need to curtail
the abuses committed by previous
administrations. When the
time arrived, in accordance with the
constitutional
mandate, to hold the elections, November
1918, he issued a
decree suspending them. This time the
Justification for

his decision was the lack of legislation regulating
all

matters concerning irrigation, as the constitution
required.
The opposition protested; they agreed that such a law
was

not enacted, but declared that the enforcement of the 1916
constitution did not suspend or revoke any previous
legislation. Law No. 322, of 1905, they contended, was still

in force and should have been applied to hold the November
elections. The government's violation appeared even more

flagrant in view of Article 18? of the provincial
constitution which stated explicitly that under no
circumstances should laws regarding irrigation deprive the

interested parties of their right to elect the authorities
and to administer their own budget.
In the area of elementary education, the first Radical

government in Mendoza gave lip service more than real support
to the school system. Lencinas appointed Enrique Julio as

Director of the Provincial School Board.

14

This was an

autonomous agency which, under provisions of the provincial
charter, was entitled to receive 20 per cent of the general

revenues and, in addition, the receipts from the inheritance
^^Julio was an active party-member who lived in Bahia
Blanca, where in 1898 he had founded the newspaper La Nueva
Provincia.
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tax. But Julio faced a permanent acute financial
deficit

because, as in so many aspects of national and
provincial
life, the gap between law and practice was substantial.

The

authorities were always behind in transferring funds from
general revenues, and failed completely to turn over the

inheritance tax funds. Given the fact that the inheritance
tax had gone into effect in 1910 and that numerous estates

had been probated since then, it is obvious that important
sums were being denied to the school system. The School
Board, thereupon, paid the teachers with considerable delay.

This endemic Argentine malady was present in Mendoza many

years before Lencinas became governor and, unfortunately,
continued many years after him. 15

In his first message to the legislature, Lencinas
outlined his firm intention to improve public education

throughout the province by opening new schools and
libraries.

The governor also expressed his determination

to normalize the payment of teachers' salaries and to increase

the number of those certified. In accord with these principles,

when a conference on illiteracy took place in late June 1918
in Buenos Aires between Yrigoyen and the National Board of

weak political power of the teachers as such,
explains to a large extent this chronic and corrupt practice,
so much generalized, both in time and space.

^The

governor noted that out of 67,000 children of
school age, only 44,000 were registered in schools. To
provide a basic education for those 23,000 not attending class
at all, Lencinas estimated that 200 new schools were needed.
Mensaje de S.E. el Sefior Gobernador de la Provincia Dr. Jose
Nestor Lencinas (Mendoza, 1918), p. 27.
•^^The
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EducatioQ. Lencinas identified himself with the aims
of the
conference. In a telegram to the President he expressed
his
desire to take steps to ameliorate the alarming illiteracy

problem in his province. Therefore, he proposed to Yrigoyen
an accord between Mendoza and the Federal Government, whereby
the latter would take over the financial burden of 50

provincial schools and the province would move to set up 100

new schools in rural areas by March 1919.
The Minister of Justice and Public Education replied to

Lencinas rejecting such a proposal. Nevertheless, he promised
that if the governor would indicate the location of the

proposed 100 rural schools, the National Board of Education
would start installing them immediately. Lencinas set aside
the minister's offer, and kept insisting on his original

scheme. His efforts attracted the attention of Congress.

Deputies Carlos Gallegos Moyano and Anibal Cabrera, both

Radicals from Mendoza, reassured their colleagues that from
1919 on, the provincial executive would strengthen the

finances of the School Board, which would make it possible
to expand the number of schools. Nevertheless, Luis Agote, a

conservative Deputy from Buenos Aires, wondered how Mendoza

would set up a large number of new schools within a few
17
months if it could not maintain those already established.

Two months later Lencinas was able to persuade the

national government to accept his offer. In consequence, the
^'^

Diputados

,

1918, III, 194-201.
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Mendozan School Board alleviated its own
financial problems
by transferring 50 provincial schools
to

the nation. Lencinas,

however, as Agote predicted, did not
fulfill his part of the
agreement. As shown by the following table,
the number of
schools did not increase; there was simply
a transfer of

responsibilities.

Number of Schools in Mendoza
1917

1918

1919

208

154

156

Private

26

25

22

National

43

93

93

3

3

3

280

275

274

Provincial

Annexed to National
Total:

Source: Consejo Nacional de Educacion, Educacion comun
en la capital provincias ^ territorios
nacionales (Buenos Aires, 1921), p. 262.
,

The fact is that the School Board by mid-1918 already

was indebted to the amount of

$

2,698,000, equal to approximately

one third of the provincial budget.

With such an enormous

deficit, how could Lencinas and Julio have made their offer to
the Federal Government? It seems that not even the largest

amount of wishful thinking would have made this deal possible.
Lencinas' failure to carry out his promises in the sphere
of primary education was accompanied by a dismal observance by

^^Provincia de Mendoza, Direccion General de Escuelas,
Gesti5n econ5mica ^ financiera La obra del Sr Enrique Julio
al frente del gobierno escolar (Mendoza, 1920), p. 46.
.

.
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1
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the Federal Government? It seems that not even the largest
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of primary education was accompanied by a dismal observance by

^^Provincia de Mendoza, Direccion General de Escuelas,
Gestion econ6mica ^ financiera La obra del Sr Enrique Julio
al frente del gobierno escolar (Mendoza, 1920), p. 46.
.

.
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his administration of constitutional procedures
governing
fiscal management. Government officials found it more

expedient to bypass legal requirements than to accept
the
norms of fiscal responsibility.
The pressing financial needs led the government to

follow the methods they had repudiated in the past. The
last budget approved by the legislature was in 1916. The

following year, the same budget was extended by decree, with
additions voted in cabinet agreements. These supplementary

modifications were made in violation of the constitution,
which empowered the legislature alone to approve fiscal
expenses and revenues. But this procedure had been used

for so many years that time had "institutionalized" the
malpractice.
The 1918 budget

— again

the same as that of 1915

— was

also extended by decree. That of 1919, which should have

been submitted in August 1918, was promised by the executive

but never sent to the legislature.
The problem of the letras continued to be handled in an

irregular way. Exactly as happened under the Regimen, the
first Radical government found in the issuance of letras a

valuable financial resource. By a decree of November 1918,
Lencinas authorized the issuance of four million pesos in
letras, using as a legal basis three laws enacted during
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Civit's second term.-^^
The opposition raised serious objections to
this decree.

They claimed that it rested on laws which had been
enacted

under different circumstances and for different needs;
that
the letras were issued in small values—a practice already

followed under the Regimen

— so

they could circulate as

currency; and of course, that legislative approval was

lacking. The national government demanded an explanation, but
once Lencinas expounded the financial difficulties of the

province, it took no steps to force a reversal.
The issuance of letras, nonetheless, was a denial of the

electoral promises made by the Radicals when they were in

opposition and coined the slogan "No mas letras de tesoreria."

With an ironical bent, Los Andes remarked that Lencinas'
decree appeared to be handwritten by Civit,
1

Q

^These laws
Law No.

Year

20

were:

Amount

Original Purposes of the Law

Irrigation works.
2,000,000
Agricultural promotion.
1,000,000
Industrial promotion.
1,000,000
An example of the arbitrary procedures used by the
Mendozan governments to obtain more revenue was given by Law
No. 437. It authorized the issuance of "Internal Debt Bonds,"
not the letras, that were in fact emitted.
389
437
438

1907
1908
1908

^^Los Andes, November 15, 1918. But Lencinas was not
the only Radical governor from the cadre of early reformers
who put aside a principle in exchange for a pragmatic^
solution. Juan Bautista Bascary in Tucuman, and Joaquin
Castellanos in Salta, also resorted to this kind of financial
relief.
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In spite of the fact that the letras specified on their
face that they were legally acceptable for the
payment of

provincial taxes, the government ordered that the property
tax be paid half in letras and half in national currency.
When the feared depreciation of these values began to take
place, the letras were exchanged at a 7 per cent discount.

The Several Roads to Federal Intervention

After so many years spent in relentless opposition to
the Regimen, it was not to be expected that Lencinas would
"bring a spirit of compromise into the governor's office.

Utterly convinced that he was supporting the right causes,
Lencinas displayed remarkable tenacity in any political
struggle he undertook. But in five instances it appears that
he exceeded the reasonable limits, and found himself in
conflict with Yrigoyen, the very man he politically admired.
These major cases involved the intervention of the Compania

Vitivinicola de Mendoza; the rejection of four provincial
deputies from the opposition; the deportation of journalists;
the enactment of dietas

,

or salaries for the legislators, and

the role therein of Deputy Governor Delfin Alvarez; and

Lencinas'

decision to suspend the members of the Judicial

Power.

In 1916 Law No. 703 was enacted with the hope of putting
an end to the serious crisis in the viti-vini culture industry.

Its purposes were to bring prices and production to reasonable
levels. The mechanism to accomplish this was to be the creation
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of cooperatives. But this remedy proved to be only
slightly
effective, for only one cooperative was formed, the
Compania

Vitivinicola, and the centralization it created appeared to
"be

more harmful than beneficial. As the bodegueros wished

to turn the market entirely free again, they had already

asked Interventor Loza to repeal Law No. 703.
Three weeks after his inauguration, and having heard
the opinions and suggestions of both sides, Lencinas took

over the management of the Compania in order to liquidate it.
The decree he issued charged that it did not fulfill the aims

for which it was created, and accused the members of the

board of financial and technical irregularities. However, the
lawyers of the Comparlia, Mario Arenas and Meliton Arroyo,
conspicuous members of the Conservative Party, appealed to the

provincial Supreme Court alleging that the decree was simply
a despoilment of their patrimony, and in April the court

ruled the decree unconstitutional.

21

This decision of the provincial Supreme Court touched off

The industrial interests of Mendoza had also challenged
the constitutionality of the financial rules set up in Law 703.
The taxes were levied not only on the members of the Corapa'Hia
Vitivinicola but on all trading wine. In November 1918, the
National Supreme Court declared that financial levy
unconstitutional, under the assumption that it curtailed the
principle of freedom of commerce. The large vitlateros and
bodegueros rejoiced at this decision. The Supreme Court, by
striking at the financial support of the Compania Vitivinicola,
in fact, killed it. It was a step toward returning to a system
of free trade, the one preferred by the largest industrial
interests. As they stated in their petition to the Supreme
Court, the ills of the industry were due to the abusive
governmental intervention, which through artificial means
pretended to destroy the law of supply and demand.
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a violent campaign against its members by the
pro-government

press, especially La Montana

.

Lencinas, moreover, appealed

the decision to the National Supreme Court, but it declined

to hear the case. The governor, so convinced of the

righteousness of his position, ignored the opinion of the
court, and denied the assistance of the police to return

the CompaSia to its former authorities. Supported by the

law but without the means to make it effective, the Compafiia

Vitivinicola found itself at a dead end, and requested from
President Yrigoyen a federal intervention.
The second provincial dispute to reach the doorstep of
the national authorities began with the election held on

April 28, 1918, to renew part of the provincial Chamber of
Deputies. The Radicals won the eight seats for the majority

while the conservatives obtained the four vacancies for the
minority.

22

The opposition, however, successfully obstructed

the chamber's scheduled meetings, by not attending them. With

this maneuver they prevented the incorporation of the newly

elected deputies, which would give the Radicals the control of
the chamber. Frustrated after six attempts to hold a session,

the Radicals met without a quorum; they first accepted the

credentials of their eight new deputies, and then asked the

conservatives to participate and swear in their four new
members. The conservatives declined, stating that the chamber
^^The four conservatives were Mario Arenas, Jose V.
Auriol, Agustin de la Reta and Fernando Lavoisier.
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had been illegally constituted. The Radicals
interpreted
this refusal as an implicit resignation of
their

seats and,

accordingly, accepted them. The acceptance of
resignations
that the conservatives did not even submit, prompted
the

four legislators to request the National Congress to
authorize
the federal intervention of the province.

The discussion of this issue in Buenos Aires stimulated

almost the same partisan feelings it had produced on the
local scene. In the Senate, the conservative Joaquin V.

Gonzalez scorned the "guilty intentions of the majority," for
its resort to the tactic of the "tacit" resignation. Senator

Civit criticized the attitude of the Lencinists and assailed

Yrigoyen's policy of intervention by referring especifically
to the cases of several other provinces intervened by the

Federal Government. The Senate approved a motion to intervene
in Mendoza, but in the Chamber of Deputies the Radicals

mustered the necessary support to set it aside.

This action

gave Lencinas some temporary leverage, but weakened his

image in Buenos Aires.

During these years Argentine journalism exhibited virtues
and defects which greatly influenced the political mind of
the common man. Pree from any censorship, both the Radicals

^^Congreso Nacional, Camara de Senadores, Diario de
sesiones 1918, III, 509-531 (Hereafter referred as Senaaores
Senator Joaquin V. Gonzalez, from La Rioja, had been a member
of the cabinet under President Roca. He was a leading
authority in Constitutional Law and a literary man. Through
his inspiration, in 1905, was created the National University
of La Plata.
,

)
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and their opposition found in the written
word their most
important partisan instrument. However,
criticism of political
foes was often made without inhibitions,
and many times
degenerated into abusive, almost vituperative
language.
The combative hostility against the
government shown by
the conservative paper La Tarde, official
organ of the Popular
Party, and its scornful treatment of the private
life of
the

governor's family, moved Lencinas to order the deportation
to
San Luis of its two directors. Other journalists suffered
the
same fate and for similar reasons. This arbitrary treatment
of newsmen, despite the excesses comitted by them, provoked
an

immediate reaction from the anti-Radical press, nationally as
well as in Mendoza.^^
The rough treatment accorded to a correspondent from the

widely read Buenos Aires newspaper Critica, in December 1918,
created even more hard feelings. The porteno daily had been

strongly anti-Lencinist

,

and it was not surprising that the

arrival in Mendoza of Cesar Orozco, its special correspondent,

would be met with suspicion. What was perhaps not expected was
his arrest by the police. Even after his release by Judge

An indication of the strong official feelings was
revealed when street demonstrators supporting the government
and enjoying police benevolence, after breaking windows of
La Tarde, paraded in front of the government house, receiving
the solid support of the governor and the police commissioner.
These incidents intensified inter-party friction and
precipitated very unfavorable comments in Buenos Aires. There,
the Circulo de la Prensa complained to Yrigoyen; Benito
Villanueva pleaded for the deported newsmen to the President,
and there were frequent critical comments from La Naci5n and
La Prensa.

91

Jorge Vera Vallejo in response to a habeas corpus
proceeding,
he was rearrested. This time he was held for
a short

time and

allowed to leave through the backdoor of the police
building,
only to be met by a group of thugs who beat him
up.
The episode had other aspects which revealed the

arbitrariness of the Mendozan governor. Police Commissioner
Quellet, who had obeyed the judicial order to release Orozco
was replaced by Roberto J. Rincci, the Mayor of Maipu, an

energetic party-member, far more experienced in the arbitrary

handling of political adversaries. More significant yet,
Judge Vera Vallejo, who issued that order, was himself ousted

from office. The complaints against the governor grew louder,
and the deportation of newsmen became another hot issue in
the already strained relations between Mendoza and Buenos

Aires.

But further troubles for the government were already
brewing, troubles which eventually would disrupt the unity of
Mendoza'

s

Radicalism. In the 1916 provincial legislative

period the Radicals had successfully opposed a bill to
establish a salary for lawmakers. In August 1918, however,
the Radicals sponsored a bill assigning a stipend to the

legislators. This represented an annual budget increase of
264,000 pesos. Lencinas was absent from the province at that
time for health reasons, and Delfin Alvarez, serving as

acting governor, opposed the proposal alleging the precarious
situation of the provincial treasury. He notified the
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legislators that if the bill were approved he would veto it,
and this he did on September 16, over the opposition of two
cabinet ministers, Puebla and Teisaire.^^ The crisis summoned
I'encinas back to Mendoza, where at once he expressed his

confidence in the two ministers and asked for Alvarez
resignation. Thus, another major conflict began to take
shape.

Alvarez found himself attacked by most of his fellow
party-members and the Lencinist newspapers. In his defense,
he declared that Lencinas, before leaving the province, had

given him full freedom of action, and that the governor was

supporting Puebla and Teisaire out of friendship rather than
out of concern for the issue involved.

26

The dietas issue brought to the surface serious personal

splits within the official party. The basic animosities lay

between Alvarez, now considered a traitor by the Lencinists,
and Teisaire, who counted on the complete support of the

opposition to Alvarez, Ministers Puebla and
Teisaire resigned. The legislature rejected Alvarez' veto on
a technicality and the dietas became effective, retroactive
to September 1, 1918.

^In

,

^^Los Andes, September 20, 1918, suggested that Alvarez'
error was"^ believe that it was th^ proper time to expel the
false apostles from the temple. La Epoca September 22, 191o,
protecting Lencinas' imag^, approached the conflict as a
Dardo
dispute solely affecting Alvarez and the legislature.
the
that
Olguin, in his biography of Lencinas, contends
for the
discrepancy over the die^tas was only a smokescreen
the poor
upon
counted
political ambitions of Alvarez; that he
Lencinas
that
health of the governor, or upon the possibility
the Senate, when Civit
woSld fill the seat of Emilio Civit in
Jose Hipolito
ended his term in 1919, Lencinas, p. 297.
coincides somewhat with
Lencinas, a son of the governor,
that the
Olguin, believing that Alvarez was so simple-minded June
26,
Kendoza,
interview,
power went to his head. Personal
1972.
,
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governor. Like a contagious patient, Alvarez was
isolated
by his former political friends. He remained absent
from
the Senate for a month in order to cool off the
tensions,

but when he returned to preside over the meetings, no
quorum was obtained.
The Radical split deepened when Alvarez was expelled

from the party. In a stormy session of the provincial
committee, held on September 29, Lencinas' wishes were

overwhelmingly supported and Alvarez was ousted. But a
group of Radicals sided with him and formed a new political
organization, the Intransigent Radical Party.

^'^

A few weeks later Alvarez sought protection in the

house of a prominent bodeguero, accusing the police of

harassing him. In Buenos Aires, meanwhile, Puebla attempted
to gain the support of the Federal Government for the ouster

of Alvarez from the government, which the deputy governor

refused to leave. But Yrigoyen declined to intervene in the

provincial conflict. As a result, the Lencinists had to find
their own solution to the stalemate. To this end, in the
session of October 17, provincial Radical Senators sponsored
a bill suspending Alvarez as deputy governor and ordering

that he be examined psychiatrically

.

They contended that the

Among those defecting from the Lencinists were
Cabrera,
a National Deputy; Bautista Gargantini and
Anibal
Jesus Romero. Soon thereafter they too were expelled from
the Radical Party. Most of the dissenters declared their
total adherence to President Yrigoyen. This marked the
formal opening in Mendoza of the breach that years later
divided the Radicals in Personalists and anti-Personalists.
^'^

fact of "vetoing the dietas and denouncing imaginary

harassments,

indicated that his mental abilities were

"

impaired. The Senate found the project plausible and

approved it.
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The public reaction was immediate, '^ile Los Andes

termed this action "the most impudent and unscrupulous"
in the history of the legislature, La Prensa deplored the

fact that a party with popular roots could acquiesce in

using such flimsy procedures.

^

In December more fuel was

added to the fire. The provincial Supreme Court, by a

unanimous vote, ruled unconstitutional the October
decision of the Senate suspending the deputy governor.

Adding to the poignant intra-party strife afflicting
the Radicals was the relative punctuality with which the

legislator'

s

salaries were paid, except to those who

deserted the party. This raised the protests of the
opposition. They contrasted this prompt payment with the

delays in paying the salaries of modest public employees,
the financial plight of the hospitals, and the perennial

tardiness with the teachers' salaries.

When early in December Alvarez sent a third public

message to Yrigoyen, reiterating his request for personal
guarantees, Lencinas rebuffed the suspended deputy governor

at once. He informed the President that his government made
^^Legislatura de Mendoza, Senadores

,

1918, 274-289.

October 19
29los Andes, October 18, 1918; La Prensa,
1918.
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no distinction between the most important
and the most
modest man, and that as far as Alvarez was
concerned, he

should he cast into oblivion, because of his
ill-services
to the party.

Each for his own reason, both Lencinas

and Alvarez sought Yrigoyen's assistance to bail them
out
of the stalemate.

The opposition to the Mendozan government became more

incensed. But the attacks against Minister Teisaire were

more venomous than those against the governor. Among the
things that antagonized the opponents and even many Radicals

against the minister, was his heavy hand in several

grandiose projects he conceived. The most important had been
the railroad line from Algarrobal to Mendoza, for which

several million pesos were approved by a cabinet agreement,

without legislative consent. Unfortunately for lencinas,
Teisaire'

s

schemes created increasing animosities against

the minister, including a severe criticism for his nepotistic

inclinations. Many Radicals complained that Teisaire abused
his high favor with Lencinas; that only the minister's

friends could communicate with the governor, while the rest
were not welcomed at the government house. The split within
the Radical Party widened, to the extent that the two main

groups had in common only their loyal acceptance of Lencinas'

^^La Epoca December 4, 1918. Yrigoyen did not
participate directly in the controversy, but the possibility
of a federal intervention cast a large shadow.
,

,

leadership. The opposition press in Mendoza,
banteringly
referred to Teisaire as the "Prime Minister."
'

Thus, in an unforeseen chain reaction,
what had begun

in August as a purely local controversy, became
by the end
of 1918 a major threat to the institutional stability
of

Mendoza and to the unity of the Radical Party.
While this conflict was exclusively a dispute within
the Radical family, another clash, this time between the

government and the Judicial Power confronted Lencinas and
conservatives again. Immediately after taking office, the

Radicals began questioning on ethical grounds the

appointments made in the past to the Judiciary. As happened
at the national level, the Radical government of Mendoza

controlled the Executive, but the judicial branch continued

mostly in the hands of appointees named during the Regimen,
appointees generally opposed to the Radical creed. The
governor, however, had a very significant advantage over
the President, because the provincial constitution

established a special body, the Judiciary Review Board, to
decide on matters pertaining to the conduct of the judges,
except those from the Supreme Court.
The first legislative assault on the Judiciary was a

request for a general investigation, introduced by Deputy

^•^This board, the Jurado de En juiciamiento, was
formed by the five members of the Supreme Court, five
senators and five deputies. The governor only needed a
legislative majority to get the ten votes required, and
legally dismiss any judge blocking official decisions. The
ten legislators were Lencinists, none from the opposition.
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Carlos Washington lencinas, son of the governor. At
this
time he did not make specific charges against any

magistrate, but in September the campaign to tarnish the

Judiciary focused on two Supreme Court judges, Arturo Punes
and Gregorio Vargas. Deputies approved their impeachment,

but the Senate, where the Lencinists were still a minority,
rejected the charges.
The coup de grace against the Judiciary was given by a

decree of December 18, which declared all its members
subject to new appointment. Lencinas proceeded to replace
three judges from the Supreme Court, four from other lower
courts, and declared vacant the judgeship of Jorge Vera

Vallejo. The stated reason for this daring overhaul was the

lack of legislation regulating the Judicial Power, as called

for in the 1916 provincial constitution. The same
justification that was previously given by the government

for not holding elections for municipal and water authorities
was offered here.
The fact that no law was enacted as required by the

provincial charter, however, need not have prevented the

Judiciary from continuing to function according to the legal
rules set up before 1916. Lencinas' action was considered by
the opposition as an unconstitutional, dictatorial move, one

motivated by revenge against the court's decisions in the
cases of the CompaRia Vitivinlcola and the suspension of the

deputy governor. Reacting against the maneuver of the
to
Executive, several ex-members of the courts petitioned
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Buenos Aires for a federal intervention.^^
This new confrontation added to the burdens
besetting
the governor, and deepened the hostility between
those

defending and attacking the government. A public letter

from the Radical Senator from Entre Rios, Leopoldo Melo,
to two former members of the provincial Supreme Court,

added more heat to the controversy. He condemned the
excesses of "those ruling that province, calling themselves

Radicals." The ex-judges replied to Melo that a word of
solidarity from an authority of such moral and intellectual
caliber constituted a gravestone for the Mendozan

government

. -^-^

Lencinas could not ignore being criticized from Buenos
Aires by such an influential member of the already divided

Radical Party. He sent a very extensive telegram to the
Senator, which clearly reflected the populist position of
the governor,
[Melo' s pretensions^ won't be able to overcome my
convictions and integrity, which I have shaped
through a lifetime of deprivations, sufferings
and afflictions, which you neither know nor
understand; because you have been only a Radical
at the happy times, the times of triumph, when
all the v\^ork was done and was easier to become a
hero [^Radical de la mesa servida y de la gloria
barata]] ....
...I am telling you, clear and loud, with all the
fervor of my convictions and my sense of justice:

feeling of uncertainty surrounded the judicial
circles. It was feared that all the legal decisions
sanctioned after December 18, could eventually be questioned
in view of the apparent unconstitutionality of Lencinas'
decree.
•^^A

'La

Prensa, December 22, 1918.
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you will never be President of the
Nation I repeat it and reaffirm it,Argentine
you
'^-'-^-^
^ " will
never be President. ^4
'

Melo replied to lencinas in an indirect
way, in a
communication to the Intransigent Radicals of
Kendoza.

Referring to the governor's telegram, Melo boasted
of his
seniority in the party and his numerous contributions,

of

all kinds, he said, at the service of the "causa."
He

reaffirmed that the Mendozan leader "did not have the
soul
of a Radical," and concluded that Lencinas'

actions in the

government not only were a contradiction of what the party
always stood for, but reflected the image of the worst

specimen of the Regimen.

Apart from the personal antipathies which increased
with this biting controversy, the whole issue revealed the
emergence of two tendencies within the Radical Party at the

national level. One, legalistic, was closer to the more
powerful, traditional segments. The other, more personalist
and popularly inclined, used words and actions which revived
some of the symbolic characteristics of nineteenth century

caudillismo in the handling of public affairs.

Buenos Aires Becomes the Arbiter for the Second Time
The subordination of the Judiciary was not the only reason

that moved the opposition to demand a federal intervention. But
^^ Los Andes, December
24

^^Ibid.

,

i

1918.

December 27, 1918.
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it was the last straw, the event that tipped the scales
against the highly controversial governor. The National
Senate had approved in September an intervention in Mendoza
in view of the arbitrary elimination of four provincial

deputies, but the bill had died in the Chamber of Deputies.

By December, pressure demanding intervention had mounted
considerably.
The opposition in Mendoza believed that lencinas had

trampled on the constitution. His uncompromising decisions
and lopsided interpretations of the nature and scope of his
rule, they claimed, made impossible a political acconmiodation

without the assistance of the national government. The
Lencinists, on the other side, also needed federal help to

retrieve a situation which had grown more entangled and

adverse for them. Since neither political sector was prepared
to reverse its position, there was no room left for an

acceptable solution within the province.

Yrigoyen himself was reluctant to intervene. He had, it
will be recalled, sent Loza in November 1917, to accomplish
the institutional regeneration of Mendoza. Now, a year later,
the necessity of sending a new intervention was embarrassing

for it was an indication of the disarray affecting what once

promised to be a showcase province for the Causa.
To save it or to damn it, there was hardly any other

solution available but to intervene in the province. Yrigoyen
discussed this matter with his cabinet and decided to send the
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intervention. However, there was
disagreement as to the
scope: should the reorganization of
the provincial
authorities affect just the legislature
or should it also
include the Judiciary? The cabinet
discussed this matter
obstinately. The Minister of the Interior,
Rosendo Gomez,
and the Minister of Justice and Public
Education, Jose
Santos Salinas, enthusiastically defended
Lencinas' position
in favor of intervening at both the legislature
and
judicial branches. The rest insisted on reorganizing
only

the legislature.

Congress was scheduled to convene on December 26, to
start a special period. Two days before, to avoid having
to

request congressional approval, Yrigoyen issued a decree

intervening in Mendoza and appointing Elpidio Gonzalez as
interventor. The decree did not specify the branches of the

government subject to the federal reorganization. Its
purpose was vaguely stated: to restore the "functional
normalcy" in the province. Yrigoyen'

s

interpretation of the

Mendozan situation was spelled out more clearly by La Epoca

,

his semi-official spokesman. The National Executive did not

question the legitimacy of Lencinas' rule as a democratically
elected governor of his province. But it was essential that
any government should function within the constitutional

boundaries. Lencinas had exceeded his legal powers, claimed

La Epoca

,

and therefore he had subverted the republican

.

102

'System of government

Congressional opposition criticized the decree

intervening Mendoza on several grounds: for having been
issued only 48 hours before Congress was schedule to
convene, for its ambiguity regarding the branches sub jet
to intervention, and because the interventor appointed was

not a guarantee of impartiality, since Carlos Washington

Lencinas and other Radical leaders from Mendoza had
campaigned actively in behalf of Elpidio Gonzalez in a

recent election in the province of Cordoba.
As it turned

out,

Gonzalez never served as interventor.

Tomas de Veyga, head of the Bank of the Province of Buenos

Aires 37 was appointed to replace Gonzalez when Yrigoyen

decided to name him Buenos Aires Police Chief early in 1919.
The definition of the intervention's scope was made by

Yrigoyen only after exploring the issue with Lencinas.

Horacio Oyhanarte, Yrigoyen'

s

troubleshooter in Mendoza,

visited that province twice during December. He asked

Lencinas to decide on three alternatives, in order to
negotiate the task of the intervention. They were: to resign
as governor, to allow the admission of the four legislators
of the opposition,

or to intervene only in the legislature.

In a letter to the President, dated January
^^La Epoca

,

1,

1919, Lencinas

December 26, 1918.

Veyga had been a federal judge, professor at the
Law School and National Deputy of the Radical Party.
^"^De

.
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discarded the idea of his resignation. If he
were to do it,
he told Yrigoyen, he would scrap thirty
years of struggle
against the oligarchy of Civit and Villanueva.
Furthermore,
he assured the President that he would win
the elections
again, against all the other parties combined,
and that
hie political success would also enhance the stature

of the

national government. The governor did not consent to the

incorporation of the four conservative deputies-elect,
because he feared that together with the Radical dissidents,
they could cripple his projects in the legislature. He did

consent to the intervention in the legislature, although he

also would have preferred the inclusion of the Judiciary

lencinas greeted this intervention without the fanfare
and high hopes with which he had welcomed Interventor Loza

fourteen months before.-"^ In his decree transferring the
Executive Power to de Veyga, on February 17, 1919, Lencinas

reasserted his unyielding belief in the rectitude of his
rule. He stated with indomitable confidence, that he would

prove to the nation that without any help from other powers,
he would be supported by the will of the people, in free

elections, as an unqualified popular ratification of his

"^^A copy of Lencinas' letter was made available by
his youngest son, Horacio Antulio Lencinas, in Mendoza.

^^The train in which de Veyga traveled arrived at

Mendoza early in the morning. Minister Puebla was at the
station to greet the commissioner. But since de Veyga was
still in bed, Puebla ordered a police officer to give de
Veyga the official welcome and left the station. Los Andes
February 18, 1919.

,
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performance as governor.
In his 300 days in office, Lencinas had been able to
consolidate his popularity with the comrnon man. The Lencinist

used every opportunity to enhance the figure of their

leader

But the massive support from the electorate could

not shield him from the frustrations of troublesome,

unresolved problems, many of them created by his own
arbitrariness. The province turned momentarily to the Federal
Commissioner. His decisions were anxiously awaited by all
segments, each one in search of lasting solutions, but also

seeking to avenge its grievances.

For Lencinas, it looked like November 1917 again, but
the clouds had already replaced the glory of the morning sun.

Ministerio del Interior, Memoria del Ministerio del
Interior 1918 - 1919 (Buenos Aires, 1919), p. 139.
,

^^In December 1917, at the height of the political
campaign, the Radical Party had condemned the participation
of public employees, as such, in politics. But a year later
it reversed its position, and the rules were changed to
authorize public servants to support the government.
Accordingly, on January 20, 1919, there was a public
celebration of the anniversary of the election held a year
before. All government offices were emptied, while the
personnel attended the party's festivities at the Odeon
Theatre, in Mendoza.

105

CHAPTER

IV

THE SECOND STAGE OF THE POPULIST
EXPERIMENT
A New Federal Interlude

Interventor de Veyga delt with the Mendozan
crisis by
adhering strictly to constitutional rules
and applying
them with complete personal independence.
In a few days he
settled the two most pressing issues: first, he
ruled that
Alvarez should be reinstated as deputy governor,
and
second, he ordered that the judges arbitrarily
suspended

by Lencinas should also be reinstated. With these two

decisions de Veyga seemingly accomplished the most important

part of his mission, but in fact, this marked only the

beginning of his problems. Unobjectionable from the legal
viewpoint, these decisions left the political impasse as

entangled as before, and in addition provoked the immediate

ill-will of the Lencinists.
Given the rift between the two Radical factions, what

kind of rapprochement would have been possible between
Lencinas and Alvarez? And after the drastic, authoritarian

measure taken against members of the Judiciary, what type
of workable relationship would be possible now between that

power and the executive? De Veyga had been sent to Mendoza
restore legal order and harmony between the branches of the
provincial government, but paradoxically, his decisions
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hardened even more the antagonistic positions
of the Lencinists
and their opponents, and led to a political
dead end.

Fearful that the return of the governor would
toughen his
attitude toward the opposition, several groups
petitioned
Buenos Aires for the continuance in office of the
commissioner.
The Partido Autonomista asserted that the only
possible
"functional regularity" was to break up the Lencinist

apparatus before holding any election.^ The Intransigent
Radicals, the Socialists, and the Progressive Democrats

requested that the executive power be also intervened, so a new
election for governor could be held and thus, effectively stop
Lencinas' arbitrariness.

The Centre de Bodegueros, in the name

of the well-being of the province and especially of its

industry and commerce, pleaded that de Veyga remain in power
for the longest time possible.-^ Voicing the same view, Los
Andes appealed to the patriotism of the commissioner, observing

with foreboding that if Lencinas had earlier dared to accuse
some of his old Radical friends of being insane and traitors,

his return to office would revive the autocracy of the "Praile

Aldao."^ This newspaper, however, in a display of commitment to

Hps

Andes

,

March 10, 1919.

^La Prensa , March 8, 9, and 10, 1919.
^

Los Andes, March 8, 1919.

^Ibid. March 13, 1919. This newspaper referred to the
caudillo Felix Aldao, fervid supporter of Juan Manuel de Rosas,
who ruled Mendoza despotically during part of the decades of
1830 and 1840.
,
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principle amidst stormy partisanship, believed that
the proper
step was to let the people decide freely about
Lencinas. If hi
party would win again, said Los Andes it would
mean
,

that he

represented the aspirations of the people.^
Delfin Alvarez pressured Lencinas with the proposal that
he would resign if the governor would do the same. But his
gesture was in vain; to the Lencinists their old caudillo

embodied the movement itself and his political stature was

beyond any compromise. Meanwhile, the Radicals did not remain
idle. Lencinas and Teisaire, openly at odds with the intervent

traveled throughout the province recruiting adherents to

petition Yrigoyen for de Veyga's immediate replacement.
Lencinas believed that de Veyga's purpose was to damage him
politically, although he thought that his prestige was above
any maneuver attempted at the national level against him and

his government.
Their confrontation led Lencinas and de Veyga to discuss
the stalemate of Kendozan affairs with the President, but not

in the presence of each other. According to Delfor del Valle,

an Yrigoyenist Senator for the Federal Capital and a close

political friend of the President, Yrigoyen censured Lencinas

personally for the mishandling of his government and the
stained image it attached to the reform efforts of the party.
Such was the deadlock between the governor and de Veyga,

explained del Valle, that on March 27, in an effort to

^Los Andes, March 13, 1919.

o
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maintain institutional order in Mendoza,
Yrigoyen forced
Lencinas to resign. The President himself

dictated the words

to Lencinas, who "touched and with tears in
his eyes," wrote

place in your hands my irrevocable resignation
as Governor of the Province of Kendoza, thus
the
Federal Government would have in their hands all
the necessary elements to resolve in a sovereign
and democratic manner what to do with the powers
of this province.

I

Del Valle said that Yrigoyen never considered this note
an official document, and that Lencinas remained on friendly

terms with the President. Beyond the anecdotal value of this
episode, what is clear is that the solution to the Mendozan

dilemma rested in the hands of the President again, as it had
in the times of the Regimen,
The Minister of the Interior, Rosendo Gomez, vainly tried
to effect a reconciliation between de Veyga and Lencinas.

Gomez told the interventor that Lencinas was an old friend and

political colleague, highly respected in the party. De Veyga
replied that he did not view their relationship at that level,
"because he had gone to Mendoza as a Judge of an institutional
7
conflict and not as a fellow party member.

Senadores 1929, I, 537-539. A photocopy of Lencinas*
letter appears on p. 539. Dardo Olguin, although citing his
source as Del Valle' s words in Congress that day, September
pp. 439-440), quoted his speech
25, 1929 ( Lencinas
fragmentarily, excluding from a long paragraph the Senator's
account of how Yrigoyen dictated Lencinas' resignation to
him. Instead, Olguin states that Lencinas left the
presidential office and wrote his note in a small adjacent
room.
,

,

'^Los Andes,

April

4,

1919.

s
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In spite of the long friendship between Yrigoyen
and
Lencinas, it can be inferred that at this Juncture,
the

President, displeased with the troubled government of
the

Mendozan caudillo, favored the position of the commissioner.®
The calculated presidential inertia, however, deepened the

pessimism of those who wanted the interventor to return to
Mendoza. They were afraid that Yrigoyen'

s

decision would

take personal interests into consideration above those of
the institutions involved.
At this point, de Veyga resigned on April

5

alleging

that the Lencinists were openly questioning his impartiality.^

Minister Gomez and the Governor of Mendoza urged the President
to accept the resignation, but Yrigoyen rejected it contending

that the mission of institutional justice that should be

carried out in Mendoza could not be stalled by any personal

reservation. Nevertheless, de Veyga insisted, and Yrigoyen then

Conservative National Deputy Manuel Lainez affirmed in
his newspaper El Diario of Buenos Aires, that two or three
governors like Lencinas would be enough to bring back to
Argentina the barbarism of several decades ago, April 5, 1919.
The Intransigent Radicals told de Veyga that they viewed
"with horror" the possibility that Lencinas would return to
office. La Prensa April 10, 1919.
,

,

^Senator Benito Villanueva, defending de Veyga'
position, affirmed that when he had decided to issue a decree
reinstating the four conservative provincial deputies
rejected by the Lencinists in 1918, he was recalled to
Buenos Aires, and never returned to Mendoza. Senadores 1920,
,

I,

669.
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accepted his decision. "^^
The President appointed Perfecto Araya the
new head of
the federal mission. He had been a Radical
legislator for
Santa Pe from 1914 to 1918, and was now a member of
the

Consejo Supremo de Guerra y Marina. The instructions given
to Araya were more explicit than those issued to de Veyga:
he was to call for elections to renew the entire legislature,

and then reinstate the governor. Accordingly, early in May
1919 f the second interventor dissolved the legislative branch

and set the election date for June

22."^^ The

partisan

alignment of the future legislature was especially important

because it had to elect a National Senator to replace Emilio
Civit, whose term ended in April 1919.
The refusal of the Federal Government to order a new

election for the governorship led the discontented opposition
to renew their demands. Among them, the Intransigent Radicals

petitioned Araya to replace all the high ranking personnel of
the administration, including the police, in order to insure

impartiality. They reaffirmed that they would prefer to be

governed by an interventor until the end of Lencinas*

term,

A virulent anti-Yrigoyenist newspaper said that when
s mission in Mendoza was over, he had told some
friends: "I am poor, the only fortune I will leave to my sons
is the integrity of my name. If I would have returned to
Mendoza, I would have lost it." La Pronda November 9, 1919.
De Veyga had died in Buenos Aires the day before.
de Veyga'

,

^^The provincial conservative deputies that had been
elected in previous elections, protested in vain against
Araya' s decision, alleging that their credentials had been
approved at the appropriate time, and that their terms only
could be revoked by the procedure determined by the provincial
constitution.
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rather than see him reinstated in office.

Using the justification that his government was
a
temporary one, and limited by specific instructions,

Arayja

denied police assistance in order to enforce
returning the

Compania Vitivinicola to its original authorities, as had

been ordered by the provincial Supreme Court. The attorneys
of the CompaRia, invoking Article 45 of the national

constitution, solicited the impeachment of the President for

failing to take the necessary steps for the enforcement of
the Supreme Court decision. Without delay Yrigoyen disapproved

Araya's handling of the case and ordered him to comply with the
legal resolution. The commissioner obeyed reluctantly. But the

provincial bureaucratic machinery, mostly in Lencinists' hands,
was averse to seeing the Compaflia defeat one of Lencinas

dearest accomplishments, and at once began clogging the

administrative paperwork of the CompaRia to water down the
presidential order as much as possible. The bodegueros
requested that the President end these irritating measures,

but Yrigoyen let them know that the solution to these
annoyances was a matter to be handled exclusively by the
province. Therefore, the situation remained unchanged during

Araya's brief interlude.
As election time drew closer, the polarization of the

diverse political sectors into Lencinism and anti-Lencinism

heightened. Conservatives, Socialists, and Radical

Intransigents emphasized their common cause against the
government and minimized the traditional differences

112

separating them.^^ The Lencinists also carried
on intensive
political activity, they supported workers on
strike,
and

especially the contratistas against owners of the
vineyards.
In the last days of the campaign, as reported daily by
the newspapers,

opposition voices increasingly complained

against the partisan attitude of the intervention, specifically
its indifference to the violence waged in the streets by the

Lencinists before the eyes of a passive police; the
organization of gangs to intimidate the opposition; the
threats against some industrialists, and the hardships

encountered by opposition groups trying to carry out their

propaganda because of the aggressiveness of the followers of
the governor. "^^

Given an electoral climate that did not offer any hope

for the opposition, the Autonomists finally decided to abstain

from the election, alleging a total lack of guarantees. This
12

The solidarity among the anti-Lencinist groups was
evident at a rally held in the capital in Kay 1919. In the
so-called Alameda there was a meeting of the Intransigent
Radicals at 4:00 P.M. Half an hour later a conservative rally
took place in another location of the Alameda. When they were
over, people from the two rallies marched together to the house
of Delfin Alvarez to show him their support. Los Andes May 29,
1919.
,

^^The Socialist National Deputy Augusto Bunge, who took
part in the campaign with his colleague Federico Pinedo,
depicted the Lencinists as the dregs of society. Bunge stated
that while a Socialist rally was in progress in Lujan, a
suburb of Mendoza,
tres veces en torno de la plaza una
. . .desfilaron
serie de carros llenos de pobres diablos, del mas
lastimoso aspecto, muchos de los cuales se
tambaleaban en forma alarmante a cada oscilacion
del carro, y que con voces vacilantes gritaban
"Viva el gaucho Lencinas
Los Andes, June 16, 1919.
"

"
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decision climaxed the gradual weakening
of the conservatives
since their defeat of January 19I8,
and it was taken in
spite of the fact that they still had
some very capable and
indeed courageous leaders, such as those
agitated
times

demanded.
The Lencinists won the election of
June 22 by a generous
margin. They took the capital and every one
of the departments,
and as a result they gained the majority
in both chambers of
the legislature, for the first time in the
Senate. The

Intransigent Radicals won the seats for the minority. "^^
Lencinas in Power Again. The Social Sphere

After five months under two federal commissioners, lencinas
was back in the saddle of the province by the will of a large

majority, just as he had predicted. In an interview with Los

Andes

,

a few days before taking office, Lencinas declared his

intention to pursue a government of moderation. He acknowledged
that at difficult times during his early government he had to

apply harsh measures in order "to protect the authority of the

ruler and the image of the party." But now, he said, the time
15
had come for tolerance, not violence.^

The governor's opening message to the legislature on July 26,

The election returns showed 15,097 votes for the Radical
July
Party against 6,459 for the Intransigent Radicals. Ibid
17» 1919. This Mendozan newspaper reacted resignedly to this
electoral evidence: "The people have decided, and this is the
government they want. So, let it be." July 14, 1919. La Nacion,
July 21, 1919, less enthusiastic about the virtues of the
principle of the majority rule, asserted that what had been chosen
was Lencinas' legislature, not Mendoza's one.
.

^^Los Andes, July I8, 1919.

,
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1919, the day he reassumed office, was
brief and almost
exclusively political. Lencinas regretted
that the unity
and discipline of the Radical Party
in older times had been
replaced by divisions, both in Mendoza and
the rest of the
country. Locally, he condemned those who
owed their

positions to the party but were now sabotaging

it— a

direct

reference to Alvarez— and he especially criticized
de Veyga
for having reversed his decision on the Judicial
Power.
There was no social or economic reference of any kind
with

respect to the state of the province. The exception was a
general outline for a new legal structure to deal with

important aspects of industrial relations, including the
creation of labor courts.
The labor legislation that Lencinas planned to propose

put emphasis on conciliation and the significant role of
the State in resolving social conflicts. He would propose
the organization of unions of workers as well of employers,

with the purpose being to create among them a harmonious
relationship. Likewise, he favored legislation establishing

conciliatory procedures and final compulsory arbitration,
as a healthy solution for major conflicts between labor and

management. The governor planned to submit legislation to

prevent the formation of latifundia in order to protect the
rural worker and the small landowner, and other measures to

regulate rural rents. To look after the proper enforcement
of these laws Lencinas proposed the creation of a new type
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of court,

created especially to deal with
labor disputes.
In his message the governor recognized
the difficulties
in the way of implementing these
initiatives. But having
established the 8-hour day and the minimum
wage in advance
of the rest of the nation, his faith in
his high purposes
was reassured. The governor's outline reflected
his basic
thoughts on the role which the government should
play in

ensuring social justice for the working man. He perceived
the function of the State as that of a supreme arbiter

balancing the interests in conflict.
Even though Lencinas now enjoyed a confortable majority
in both houses of the legislature, these innovative ideas

were never transformed into specific proposals for legislative
action. The governor needed an essentially united party and
a well disciplined body of legislators. He did not have

either of them during the second part of his government, for
the bitter intra-party split found in the legislative

chambers another forum where the rivalries intensified.

Similar principles to those set forth by Lencinas in
1919 were to become, many years later, the standard labor

rules of modern nations. But Lencinas had in mind a

paternalistic structure, functioning to a large extent
through the personal leadership of an enlighted individual,
and not the highly bureaucratic, impersonal organization

^^Provincia de Mendoza, Kensaje del Gobernador Dr J ose
Nestor Lencinas a la Honorable Legislatura (Mendoza, 1919).
.
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characteristic of modern states.

Besieged by the serious problems
he had to face since
coming back to office, lencinasadvanced scheme of labor
legislation remained just a blueprint
for the future. But

his towering accomplishments— the
8-hour day and the
minimum wage-already gained for him
a secure and privileged
place among the early social reformers
of Argentina,
regardless of his actions and attitudes
in other spheres of
government.

Lencinas was genuinely cognizant of the
necessities
and aspirations of the humble people. As
an individual and
as a public servant he promoted their
spiritual and material
well-being. His firm convictions and the leadership
he
enjoyed for many years in his province before he reached
the
governorship, instilled in him a devoted concern for the

elevation of the masses. "^"^
In the party Jargon he was called an apostle, like
Yrigoyen, and he displayed a paternalistic disposition

toward the large number of economically less fortunate
people, like a shepherd who must take care of his flock.
This paternalism was born of his conviction that he really
17

To Lencinas is attributed the statement that "the
mountains are ascended in alpargatas," connoting that the
heights are only reachable by the humble people. Gabriel
del Mazo, El Radi calismo Ensayo sobre su his toria ^
doctrina, Vol. I (Buenos Aires, 1957)
p. 169; and Arturo
Jauretche, El medio pelo en la sociedad argentina (Buenos
Aires, 1967T7 p. 172.
.

,
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understood and interpreted the yearnings
of the lower
classes. Lencinas voiced this thought
in a manifesto which
well may be the consummate populist
expression of
his

government;
...we do not belong to these governments
live in an ivory tower, where the voice which
of the
poor never reaches; but we authentically
belong
to the people. Therefore, we feel that
the
majesty of our rule is enhanced when we speak
directly to the common man. Ours is a government
which rejoices with the happiness of the masses,
because we share their sorrows, because we are
the people themselves. 18

On practical grounds, however, Lencinas' actions to

improve the daily living conditions of the poor were not
as revolutionary as his social legislation. The conditions
of poverty affecting large sectors of the rural and urban

population were not significantly altered during the
Lencinas administration.

Housing was a major indicator of the social decay
afflicting the lower class; in the capital there were a
good number of conventillos which only had two bathrooms
to serve almost two hundred persons. Many houses were in

fact wretched places without a toilet. In areas beyond the

wooden pavement, the general conditions resembled an
Ottoman city, with the not uncommon sight in the streets
of a number of invalids and needy people, many of them
1

o

Union Civica Radical, El Comite Departamental de
San Carlos of rece a sus correli gi onari os la recopilaci 5n
de algunos documentos politicos de actualidad (Mendoza,
1919), p. 11.
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mendicant children.

This was to a large extent a direct

responsibility of the municipal authorities.
But beyond
what specifically concerned the municipal
governments,

the province did not take any radical
measures to alleviate
the distressing pauperism in which the lower
classes lived.
The Lencinist press, nonetheless, often accused
the well-

to-do sectors of profiting from this situation. La
Montarla

upbraided Benito Villanueva for being one of the most
prominent among the legion of conservatives owing
conventillos.

20

At this time the Radicals, while championing political

equality, did not envision that the role of the State

might be extended to include serving as a relief agency for
the most needy, and reducing social and economic disparities

by changing the fiscal structure and realigning the

priorities of the province. The upper class segments

•^"The beggar is an institution in this city,"
expressed Los Andes December 7, 1919 in one of its many
editorials denouncing the shameful living conditions of the
poor. Water contamination was very common because of the
large number of cesspools; and the constant dust in the
streets and garbage left on the sidewalks attested to the
unhealthy climate in the popular barrios of Mendoza.
Furthermore, Lencinas was criticized for sponsoring a
monument to the worker while endemic ills, like goiter,
continued to be an insurmountable problem throughout the
province,
,

»

^^An illustration of the social and economic abyss
dividing the provincial society was given by two notices
published on the same page in Los Andes on November 3i
1918. While one reiterated a complaint about the
considerable number of conventillos without a single toilet,
the other, a few lines down, announced that that afternoon
a "five o'clock tea" would take place in the Jockey Club,
with a selected musical program as entertainment.
,
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financed and administered a few charitable
associations,
which performed an extremely useful
service to the

community, especially for the most
impoverished. It was a
self-imposed moral obligation, inspired by
humanitarian
principles, but it was carried out within the
elitist
framework of the traditional society of Mendoza.^^
The provincial budget, while a good source
of

employment for the lower segments, did not provide
strong
direct assistance for the poor. Moreover, the fiscal
structure was not engineered to create a social
revolution, but oriented to serve the needs of the

bureaucracy-ridden provincial apparatus. The most important
social service was hospital assistance, free of charge to
the people, but always inadequate. Outside the capital

there were only two hospitals in all the province, both

located within forty miles of the capital.
21

An example of the aristocratic-minded approach
which characterized the upper segments was given by Josef ina
Civit de Ortega, daughter of Emilio Civit, when she referred
to a kindergarten created in Mendoza in 1908 by Law No. 474,
during her father's second term as governor. Mrs. Ortega
stated that it was a model in its class, the best in Argentina
and perhaps in South America a viewpoint also expressed by
Theodore Roosevelt, she added, when he visited Mendoza. V/hat
filled Mrs. Ortega with pride was that a jury at the Ghent
Exhibition, in Belgium, awarded the first prize to the
kindergarten for its architectural merits. Thus, while the
conservative government of Mendoza had created an institution
whose highest pride was having aroused the European curiosity
for its architectural values, many dwellings of the poor

—

II (Mendoza, 1970), 622.
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Old Longings and New Controversies.
The Political Scene

Lencinas' hopes to further the enactment
of progressive
social legislation were rendered fruitless
by the resurgence
of old political problems and the appearance
of new ones.

Pour of these problems became major political
issues in the
province: the impeachment of Deputy Governor
Alvarez;
the

teachers'

strike and its aftermath; the election of Teisaire

as National Senator by the legislature; and the
appointment

by the National Chamber of Deputies of a committee to

investigate the enforcement of individual rights in Mendoza.
These issues renewed the wrangle between Lencinists and

anti-Lencinists, and brought the already strained

relationship between Lencinas and Yrigoyen to its lowest ebb.
The issue of ousting the deputy governor was first on

the agenda of the reinstated government. The Lencinists were

determined that the number two authority in the province
should be a man of their confidence. Having failed to persuade

Alvarez to resign and, later, to get rid of him by charges of
insanity, the new Lencinist majority in the legislature was

finally able to carry out Lencinas' resolution to eject from
office his undesirable deputy governor.
On July 30, only four days after Lencinas reassumed
power, a petition was introduced to the legislature

requesting Alvarez' impeachment, charging him with having
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improperly fulfilled his official duties.
The intense
political rivalry aroused by this maneuver
was clearly
indicated by the political weight of Alvarez'

defenders:

National Senator Leopoldo Melo and National
Deputies Juan
Luis Ferrarotti, Miguel Laurencena, Carlos A.
Becu and Anibal
Cabrera, all Radicals.
The legislature observed the constitutional
formalities

step by

step— although

the defense was pressed by arbitrarily

set time limitations— and on September 13, the Senate removed

Alvarez as deputy governor, finding him guilty of having
illegally replaced the secretary of the chamber. As the
Lencinists had a large majority in that body, this ruse

proved to be a good justification.^^
The adverse publicity created by this political

manipulation of the Lencinists occurred when labor agitation
was riding a high crest in Mendoza. At a time when organized

resistance by workingmen against social and economic

inequalities was very often branded as the work of

Maximalists

— the

term given to the Marxists

—

Lencinas'

,

approach to labor conflicts was markedly paternalistic. This

became more evident in the latter half of 1919

»

a period of

social and political confrontations. A qualified observer of

Mendozan life said of this attitude of Lencinas that
Meanwhile, feeling his safety endangered in Mendoza,
Alvarez moved to Buenos Aires. There, one more time, he
demanded of the President a federal intervention in his
province. Ricardo Baez, an old-time Radical who was the
acting chairman of the Senate, formally became the number two
man in the province.
,
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j^s^^gialista conceptions could
nn?
not tolerate the fact that a few "gringos"
were
^o^^ga or printing shop workers
mf^'^'l^Z^
against hira. He was the only one who could
resolve
these problems and he did not admit any
intermediaries. 23

During the de Veyga and Araya interventions, the
propertied sectors resented the open Lencinist support
given to strikers who demanded, among other things, the

enforcement of the 8-hour day and the minimum wage. But it
was the teachers'

strike which provoked the major social

and political reverberation during Lencinas' rule. It began
in April 1919 when a small number of teachers founded an

association aimed at correcting deficiencies in the school
system. The organizers of this group were leftist in outlook;

but regardless of their political orientation, their
complaint about inefficiencies was a legitimate one.^^

^^arianetti, En la verde le jania del recuerdo,
24

—

—

p.

166,

This group bound by secrecy, like a lodge was
seeking to end the delay in the payment of teachers' salaries
and the rents of the school buildings; to press for the
regular! zati on of the federal subsidy; to replace the
existing anarchy of methods and programs; and to erase
political favoritisms. The existence of these inefficiencies
was later confirmed by Eduardo Luzuriaga, acting Director of
the School Board during Araya' s intervention, in May 1919.
Luzuriaga stated that in order to collect their salaries, the
teachers had to discount them at a provincial financial
institution. As regards the accounting records of the Board,
Luzuriaga reported that the last entries recorded were from
1917. La Prensa, July 20, 1919. Among the leaders of Idea
were Florencia Fossatti, a highly regarded Kendozan educator,
and Angelica Mendoza, who in those years helped to establish
the Communist Party in Mendoza. Years later she left the
party, received a doctorate at Columbia University, and in
the late 1950' s taught at the National University of Cuyo.
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These teachers divulged their purposes in a
publication
called Idea. Enrique Julio, the Director of the
Provincial

School Board, a very capable man but, according to the

Mendozan historian Jorge
authoritarian one,

^

A.

Segura, an intolerant and

interpreted the creation of the

association as a revolt against the school authorities, and
a source of indiscipline among the provincial teachers.

Therefore, he suspended the teachers who organized it. This

marked the beginning of a long conflict: the provincial
teachers decided to strike and requested Lencinas to replace
Julio.
The significance of this confrontation went far beyond
a simple labor dispute. The fact that the teachers clashed

with the government immediately politicized the conflict.
The opposition, unexpectedly, had found an ally. This

situation, however, posed a contradiction: while the

organizers of the strike were ideologically on the left, the

traditional anti-Lencinists were conservatives. Another

incongruity of this alliance was that in order to reinforce

their bargaining position, the teachers sought the support
of the Federacion Obrera Regional Argentina (FORA), but this

anarchist-led trade union central was anathema to the
industrialists, businessmen, and the well-to-do in general,

who sympathized with the strike mainly because it embarrassed
the government.

^^Jorge I. Segura, Historia de Mendoza, p. 769.
Unpublished.
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Lencinas believed that, above any other
consideration,
his authority was at stake. Accordingly, he
adopted
an

inflexible position which propelled the conflict,
contrary
to his intention, beyond the bounds of the
province and
created still another fissure in his relationship with

President Yrigoyen. Lencinas would not accept any solution

based on displacing those whom he regarded as his trusted
political associates. No one in his home had imposed any

policies on him, he said, and the same policy should be

applied in the government.
When de Veyga was appointed interventor, early in
1919

»

he reinstated the teachers who had been expelled;

and since he was appointing his own assistants, he removed

Julio from the School Board. This situation continued under

Interventor Araya. But when Lencinas came back to office,
in July 1919, he reappointed Julio as Director of the

School Board.
To compensate for the loss of school classes created

by the strike, the teachers taught pupils at their own
houses. This situation induced the opposition to urge a

federal intervention, since the provincial government
could not guarantee primary education, as required in

Article

5

of the national constitution. There were

^^Los Andes, July 25, 1919. One of the tactics of
the Lencinists was to promote the creation of a new trade
union for teachers, to counteract Maestros Unidos, which
was the established organization, and which had declared
the strike. Thus, the so-called Union Mendocina de
Maestros was born, grouping those backing Lencinas.

—
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stoppages of mercantile activities in support
of teachers
—a general strike lasted eight days— and the police
reacted against the strikers with vigorous
repression. The

opposition blamed lencinas for the climate of social
disorder than ensued, alleging that his stubbornness
in

supporting Julio had caused the teachers' strike, truly
exotic for Mendoza, it was asserted,

^'^

and a damaging

paralysis of general activities.
The response of the Lencinists was a bill, introduced

in the legislature by Senator Manuel Molina, prohibiting

all provincial personnel from becoming members of any trade
union. This proposal was based on the alleged need to

protect the highest interests of the community against the

despicable intentions of the Maximalists.

But the bill

never reached the floor of the Senate.
La Nacion accused the government of Mendoza of

following a two-faced policy in regard to the rights of
the workers. As far as the major sources of wealth were

concerned

— the

vines, the bodegas, commerce in general

the government thought that trade-unionism was an inevitable

phenomenon and a positive tool to achieve social progress,
even if the unions resorted to violence. But the government,
on the other hand, under siege by the teachers, considered

the strike as politically-motivated and as an unacceptable

^'^Los Andes,

^^Ibid.

,

August 13, 1919.

August 23, 1919.
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anarchical threat.
Early in August the government partly eased
public
tension by ordering an investigation into the
accounting
office of the School Board, to verify the presumed

irregularities that Luzuriaga had denounced, and Julio
then
stepped down temporarily. When the administrative

investigation ended at the beginning of September,

declaring Julio free from any wrongdoing, he was reinstated

by the governor. This in turn touched off a new strike and
a further deterioration of the authority invested in the

School Board. Police repression intensified and many
teachers were fired. -^"^
The atmosphere of the provincial capital continued to
"be

disturbed: the FORA arranged a one-day general strike

for the last day of September; the encounters between

policemen and strikers and the claims of police mistreatment

continued unabated. The government dealt harshly with the
labor segments that sided with the strikers, alleging that

their only interest was to upset the social order.

-^"^

^^La Nacion, August 24, 1919.
^^La Epoca September 9, 1919, reported that the
Mendozan government had denied charges that the teachers
could not meet freely. It also defended the procedures of
the police as being directed only against those engaging in
subversive activities and as being designed to guarantee
the rights of the teachers who wished to work.
,

in September 1919, England experienced its
greatest labor conflict, involving 500,000 railway workers.
Lloyd George's government faced the strike sternly, and

^Hate
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The importance of the strike and the
widespread

commotion it provoked were echoed in Buenos Aires.
University
students in the Federal Capital organized a number
of

rallies in support of the teachers and there was
a proposal
to the Federacion Universitaria Argentina to declare
a

national student strike if Yrigoyen failed to intervene in
Mendoza. 32 Any effort of the President to reconcile the

parties needed the acquiescence of Lencinas. The latter had

promised to discuss the problem with Yrigoyen, but remained
in Mendoza, preoccupied with the school conflict and the

heated Radical dispute over the election of a National
Senator. To add to Lencinas' difficulties, National Deputy

Bunge informed Yrigoyen that the deportation of many workers
from Mendoza "savagely forsaken in the desert by the police,"

had been proved beyond any doubt.

-^-^

To neutralize the adverse

effects of these incidents, the Radical legislators of

Mendoza declared that public opinion in Buenos Aires was

used all means at hand to maintain public order, believing
that the workers were used by extremists for sinister
purposes. In Mendoza, Lencinas had followed the same pattern
toward the strikes besetting his province, and he felt
reassured by Lloyd George's actions. In a press interview,
Minister Puebla remarked that "public opinion will judge
whether a government which deals with its labor problems
by applying the same policy as the most advanced nation in
the world can be labelled barbaric." La Naci5n November 2,
,

1919.
•^^La Prensa

,

October

8,

1919.

^^La Fronda, October 10, 1919.
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being misled by the biased information of La
Nacion and
La Prensa and that the people of the province
were
,

enjoing their rights as they never did before. -^^
By October 1919, six months after the teachers had

made the first challenge to the school administration, the
conflict had spread widely into other provincial activities

and even became a preoccupation of the national government.

For those at one end of the political spectrum this
complicated episode was simply a subversion engineered by

undesirable Reds. For those at the other end, the only
possible remedy was a federal intervention in the three

branches of government.
With the passage of time, the original issues of the
strike became enmeshed with the political positions of the

people involved in it. This was exemplified at a rally held
in Mendoza on October 16 in support of the strikers. Among
the guests were Julio V. Gonzalez and Gabriel del Mazo, for

the Federacion Universitaria Argentina and Luis H.

Sommariva, president of the Federacion Universitaria de La
^^ los Andes October 11, 1919. In open dissidence
from the thoughts of the legislative majority, Luis Maria
Calle, co-director of this newspaper, denounced the abuses
of the government, not to the provincial or national
authorities, but to La Frensa , which he regarded as the
only barrier in Argentina against the growing
authoritarianism of the Radical governments. Calle
asserted that, in his presence and that of Deputy Bunge,
a speaker at a Radical rally had advised the police to
set fire to the printing shop of Los Andes and to
"enlazar los conservadores. " La Prensa , October 13, 1919.
,

,
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Plata.

When Gonzalez was addressing
the people, he was
heckled by someone in the orowd,
to whom
he replied:

"

P^^P^^
^hi^
has
salf "-vw"""
said
Viva el gauoho lencinas!" audience
We are not
"'^'^^"^
dea?h o? any
persfn
person....
"'wr/°'''?
We do not repudiate the
gauoho because
of his condition, we love the
gaucho who lives in
''''
fectifn of °hrs°wif
cniiaren, nviL'°
children
living a simple and honest life. Fan"
But we
-omes from 'the'citier
^^i^^^^-h^
with the police saber to attack
^tSlhrSom'o!
our institutions
at, ui i^uxions,
to curtail our freedom
,

f

Purther assailing Lencinism, Gonzalez
echoed Juan
Bautista Alberdi, stating that it was
necessary

to be alert

in order to prevent universal suffrage
from being

transformed into universal ignorance. Otherwise,
he said,
the minority will rule where the majority
is imbecile.
In spite of the local storms and the pressures
from

Buenos Aires, Lencinas remained intractable. He thought
it
was his legitimate privilege as a ruler to select his
subordinates. He maintained this inflexible position until,
finally, the conflict lost its steam. The support of the

workers in behalf of the teachers weakened in a few weeks

because of the financial attrition inflicted upon the
35

This politically-inspired participation of leaders
from university students organizations, anticipated the
similar collision which took place mostly in Buenos Aires,
in 1945.
•^^Los Andes
October 17, 1919. To quell the agitation,
the Radical legislators proposed that Lencinas name Julio
mayor of the capital and appoint to the School Board an
educator from outside the province, as Yrigoyen had
suggested to the governor. But Lencinas was able to convince
the legislators to put aside this proposal.
,

.
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working man. Moreover, the unwavering police
repression
against many labor leaders diminished their

strength and

muted their protest. New teachers replaced
those who were
ousted, and by the end of November the school
year
closed, placing a peaceful lid on the once
boisterous

provincial dispute. The sectors disaffected with the

governor did not forget the incidents and the arbitrary
treatment they had to put up with. But the period of
convulsion ended, its energies exhausted by the wear and

tear of a conflict enlarged out of proportion by interests
other than those originally sponsored by the Idea group.

Sustained by a strongly personalist and profoundly
ethical perception of politics, Lencinas fully repaid the

political loyalty of his supporters with unreserved
solidarity.

"I

am indebted to my friends and their

aspirations," he said in his 1918 Inaugural Message, "and
it will be a cowardice to abandon them at the sweet hour of
triumph."-^

The loyalty of Lencinas to Julio was exemplary,

though by defending Julio's position the governor was

protecting above all, what he considered a privilege of his
function and position as a ruler. He did not close the door
to discussion of the teachers' grievances, but he kept an

unyielding position when he thought that being forced to
discard an important collaborator meant to question his
authori ty

Mensaje de S.E. el Senor Gobernador

37,

,

June 1918, p.

5
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Perhaps the mountain of criticisms and problems
generated by this conflict, in Mendoza and elsewhere,

could

have been avoided if Lencinas had been more
receptive to
those claims of the teachers that related to well-knovm
deficiencies. The government did not take effective steps
to alleviate the financial straits of the School Board,
and

thus continued to ignore the provisions of the constitution
on this matter. In fact, even without reference to the

impassioned accusations of the opposition, it is clear that
the government did not live up to its own promising

statements on popular education. Julio himself stated that
politics had downgraded the social function of the teachers
and that the financial branch of the government did not

work in earnest for the betterment of the school system.

-^^

To the preoccupations of the government in getting

Delfin Alvarez out of the official family, and the
complications of the teachers' strike, was added another
hot political issue: the election of a National Senator to

replace Civit, Minister Puebla was one of the candidates,

but Yrigoyen was adamantly against the idea that high

ranking officials be appointed to the National Senate, as
had been customary under the Regimen. With Puebla out of
the contest, and with Lencinas' support, Teisaire's friends

mustered the necessary strength to nominate him, although
^^Julio, Gestion economica ^ financiera

,

p.

23.
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his candidacy was vehemently opposed by some
party leaders.
The two government factions in the
legislature, pro
and anti-Teisaire, collided in a debate that
revealed
the

intrigues of the badly divided Radicals. Especially
sour
for the majority were the words of Senator Emilio
Quellet,
who had been Police Commissioner in Mendoza in
1918, under
Lencinas. He expressed his profound disenchantment with
the governor for favoring Teisaire's "camarilla nefasta,"

and he censured Teisaire for his policies of hate and

disrepute for the old-timers of the party.
In spite of the hardy opposition, the majority of the

Lencinists decided to adhere to party discipline, and
early in November Teisaire was elected National Senator.

This was a rare case, in which the successor of a

conservative Senator would be his former secretary and

fellow-partisan of years ago, who now was enrolled in the

leading anti-conservative party. It was up to the National
Senate to approve his credentials, but already his election

Quellet accused him of concocting from La Montana
the ambitions of National Deputy Francisco Rubilar for the
governorship of the province, with the sole intent of
planting doubts in Lencinas' mind about the loyalty of
Rubilar. In his long and heated speech, Quellet echoed the
charges of Machiavellianism which had been made before
against Teisaire, for his self-interest in the manipulation
of provincial affairs through personal influence and
subterfuge, without the knowledge of the governor. Provincia
de Mendoza, Senadores, 1919, II, 5-19. Another legal
barrier raised against Teisaire's election was that he had
filed for bankruptcy, and the case was still pending in the
provincial courts. This disqualified him from becoming a
National Senator.

,
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by the provincial legislature had shattered
what remained
of party unity.

The opposition to lencinas realized
that in spite of
the cool relationship between the governor
and the

President, Yrigoyen would avoid taking any decisive
action
contrary to Lencinas' interests. Therefore, they
turned to
the National Congress. The Radicals who disliked the

Mendozan government, which they considered wicked and
irresponsible, took up the issue of Lencinas rule in the

Chamber of Deputies. In November 1919, Deputies Victor
Molina, Jose P. Tamborini and Carlos

F.

Melo, among others,

proposed to set up an investigating committee to examine

how constitutional rights were enforced in Mendoza. As the
Yrigoyenists deputies did not object to the proposal, it
was easily approved. 41
This measure satisfied conservatives and Socialists

because they could gain a foot in the provincial structui-e

In August 1920 the National Senate rejected
Teisaire's credentials by an uncontested decision of the
conservatives and Socialists. The Radical Senators did not
attend the session. Senadores I, 673-675.
,

^•^

Diputados 1919, VI, 383-412. Julio Cesar Raffo
de la Reta, a conservative Deputy from Mendoza pronounced
the most critical words against Lencinas: "That province
is under a tyranny," he stated, which ought to be destroyed
"por razones de cultura y humanidad. " ^The committee was
formed by Miguel Araoz (Tucuman), Jose A. Gonzalez (Santa
Fe) , and Valentin Vergara (Buenos Aires), Radical
Yrigoyenists; the conservative Manuel Bermudez Corrientes)
and the Socialist Enrique Dickmann (Federal Capital).
,

(
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without any interference from the national
Executive. The
Radicals, in spite of the fact that in theory
they

accepted the investigation of a government
of their own
party, were themselves becoming somewhat
disillusioned
with Lencinas' rule and, in any event, they
were

safeguarded by holding the majority of the committee.
On previous occasions Lencinas had publicly

demonstrated his combative spirit. He exhibited it again

when confronted with the chamber decision. To general
astonishment, on November 23 he issued a decree denying

any right to that committee to conduct any investigation.

After stating constitutional objections, he made a
political attack against the National Chamber of Deputies,

which was illustrative of Lencinas' character and
convictions and, at the same time, would have greatly

satisfied Yrigoyen. If a branch of Congress had the legal
power to investigate Mendoza or any other province,

asserted Lencinas, then the province should have the same

power to investigate how the representatives of the people
were fulfilling their obligations. It should have the

right to inquire into the causes that made them transgress
the constitutional mandate

political debates

— while

—by

their indulgence in sterile

a large number of bills on

importat matters concerning the welfare of the nation were
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condemned to the files.

Following up this step, Lencinas six days
later sent
a copy of his decree of November 23 to all
the governors

and interventors in other provinces, and
invited them to
express their political solidarity with his
position. With
this action he seemed to be moving onto the
national

political stage as the champion of provincial autonomy.
This unprecedented move by Lencinas indicates how firm

and strong-willed he was concerning the issue of federalism.

On the other hand, it demonstrates that Lencinas failed to
realize that each province would view its own relationship

vis-a-vis the Federal Government according to its own

particular interests and circumstances.
Contrary to Lencinas' hopes, only a handful of

governors and interventors replied, while some merely

acknowledged receiving Lencinas' note. The replies did not
support the position of the governor. They discerned that
the problem

v/as

simply a dispute between Mendoza and a

chamber of National Congress, whose solution was not under
the jurisdiction of the other provinces. Among those who

replied to Lencinas, the governors of Cordoba and Entre
Rfos added that the chamber had the right to make the
43
inquiry, though without arrogating executive functions.

^^Provincia de Mendoza, Boletin Oficial
1919, pp. 5184-5185.
^^La Prensa, December

4,

1919.

,

December 24,
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The governor of Corrientes stated that
those who ruled
with an open door should not make any
objection
to a

congressional committee seeking information/^

Apart from this new clash between lencinas and
his
opponents, his blatant decree refusing to acknowledge

the

validity of the congressional committee raised a
constitutional question. Did the chambers of Congress have
the right to order an investigation of sovereign provinces?

This issue was discussed in the leading newspapers. Senator

Joaquin V. Gonzalez affirmed that when the executive powers

— the

federal and the provincial

— linked

their interests

and joined together politically, then it was proper to

resort to a congressional investigation.^^

Dissenting from this view, Juan

A.

Gonzalez Calderon,

another authority on Constitutional Law, stated that neither
the Executive Power nor Congress was legally empowered to

conduct that inquiry.

La Prensa supported this interpretation.

Though disapproving of the tone of Lencinas' decree, that

paper maintained that the provincial governments were not
constitutionally responsible to any chamber of Congress.

La Nacion carped at Lencinas' dual criteria for not having
vindicated the principles of federalism when Yrigoyen had

^^Ibid.

^^La Prensa, December

2,

1919.

^^La Nacion, December

5,

1919.

s
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appointed Diego Saavedra in 1917 to study
the situation in
Mendoza, ruled then by an anti-Radical
government.

Branding this a double-edge-knife policy,

L_a

Nacion

contended that Lencinas- sole interest was to
sanction any
procedure against non-Radical governments, and disavow
as

illegitimate any measure taken against Radical rulers
The stern decree of the governor provoked the paralysis
of the still-born committee. In fact, after Lencinas'

reaction, what possibilities had they of carrying out their

mission? It is reasonable to believe that even if Lencinas
had not been so fiercely opposed to that committee, the

institutional situation in Mendoza would not have changed
at all, as was demonstrated in 1917 during Saavedra*

mission.
Those still wishing to see the end of Lencinism had

only the possibility that Congress might approve a federal

intervention. But this was quite unlikely, since neither
the Yrigoyenist legislators nor the President was inclined

to behead the Mendozan caudillo politically,

Los Andes, the most important anti-Lencinist bastion
in Mendoza, stated its opposition to a new intervention. It
did not justify its position in the name of federalism or
out of respect for a government democratically elected.

Los Andes declared that the arbitrary and intolerant policy

Prensa, December 14, 1919; and La Nacion,
November 29, 1919.
^'^La
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of Lencinism was steadily eroding the
Radical Party. It
was necessary only to let them rule for a
time to witness

the party's irretrievable collapse. A
federal intervention,
it said, would stop the otherwise inevitable
process of

party decomposition and it would reaffirm the
predominance
of Lencinism,

Constitutional Duties, Fiscal Responsibility
and Industrial policy. An Uneven Performance
The political developments described above were only

part of the picture of the populist government of Lencinas.
His performance of constitutional duties with regard to the

municipal system and the local irrigation authorities, as
well as his handling of public finances, was almost as

unsatisfactory as during his first year in office. His
policy toward all aspects of the wine industry, however,
was an enlightened one, and resulted in the enactment of

highly promising legislation, aimed at curbing the

domineering position of the large bodegueros, while

protecting the interests of the considerable number of
small vinateros.

During the second part of his term, municipal autonomy
continued to be a dead letter in spite of specific

constitutional clauses and the fact that for five months
the province was in the hands of two federal commissioners.

48

Los Andes, December 6, 1919.
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By December 1919, eleven departments out
of seventeen were
still under the direct control of the
governor.

Only with regard to the election of water
authorities
did Lencinas reverse in 1919 his position of
1918. As no
law was yet enacted on general rules for the
administration
of water, Lencinas called for elections in November
1919

under the system established by Law 322, of 1905. Now,
ironically, the governor followed the legal procedure which
the opposition recommended be observed a year before, and

which Lencinas then rejected by suspending the elections.
The inefficiency of fiscal administration increased

after Lencinas reassumed office. In his opening message of
July 1919 not a single word was said about the state of
Mendoza'

s

economy. From then on, the financial reports were

not made public and some of the new expenditures continued
to be authorized by cabinet agreements, ignoring the

required legislative approval.

AQ

In November 1919, the 1920 budget was submitted by the
Executive. Total expenses were estimated at 12,163,000
pesos, significantly higher than the 9,913,000 spent in
1918. This increase was due to a general rise in v/ages and

salaries and the expansion of the police force. To meet
these expenses several taxes were to be raised, especially

^^To find a solution to the permanent financial
deficit, a special tax on wine two cents per liter became
effective on October 1919, with the revenue specifically
allocated to pay salaries and other debts from previous
years.

—

—
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on wine, properties and licenses. This
provoked a strong

campaign against the government proposal
by the whole
business and industrial sectors. As the
legislature did not
take any action, lencinas issued a decree, once
again,

enforcing the 1920 figures of the I916 budget.
In the financial sphere, the Achilles' heel of the

government was the Provincial Bank, which lencinas had
promised to transform into a mixed institution, modeled
after the Bank of the Province of Buenos Aires. But the

bank remained in provincial hands and, as in the past, it
served as a tool for political f avoritism.

The letras

continued to be undervalued, adding a burden to most wageearners, because only federal and railway personnel

received their wages in "nacionales. "^^
The wine industry benefited from this situation. As

most of its sales were made outside the province, almost
all its receipts were in pesos, while it paid wages and

local expenses with letras. But the industry was concerned

with its economic outlook. Every sector, for its own
reason, was dissatisfied with the policy of prices and

production, and although all of them referred to the

Its director, Francisco Muniz, had to resign under
corruption and inefficiency leveled against him
of
charges
Lencinist legislators.
of
by a group
^

^^The thirst for pesos was evident in signs in the
windows of the stores: "Se necesitan nacionales"; and the
banks set up separate accounts for their customers, one in
pesos, another in letras.
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"crisis" of the industry, the phrase meant
quite a different
thing to each one. The core of the viti-vini
culture problem
was to determine whether the industry should
be regulated,
and if so, by whom. The government favored a
mild

intervention, intended basically to defend the
interests of
the small vinateros. The larger producers and
bodegueros,

on

the other hand, had in the past preferred their own
kind of

regulation, as had been embodied in the

Corapaflia

Vitivini cola,

created in 1916 by Law No. 703 when the industry was in a

serious crisis. But as prospects improved in 1919, they

reversed their position and vigorously advocated a policy of
total reliance on the principle of supply and demand.

More than any other factor, the climatic condition in
1919 helped to bring an end to the crisis which had been

affecting the industry since 1914. Hail and rain were
responsible for damage to a large number of vineyards. This

meant a heavy loss for some vinateros, but at the same time it
significantly raised the prices for grapes and wine. The large
surpluses of wine, which for four years had kept prices at a
very low level, were greatly diminished in a short time. Sales
of wine in markets outside the province rose from 340 million

litter in 1918 to 413 million in 1919.^^ With the promise of
an industrial bonanza in sight, the bodegueros insisted on

Provincia de Mendoza, Estadisticas de la Provincia de
Mendoza, 1930/ 31 (Mendoza, 1932), p. 169. The Banco de la
Nacion reported the rise in prices and shipments, concluding
that the improved situation had cast aside any fears of
overproduction. F.emoria del Banco de la Nacion Argentina
(Buenos Aires, 1920), pp. 3-4.
^
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their preference for a free market.

Upon his return to office, Lencinas tried
to avoid the
previous unfortunate experience when some of
the production
was destroyed. He sought legislation to shield
the
vifiateros from the losses produced by natural
calamities

and from the greediness of the bodegueros. In this
endeavor,

Lencinas profited from the assistance of his new Minister
of Industries, Leopoldo Suarez, who had first-hand knowledge

of all facets of the industry.

In September the government proposed that the

legislature set up compulsory insurance for the vinateros
against hail and other natural disasters; determine a

minimum price for grapes, and sponsor the construction of
regional bodegas

— or

use existing ones

— to

facilitate the

vinateros without bodega to process their own production.
The bodegueros disapproved of the creation of regional

bodegas, which, of course, was contrary to their interests.
They contended that the capacity of the bodegas greatly

surpassed the demand of the national consumption of wine.
What they asked, appealing to the obvious, was the reason
to build new bodegas when those already established

exceeded the needs.
This viewpoint of the bodegueros was technically

acceptable; but the intention of the government did not focus
the only original member remaining
office in July 1919.
reassuming
after
in Lencinas' cabinet
during the
Irrigation
of
Superintendent
Suarez had been
government.
first part of Lencinas'

^\inister Puebla was
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on the capacity of the hodegas available,
but aimed

essentially at the protection of the
vinateros from being
forced to sell their production at a very
low price. The
principles outlined by the Executive were
enacted in
November 1919.
This legislation represented a positive
step in normalizing the relationship between
the highly
conflictive industrial interests. It provided a
shelter for
the small producers, without suffocating the large
industrial
groups. If these laws were properly enforced, the added

taxation they imposed would be worthwhile, and all segments

related to the wine industry would prosper.
The End of the First Populist Experiment
The response of the Lencinists to growing criticism by

the press was to exclude it from official sources of

information, as happened with Los Andes
Nacion.

^

,

La Prensa

,

and La

This attitude indicated how Lencinas' well

developed sense of self-righteousness became more acute as
54

Law No. 758n authorized the building of new bodegas,
the purchase of existing ones, and the setting up of
cooperatives, as well as other complementary measures, to
be financed by an additional tax on grapes and wine. Law No.
759 instituted compulsory insurance covering hail and other
of nature's risks, to be financed by a tax on the official
price of the grapes. The minimum price for grapes was later
determined at 8 pesos per 100 kilos, the same price
requested by the vinateros.
^^Artificial conflicts were also created between the
newspapers and the people selling them, with the purpose of
paralyzing their distribution. On several occasions the
windows of Los Andes were the targets of politicallymotivated vandals.
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problems grew more troublesome for
him. This was noticeable
in the answers he gave to a correspondent
from La Nacion in
November 1919, a time at which he was
pressed by

i ssues

threatening his survival as governor of
Mendoza. In a
"David versus Goliath" fashion, he

complained that he had b e

a victim of the big

press— meaning

'

La Prensa and La Nacion

—

of Congress, and even of some members of
Yrigoyen's cabinet;
all were trying to tarnish his government. He
said that the

accusations of his use of political repression
against his
opponents were all lies spread by the misinformed
correspondents of the large newspapers. Questioned about the
certainty of the rumors about a new intervention in Mendoza,
he exclaimed: "You will see me dead before that'."

— adding

his confidence that the President would not consent to the

intervention.

"I

trust him,

am his friend,

I

I

have known

him for thirty years," said Lencinas, "but if Don Hipolito
trips my horse, it will be diff erent.

. . .

"^^

The succession of conflicts crippled Lencinas'

dreams

for a progressive government. His own party was badly split
56

Interview with Ernesto Escobar Bavio, correspondent
of La Nacion, sent especially from Buenos Aires. La Nacion
November 14, 1919. Yrigoyen tipped Lencinas' horse. A
traditional but unimportant ceremony provided him with an
official occasion to show his disapproval of Lencinas. It is
customary in Argentina for the President to be the godfather
—by proxy of any seventh male child born in a family. As
there was such a case in Mendoza in January 1920, Yrigoyen
named the National Deputy Erancisco Rubilar as his
representative, instead of appointing Lencinas, as he had
done before. El Intransigente January 10, 1920.
,

—

,
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into three factions, one entirely
loyal to the governor,
another under the leadership of Ricardo
Baez, the President
of the Senate, and the third under
the guidance of National
Deputy Francisco Rubilar, firmly loyal
to Yrigoyen.
The

Lencinists were especially concerned that
in view of the
failing health of the governor, there should
be a

possibility for Baez to fill in Lencinasposition. Baez
Bided with the anti-Teisaire group, and this
attitude
seriously strained his relationship with Lencinas.
To prevent further political erosion, the
group most

closely supporting the governor, which controlled the
party,

ordered its reorganization. The committee in charge of the

arrangements was headed by Carlos Washington Lencinas, and
it immediately revoked the terms of all provincial party

authorities. The Rubilarista faction, closer to Yrigoyen
than to the governor, ignored the reorganization. This

situation made more significant than ever the fundamental
question whether the Radicals and Lencinists were becoming
two separate political entities.
The excellent relationship of earlier times between

Yrigoyen and Lencinas had been steadily declining.
Disturbed by the wandering course of the Kendozan
government, Yrigoyen asked the governor to see him in

Buenos Aires, but Lencinas sent instead his Minister
Puebla. The minister returned to Kendoza carrying a strong

complaint from the President because of the arbitrary
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manner in which Lencinaa ruled the
province. Yrigoyen had
told Puebla that the situation of
Mendoza
was uncertain,

and it had to be settled. 57 The governor,
always zealous of
his political independence, interpreted
the presidential
admonition as an intrusion into provincial
affairs.
Consequently, on January 3, 1920, he sent a
long letter to
Yrigoyen, in terms clearly inferring the end
of a long
political friendship. To the presidential threat
"to settle"
his government, Lencinas replied that he was afraid
of
no

one, including Yrigoyen. He reminded the President
that he

has been his loyal friend but warned him not to take
any

"Machiavellian action" against the government of Mendoza.
In thus defying the President, Lencinas may have had a

presentment that his poor health would prevent any actual
clash. At any rate, less than three weeks later the

impetuous governor, long a victim of uremia, was dead.^^
57

Yrigoyen' s opinions were referred in Lencinas'
reply to the President. See footnote No. 58.
-"^Senadores, 1929, I, 369-370. The nine-year old
letter was read in the National Senate by Carlos V/ashington
Lencinas. On that occasion the Yrigoyenist Senator Delfor
del Valle recalled that Yrigoyen had told Puebla that he
would not allow Lencinas to remain as governor one single
day if the charges of corruption, and the beatings and
deportation of political adversaries, were as bad as was
feared. In order "to defend the austere and puritan
reputation of Dr. Jose Nestor Lencinas," Carlos Washington
replied to del Valle that Yrigoyen had never been a
538, 542.
sincere friend of his father. Ibid
.

,

^^When on January l8 his illness became critical,
Yrigoyen sent three doctors from Buenos Aires, but the
governor died on the 20th while they were en route to
Mendoza. Lencinas' term would have expired on March 6, 1921.
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The burial of the controversial
governor was an imposing
demonstration of the popular affection he
enjoyed. The
eulogies were filled with understandable
panegyrics, as

demanded by the occasion. But half a century
later, some of
those concepts have retained their historical

substance. The

provincial Senator Ricardo M. Encina, for example,
said that
with lencinas had disappeared the last popular
caudillo,

who

represented at the same time the strong personalism of the
pre-constitutional era and the university education
characteristic of a modern statesman. The Senator equated
Lencinas'

acumen with the instinctive feelings of Facundo,

of knowing how to read men's hearts.

its criticism of Lencinas'

Los Andes

,

softened

errors by blaming the circle

around him, and enhanced what it considered his major virtue:
his unalterable love for the lower classes, to whose well-

being he had devoted his life.^^
The eulogies and criticisms with which the national

press reacted had in common an almost unanimous recognition
of the fact that Lencinas had been a ruler loved and revered

by the popular sectors. La Razon

,

an evening Buenos Aires

newspaper, declared that for his correligionarios he had been
a father,

a protector, and a friend; and that Lencinas had

governed more with his heart than with his brain. "His

^^Los Andes, January 22, 1920.
^•^Ibid.

,

January 21, 1920.
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ascent to power," it added, "more
than an evolution,
symbolized a revolution. "^^

But La Pronda, the arch-anti
Yrigoyenist Buenos Aires
daily founded in 1919, stated that
Lencinas had governed
above the constitution and the law and
that his professed
affection for the people was nothing but
the exploitation
"of the bad popular instincts, in a
class war, and

permanently flattering the lowest passions of
the people,"
in what La Fronda called "an outrageous excess
of
caciquism."^^ Critica said that Lencinas' death should
be
regretted as that of any human being, but it shouldn't be

lamented because he had been such a dismal ruler. If
Lencinas would have been a bit more talented, asserted

Critica

,

— "tierra

this aggressive Don Quixote of the interior

adentro"

— would

have been a great governor. But

he failed because of his disdain for legal norms, his

despotic selfishness, his queer mixture of culture and

barbarism and his scorn for other people's rights.
With more sober words and more moderate discernment.
La Naci on viewed Lencinas as

a

ruler with authentically

distinctive characteristics, who displayed a careless
frankness, sometimes indelicate, other times naive and

^^La Razon

^^La Fronda
^^ Critica

January 20, 1920, 5th edition.

,

,

January 21, 1920.

January 21, 1920. Further appraising
Lencinas' personality, this newspaper said that he was a
"gaucho levantado en montonera electoral contra el
poblado, del que adulo a lo peor de su pueblo, en
perjuicio de las elites mas calif icadas. "
,
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picturesque, typical of the so-called
men of the interior.
La Nacion credited hirn for the
sincerity of his purposes and
his good intentions, but pointed out
his lack of proper
judgment in selecting his collaborators.

Reflecting the chilled relationship
which existed
between the President and Lencinas, La

E^oca stated that the

historical appraisal of the Mendozan caudillo
and his
government should not be made by his contemporaries.

But La

E£Oca admitted that the old Cuyano leader had
been,

politically speaking, a product of the people, because
of
the grass roots qualities of his personality and
the faith
with which the masses went hand in hand with him.^^

Perhaps nothing reveals better the extent to which

Lencinas was a controversial figure in his times, than the
attitude taken by the National Chamber of Deputies, of which
he had been a member, the day following his death. When

Manuel Caceres, Radical Deputy from Santiago del Estero,
proposed the customary homage of standing up in memory of
Lencinas, the conservative Matias Sanchez Sorondo expressed
his disapproval and requested that the decision of the

chamber be manifested individually. To accept this homage,

Sanchez Sorondo said, would be to disown his past criticisms
and repudiation of Lencinas' rule. The Yrigoyenist Vergara

^^La Nacion

^^La Epoca

,

,

January 21, 1920.

January 22, 1920.
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insisted that the proposal was simply
to pay respect to
Lencinas as a former member of the body,
irrespective of
any Judgment on his virtues and defects
as a ruler of his
province. Deputy Luis Agote reasserted
the conservative
opinion. He rejected paying homage to
Lencinas
because,

in his words, "there are tombs which only
deserve silence."
The motion was turned down by 31 votes of
the conservatives
and Socialists, to 29 of the Radicals. ^'^
This was the only instance to that date in
which a
chamber of Congress refused to pay the traditional
respect
to one of his ex-members, when he died. But even if
the

motion had been approved, the fact that it was debated
violated one of the time-honored parliamentary norms.
The death of the populist leader prevented a final

showdown with Yrigoyen and ended a government which for the
first time had confronted the provincial oligarchy head on.

Lencinas was revered by his supporters as a virtuous man,
and denounced by his adversaries as a despot and a
^^

Diputados

,

1919, VII, 215-220 (January, 1920).

Lencinas had been involved already in a similar
incident, although not as serious as that mentioned above.
A few days after the election held in Mendoza in January
1918, in which he was elected governor, Lencinas asked the
National Chamber of Deputies to allow him to be absent for
five sessions, alleging health reasons. As the request was
denied by the majority of his peers, the chamber voted
again for the second and third time, with identical
results. There was no precedent for this extreme
discourtesy, since these requests were traditionally
approved regardless of the motives invoked. Diputados 1917,
VIII, 435 (January, 1918).
,
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demagogue. He had been blessed and
cursed with an intensity
which during the period of the Radical
national governments,
was only surpassed by the admiration
and hatred for Hipolito
Yrigoyen at the national level, and for
Federico Cantoni in
the province of San Juan.
A general appraisal of Lencinas'
performance— the
objective of the next chapter— will measure
the historical
relevance of his leadership and the impact of
the movement
he had begotten.
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CHAPTER

V

LENCINAS AND LENCINISM. AN
APPRAISAL
Lencinas, and Yrigoyen through his
own political
weight, were the pillars of Mendozan
Radicalism. The

significance of their political philosophy
and the
circumstances they had to face in the government,

are of

utmost importance in understanding why they
were the epitome
of the Radical movement, and in discerning the
causes
that

led to their estrangement.

Yrigoyen and Lencinas ascribed to themselves the high
moral qualities demanded of true leaders. They became
the
political guides of the popular sectors, which led to their

indisputable leadership in their spheres of influence.
Likewise, their followers placed them on such a high level
of civic integrity, that they were not only considered the

leading heads of the party, but the "apostles" of the movement.

Both attained their high public positions after many years
of proclaiming from the opposition the shibboleths of

"reparation," and rigidly defending its principles in the
government.
The Mendozan scholar Andres Roig has stated that Yrigoyen

provided the Radical movement with an ideology which made a
dogma of the need for all citizens to participate in public
affairs, through free suffrage. This awoke the faith of the

people in themselves, assigning to the concept "people" a

dimension unknown until then. Yrigoyen laid down the basis of

^s
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what Roig calls a solidarista
neoliberalism, which intended
to replace the exclusionist
liberalism of the oligarchy.
Lencinas shared the political creed of
Yrigoyen and embraced
the tenets of social liberalism,
seeking to achieve a more
equitable distribution of wealth within
the capitalistic
framework of provincial society.

Both Radical leaders demanded the same
devotion and
loyalty from their collaborators which they felt
for the

Causa. But this created a predicament which added
a heavy

burden to their governments. In 1917 the Socialist leader
Juan B. Justo warned Yrigoyen about the obstacles ahead
on
this matter. He said that he believed in the virtues and

honesty of the President, but he alone could not govern
Argentina, and, unavoidably, he would be surrounded by men
not as honest as he was.

The historical experience of the

governments of Yrigoyen and lencinas substantiated Justo'
views. Both were accompanied by several mediocre

collaborators and, in the case of the governor, by some

individuals of questionable honesty.

Both men had to share the virulence of the opposition,
which did not offer them any truce, and which many times

intruded into their private lives. This served, nonetheless,
to consolidate the ties between them and their followers;

and in spite of the difficulties and frustrations they

"^Andres Roig, Los krausistas argentinos (Puebla,
Mexico, 1969), 173, 2357

^Diputados, 1917, I, 338.
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encountered in office, they maintained
their political and
personal prestige. Lencinas often
travelled throughout the
province, and his close relationship
with his constituents
laid the foundation for a loyalty which
in time became
his

best political support. Yrigoyen, on the
contrary, was
more aloof than Lencinas— a fact which
makes more
remarkable the dimension of Yrigoyen' s leadership.^

Yrigoyen and Lencinas were introvert personalities.
Perhaps the years they spent as active conspirators
impressed upon their characters a sense of reserve and
confidentiality. Yrigoyen had a calm temperament, less

impassioned than that of the Mendozan leader. But both

maintained an uncompromising stand on what they regarded as
the basic principles of the party. Yrigoyen'

s

statements on

this matter could have been signed by Lencinas without

hesitation, and vice versa.
The different attitudes taken by Yrigoyen and Lencinas

in government were imposed, to a large degree, by their

dissimilar levels and the circumstances in which they
performed. One author claims that Yrigoyen relinquished his

ideals for political reform from the moment he became
President, for in spite of having "all the power in his

In the words of one of his opponents, Yrigoyen was
the exceptional case "del tribune mudo, del apostol sin
doctrina, de la elocuencia sin palabras." Julio A. Costa,
El presidente Hombres y partido (Buenos Aires, 1913), p.
105.
.
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hands," he allowed the Regimen to
survive/ This

interpretation-shared by other authors-does
not resist
historical scrutiny. Yrigoyen did not

have all the power in

his hands; in fact, not even the
full control of his own
Radical Party. He might have erred in
his tactical political
approach to the Regimen, but he was hampered
by a society
loath to accept political reform, especially
when
it was

being implemented by unorthodox constitutional
means.
Lencinas could control the province with a heavy

hand and

abuse legal norms if he chose, not only because he
enjoyed
wide support within the province, but also because
of the

benevolence of the national executive. Yrigoyen, on the
other hand, did not have the protection of a higher

authority as a recourse to solve his problems, but instead

saw his actions continuously blocked by powerful legal and
political barriers.
These men were friends who respected each other.

However, they had to break up their friendship when both

persisted in their intransigent viewpoints, zealous in

matters they thought belonged to their own jurisdiction.
As they were leaders with a profound sense of authority,

they reached a point beyond which they were unable to

conciliate their positions. Of the two leaders, perhaps

Lencinas should have been more flexible, in view of the

implications his policies had for the federal government.

^Olguin, Lencinas, pp. 307-309.
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But the Mendozan caudillo preferred to
sever his friendship
with Yrigoyen rather than compromise
on
issues in a way he

regarded as unacceptable

.

By placing themselves on a level
above ordinary rulers

and attributing to their leadership the
highest moral value,
Yrigoyen and Lencinas somewhat removed themselves
from the
social reality in which they had to experience
their ideals.
It was neither possible to transform overnight the
political
customs of the people, nor to eliminate in a short
time the

imbalances and privileges which over the decades helped to
create

— from

the social and economic viewpoint

— two

very

dissimilar societies within the province.
The two Radical leaders viewed the role of the party as
one of exceptional nature, destined to regenerate Argentine

political life; and saw themselves as the ones chosen to
carry out this high purpose. This stern disposition of mind

might explain why the Lencinists felt that their most bitter
opponents were pathological, as reflected, for example, in
their attitude toward Delfin Alvarez: only a man out of his

senses could have opposed their good government.

If according to their own evaluation only the Radicals
embodied all the civic virtues, then by extension, they were
the only men of principle and the only ones who deserved to

govern. Those who left the party, because of disagreement

with the government, or dissented from the Lencinist rule,
were considered traitors. This was precisely, Lencinas'

reaction when Interventor de Veyga was trying, in Buenos
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Aires, to gain presidential backing
for his decisions.
Lenoinas believed that the real interest
of de Veyga was to
harm him, by opening a crack in his old
friendship with the
President. In lencinas- eyes this action
was tantamount to
treason.

In another situation, but one in which
Lencinas took a
similarly inflexible stand, he expressed his
disbelief when
some tramway operators who were on strike had been

harassing the policemen placed in all vehicles to insure
normal service. Lencinas considered the behavior of the
workers as being directed against him, and he found it

incomprehensible. He could not believe, he said, that the

workers could attack a police force who respected them.
Instead, they were creating difficulties for a government
"well known for his emotional solidarity with the people."

Lencinas concluded that those confronting the government
were only provokers, alien to the real
workingmen.

interests of the

5

Lencinas felt a strong self-confidence in his
political power. He said of the conservatives that he alone
could have won the elections against them all.^ This

expression of paternalistic superiority reveals Lencinas'

self-assurance of being the leader of the majority of the
people of Mendoza. The governor portrayed himself in the
^Union Civica Radical, El Comite Departamental
^La Nacion, November 14, 1919.

,

p.

13-
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provincial arena as the representative
of good against evil.
"I have fought for thirty years
against the group who
possessed this province," he said, "and
I'll always defeat
theml" He professed the highest faith
in his aims
and

defended his actions obstinately. This is why
he left no
room for compromising in the serious conflicts
in which he
was involved. The only political alternative
in the

province was to be with him or against him. But to
rout him
out, he said, was impossible, even by killing
him, as he
told a porteno correspondent: "If

I

am protected,

I

do not

known by whom, but someone protects me, a mysterious forcel"'^
Lencinas was convinced that his political decisions were

rational and totally justified. Therefore, he reacted

harshly against his critics, especially when they questioned
his intentions. When he refuted the accusations of police

harassment of former Deputy Governor Alvarez, Lencinas wrote
to Yrigoyen as if, instead of being a ruler at the service of

the law, he were the patron of the province:

"...I would be

severe in punishing those who in this way attempt to cast
shadows over the good faith and correctness of my
government. "^

Few Radical leaders of his time commanded such

admiration from their followers as did Lencinas. For his
longings in favor of social justice, he was compared with
'^

Ibid

.

Q

La Prensa, December

5,

1918.

.
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the Uruguayan statesman Jose Batlle
y Ordonez.^ Lencinas
himself felt elated when he compared
some of hia

accomplishments and decisions with those
of the statesmen
from countries more advanced than Argentina.
Lencinism proclaimed itself to be

a

movement

authentically representative of the people.
Accordinc to
this viewpoint, the term "people" embraced a
strong
political and social connotation: the underdogs, the
chusma
de alpargata, the descamisados, that is, the lower
classes,
in opposition to the oligarchs, the landowners, the

bodegueros and the social elite. As the people had been
exploited by an unjust political and economic system,

Lencinism

— more

than national Radicalism

— considered

itself

the liberating movement which through free suffrage and

social action would eliminate the inequities of provincial
society. Moreover, within the political context, the

expression "people" conveyed the particular notion that it
was unpolluted by the greediness of the superior classes,
"People" then, represented a pure and noble human
segment, which even erring was not at fault, because the

humble sectors could make mistakes out of ignorance, but

^Sometimes the tribute of praise approached hyperbolic
symbolism, as when it was said of him that: "Parece una
resurreccion del heroe de Cervantes, pero esta vez salido
de las paginas de la fabula para repetir en la vida real las
aventuras quijotescas en defensa de los desvalidos, de los
humildes, de los que lloran sus infortunios en el tugurio
sin pan ni calor, y sus desesperanzas en las tinieblas de su
noche moral." H omenaje de la Muni cipuli dad de la Capital al
Doctor Jose Nestor Lencinas (Mendoza, 192«), p. 6 From a
decree naming a street in the provincial capital after
Lencinas
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not through bad faith. This provided
the term "people" with
an aura of infallibility. If any
action could be justified
in the name of the people, it received
its legitimacy
regardless of the intrinsic merits of the
issue itself.
Just because they had been traditionally
exploited by the

upper groups, "people" meant virtue; and the
exploiters
became not mere adversaries, but anti-people. To
be one

of

them was a negative condition, and thus in the
mind of the

popular segments the issues lost their normal complexities,
and were transformed into simpler situations in which the
alternative was to be for or against the people. -'^
The relevance of that term derived from the political

transformation provoked by the Saenz Pena Law in Argentine
civic life. But in Mendoza, under Lencinas, its social

connotation was enhanced, because moving beyond Yrigoyen's
goals, the Mendozan caudillo attempted a social

transformation in which the symbolic values of the

terra

"people" surpassed the restrictive meaning of Radical

regeneration.
A Mendozan sociologist asserted that the liaison

between a leader and the masses is based on a personal
relationship, since the popular sectors are involved in

primary interactions, where the functional takes a

'^The folkloric fervor for this interpretation of
the word "people" has increased in Argentina through the
years. In this topic, for example, Olguin refers to the
election held in Mendoza on June 22, 1919, as a coalition
of conservatives and Radical Intransigents "que se
volvieron a coaligar en la lucha contra el pueblo
[iencinismj ." Lencinas p. 494.
,
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secondary importance. This process
develops the most
favorable conditions for the ascent of
a caudillo, because
besides the intrinsic qualities required
to become
one,

there exists a large social group in
need of a leader.
For Lencinas' followers his ascent to power
represented the
achievement of their political freedom. "The day
has
finally arrived, "-stated "One of alpargata,"
in La Montana
celebrating the Radical electoral success of January
1918—

,

for those "without an illustrious name but with
noble
feelings, serving unselfishly the needs of the people. "^^

"'•^Luis

Carapoy contends that the Creole group in

Argentina has permanently created the ascendancy of new
popular leaders. Once the masses identified with the caudillo,
they remained most loyal to him, even after the caudillos

die, as was the case of Lencinas; or after they escaped, as
happened with Rosas and Juan D. Peron. "Grupo cultural
criollo bajo," Investigaciones en Sociologia (Mendoza) IV
(January- June, 1965), 49-51.
,

12

La Montana, April 20, 1918. "Uno de alpargata" was
the pen name of Juan Draghi Lucero, then a young and fervent
Lencinist, who years later became a distinguished local
historian. In the Archive Historico de la Frovincia de
Mendoza are preserved many letters written to Jose Nestor
Lencinas by humble people who, the best they could,
requested a favor from the governor, to solve a personal
problem or a petty political dispute. The tone of these
letters indicates that Lencinas commanded the highest
respect and confidence as an arbiter, and that loyalty to
the party was also a matter of fundamental importance. The
following excerpts are typical examples: "Teniendo en
cuenta que nosotro como rradicales emos trabajado mucho para
obtener el escito de su triunfo, decearia saber si su
escelencia podria hacer algo para que un senor que me deve
una cuenta hace cuatro anos me pagara, por que yo soy pobre
y con nuebe ijos...." (May 10, 1918); "...por haber sido uno
de los que se sacrificaron luchando por la noble causa del
Partido Radical." (November 4, 1918); "...decirme cuando
podre ablar a S.E. aunque tenga que hirme de a pies de esta
no me importa." (November 20, 1918). Another man was asking
for a free railroad ticket to San Juan, if not, he asked
Lencinas "...me preste el dinero necesario, que vo en
pudien^o le hare la devolucion." (November, 1918). Carpeta
25-1. Epoca independiente.
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At the same time, the political
ascent of the common
man and the agitation of the social
question intensified
the polarization of Mendoza's
societal groups. On the one
hand was the oligarchy; on the other,
the sectors with
lesser income, the "people." The Lencinist
literature

voiced the resentment of the lower classes.
La Montana
assailed the "senores del regimen" that
ignoring "Juan
Pueblo" had been contented with just luring
the people with
wine on election day.^^ On the opposite side,
the

propertied elements expressed their indignation at the
socio-political changes experienced in the society through
Lencinas' actions in favor of the workingmen. Before the

Radicals came to power. La Opinion lamented, the policy of
the rulers was to gain the favor of the patron, of the

owners,

of those who "handled" workers and,

therefore, had

the ballots in their hands. Now, it said, the situation was
;just the

opposite, because the workers were taught to hate

the patron and were incited to be undisciplined, and even
to declare strikes."'"^

Those supporting Lencinas believed that the decisions

he took on important issues were indicative of his strong

character and will power. But those who judged him from the
opposition denied him these qualities and asserted that he
was simply arrogant; that Lencinas' firmness was not such.

^^La Montana

,

April 19, 1918.

^^La Opinion

,

March 11, 1919.
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but mere stubbornness denoting
an "alarming disturbance
of
his moral equilibrium. "^5 The
fact was that his political
and personal preeminence was such
that as stated
in a

contemporary comment, "Lencinas is the
whole party: he
speaks in its name, and he handles
its business at the
same time that he does that of the
province, absorbing all
the functions.""'"^
The Radical leader was closely
identified with the
common man, upon whom he exerted an
extraordinary

influence. Because of Lencinas' sympathetic
concern for
the lower class, the conservatives reflected
upon him the
same negative image they had of those popular
segments,

largely illiterate and socially inferior. On the same

wavelength of criticism, an interested observer remarked
that Lencinas "impressed one as a barbarian, capable of

any violent action," 17 and another stigmatized him as
"the caudillo of the illiterate masses.

""'^

One of the criticisms most often leveled against

Lencinas was his strong reliance on the forces of the
15

La Prensa, December

8,

1918.

^^Ibid. April 19, 1919. Upon Lencinas fell the
accusations of being a "Soviet raendocino," a Maximalist;
and his policies were compared with those applied in
Russia, aimed at destroying the capitalist regime. But
neither Lencinas' ideas nor actions Justified these
charges.
,

^"^Galvez, Vida de Hipolito Yrigoyen

,

p.

416.

Bosch, Historia del Partido Radical
(Buenos Aires, 1931), p. 192.

Mariano

G.
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comite. Cruz Vera, the President
of the Partido
Autono.ista,
and a partisan viewer, said that
the rank and file of the
administration was made of "elements
of the comite,
incompetent, unethical and most of
them illiterate.

Regardless of the possible overtones
of Lencinophobia in
this statement, the fact was that
the

Radicals engaged in

widespread political patronage which
accentuated the
traditional shortcomings of the provincial
bureaucracy:
administrative disorder, slowness, and
dependence on some
kind of influence.
Those more fiercely opposed to the Lencinists
claimed
that the masses had been made fanatical by
propaganda, so
they would irrationally follow their idol.
For
them,

Lencinism was just a mass of misguided men, "ragged,
drunk,
starving, and with their feet scarcely covered by humble
alpargatas," 20 or Just "illiterates and drunks.

"^-^

Lencinas' more mordacious contemporary critics placed a

significant weight on the more aggressive and disruptive
elements of the lower class, which massively supported

Lencinism, and often compared them with the chusma that

applauded Rosas in the 1840' s.^^

^^La Nacion

,

October 27, 1919.

^^La Tarde, September 24, 1919.
^"Ibid.
22

,

July 28, 1919.

Sharing the conservative viewpoint, the Anarchists
of Mendoza also joined the anti-Lencinist choir, and
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The Radicals constantly and
intensively disseminated
their own propaganda. Thousands
of lencinas- pictures
covered
the walls of the buildings of the
capital, and even the
municipal vehicles; and in the most
distant ranches, or mean
dwellings, of the province, the
peasants exhibited with prid e
the picture of the "gaucho Lencinas,"
also popularly known
among his supporters as "el viejito de
la buena suerte." Thi 3
was sincere popular veneration, but
doubtless, it had been
•

amply stimulated by a vigorous and persuasive
propaganda by
the Lencinists.
A team of journalists from La Voz del Interior

a well-

,

known newspaper of the city of Cordoba, which was
sympathetic
toward the Radicals, was sent to Mendoza at the end
of 1919

to analyze the provincial situation. They reported
that the

Lencinists were very active, with their rallies well-attended
and preceded by intensive propaganda. They also confirmed the

diligent participation of provincial employees in the

activities of the Radical Party. In their long report, the
newsmen of Cordoba emphasized the unequivocal popularity of
Lencinas, but they felt that the propaganda of the party was

excessively personalist. They observed that because such

referred to the Radical government as one of "caudillaje,
matoneria y barbarie." Pensamiento Nuevo (Mendoza), January
1, 1920. A by-weekly publication of the Anarchists of
Mendoza. The Lencinist leaders were also criticized for
merely paying lip service to their rejection of
"oligarchical" way of living. V/hile they flattered the poor,
they were dressed by the best tailors of Buenos Aires; and
while they shouted ";viva la alpargatal" their footwear was
made of patent leather or other refined foreign materials.
El Intransigente December 30, 1919.
,
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propaganda centered wholly around
Lencinas, it was contrary
to the impersonal spirit upon
which Radicalism was founded,
and a threat to the progress and
^3
cohesion
of the party.

In spite of the popular support
for Lencinism,

personal ambitions and internal disputes
impaired its
possibilities of governing efficiently. It

had to endure

the displacement of important assistants
of the governor,
such as Francisco Muniz, as manager of the
Provincial Bank,
and Emilio Quellet, as Police Commissioner;
the acerbity of

old timers like Ricardo Baez and Francisco
Rubilar, and
their old political friends, against Teisaire; and
the

desertion from the party of men like Jesus Romero and

Antenor Pereyra, who had accompanied Lencinas during the
1905 revolution and the ensuing exile in Chile.

It is generally contended that the responsibility for
Lencinas' mistakes belongs, to a large extent, to his inner

circle of collaborators, in which Teisaire appears to have

been the devil himself. In fact, his negative influence
eventually cast a long shadow on the prestige of the
governor. However, the general acceptance of this

interpretation begs the question. Taking into consideration
his personal qualities and commanding authority, how could

Lencinas have been so dominated by

a few

politicians of

Los Andes December 28, 1919. The newsmen from
Cordoba cited as examples the incessant proclamation of
Lencinas as the supreme and only leader of Kendozan
Radicalism; the plethora of worship for the trilogy "Alem,
Yrigoyen, lencinas"; and the exaggerated repetition of
the popular expression, "jViva el gaucho Lencinasi"
,
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lesser stature? Did Lencinas know
exactly what was going on
in his government? Did he know how
to appraise men as well
as the majority contended? Whatever
the answer might be,
it would hardly favor Lencinas' image
in this
matter.

Instead, it would cast a doubt over the
generalized
interpretation that he controlled the
government with a
strong hand but, at the same time, was
unaware
that the

people around him, and especially Teisaire, were
the real
masters of the show, running it from backstage.

Political principles and practices under Lencinism
followed divergent lines on many occasions. The Radicals
engaged in political favoritism of the same nature that
they had criticized before in the governments of the

oligarchy. A decree of July 1918, for example, forbade

public employees to recommend any person for a provincial
job, under the penalty of losing their own jobs after the

second violation. Regardless of its good intentions, this
decree was contrary to the kind of favoritism inherent in
the human condition, and essential at that time to the

building of the electoral clientele. The fact was that
the Radicals

in power

— as

well as the conservatives when they were

— implemented

very generously the policy of

political patronage.
The Lencinists justified many of their actions, like

not holding elections for municipal and water authorities,
by their belief that their stand was coherent with the
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principles of Radical political
regeneration and in
observance of the provincial constitution.
Did Lencinas
apply a double standard on these
occasions? In

reality, the

Lencinists made twisted interpretations
of the constitutional
rules in order to fit their political
purposes. But when the
conservatives were in power and distorted the
laws, the

Radicals had claimed that it had been done
to perpetuate
the oligarchical power of a minority. Prom the
practical
viewpoint, and setting aside their avowed intentions,

the

Lencinist conduct produced the same negative effect
as the
conservative policy of older times. To manipulate elections

for municipal and water authorities in order to impose
specific candidates, or not to hold them to avoid the risk
of losing power, were both procedures which did not honor

the rulers who indulged them.

The Lencinists proudly waved the flag of their

concern for the underprivileged, and the enactment of

legislation which brought social Justice for the forgotten
majority. But in spite of the tremendous strides their

actions represented

— labeled

by an unsympathetic newspaper

"conquests sans-culotte style"

— they

senselessly delayed the

payment of teachers' and other public servants' wages.

^Los Andes September 13, 1919. The magnitude of
the financial plight affecting them is given by the growing
number of salaries discounted at the Banco de Prestaraos y
Ahorros, a provincial public institution:
,
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Ironically, when the Radicals requested
federal intervention
from Yrigoyen in May 1917, one of their
complaints was that
the Mendozan government kept the
teachers' salaries in
arrears,
The Judicial Power fell victim under
Lencinism of the

legal institution called Judiciary Review
Board— created for
self-serving purposes by the conservatives when
they were in
power. Thus, as it was under the Regimen,
party adherence

continued to be an essential requisite for an
appointment to
the Judiciary.
In like manner, a significant gap existed between the

promises for better elementary education and the limitations
and conflicts which plagued the system. The provincial

schools decreased both in number and quality; and when the
teachers raised their protest on well-founded grievances,
they were labeled subversives by the government, and their

movement harshly dealt with by the police.
It was precisely the police

played a major role in

v/ho

sustaining the sometimes sever policies of the Executive,
The Lencinas administration did not improve the traditional

Wages and Salaries

Public personnel
Teachers

1917
Number

1918
S

Number

$

1,606

237,300

1,872

261,300
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20,300

1,669

191,300

Ibid
July 9, 1919. Thus, in order to get cash, the teachers
and other employees paid interest for a loan, or advance, of
the salary they have already earned, but which was paid by
the province with a promisory note.
.

,

^^Yrigoyen, Pueblo y gobierno
326.

,

Vol. II., Part I, p.
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behavior of this institution. The
police had been in the
past a political arm of the
government,

and continued to be

so under the Radicals. The people
were aware of their
arbitrary means; and they especially
feared them in the
rural areas, reflecting in this way
the apprehensions of
the humble people about the symbols
of authority.
The deportation of newsmen and workers
and the

authoritarian handling of labor conflicts
reaffirmed the
undisguised political role of the police. It was
more

evident during the electoral campaigns, when the
heavy hand
of the uniformed authority set the climate by
intimidating
the opponents, or remaining passively at the sidelines
when

Lencinist groups provoked the people rallying for their
adversaries.
The government justified the police behavior as a

necessity to counteract the excesses in which all political
groups were engaged. "Savage behavior is not a monopoly of

ruthless policemen," asserted Jose E. Aguilar, a high-

ranking official in Lencinas' government, "but it is also
found in the uncontrolled multitudes," subscribing to the
theory that strong governments were not a creation of fate
2'6

A report of a political delegate of the Department
Santa Rosa to Interventor Loza, after the January 1918
election, pointed out this characteristic of the rural
inhabitants, "humble people that, facing the specter of
hunger, accept the job they are given, aware of the
sacrifices ahead, because they curse the patron who is
unjust and arbitrary, and believe that most of the time the
authority is an accomplice of the abuses committed against
^hem." Archive Historico de Mendoza, Carpeta No. 25 H,
Epoca Independiente,
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but a consequence of the characteristics
of the people. ^7
Certainly, in dissonance with the
customary provincial
tranquillity, it was common for an adult
male to carry a

weapon. The gun was not only a source
of personal protection,
but for the most aggressive individuals
it was also a symbol
of political machismo. Regardless of
the extent to which the
police behavior was Justifiable, its apparatus
served the
purposes of the Lencinists, as in previous
governments it

had served the interests of the Regimen. In
this regard,
Lencinism proved to be no different from the conservatives.
Early in the century, a student of Argentine society

asserted that the creole anarchy and its symbol, caudillismo
were coherent characteristics of the Argentine historical

complexion. 28 Almost fifteen years later, Los Andes analyzed
the social reality of Mendoza and Argentina and shared

Ayarragaray'

s

viewpoint. This newspaper believed that the

transition between electoral methods so different as those

applied before and after 1912, had been too abrupt to be
properly grasped by the citizen at the bottom of the social
structure. The common man was unable to appraise the real

impact of the Saenz Pena Law and the suddenly acquired

significance of his ballot. The law had moved on paper

farther and faster than the political customs. The masses

^"^La

Nacion

,

November 20, 1919.

^^Lucas Ayarragaray, La anarquia argentina (Buenos

Aires, 1905)

,

p.

135.

,
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were then free from frauds and
violence when casting their
votes, but within them there still
subsisted the wicked,
unreformed political attitudes of the
past.^^

On the positive side, lencinas initiated
a process of
socio-economic changes which paved the way
for evolution
toward a more just society. But those
changes did not alter
or destroy the traditional framework of
the provincial
economy. One of Lencinas' biographers contends
that

Lencinism sapped the foundations of political privilege
and deeply modified the social and economic structure

of

Mendoza. The revolutionary spirit of that movement, he
said, led them to cut up root and branch of the oligarchy,

at all its sources of power.

This Interpretations appears

to be inspired more by populist fervor than by the Kendozan

reality. Lencinas did bring a new class consciousness to
the lower segments, and enacted social benefits which would

had been unattainable under an oligarchical government. The
Lencinists romanticized the idea of an equalitarian society,
and when they gained political power, materialized their

aspirations by implementing novel social legislation without

disturbing the economic structure of the propertied class.
At no time did they advocate outright collectivization or

expropriation of private property. Lencinism was a political
29 Los Andes, April 21, 1919

^^Ig-ain, Lencinas, pp. 307-309.

—
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and social revaluation of the
lower classes, in line with
its liberal-solidarista philosophy,
but it did not attempt
to find a sustitute for the
capitalistic basis of
the

society,

Lencinas- policy in regard to the wine
industry was
firmly oriented to curtail the too-powerful
interests of
the large bodegueros. The governor
was committed to the

principle that it was a fundamental duty of
the government
to regulate the basic source of
provincial
wealth, in

order to ensure its normal development by
avoiding the
chaos of the price structure, the maladies of
overproduction,
and to correct the disproportionate power of the
large

industrialists. Kis intervention in the Cooperativa Vitivi-

nicola in March 1918, as well as the legislation enacted in

November 1919, attest to the seriousness and determination
with which Lencinas was resolved to block the unchallenged

influence of the industrial sector in provincial affairs.
Traditionally, the large bodegueros had been politically

associated with the conservatives, and their liaison became
more cohesive when they confronted a Radical government.

Lencinas deserves full credit for the political courage and
the forthright determination with which he pursued the

defense of important sectors who had always been at the

mercy of the bodegueros.
This struggle has been condensed in a populist

expression, "alpargatas versus casks

bordalesas

,

"

which
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conveys a strong political message
of good versus evil.^l
But from a broader viewpoint, in
which all the interests
involved were part of a complex
economic problem which
could not be solved by simply relying
on a "black versus
white" interpretation, Lencinas'
policy proved to be
beneficial for the whole industry. The
bodegueros had to
pay better salaries, provide better
working conditions,
and compensate the vinateros with a fair
price. In
contrast with the free rein the bodegueros
enjoyed before
Lencinas, the new rules imposed upon them specific

obligations. However, they were not crippled in their

activities, and the major problems affecting the industry

were not caused by the government'

s

decisions

.

Time has

proven Lencinas* right in his belief that the government
should establish a minimum price for grapes before harvest
begins. Today, with a wine industry far more orderly than
that of 1919, the government continues determining each

year the minimum price for the product.
Summing up this evaluation, it can be stated that

from the political viewpoint, time has granted historical
credence to the evaluation made by Los Andes the day after
Lencinas'

death. It affirmed that his crusade for political

regeneration, waged relentlessly during long years in the
opposition, surpassed whatever he accomplished in the

From the social viewpoint, on the contrary,

government.
^•^

32

Ibid

.

,

p.

310.

Los Andes, January 21, 1920.
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it was in his first year In office
that Lencinas achieved
a landmark by becoming the pioneer
social legislator of his
time. But beyond the benefits
derived from the laws, it was
even more important to have given
the masses dignity and

self-confidence. With leaders like Lencinas
they began their
long way toward the accomplishment of
their most significant
"silent victory— in the expression of
Sergio Bagu^^— the
,

self-recognition of their status in the society.
A hardfought social recognition which was not fully
achieved in
Mendoza, or anywhere else in Argentina, until
the
1940' s.

Neither savior nor tyrant, Lencinas fought for the
principles of political reform more as a caudillo than a
statesman; and he gave hope to the traditionally forgotten

sectors of Mendozan society. A study of his performance as

leader and reformer will necessarily show the peaks and
valleys of his successes and failures. But in spite of his
numerous shortcomings, Lencinas emerges with a historically
enhanced image. The political, social, and economic goals of

Mendozan Radicalism assumed a very distinctive orientation
in Lencinas' hands. His strongly personalized rule affected

provincial political life from its roots on up; his social
innovations opened a new era of expectations for the common
man; and his economic aspirations favored a social liberalism

which proved easier to outline on paper than to implement
in action.

^^Sergio Bagu, La sociedad de masas en su historia
(Cordoba, 1961), p. 70.
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CHAPTER

VI

THE SECOND LERCINIST EXPERIENCE.

ITS POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PHASES
The death of the Mendozan caudillo ended
a cycle of

populist government, but its impact upon the
masses paved
the way for the continuation of Lencinism well
into the

1920' s. This political force found a new leader in the
late

caudillo'

s

son,

Carlos Washington, who on assuming command

of the party placed it under the spiritual guidance of his

father. Under the young Lencinas, the movement known as

Lencinism would gain a stature of its own as a regional
force, while simultaneously becoming a branch of the anti-

Personalist faction of the Radical Party.
Carlos Washington's historical significance rests in
the depth of his popularity as provincial caudillo, and in
the role he played in the agitated national politics during

Yrigoyen's short-lived second presidential term. This
chapter and the next will focus on the relevance of Carlos

Washington Lencinas as a provincial populist leader, and
his endeavors and accomplishments as such.
The death of Jose Nestor Lencinas

v/as

succeeded by a

tremendous scramble for power within the divided Radical
movement, Ricardo Baez, the acting chairman of the Senate
and a former protege of the old Lencinas, succeeded to the

governorship inasmuch as the post of deputy governor was
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vacant. Baez was an o±Q
old Kaaical,
Radi nan
o «^
a
companion of Lencinas
since the early days when
Radicalism was founded in
Mendoza, but he had been somewhat
at odds with the fcormer
governor because of the recent party
disputes.
:

Although Baez was not endowed with
statesmanlike:e
qualities, he was known for his

forthright honesty. He

reshuffled the administration and reported
about alleged
anomalies which had taken place during
Lencinas'
government. Moreover, he stated that the
provincial
personnel was overstaffed and plagued with
incompetents.^
Baez' actions led to an open confrontation
with the

Radicals loyal to Jose Nestor Lencinas who now
were

entrusting the leadership of the party to Carlos
Washington.

p

The provincial constitution prescribed that a new

election for governor should be called within thirty
days, and accordingly, Baez announced the date of April
4,
1920. But it soon became apparent that Baez wished to

Provincia de Kendoza, Memoria administrativa de
los cuatro meses del gobierno del Sr Ricardo Baez
Ilendoza, 1920)
pp. lb, 26.
.

,

2

On March 7, 1920, during Baez' rule, the election
for National Deputies took place. This contest was held
at a time when the faction-ridden Radicals were entangled
trying to assert their supremacy within the party. The
electoral returns were: UCR pro-Yrigoyenist candidates:
Francisco Rubilar and Emilio Quellet) 12,833 votes; UCR
(lencinist, candidate: Carlos V/ashington Lencinas) 7,319;
Socialists 2,791; Conservatives 2,554. Rubilar, Quellet
and Lencinas were elected. La Prensa, March 13 1920.
(

,

i

remain as governor beyond the time
limit deten^ined by the
constitution. He began an intensive
propaganda campaign,
praising his own leadership and
seeking support from the
business and industrial sectors.
Alleging the
need to

maintain social order, Baez postponed
the election until
July 4. This action touched off a

constitutional conflict

that would end only when the central
government again
placed Mendoza under its authority.

Baez had rightfully assumed office, since
he was
president of the Senate at Lencinas' death. But

his term

as Senator would end on May 31, 1920, which
meant that

after that day he would automatically cease as
governor.
The postponement of the election until July revealed
that

Baez intended to continue in office beyond May

31.

Sensing the approaching storm, Baez closed the legislature
on May 18, and requested federal intervention as the only

means to hold a new clean eletoral contest.
The president of the provincial Supreme Court,

however, announced in a message to the Ministry of the

Interior, that as of midnight of May 31 he would assume
charge of the government, in accordance with the

constitution; and that he would then request the

appointment of a federal commissioner. But Baez stated
that he would refuse to deliver the government to the

Supreme Court. In Buenos Aires, national deputies from

Mendoza also asked for intervention from the Federal
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Government. Thus, although everyone
petitioned according
to his own convenience, all the
sectors demanded that
Buenos Aires decide how to settle
Mendoza- s political
quandary. In fact, the provincial
constitution provided
the means to restore political life
to normalcy, but
local, personal rivalries demonstrated
one more time
that federalism, the cherished symbol
of provincial
autonomy, was not such a vital principle
for the men of
the interior. Judging these self-seeking
requests for
the arbitration of Buenos Aires, La Prensa
observed
that they indicated "a degeneration of democratic
life

and an atrophy of civic virtues."-^

Buenos Aires was again master of the Kendozan

situation when Congress enacted in August 1920 the

intervention law. It stated that the federal commissioner
should comply with the constitution and laws of Mendoza.
This provision was important because, according to the

provincial charter, elections for governor should be held
on the first Sunday of January 1921.

Yrigoyen appointed Eudoro Vargas Gomez, a Radical
leader from the province of Corrientes, to serve as
commissioner. His rule had two salient characteristics:
he carried out intensive negotiations trying to unite the

Radical factions, and he seriously neglected the

•^Ibid.,

June 13, 1920.
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administrative business of the
province. The difficult
and
thorny negotiations held in
Mendoza

and Buenos Aires to
forge Radical unity are
indicated by the length
of the
intervention. Whereas Commissioner
loza, who had arrived
in Mendoza in November
1917, stayed in power

less than

four months; and de Veyga and
Araya interventions lasted
a bit more than seven months,
Vargas Gomez ruled Mendoza
until early February 1922, that is,
for

seventeen months.

The achievement of Radical
unification was

especially important not only to ensure
the preeminence
of the party in the province, but
also to strenghten it
for the coming presidential election. As
the
chances of

the Radicals getting the governorship were
excellent,
the struggle over the candidacies became a
major

stumbling block in solidifying the party. The
repeated
failures to achieve the desired unity forced the

commissioner twice to postpone the elections. Los Andes
summed up the intra-partisan fight by asserting that
"there is not a single Radical who looks at the situation

with the same viewpoint."^
As the elections approached, a self-labeled

"unionist" sector proclaimed Rufino Ortega, a loyal

supporter of Yrigoyen, its candidate for governor. At the
A

los Andes,

Tlay 19,

1921. As an indication of the

prevailing intolerance. National Deputy Emilio Quellet
was assassinated over political differences.

same time, another Radical
coavention chose Carlos
Washingtoa Lencinas as its
candidate. The Lencinists
tried to enhance their position
by appealing
to the

popularized expression "El muerto
manda," symbolizing that
Jose Nestor lencinas was guiding
them and commanding that
the future of the movement be
placed in his
son's hands.

Since Lencinas was the candidate
who could muster the
largest electoral support, Ortegas candidacy was
withdrawn. Lencinas was already a
household name with a
considerable following. But Carlos
Washington's popularity
was not only an inherited one. He had
personal qualities
for leading the Radicals, now officially
transformed into
the Union Civica Radical Lencinista.
Carlos Washington had been learning politics
as a
companion to his father ever since his return to
Hendoza
in 1913, as a brand new lawyer graduated from the

University of Buenos Aires. Born in Department Rivadavia
on November 13, 1888, he was one of the youngest political
fig-ures of the province,

especially when compared with the

leading politicians of the times. However, he had already
acquired substantial political experience by serving in

responsible positions within the party, and as provincial
deputy from 1917 to 1920. He had also been part of the

bureaucratic machine during his father's governorship,
serving as attorney for the Provincial Bank and the School
Board, and as a member of the Irrigation Council. In 1920
he had been elected National Deputy, in the first electoral

^

s
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contest held after his father's
death.
To assure success in the
forthcoming election, the
lencinists sought to balance the
popular image of Carlos
Washington with a candidate for deputy
governor agreeable
to the moderate sectors. Because
of the arbitrariness of

Jose Nestor Lencinas when he was in
office, the reputation
of Lencinism had been stained in the
eyes of the nonLenoinist electorate. Hence, it was important
for Carlos
Washington to appeal to the different sectors
and

especially to dispel the charges of "Bolsheviks"
applied
to them by the conservatives. He was able
to recruit
the

support of Bautista Gargantini, Jr., son of one of
the

largest bodegueros of Llendoza. In this way the ticket

presented a facade more palatable to those less

responsive toward Lencinism.^
The lencinist program as approved by the party

convention expressed moderate goals, with emphasis on
5

As a National Deputy, Carlos V/ashington'
performance was as inconspicuous as that of his father.
He introduced only two pieces of legislation, one of them
a bill that his father had unsuccessfully sponsored in
1916 for a national wine industry statute.

^Lencinas and Gargantini received the acquiescence
of Buenos Aires, but in Llendoza the other Radical sectors
were reluctant to endorse them openly. Gargantini had
Joined the Radicals, but later he sided with the
dissidents who formed the Intransigent Radi cal ^Party in
1918, when Jose Nestor lencinas purged Delfin Alvarez
from the deputy governorship. Jose Hipolito Lencinas
recalls that Carlos Washington exhorted Gargantini:
"acompaneme por una corazonada." Personal interview,
Mendoza, June 22, 1972.

social services aad the efficiency
of the bureaucracy.
The
principal points of the program
referred to granting a
pension for the aged, the spread
of health services
throughout the province, improvement
of the financial
system by transforming the Provincial
Bank into a semiprivate one, self-government for the
municipalities,

reasonable prices for grapes and wine,
irrigation works,
modernization of the school system, and
normalization of
the financial conditions of the school
teachers.'^
The conservatives, adopting a new party
name,

Partido Liberal, to replace that of Partido
Autonomista,
selected Mario Arenas and Jose V. Auriol as their
candidates in October 1921. A party statement

characterized the differences between the Liberals and
the Lencinists in class terms. In the Liberal Party,
it
said, were to be found the majority of the provincial

leaders, the most capable, the most traditional, and

those with the highest interests to protect. In contrast,
the statement viewed the Lencinists as men who in order
to get votes "flatter the people, teach hatred for the

patr5n, and abusing their

j^the people'

sj ignorance,

misguide them to believe that they had the right to take
Q

property without paying for it,"

'^La

Prensa

,

July 31, 1921.

o

Los Andes, November 10, 1921.
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Since the conservatives had
limited hopes for success,
they used the Mendozan electoral
confrontation chiefly as a
platform from which to attack Yrigoyen.
At the party
convention in Mendoza, Matias Sanchez
Sorondo sounded this
note when he exclaimed: "...for the
salvation
of our

fatherland, the least

I

can say is: Delenda Yrigoyenl
Let

us destroy Yrigoyen and his Radical
government'.
The election held on Sunday, December
18, 1921

confirmed the overwhelming popularity of
Lencinas, despite
the opposition of other Radical factions and
the lukewarm

attitude of the national leadership.

Carlos Washington

thus entered the governorship with a broad base of
support,
a support he did not hesitate to associate with
his father.

"Voting for me," he said, "my followers not only have

thought of the 'gauchito' [[little gaucho^

,

as they call

me, but of my father who made so many sacrifices for the

Radical cause.

"^'"

On February

4,

1922,

Carlos Washington assumed the

governorship of Mendoza. Only 33 years old, he received

^Ibid., October 17, 1921.

^^The UCR Lencinista won in the capital and in every
department by a wide margin. The total electoral returns
were: UCR Lencinist 13,207 votes; Liberal Party 6,085;
UCR ( Tabanerista, another Radical faction) 5,083; and
Socialist Party 1,905. La Prensa December 28, 1921.
,

^^La Prensa, January 6, 1922. As soon as he was
elected, Carlos Washington sent a congratulatory telegram
to Yrigoyen, telling the President that the election
returns had confirmed "your prestige as interpreter of the
dearest aspirations of the people." Ibid . , December 19,
1921.
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that day expressions of the
same warmth and
solidarity
from the common people that
had been given his
father four
years before. The crowd broke
the police lines and
erupted
into the government house,
as if to symbolize
the fact
that the people were again
in power.
Lencinas'

political success was rooted
in the
popularity he enjoyed among the
masses. In fact, many
contemporary observers believe that
he had greater appeal
among the humble than his father.
His personal qualities,
especially his frank and open manner,
contributed to their
devotion. But lencinas was a practical
politician who
worked hard to win their support. Taking
advantage
of the

swift development of the automobile,
he travelled

tirelessly throughout the province, carefully
organizing
his political tours to reach every possible
corner.
He

disciplined his mind as well as his body to the hard
scheduled he imposed upon himself. When he needed
to

recoup his energies he used to sleep for half an hour at
12

His mother, Pidela Peackok de Lencinas, placed
the sash upon him. That day was also a cherished one for
the Radicals, because it marked another anniversary of
the 1905 Revolution. Thus, in a telegram to Yrigoyen,
Lencinas complimented him for that landmark "in the
history of the glorious party which embodies in you the
highest aspirations of the people." La Epoca February 7,
1922. Lencinas appointed as his collaborators many who
had also served under his father. Among them, Carlos I.I.
Puebla returned to the Ministry of Government; Leopoldo
Suarez was entrusted with the Ministry of Industry and
Public Works; and Jorge Cespedes became Minister of
Hacienda. But in May Cespedes was elected National
Senator by the legislature, and was replaced by Clodomiro
Soto.
,

any place, and then he was
up again with new
vigor.
While the conservatives
opened their comites
only at
election ti.es, asserted a
Mendozan writer, Carlos
Washington
was in contact with the
gaucha^je all year round.l3
His sharp
memory was also of great
assistance in his communications

With the people. He could trace
the members of a family
as if
it were his ov^; hence, the
proverbially large number of
godchildren he had all over the
province. Benito Marianetti
recalls the fact that many children
born in Mendoza used to
bear the names Jose Nestor or Carlos
Washington.
Lencinas was a good-looking man, of
average height; he
had the appearance of an excited,
lively man, with a long
broad face with wide deep-set eyes and
full lips, and with
hair combed straight back off his high
forehead. Although
he sometimes dressed in gaucho apparel,
he had the pose of
a typical urban caudillo. The fact that
he was a fairly

young governor contributed to build up his remarkable
political following. Moreover, the memory of his father
was
very vivid and helped to capitalize the appeal evoked
by

his name, especially in the rural areas. His vitality
also

denoted new blood in handling the business of the State.
His father died at almost 61 years of age; Carlos Washington

became governor at half that age. While Jose Nestor Lencinas
"^^Interview with Carlos Alberto Arroyo, Buenos Aires,
May 13, 1972. Mr. Arroyo is a member of one of the so-called
traditional families of Mendoza.
14

Marianetti, Las luchas sociales en Mendoza,

p.

63.
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had been a respected, poised figure,
in the patriarchal
style of late nineteenth century, Carlos
Washington
represented modernity, both in his physical
appearance and
his proverbial dynamism. His brother Rafael
Nestor
recalled Carlos Washington's expression that
"I'll be the

governor of Mendoza because

I

do not take a siesta,"

implying his drive to communicate with people as
much as
IS
possible,
A Mendozan historian who in the 1930'

s

played a

prominent political role in conservative politics,

recognizes Carlos Washington's interest in public works,
but laments that as a leader

— "el

mas popular de todos"

he wasted his enormous prestige by attracting and catering
to the masses "in his own way, without attempting either
to educate or to improve their ideas and sentiments.""'"^

Likewise, Adolf o Vicchi credits the younger Lencinas for
his extraordinary ability to establish a warm rapport with
the people all over the province.

^'^

Carlos Washington's political action was based upon a

personalist influence, getting directly involved with the
people, enjoying being with them, sharing the good moments
IS

,

Personal interview with Rafael Nestor Lencinas,
Mendoza, June 29, 1972.
Edmundo Correas, "Historia de Mendoza," IV, pp.
500-501.
^'^Luis Alberto Romero, interview with Adolf o Vicchi,
former Governor of Mendoza (1941-1943), Buenos Aires,

August

5,

1971. Columbia University, Oral History Program.

.
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and helping them in the bad
ones. His personality
enabled
him to attract the goodwill and
affection of the popular
sectors. If their veneration for
Carlos V/ashington was like
a religious experience, it
was because those who had
very
few material things to protect found
in him a protector of
greater values, their dignity, a
sense of equality
as

human beings, and a friend who never
closed the door to a
man in distress.
His father had
plowed the same field,

18„
Carlos Alberto Arroyo, who won the
Awardo of^ the Fondo Nacional de las Artes (a 1972 Literarv
Federal
Government council for the endowment of the arts),
has
foousing on the Loncinist experience,
a^pf^n^.n^'^'i"
?Sev
ihey are:
Odio entre hermanos (Buenos Aires, 1957)Politicos enloouecidos (Buenos Aires, 1959); El
interv entor
federal Buenos Aires, I960); and La furia deTos
vencid^
(Buenos Aires, 1961). In El intervent^FTid¥fa.T7~T. n. i pH129, he presents an image of Carlos Washington Lencinas
which
his own view (personal interview, Kay
9, 1972)
reflects the true sentiments between Lencinas and
the
common people:

m

*

Los criollos veneraban al caudillo: su fotografia
veiase junto a la imagen del santo de la devocion femenina,
sujeto en la quincha, homenajeado con un ramillete de
humildes flores silvestres
Toda esa masa profesaba una
fe y la unia un sentimiento.
Estaban dominados por un
fanatismo semejante al de los creyentes de una religion.
Veian en el caudillo a un nuevo redentor, pero de carne y
hueso, a su alcance, al que oian...el gobernaria para ellos;
el quitaria a los ricos y daria a los pobres. Y se codeaba,
y comia y chupaba con sus iguales los paisanos. No los
rehuia, no los miraba con soberbia. Vivia para ellos, se
sacrificaba por ellos...
- A mi no me van a comprar por mas que me engatusen. Yo soy
criollo,
yo soy gaucho como ustedesl
- Los ricos dicen que yo los persigo, que los quiero
empobrecer.
Si
es ciertol Es para que ustedes tengan un
poco mas y ellos un poco menos....
- ...ellos son todos parientes y van al mismo club social.
Son oligarcas y ricos. No son como nosotrosl Nosotros
somos iguales a ustedes....
.

. .

.

.

.

.

.

;

i

,

;

.

.
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tut Carlos Washington did not have
to rely upon Jose
Nestor's memory to enjoy the fondness

of the workers and

the campesinos."^^

The political style of Carlos
Washington made it
possible for him to build up his personal
image. A
sympathetic newspaper stated that a
visit to the government
house provided a valuable psychological
dissection of the
way he dealt with all kind of visitors.
The waiting rooms
were always crowded, especially with lower
class people. He
was the ultimate arbiter even in matters
which should have

been resolved at lower levels, because the people
were only
satisfied with his words.

Luring the rule of Jose Nestor Lencinas only Carlos
V/ashington of his several sons, had been a part of the inner

circle of government. But when Carlos Washington became
governor, his brothers Jose Hipolito and Rafael Nestor

entered the political arena and played significant roles.
19

Personal interview with Benito Marianetti. Kendoza,
June 21, 1972. Marianetti noted that Yrigoyen, in contrast
with Lencinas, was essentially reserved and aloof, having
almost no communication with the masses.
'^^La

21

Palabra, May 16, 1923.

Jose Hipolito was born in I.lendoza in 1892, and
graduated as a lawyer from the Law School at the University
of Buenos Aires. He served for a brief period as secretary
to his father when Jose Nestor Lencinas assumed the
governorship in 1918. Jose Hipolito had a strong voice in
party and government affairs. Early in the 1920' s he was
appointed prosecutor, and later named attorney for the
Provincial Bank. In 1923 he was elected National Deputy and
appointed legal adviser of the Promotional Committee in
charge of the activities of the former Cooperativa Vitivinicola.
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The diversity of the personalities,
values, and charact ers
of the three brothers was highly
influential in molding

public opinion about their actions and
motivations. Carlo s
Washington enjoyed an immense popularity,
almost unrelated
to his successes and failures in
office. His authority was
never questioned and his decisions seldom
challenged. Jos^
Hipolito acted from the beginning as a shrewd
politician,

expeditious in resolving problems in a pragmatic
and
utilitarian way, respected because of his power,
but not
22
loved.
Rafael Nestor was in many respects like
Carlos

Washington, a warm, open-minded person, but he lacked the

maturity of a leader and the self-discipline required to
serve efficiently in the party and the government. Of the
three brothers, only Carlos Washington had the charisma of

Jose Nestor Lencinas, and his ascendancy overshadowed the

political significance of his brothers.

Rafael Nestor was born in 1896 and died in August
1972. V/hen Carlos Washington assumed office he also became
an influential figure, was elected provincial deputy and
in 1924 was chosen Speaker of the provincial Chamber of
Deputies, and appointed representative of the legislature
to the Caja Obrera de Pension a la Vejez e Invalidez. In
1928 he graduated from the Kedical School at the
University of Buenos Aires, although he never practiced
medicine. There is a fourth son of Jose Nestor Lencinas,
Horacio Antulio, born in Mendoza in 1917» a lawyer, and
a daughter, Maria Irene.
^^Through the initiative of Jose Hipolito Lencinas
the Circulo de Armas, a socio-political institution was
created in 1923. It performed for the Lencinists the role
that the Jockey Club performed for the conservatives.
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Carlos Washington was an affable
man, instilled with
the personalistic inclination
typical of the leading
caudillos from the interior. He was
well adjusted to perform
under any circumstances, be it a meeting
with the president
of the republic or a criollo dinner
with humble supporters
,
in a rancho far away in the countryside.
He was an intuitive
leader, not a thinker, whose university
background enabled
him to add stature to his populist movement.
However, as a

Mendozan writer has pointed out, he was not a
doctrinaire
and did not proclaim his educational status to

the masses.

On the contrary, he preferred to be considered
another
"criollo gaucho" like them.^^ As a politician, he
embodied
the typical "dotor" of political life; he devoted all his

energies to the party, for in the party were his friends,
his interests, his problems, everything in his life.

Every time Carlos Washington arrived from Buenos Aires,
it was a happy, colorful occasion for his legion of

partisans to demonstrate their affection for him. The
capital was prepared for the event in advance. Bands,
petards, flags, pictures of both Lencinas, carts filled

with people coming from the departments filling the streets
with a gaudy spirit of holiday.

24

2^

Dardo Olguin, "...y en el medio de mi pecho, Carlos
V/ashington lencinas," Todo es Historia (April, 1969), 33.
^^On one occasion, in August 1923, Carlos Washington
was taken from the train, lifted in the arms of his
supporters and carried into the streets of Mendoza. Like a
civic procession, they usually paraded from the Pacific
Railway Station to the Circulo de Armas. Los Andes, August
13, 1923.
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During the long months of intra-Radical
political
maneuverings and on the arduous campaign
trail,

Carlos

Washington's abilities to prevail as the
indisputable party
leader and upon the electorate's choice,
were proven beyond
doubt. But how did the "gauchito"
perform as a
governor?

What reforms resulted from his political,
social and
economic actions?
The Populist Performance.

Political and Constitutional Affairs
The main characteristic of Lencinist politics was its

personalism and in this regard Carlos Washington continued
his father's approach, although with a tone less moralizing
and less stern than that of the late leader.

Carlos

Washington served as the political umbrella of his

movement protecting and promoting its candidates.
Verticality, discipline and loyalty to the party and its

leadership were basic features of lencinism. Members were
warned, as on the occasion of the 1923 congressional
elections, that:
25

The propaganda of the party had a strong
personalist accent. For example, it was customary to name
the comites after prominent men in the party. This was
especially so with the Lencinists, who profusely displayed
the iconography and revered anniversaries of the movement.
Besides the numerous comites simply named Jose Nestor
Lencinas or Carlos Washington Lencinas, there were other
baptized as "Gran Gaucho Lencinas," "Nuestro Gran Jefe
Lencinas," "Gaucho Lencinas," "Ocho horas," "4 de
febrero," "Pension a la Vejez," "Defensa Obrera Gaucho
Lencinas," and many others with similar exaltations.

"
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^^"^ sustitutes even only
one of our
^''S^''^^"!'
candidates,
is a traitor to the party!
The
whole list, or not
at all. This is ^"'S
arair'^h.""^"'
party discipline. 26

Carlos Washington was inclined to reward
his political
friends by welcoming them onto the official
payroll. As he
frankly put it in his June 1922 inaugural
message
to the

legislature,

"I

have sought to provide the friends who

shared with me the hours of sacrifice with the
public
rewards, according to strict partisan merits
"^'^
While
at the highest level he sought the collaboration of
those

who had performed under his father, in the lower echelons
he promoted, or at least tolerated, the active interference
of the petty bosses of the coraites to carry on some of the

business of the government. On many occasions this attitude
led to the public exposure of despicable parochial

interests, creating situations which impaired the adequate

functioning of the provincial government.
The so-called "politica de comite," which granted

higher relevance to party affiliation than to any other
qualification, was responsible for placing very mediocre

El latigo (Mendoza) March 2, 1923. The author
recalls how many years later the same electoral technique
was used. The political campaign for the April 1954
congressional election in the Federal Capital, was carried
out by the officialist party as a simple presidential
mandate. The personal merits of every candidate were not
only ignored by the propaganda, but as far as the election
was concerned it was totally irrelevant. On this occasion
the tactic was based on a poster of President Pcron with
only this statement: "Support Peron by voting his
candidates.
,

^'^Provincia de Mendoza, Mensaje del Gobernador Dr.
Carlos Washington lencinas 1922, n. p.~XHereaf ter cited
as Mensaje del Gobernador .
,
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elements in bureaucratic positions.
Sometimes, the voices
from the comites were capable of
blocking appointees who in
their eyes were not real party
loyalists. ^8 Through the dayby-day maneuvers, there arose a cadre
of Lencinist leaders,
caudillos of lesser stature who in the
folkloric nature of
such a personalist regime played a role
much larger than
their capabilities warranted. ^9 The Mendozan
historian Juan
Draghi Lucero believes that one of the
negative aspects
of

Lencinism was its exclusion of the other sectors
of Mendoza.
Guided sometimes by a spirit of political revenge,
it

fostered the creation of a provincial group of favorites.

Marianetti has observed that many of Lencinists' followers
were motivated to participate in public life not by political
reasons, "but for the purpose of resolving their own

problems.

"-^^

This type of local leader had a tremendous influence at

popular level, and was therefore, very useful in gathering
mass support for the party. The highest Lencinist officials
were aware of the mediocre caliber of many of these local
?8

Such was the case in July 1922, when the Senate
rejected lencinas' appointment of Ramon O'Donnell as judge
and Samuel de Rosas as prosecutor. Neither v/as a member of
the party nor a Lencinist.
29

*

Among them, the case of Tomas A. Lima is one of
the more interesting. Known throughout Mendoza as "One-eyed
Lima," he was given municipal positions from v/hich he became
engaged in many partisan affairs. He was widely known for
his skillfulness in handling dubious situations and through
the years his name has grovm to become a legend of unenvied
reputation.
^*^Personal interview with Juan Draghi Lucero, June 14,
1972, and with Benito Marianetti, June 21, 1972. Ivlendoza,

party politicians, but tolerated
and even patronized them
because of their rapport with the
rank and file. Antulio
Lencinas, the youngest brother of
Carlos Washington,
ascribed this tolerance to the need
to fill party position
with the people it could get. The
party, despite its wide
political base, exercised power with
loyal but poorlydisciplined and inadequately-trained local
leaders, a
situation that forced Lencinism to commit
mistakes.

Prom a historical perspective, however, it
seems
questionable whether the price paid for admitting

such

elements within Lencinism was not too high,
for the time
came when the movement had to prove before the
public
opinion the honesty of its leaders and the efficiency of
its procedures in the government. On the other hand, it

appears doubtful that a party with such grass roots

strength could have been politically effective without
the assistance of minor leaders who were socially and

economically close to the masses. This seems to be a

normal pattern for populist regimes. Theoretically, they
are the most democratic because they claim to derive

their power straight from the people, that is, the

largely underprivileged majority. In an underdeveloped
society, like that of Mendoza in the 1920'

s,

if the

majority were to rule, it had to be a government where
the "one-eyed Limas" would play an important role, since

•^^Personal interview with Antulio Lencinas, June
17, 1972.
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they were more representative of the
majority than was any
of the leaders from other parties.

Los Andes, which originally welcomed
Lencinas as a
promising young ruler, urged him after
several months in
office, to draw a line separating the
business of the
government from that of the comite.^^
Assimilating
the

politics of the State with those of the party,
noted Los
Andes on another occasion, was like making
a small hole
in a rice hag. The loss of the grains would be
hardly
noticeable, but it would be unceasing, and although
it
would take time, it would end by emptying the bag.^^
In the legislature the strength of the Lencinist

majority gave rise to abuses, especially in the
treatment of opponents. This was the case when in 1923
the credentials of the conservative-inclined provincial

Senator-elect Julio Cesar Raffo de la Reta was impugned
on the basis of anonymous charges. The Lencinist Senators

did not find this procedure objectionable. Instead, they

extended full credit to the accusation, and by rejecting
his credentials penalized a man who had been highly

esteemed in Kendozan public life.
A year later, in May 1924, the provincial Chamber

Los Andes, December 20, 1922. This newspaper
had strongly censured Jose Nestor Lencinas. But with
respect to Carlos Washington, it adopted a conciliatory
position, encouraging him to carry out a positive
government. It criticized the governor often, but did
so with moderation.
^^Ibid.

,

March

5,

1923.

,
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Of Deputies took a similar
action against conservative

Deputy-elect Joaquin Mendez
Calzada. He had been
an
unrelenting critic of lencinis.

and a legal dispute he
had

With Deputy Governor Gargantini
served as a Justification
to reject his admission to
the
provincial Chamber of

Deputies. This act against Mendez
Calzada had its roots in
the vituperative criticisms
he directed against
Lencinism
from El Censor, the official
publication of the Liberal
Party, of which he was the director.
There were also instances in which
political
adversaries were subject to rough treatment
by unruly
Lencinist party zealots. In December
1922, for example,
Gregorio Caro, owner of the opposition paper
La Gensura,
was physically assaulted; on another
occasion shots
34 Por

example, the report made by this newspaper
of a huge Lencinist political celebration is a
testimony
01 Its intemperance. Few lines could be found to match
the savageness of this report. El Censor (Kendoza)
January 12, 1924, included these excerpts:
...alguna cuchipanda populachera organizada por
empleados publi cos . . . que sienten la necesidad de emborracharse en presencia y compania del Sr. Lencinas, y dar
de paso rienda suelta a su ululante salvajismo indigena,
entre alaridos a la memoria desdichada y nefasta de ese
gaucho barbaro y torpe que se llamo Jose Nestor Lencinas..,
...entre el refusilo de las dagas, el vaso de
vino, y la chillona griteria de un par de cientos de
vagos ebrios, es donde el gobernador Lencinas se encuentra
a sus anchas...^
...esa fiesta memorable, mi tad bacanal dionisiaca
mi
tad
cuchipanda de burdel arrabalero, es una afrenta
y
para Mendoza. En ella este gobierno de melena y taco
punteagudo tiene su mas signif i cativa expresion y su

exacto retrato.
All the individuals who were interviewed by the
author, from all political sides, attested that Carlos
Washington never drank with excess.
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were fired agai„st the leading
provincial conservative,
Deputy Mario Arenas; and the Liberal
and Socialist parties
often denounced the arbitrary police
decisions to prohibit
opposition rallies.

While the lencinists engaged in this
kind of
aggressive action against their opponents,
they fanned the
support of the people by extolling the
virtues of their
maximum leader. They tried to assign to the
late Jose
Nistor Lencinas a place in destiny even before
history
could pass a judgment on his merits. Hence,
the promonument fervor of the Lencinists was displayed again
in

June 1922 when the Central Committee approved raising
a
statue in homage of the deceased caudillo, in a prominent

place in the capital. Another panegyric attempt was a
decree of March 1924 entrusting former Minister of

Hacienda Dardo Corvalan Mendilaharzu, with the task of

writing a biography of Jose Nestor Lencinas.

These two

resolutions, although they never materialized, were

evidence of the personalist nature that was the lifeline
of Lencinism. Critical of these self-serving projects,

La Prensa stated that "yesterday's statue and today's

biography, of the same origin, reveal a social and

political climate that saddens the spirit. "^^

^^La Libertad (Mendoza)

^^La Prensa, April

1,

,

April 4, 1924.

1924.

—
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A comprehensive view of the
behavior of the opposition
during Carlos Washington's rule,
indicates that it did not
have a very significant influence
in the political situation
of the province. The conservatives
had been in a defensive
position since I918, when Jose Nestor
Lencinas defeated
Civit. The populist tide had buried
their chances to become
the party preferred by the electorate.
The Mendozan

Socialist Party, although small in size, was
dogmatic and
aggressive, and therefore, presented a
distinctive facet in
provincial politics. As was its traditional posture,
the

Socialists adopted a moralizing position. They preached
against alcoholism, the civic degradation which was

represented in the comites, and the ill-effects of illiteracy.
With a strong admonishing voice, the party newspaper. El

Socialista

,

alerted the people stating:

Citizens: you must not go to the comites, which
are centers for corruption and barbarism, and
where the old politicians offer you wine just to
degrade you.... You must not go to the taverns,
where you drink poison, because poison is what
the bodegueros produce and what the bolicheros
sell. ... 37
The Socialist press was implacable against the

government of Carlos Washington. Once it published the words
of an hypothetical former supporter of Lencinas who stated

that a good Lencinist "is one who knows how to steal, how to

bribe

coimear

^'^El

—

,

and be a blind servant of the governor."

Socialista

^^Ibid.

,

,

March 13, 1924.

August 15, 1924.

1
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The Socialists admitted that for
the ignorant masses, who
comprised most of the electorate,
the social and popular
postulates of Lencinism resembled
Socialism. But -between
a Socialism like ours," they said,

which does not open comites or
gambling houses,
and advises [people^ to drink water;
and a
Socialism" like the Lencinist, which
free and abundant alcohol during the provides
long
electoral campaigns, the ignorant masses
prefer
the "Lencinist Socialism. "39
'

Mario Bravo, the Socialist Senator for the
Federal
Capital, after a tour of Mendoza province in March

1923,

expressed the harshly critical views that typified

Socialist attitudes toward the provincial political
leadership. Noting the dreadful housing of the poor, the

inadequate salaries, the long hours of the bodega worker,
the high illiteracy rate, the widespread incidence of

diseases like typhus and syphilis, Bravo accused both the

Conservative and Radical parties of responsibility for
the decline of civic spirit and the debasement of the

voter.

"Alcohol is the base of the organization of the

political parties," he stated, "and gambling is a

propaganda device tolerated in order to keep the comites
alive. "^0

^^Ibid., May
^

1,

1926.

Los Andes March 28, 1923. In the next issue
Los Andes editorially rebuked Senator Bravo affirming
that Mendoza's social ills were not imputable only to
its domestic politics, and that "all the parties
March 29
everywhere in the nation behave alike," Ibid
1923.
,

.

,
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Benito Marianetti, then a Socialist
Party leader,
acknowledged that their political
preachings were sectarian
and, therefore, limited in ef f
ectiveness/1 As the
polls

repeatedly indicated, the masses preferred
to be ruled by a
gaucho of flesh and bones rather than by
rigid ideological
principles of the proletarian cause.

Besides the inter-party collision, the sharp
dissensions between Radical factions, which had been
a
feature of political life since 1918, and especially
after
the death of Jose Nestor Lencinas, were also manifested
in

the legislature. The governor had to appeal directly to

party members to overcome their antagonisms, so as to be
able to block the anti-Lencinists.^^ In his 1922 message,
Carlos Washington stated his desire to reorganize the

Radicals under his principles and hegemony. A party union

promoted from the highest level, he said, was auspicious
when carried out with justice and equity.
41

Personal interview, June 21, 1972. The Lencinists
used to refer to Socialism as "cosa de gringos," while the
Socialists termed Lencinism as "la politica criolla."
Marianetti claims that no other party was engaged in a
permanent civic enlightening campaign deeper than the
Socialists.
The Socialist position, although well inspired,
failed to consider human nature as it is. The gambling
casino built by the Lencinists in 1924, in the city of
Mendoza, is still functioning in the same building, and
opening its doors six days a week.

^^Related to this matter, Jose Hipolito Lencinas
affirmed that undated resignations were never requested in
advance from any legislator. Personal interview, June 23,
1972.
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But such a solution was not
possible. In spite of the
fact that Lencinas was beyond
question the leader of the
majority of the Radicals of Mendoza,
he had to
face the

permanent opposition of the Yrigoyenist
Radicals. This
alienation, begun during the government
of Jose Nestor
Lencinas, had become more acute under
Carlos Washington.
His relationship with Yrigoyen, in
spite of their
early

mutual acceptance, and the congratulatory
telegrams sent
by Lencinas to the President, soon faded
away,
since the

Personalist Radicals of Mendoza considered the
Lencinists
as deviationists from the party.
The channel of political alliances followed
a logical

path;

the final break between Carlos Washington and

Yrigoyen was a corollary of the situation in the province,
where Lencinists and Yrigoyenists were at each other's
throats. The accession of Alvear to the presidency in

October 1922, and the further detachment between
Personalists and anti-Personalists

,

placed Lencinas

squarely in the anti-Yrigoyen sector.
In the Mendozan scene Carlos Washington also sought
the shelter of a friendly Judiciary, taking advantage of
the so-called Jurado de En juiciamiento

,

a Judiciary

Review Board for members of the judicial system. To this
end the majority in both branches of the legislature

appointed only Lencinists as their representatives to the
Board, as they did when Jose Nestor Lencinas was governor.

Once again the opposition raised its protest in vain. The
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lencinists restated their viewpoint
that the Board was a
political body, and as such, it was
logical for the ruling
party to fill
the membership with its own
men. When

m

the

provincial charter called for minority
representation,
they claimed, it did so explicitly,
as in the provisions
dealing with the electoral system.
The seriousness of the situation lay
in the fact that
the Lencinists controlled the legislature,
and consequently,
the Executive could control the Judiciary
by using the

Review Board to remove, legally, the judges it
wanted to
eliminate. Traditionally, this had been a provincial
fact
of life. Until 1918 there had been "conservative"
Judges;

with the Lencinists in power, it was the turn for "Radical"
judges.
The most resounding case involving the Board was the

impeachment of Judge Jorge Vera Vallejo.^^ This judge had
been suspended by a decree of Jose Nestor Lencinas in

December 1918, but he had been reinstated by Interventor
de Veyga in February 1919. In August 1923 he was accused

^This situation demonstrated the relevance of the
words of Agustin Alvarez, a noted Kendozan thinker (1857who wrote that "V/e have enough talent to know the
1914)
vital role of Justice, but enough weakness in our
character so as to fail to put it into effect." I.!anual
de patologla poll tica (Buenos Aires, 1947), p. iB"^
Originally published in 1899.
,

the wide coverage given in the daily
press from August 1923 to January 1924, this case is
reported in detail in Jorge Vera Vallejo, I.li maris tratura
2d revised edition (Mendoza, 1966), pp. 9^2057
''''^Besides

,
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of having illegally arranged a
transference of funds.
Whatever the reason, he was charged
before

the Review Board

with "desconcepto publico"— dishonorable
conduct— in his
performance as a judge. Neither in the
constitution nor the
laws was mentioned such a juridical offense.
Joaquin Sayanca,
president of the Supreme Court, described this

term as simply

an impudent invention of the lencinists.

Whether to embarrass Vera Vallejo or simply to
test his
endurance, a final decision by the Board was delayed
beyond
the time-limit determined by the constitution. Finally,
Vera
Vallejo was removed as a judge by the ten votes of the
Lencinists against four cast by the members of the Supreme
Court in the Board.

Apart from the legal charges brought against one member
of the Judiciary, the Lencinists harassed other members whom

they considered representatives of the Regimen. These were

vaguely charged with delaying the administration of justice
in order to serve the interests of the upper class, that is,

purposely discriminating against the welfare of the people.
"We want an honest system of justice, fairly distributed to

the rich as to the poor," stated one of the slogans raised
A

T

by the Lencinists.

^^La Prensa, September

4,

1923.

^^The Mendozan Bar Association reacted at once
demanding that Congress vote for a federal intervention of
Mendoza.
^'^Los Andes,

October 14, 1923.
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But, did the removal of Vera
Vallejo reform the
prevailing system of quick Justice
for the rich, unfair and
belated for the poor? Did the prestige
of Lencinism increase
by focusing the alleged ills of the
Judicial Power upon a
single judge? Was it plain coincidence
that the deposed
Judge was the same one who had criticized
the arbitrary

actions taken by Jose Nestor Lencinas
against a portefio
journalist? If the official action was well
inspired,

it did

not bear the fruits which Lencinism hoped
for. If the

Lencinist move was essentially politically motivated,
it
backfired. For in Buenos Aires, where the anti-Lencinist
forces

— Yrigoyenists,

Socialists and conservatives— were

looking for an opportunity to purge Mendoza of the Lencinist
rule, this episode received adverse publicity.

If in the realm of the Judiciary Carlos Washington
revived the high-handed methods of his father, at least he

improved on Jose Nestor Lencinas' record of performance as
regards the normalization of municipal institutions. After
several years in which departmental self-government was a
dead principle, elections were held in July 1922 in which
the Lencinists succeeded in gaining the majority in the

capital and all the departments, except one. This

normalization represented a considerable advance over the
de facto status in which the municipalities had been kept

during the first Radical government and the federal
interventions. However, in subsequent elections, in the
very few instances where non-Lencinists gained control
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either of a municipal council or a
mayoralty, the Lencinist 3
resorted, in traditional political
behavior, to the

governor's constitutional power to
intervene in the
departments.
Thus, Lencinism was apparently not
content 'with

controlling the affairs of most provincial
bodies, but
insisted on unanimity. This was best exemplified

in the

conflict involving Las Heras, a department
bordering the
capital from the north, whose mayor, Roberto Zapata,

was a

non-Lencinist. He was pressed by the governor to resign,

without success, whereupon the Lencinist majority in the

departmental council suspended him in December 1923. The
provincial Supreme Court voided this resolution but when
Zapata tried to reassume office, he was blocked by the
police. Zapata at once asked the National Congress to

enact a federal intervention in Mendoza, contending that
the provincial government was violating Article

5

of the

national constitution, which guaranteed the autonomy of
the municipal system. Lencinas then issued a decree

reinstating Zapata, which was legally superfluous, since
what was needed was simply to enforce the ruling of the

provincial Supreme Court.
Why was a minor situation like this not allowed by

Lencinas to be resolved by a subsequent election? To what
extent could his government be politically damaged by

tolerating one mayor from the opposition when he enjoyed
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such overwhelming support in the rest
of the province? Why
did Lencinas allow an almost trivial
situation to grow so
uncontrolled that a mayor of a provincial
department would
demand a federal intervention from National
Congress? La
Prensa stated that the governor was only
satisfied with
unanimities, as had been the case under the
Regimen; "he
admits unconditional friends," it said, "but
not
adversaries."''-^ As could be expected,

this issue was

seized upon by the anti-Lencinist National Deputies from

Mendoza to request appointment of an investigating
committee to report on the alleged political maneuvers

ordered or consented to by the governor.

With respect to the election of local irrigation

authorities

—a

constitutional provision of major

importance in Mendoza

— the

law was obeyed under the rule

of the young Lencinas, but its results were diluted by

administrative decisions taken a posteriori

.

After

assuming office, Lencinas appointed new irrigation
authorities until November 1922, when elections were held
as prescribed by the constitution.

50

But the road ahead

for the new authorities was not smooth. In some cases,

^^La Prensa

,

^^ Diputados

,

September 25, 1923.

1923, V, 607-615; VI, 460-464; VII,
50-53. This petition was sent to the committee, but no
further action was taken on this specific proposal.

^^Although according to the constitution the
elections should have been taking place each November,
the last election had been held in November 1919.
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their assumption of office was delayed,
in other instan ces
the Superintendent of Irrigation
replaced
them by his own

fiat, without the legal consent of
the Irrigation Council.
Marianetti states that the Superintendency
abused its
powers and entered into many "maniobras
escandalosas"

concerning the transference of "water rights,"
which were
illegally sold independently of the lands.
This marked the return to the familiar abuses
known
as "el torniquete del agua," always useful
to harass a

landowner or contratista opposed to the government, and
as a vehicle for personal revenges. Favoritism, or
lack of
it, in the irrigation shifts, was enough to alter the

value of the lands. But it would be unfair to blame the

Lencinists exclusively for this situation. Water was life,
and therefore, its importance transcended party lines.
The Populist Performance. The Social Sphere

lencinism was not only a political force sustained by
a numerically significant popular base, it was also a

pioneer regional social movement. For it was in the social
sphere, with its concern for the underdogs, where it made
the largest impact. Under the rule of Jose Nestor and

Carlos Washington Lencinas the first significant social

legislation in all of Argentina was enacted, and under
their leadership the Cuyan masses acquired a new sense of

^^Marianetti, Problemas de Cuyo

,

pp.

188-189.
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dignity and self-recognition.
In their quest for social justice
the Lencinists did
not arouse the kind of dogmatic class
consciousness which
the Socialist instilled into their
political action.
Lenoinism, in comparison, was inorganic,
devoid of a wellfounded ideology, and its methods, to a
large extent,

resembled that of the traditional "polftica
criolla." While
the Lencinists praised themselves for what they
thought
were their towering social accomplishments,
their
adversaries branded them as simple political opportunists.
What, then, were the true social achievements of the
scion
of the old Lencinas? Was Carlos Washington a sincere social,

reformer or just a demagogue?
Carlos Washington inherited the luster which his

father had acquired as crusader for the lower groups. Jose

Nestor Lencinas was always hailed in public memory for his
legislation on the 8-hour day, the minimum wage, and
retirement benefits for public servants. With the same
spirit, Carlos Washington kept the door of the government
house, and his own, open to the workers and campesinos with

whom he liked to evoke his father's memory.
As of 1922 the social conditions in Mendoza had

improved substantially. Carlos Washington was spared the

hard post-war times of his father, when strikes and
disorders plagued not only Mendoza, but the whole country.

In his inaugural message he announced that in the
immediate future he would submit to the legislature "social

legislation based on modern principles. "52
in December he
did send a message to the legislature
that proposed the
creation of the so-called Caja Obrera
de Pension a la Vejez
e iQvalidez, which would provide
pensions for the aged

and
the invalid, establishing a monthly
payment of fifty pesos
for any person 65 years old or over. Lencinas'
initiative

sought to help those unable to earn their own
subsistence.
In his message he referred to the natural lack of
provision
of the worker, who with his reduced resources was
neither

inclined nor prepared to accumulate savings, "nor to think
of a distant future, because he has enough preoccupations

with the present. "5^ In this message, the governor
remarked that with this legislation Mendoza would continue
to be the leader in this field among all the other

provinces, and he praised the innovative social

accomplishments of his father, "the first who as a ruler
rooted in the great Radical movement, was able to instill
it with a social content, its real character and purposes,

beyond the single political objectives."^
The pension plan for the aged enacted in 1923

represented a giant stride in the arduous task of
^^

Mensaje del Gobernador, 1922,

n.

p.

^^Provincia de Mendoza, Ministerio de Industrias y
Obras Publicas, Mensajes ^ proyectos de leyes Pension a
la ve.1 ez e invalidez (Mendoza, 1922J, p. 34.
.

^^Ibid., p. 35.
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providing social benefits for workers
and the retired, and
enhanced the popularity of Lencinas'
name in Mendoza as
well as in the nation.
In his second annual message, in June
1923, Lencinas
anticipated the enactment of other social
measures, such

as life and unemployment insurance, and
maternity

benefits. But these ideas were never formally
introduced
to the legislature. 55 ^^^^^

^^.^^

promises

outlined in the annual messages, the only major
social

legislation enacted under Carlos Washington's term was
the pension for the aged.^^
The enforcement of existing social laws was also at

issue. Complaints of lack of proper implementation during

Carlos Washington's rule were numerous and continuous.
The government, it is true, did not set up effective

machinery for enforcement, although it greatly improved
the Departamento Provincial del Trabajo from the neglected

status in which it was received in 1922.

No doubt, the

novelty of the social legislation conspired against its
enforcement. It is hard to imagine how a simple worker
^^ Mensaje del Gobernador, 1923, n. p.

5^Pelix Luna stated that Lencinas enacted "good
social laws in principle," but that they were technically
unapplicable. Yrigoyen p. 385. In fact, Carlos Washington
only promulgated one social law of importance.
,

his 1922 message, the governor stated that
there were 1,255 demands paralyzed, and that inspections
were not made, even in the capital. Mensaje del Gobernador
1922, n. p.
^''^In

,
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who depended on his job for family
sustenance, could have
ordered his employer to adhere strictly
to the S-hour rule,
or have demanded the minimum wage,
or even threatened t 0
complain to the authorities, without having
any protecti on
at all for his job. The price for these
daring social
innovations was paid in the abuses which took
long years
to root out.
The failure of the social legislation to
produce

immediate significant changes should be placed in
proper

historical perspective. For the laws fulfilled the all

important function of cracking a system which had fought
very hard to block them. They opened up for the first time
the possibility of altering the traditional one-sided

relationship between workers and patrones, even though
full observance of that legislation was not possible

because of inadequate governmental control and, more

important yet, because of the prevailing mentality of the
patrones coupled with the lack of adequate protection for
the workers.
The slowness of the State in implementing social

legislation perhaps may also be attributed to the fact
that the government viewed the improvement of the most

needed sectors with an exclusively political criterion,

rather than as a change required by the incessant social
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evolution of mankind.^S outside the
Lenoinist circles the
belief prevailed that the populist
governmerits had enacted
this type of demagogically-inspired
legislation, solely

or

for the most part, to retain power for their
own benefit.
In defense of the Lencinist position, the
best
argument

perhaps is offered by the conservatives themselves.
When
they returned to office, from 1932 to
1943, they did not
repeal the basic social laws enacted by the Lencinists

—with

the exception of the minimum wage, ruled

unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1929

—but

rather

improved them by bringing them up to date.
In similar fashion, the Lencinists themselves brought
to light the shortcomings of Carlos Washington's rule in

this area. At a party convention held in December 1924,

they approved a "minimum program" which postulated, among

Other goals, the 8-hour rule.^^ This indicates the extent
to which the 1918 law was still unenforced. Moreover, not

until 1926, under the Lencinist government of Alejandro

Orfila (1926-1928), was a raise in policemen's salaries
granted, the first since 1916;^^ and not until that year were

^^This was Los Andes view, November 18, 1923. El
Socialista January 17, 1924, called the pension law for
the aged, "a major my thif ication" made by Lencinism,
because it was only inspired by electoral purposes.
'

,

^^La Prensa

,

December 15, 1924.

^^Provincia de Mendoza, Recopilacion de leyes
1926-1937, I (Mendoza, 1938), p. 93.

,
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minimum wages raised from 2,00 and
2,50 pesos per day, to
4,00 and 4,80, respectively. This was
the first time they
were increased since they were
enacted by Jose Nestor
lencinas in 1918.^1 In 1927 also there
was established,
for the first time, a minimum wage and
a Sunday holiday
for people in domestic service. ^2 therefore,
with the
exception of the old-age pension, Carlos
Washington failed
to introduce to the legislature the new
social programs he
had promised. In view of the high objectives for
social

betterment which Lencinism ostensibly represented,
it
might have been expected that he would, at least, have
sponsored a raise of the minimum wage.^-^

This minimum wage was enacted by Law No. 922. In
October 1929 this law was ruled unconstitutional by the
National Supreme Court, which stated that the provinces
could not enact such legislation because the power to do
it^was delegated to the national government. The case was
Vinedos ^ Bodegas Ari zu v. Mendoza Santos Primo Amadeo,
Argentine Constitutional law (New York« 1943), p. 151.
.

62

It is worthwhile to note that in Governor
Orfila's message to the legislature proposing these
benefits for the large number of people working as
servants, he stated that these workers "could have been
playing the role of humble slaves for life, as it was in
older times, when they were transferred with the property
where they worked." Mendoza, Recopilacion de leyes p.
,

176 •

^^Jose Hipolito Lencinas erroneously stated that
Carlos V/ashington raised the minimum wage from 2,50 to
4,80. Carlos Washington Lencinas Mi si on ^ futuro de una
epoca (Mendoza, 1963), p. 116. As was mentioned, the
raise was enacted by Law No. 922, of 1926, under the
government of Alejandro Orfila.
.
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The Lencinist administration,
however, should be
credited for providing one of the
most important tangible
benefits for the lower classes in the
field of public
health. Two new hospitals were
inaugurated, one in the
capital, the other in San Rafael. ^4
Likewise, public works

received a preferential attention from the
government,
including important irrigation projects, so

essential to

Mendoza's prosperity.
But in the sphere of popular education the
reality
was a pale reflection of what was promised. In
February
1922, when Carlos Washington took office, the condition of
the school system was insolvent and inefficient. An

education bill to replace that of 188? was still to be
enacted; the School Board continued deficit-ridden, and a

large number of children of school age remained

permanently absent from the classroom, increasing the

appalling number of illiterate adults.
Lencinas' messages to the legislature to remedy this

situation, were little more than words. In June 1922 he

promised that emergency taxation laws would resolve the
school deficits. The following year, the governor reported

that primary education was maintained "within the regular

^^The latter, whose construction had begun in 1910,
greatly benefited the population of the whole southern
region of the province, which before had depended
exclusively on the capital for any major medical problem.

^^Juan Agustin Moyano, who was Director of the
School Board, stated that only 36 per cent of all the
children who should do so were attending school. La Prensa
June 27, 1922.

,
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norms set up by the government, which
keeps its daily vigil
for its efficient operation," a naive
and uncritical
statement, to say the least.^^ In the
1924 message the
governor ceased to make any comment on
the financial status
of the School Board.
The administrative disorder of the
school system was a

consequence of the lack of proper observance of
the procedures already established. Ever since 1897 a
provincial
law required that the municipal governments contribute
1

per cent of their revenue to the school fund. But this
obligation had remained unfulfilled since the first years
of the century.

The provincial constitution in its Article

212 also had assigned 20 per cent of the provincial

revenue to the School Board, with the specific warning
that these funds could not be diverted for other purposes.

But a law to implement this constitutional principle was

never enacted during the Lencinist governments. In 1922
so-called emergency laws aimed at putting an end to the
traditional arrears in teachers' salaries. These did not
work as planned, however, judging from the data: in March
1922 the salaries were behind eight months; in December,
ten; in April 1923, five; in November, six; in March 1924,
five.^'^ The publication of the Federacion de Maestros de

^^

Mensaje del Gobernador

,

1922, n.p., and 1923, n.p.

^'^The revenue from law No. 779, one of the emergency
laws, should have been allocated to eliminate the School
Board deficit. When these laws expired, but not the
a Buenos
deficits, the province borrowed 500,000 pesos from
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Mendoza said in ^u^^ust
Aufmst

1Q24.
±^£^4,

fha+ in some
«^
^
tnat
departments the

salaries from 1918 and 1919 were
still unpaid.
The National Board of Education
was to some extent
made the scapegoat for the persistence
of the deficits.

National Law No. 2737, (1890), granted
financial
assistance to the provincial School Boards

if at least

ten per cent of the provincial budget was
allocated to

primary education. Mendoza, therefore, received
a yearly
grant. But early in the 1920' s the payment of the
national

subvention was delayed by the National Board of Education

because it considered that Mendoza had breached the
agreement by paying its teachers with letras, whose value
was less than that of pesos. Mendozan officials, including
the governor, pleaded before the National Board and even
to President Alvear, to obtain the remittance of the

grant.

Meanwhile, in response to constant complaints by the
large number of its unpaid teachers and suppliers, the

School Board placed the blame on the national government

for failing to fulfill its financial obligation. The

Mendozan authorities affirmed that the letras were
accepted at par
cases

— and

— which

was not entirely true in all

that "the insignificant fluctuations are due

Aires firm for the same purpose. Eventually, in 1926,
the bodegueros set up a loan to the province for
1,345,000 pesos just to bring the teachers' salaries up
to datel
68

Palanca (Mendoza), August

30,

1924.
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exclusively to speculators "^^
J3U-U
But thp
-f«.+ was
tne fact
that the
National Board of Education did
not oDject
iivi
obieot +n
to -.v.
the payment
Of the salaries with letras-it
had been
.

customary in

Mendoza since the governments of
the Regimen-but that
the
salaries were paid in a currency
undervalued with respect
to the peso. The temporary
suspension of the

federal grant,

moreover, could not have been
responsible for the widespread
failure of the Board to pay its bills,
for it amounted to
less than 10 per cent of the total
outlays of the School
Board.'^^

As to educational achievements,
Lencinas'

ments were also meager. Abrahan

J. Jofre,

accomplish-

Regional

Inspector in Cuyo of the National Board of Education,
said
in March 1924 that of 70,000 children of school
age,
only

60 per cent were registered, and only two thirds of those

attended classes.

This indicated that more than half of

69

Los Andes, January 25, 1923. Telegram of the
governor to the Minister of Interior.
70

Year

These are the figures:
Total outlays
School Board

Federal
grant

% covered by
the grant

1922
e
2,998,177
$ 270,000
1923
270,000
3,143,840
1924
270,000
3,589,922
Provlncia de Mendoza, Slntesis de la Bireccion
de Estadisticas 1930-1931 (Mendoza, 1932), p.
the total outlay of the School Board only).
t

'^Hos Andes, May 17, 1924.

9.0
8.6
7.5

General
100. (Por
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the children did not receive even
the least acceptable
level of education.
The Provincial School Board admitted
the sad reality
of the statistics, but said it did not
have any direct

responsibility for them. The Board stated
that the
situation was not the result of the scarcity

of schools

or of indifference by the government, as J of
re had

reported. Instead, it was the consequence of
the "innate
malice and ignorance of a part of the population,
which
in its drive for money and its over-preoccupation for

material well-being, forgets the duties it has toward
its children.

""^^

In a government devoted in principle to satisfying
the needs of the masses, one of its main priorities

should have been to provide an education to thousands
of underprivileged children. Those of the well-to-do

sectors had the means to attain satisfactory

educational levels, preparing them to be the future
"men of property," well-endowed to enjoy the fruits of
life. In order to diminish the social and economic gap
of the future generation, what better program could

have been offered by Lencinism to the children of the
"chusma de alpargata," than a first rate primary

^^Ibid. , May 22, 1924. La Prensa May 30, 1924,
reacted against this opinion, stating that there were
no grounds to believe that the inhabitants of Mendoza
had a larger "innate malice and ignorance" than the
rest of the population of the country.
,

220

education?
Confidence, loyalty and affection
from the masses
continued to be the bountiful harvest
of Carlos Washington
for his endeavors in their behalf.
Nevertheless, his

political success did not always represent a
triumph of
civic virtues. And for all the proclaimed
purposes
of

achieving a better social justice, the social
innovations
of his government were less significant than
those of
Jose Nestor Lencinas,
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CHAPTER

VII

THE SECOND LENCINIST EXPERIENCE.

THE ECONOMIC PHASE. AN APPRAISAL OF

C.

W.LENCINAS' RULE

The Populist Performance. Economy and
Pi nances

If the political and social phases of the
government
of Carlos Washington Lencinas may be characterized
as an

evolution marked by plateaux and regressions, what does
an

examination of his economic and fiscal policies, measured
against his avowed populist stand, reveal?
At the time Carlos Washington assumed office, the

financial situation was desperate, the result in large

part of the inefficient administration of Federal
Commissioner Vargas Gomez. Confronted thus with an
immediate crisis, Lencinas suspended payments on salaries
and debts incurred prior to 1922, until revenues could be

provided to meet these obligations. Toward that end, the
legislature in May 1922 enacted the so-called emergency
laws."^

Although the revenue from these taxes was generous,
the old debts were not entirely cancelled. There were

These laws were: No. 776, imposing a special tax
on tobacco, cigarettes, beer, and a few more items; Nos.
777 and 778, authorizing three million pesos in bonds
for school buildings, and No. 779, taxing wines and
grapes, earmarking 60 per cent of the revenue to pay
debts from previous years, and 40 per cent to finance
the regular expenses of the current year.
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always some salaries left in arrears
and, of course, the
teachers continued to be the cinderellas
of the Kendozan
administration. Likewise, two serious
malpractices
were

continued by the government, that of
applying funds for
other purposes than those for which they

were approved, and

that of resorting to "emergency" laws to
finance regular
expenses, which in theory should already have
been covered

by permanent revenue. Moreover, the legislature
failed to
enact budget laws except for 1924. In response, in
what
had become a normal procedure in Mendoza, the governor

resorted to cabinet agreements as a backdoor solution for

keeping his government functioning.
Another grave anomaly was the lack of a Tribunal de
Cuentas, an agency indispensable for verifying public

expenses and forcing the Executive Power to keep its

financial operations on a sound basis. Under the terms of
the 1916 provincial constitution this tribunal should

have been created by law before the first of January, 1918.

In fact, the legislation providing for it was not enacted
until May 1922 (Article 11 of Law 779). This could have

been a belated solution, but the governor never implemented
Article 11 in spite his assertion in his first annual

message to the legislature, in June 1922, that without any
doubt, the Tribunal de Cuentas would be "the most adequate
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institutions to carry out an efficient
control.
Complementing this objectionable
handling of financial
matters was the failure of the
Lencinist government to
release proper and complete statements
on the provincial
debt. Thus, there was no way to
verify the real financial
needs, or the extent to which the
taxes imposed corresponded

to real requirements. Creditors filled
the government house,
and the administration was accused of
applying a "politica
de aparceria," that is, using favoritism
as a guideline to
make the payments.^ Neither these procedures
nor the

practice of using emergency revenues to meet normal

expenditures were originated by Lencinism. What is
significant, however, is that in matters as important as
these, they performed no better than the conservatives."^

The wine industry, naturally, continued as the
2

Mensa.je del Gobernador 1922, n.p. There was a
General Accounting Office in Mendoza, which had the right
to verify the payments to be made, but it was a mere
bureaucratic office and lost all its strength as a firm
watchdog. This was so because the Executive Power could
override any objection. Jose Leguida (h.), "La ley de
contabilidad y contaduria general de la Provincia de
Mendoza. Organizacion general," Revista de Ciencias
Economicas XXVI (1926), 346.
,

,

^Los Andes, February 7, 1923.
4.

Luring the second Lencinist administration
financial disorder continued uncontrolled. The provincial
debt to the nation was also in arrears. As of the end of
1924 no payments of principal or interest on the External
Public Debt of 1909 had been made since 1921. Corporacion
de Tenedores de Titulos y Acciones, Memoria del primer
eemestre del ejercicio de 1924 -1923 (Buenos Aires, n.d.),
p. 20. This is a publication of the Bolsa de Comercio de
Buenos Aires.
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economic lifeblood of the province. When
lencinas took
office harvest perspectives were gloomy,
mainly because of
the uncertainties of the consumer market
in the Littoral
and the lack of proper coordination of the
industrial
activities within the province. But well-timed
measures
taken by the governor improved the situation
in
only a

few weeks.
A permanent source of dissatisfaction on the part of

vinateros and bodegueros, however, stemmed from the financial

burden imposed by Laws 758 and 759 (enacted in 1919 under
the sponsorship of Jose Nestor Lencinas)^ which set up

compulsory insurance against hail damages and provided funds

for the construction of regional bodegas.^ The growers and

processors claimed that the only part of these laws to be
fully implemented was the collection of taxes; as far as

reimbursement for hail damages was concerned, these were not
paid on time

— except

when payments were expedited by the use

of interested middlemen

—

;

furthermore, not a single

regional bodega had been built.
The discontent of these sectors was channeled into

action with the initiation of an intense campaign known as
the deroguista movement, aimed at repealing Laws 758 and
759. Minister of Industries Suarez energetically defended
5

See note 54, p. 143.

^Specifically because of the industrial situation
in 1922 La Prensa sent Rodolfo Luque as special correspondent
to Mendoza, to analyze and report on the general conditions.
His articles appeared in November 2, 8, 13, 19, 21, 23, 27,
and December 2, 6, 10 and 15, 1922.
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these laws on the grounds that
"they had fulfilled and
continue fulfilling the high purposes"
for which they were
created. '7 In his view, without some
kind of support, the
price of grapes would decline and
therefore, the economic
value of the lands would be lowered.
He affirmed
the

government's intention to protect the
vinateros without
bodegas in view of the significance of
their interests.^
Minister Suarez contended that he could not
favor an
industrial policy guided solely by the principle
of supply
and demand, for in that case the vinatero would
not
have

any protection from an intentionally-provoked decrease
in
the price of grapes. Contrary to what was generally

possible with grains the grapes could not be stored or

preserved for a period of time. They had to be gathered
at the proper time or they would be entirely lost within
a few days.

Q

7

'Los Andes , August 14, 1922.

g

Suarez provided the following statistics:

Vinateros without
bodega
Vifiateros/bodegueros
Bodegueros without
vineyards

Number

Hectares

3,768
1,349

40,657
30,812

56.9
43.1

71,469

100.0

375

5,492

September 17, 1922. Thousands of
Ibid
contratistas aided the vinateros.
.

,

September 22, 1922. Suarez reaffirmed his
^Ibid.
stand in the Ministry's annual report, stating that Laws
,
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Suarez-

efforts to assure a reasonable
protection f or
the vinateros was strongly supported
by Los Andes
Thi s
newspaper insisted time after time
that any industrial law
which did not protect the vinatero from
the bodeguero was
worthless; that the 1919 legislation needed
to be reformed,
not repealed, and that the new course
followed by the
.

government was purely a "bodeguero solution. "^^
The deroguista forces engaged Minister
Suarez in a

heated controversy throughout Mendoza during a good
part
of the second half of 1922.^^ They insisted that the
price
of the grapes should not be determined a priori

,

but

instead, be left to market forces. Before a committee of
the provincial Senate, the bodeguero sector reiterated the

views of their group: total repeal of the laws regulating
the industry, the worthlessness of building any regional

bodega, and the uselessness of the State insurance against
hail. The bodegueros' position was summed up with the

758 and 759 "...bear my signature," and that they were the
"saviors of the industry." Memoria presentada a l_a Honorable
Legislatura por el Minister! o de Industrias ^ Qbras Publicas
Ing Leopoldo Suarez (Buenos Aires, 1924), p. 25. Suarez'
viewpoints were explained in great detail in his works La
industria vitivinicola en I.lendoza en 1922 (Mendoza, 192*27,
and La accion del estado en 1^ industria vitivinicola
(Mendoza, 192277"
.

^°Los Andes, March

5,

1923.

deroguista forces were: Sociedad Agraria e
Industrial (a strong bodeguero voice). Centre de Vinateros,
Union Comercial e Industrial, and Centre de Almaceneros
Minoristas.
•^^The

,
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statement that each viSatero
"should be able to protect
"^^
himself.
The compulsory insurance
against hail established by
law 759 was a heavy burden for the
vinateros and became an
ideal target for the bodegueros to
attack. During 1920 and
1921 the revenue of Law 759 amounted to
$ 11,052,000— an
enormous sum-while the indemnifications
paid until the
end of July 1922 did not exceed $
5,390,000. The industrial
sectors were especially critical of the
administrative

expenses of the ^omision de Pomento, the
agency

supervising the two laws, which amounted to

$

3, 044, 000.

"'•^

Taking into consideration that not all the compensations
to the vinateros were paid, and that not a single
regional

bodega was built, the opposition was amply justified in
asking the government what it did with the funds. Although
many vinateros abused the system by exaggerating their
losses, it was apparent that the government wasted in an

unnecessary bureaucracy funds that were an important part
of the provincial wealth. "^^

An answer to the controversy was worked out in direct

^^Los Andes, August

5,

1922.

^^Ibid., August 15, 1922.

^^Lencinas stated that 4,775 hectares reported as
destroyed by hail, were not. This amounted to an illicit
claim made by the vinateros for $ 1,710,000. Mensaje del
Gobernador, June 1922, n. p.
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discussions between the governor and the
bodegueros.
Accordingly, as Lencinas yielded to
bodeguero pressure, the
legislature repealed most of the laws
regulating the wine
industry.

15

Jose Nestor lencinas had tried in 1919 to
counterbalance the traditional supremacy of the bodegueros

over

the vinateros through the enactment of Laws
758 and 759.

But these laws were only partially enforced, and the
huge
sums collected from the vinateros and the bodegueros had

fed a provincial bureaucracy often accused of inefficiency

and corruption. It might then be asked why Carlos

Washington did not try to reform the laws instead of

yielding to the demands of the bodegueros. Could he ignore
the argument that giving a free hand to the processors

meant diminishing the bargaining position of the vinateros?
Did he underestimate the fact that there were thousands of

contratistas whose fate was bound to that of the
vinateros?

In his second annual message, in June 1923, Lencinas

acknowledged the indisputable weight of the deroguista
movement, and praised his own decision for accepting a

view which was contrary to his own personal position. It
^^Law 810, of February 1923, repealed Laws 758 and
part of 759. The bodegueros obtained still another triumph.
In December 1923, Law 866 was enacted, reinstating a tax
on grapes sold outside the province for the purpose of
producing wine outside Mendoza with grapes from this
origin, and forced the vihateros to resort to the
bodegueros as the only source available to sell their
production.
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seems that Lencinas, as head of
a movement claiming
to be
free from the oligarchical virus,
should have been able
to remedy the widespread
deficiencies of the Comision de
Pomento, while using it to balance
the interests
of the

two most important groups in the
provincial economy, and
not simply conceding to the wishes of
the bodegueros.
The wine industry had other reasons
to be content
with the years 1922-1924. Not only were
Laws 758 and 759
repealed, but the labor climate remained
very peaceful

compared with the agitation which Jose Nestor
Lencinas
had to endure in his two troubled years in power.
The

industry, as a consequence, was able to leave behind
the

period of crisis, and indeed in 1924 enjoyed one of the

best years of the decade. Prices for wine were good,
consumption increased, public works, both national and
provincial, improved the utilization of water resources
and communications, and with the economy on the upswing,

immigrants once again settled in Mendoza in growing
numbers, although far from the high figures of the first

decade of the century.

Poreign immigration to Kendoza increased
steadily after World V/ar I, as indicated by the following
figures:
1922
2,865
1918
547
885
1923
1919
3,953
1924
3,837
1920
1,740
1921
1,528
Ministerio de Agricultura de la Nacion, em or i a
de la Direccion General de Inmigracion (Buenos Aires,
1928), p. 192.
1.1
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Political favoritism was a
ubiquitous feature of the
Lencinas administration and this
readily led to abuses in
the handling of funds. This was
particularly true in the
Provincial Bank where the conduct of
its directors, mostly
political confidants of Lencinas, created
a scandal that
even affected his good name. Moreover,
his
first

appointee as general manager of the Bank
had to resign
amid cries of anomalies, but the man
Lencinas
chose to

succeed him was no better, ending up in the
courts under
^'^
prosecution for wrongdoing.
But the Achilles' heel of the Mendozan government,
the letras de tesoreria, were to bring the
province once

again under federal tutelage.

The use of the letras as

17 mi
The

gross mishandlings in the Provincial Bank not
only involved high officials of the administration, but
also two Lencinist National Deputies, Jose A. Nunez and
Luis Olmedo Cortes. They were investigated by a committee
set up by the National Chamber of Deputies and after
disclosure of their extensive illicit maneuvers in
connivence with the high authorities of the Provincial
Bank, they were expelled from Congress, further damaging the
reputation of Lencinism. DiDutados, 1925, I, 340-354; III,
761-770, 838-855; IV, 342-361, 449-471, 533-557, 574-586;
V, 30-33.
Carlos Washington's intention to transform the
Bank into a semi-private institution was repeatedly
expressed, and to that effect several meetings were held
in Buenos Aires and Mendoza, In a press interview the
governor announced in August 1923 that all preliminary
steps had been successfully taken, and reiterated his
wishes that at the end of his terra the new bank would be
already functioning. Los Andes August 19, 1923.
,

1

8

Curiously, the most recent general work on the
history of Mendoza, Jorge M. Scalvini's His tori a de Mendoza
does not mention at all the letras when referring to the
government of Carlos V/ashington.

,
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a substitute for national currency
had begun with the

national government's reluctant tolerance
at the end of
the nineteenth century. Although their
value
was not at

par with the peso, the letras were usually
accepted for
domestic transactions without any reservation,
to the

point that almost all provincial salaries were
paid with
them. The first symptoms of a noticeable devaluation

appeared in 1921,^^ and gradually the situation became
more acute. As confidence in the letras eroded, nickel
coins began to disappear from public use, and then pesos

followed the same path. The principle of Gresham's Law
was confirmed in Mendoza, where the "bad" currency

removed the "good" from circulation.
The government believed that the bodegueros were by

and large the beneficiaries of the situation, because
they sold most of the production outside the province, in
pesos, while they paid all local salaries and other

expenses in letras. The Lencinist press put it in a very
simple, one-sided perspective: the depreciation of the
20
letras was "a new political maneuver of the conservatives."

Although the devaluation of the letras was small, the
difference of exchange was significant because of the
large volume of the wine trade. Los Andes estimated the

bodegueros' windfall ranging from six to eight million

^^endoza was then ruled by

a federal commissioner.

^^El Latigo , February 1, 1923.

pesos annually. 21 with this fact in
mind, the government
decreed in October 1922 that the tax
on wine imposed by
Law 779 should not be paid entirely
in letras, as had been
the case until then, but that 60 per
cent be paid in pesos
and the rest in letras. ^2 The industrialists
rightfully

protested that the government was violating
the existing
law which allowed full payment of taxes with

letras. This

action proved that the government was the first to
show
lack of faith in the papers it had issued. Moreover,
the

bodegueros argued that they were handling the funds they

received from outside the province in the same manner
that the government did with its grant from the National

Board of Education, receiving it in pesos while paying
out teachers'

salaries in letras,

Judging the situation from a different angle,
however, the measure taken by the government appeared

reasonable, considering that the bodegueros were making a

profit without justification. The government rule,
nonetheless, worked in reverse, since by reducing the

acceptability of the letras as payment for fiscal
obligations, it diminished their market value.

2^Los Andes

,

May 29, 1924.

^^During a four-month period in 1923, it was even
decreed that the taxes be paid fully in pesos.
2^Los Andes, November 17 » 1922.
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Whatever the merits of the argument,
the real value of
the provincial money continued to
decline. The devaluation
rate reached 3 per cent by mid-1922
and increased to 4 per
cent at the end of that year; it was
lowered temporarily
early in 1923 because of the large demand
for letras to

pay the wages for the harvest, but later
climbed again,

reaching

5

per cent in June 1923. The government,

apparently did not welcome the devaluation of the
letras,
but defended them as instrumental to the economic
progress
of the province.^''" Los Andes contended that
the avowed

position of the governor was fictitious, for the letras
were basically intended to provide the Lencinists with
illegal currency to use for electoral needs, and to
finance the provincial cash deficits.
In August 1923 Lencinas affirmed that the government

wanted to restore the letras to par value, and

v/as

considering their full acceptance for tax payments. In a
stance resembling that of the governments of the Regimen,
he insisted that the province had the right to issue

^/lensa je del Gobernador June 1923, n. p. Federico
J. Moyano, former Dean of the Law School of the Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, and brother of Juan Agustin
Moyano, asserts that it would have been a catastrophe
to have withdrawn all the letras at once, since everything
was traded in such currency, and some people did not have
a chance to see a peso for a long time. Personal
interview, Mendoza, June 25, 1972.
,
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Los Andes, June 12, 1923.
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letras unless the National Supreme
Court ruled otherwise,
because it was one of the prerrogatives
not entrusted t.
the federal Government. ^6 This was
the same
thesis that

Governor Emilio Civit had enunciated in
I908, in response
to a reprimand from Buenos Aires.

Another factor adding to the growing
apprehension
about the provincial money, was the spread of
a rumor to
the effect that the value of letras in
circulation

exceeded the

S

9,380,704 the governor had reported in his

1922 message. This rumor was soon shown to be true when,
in July 1923, Minister of Hacienda Soto's plan for a

gradual withdrawal of the letras, involved the issuance
of $ 12,000,000 in so-called "bonos del tesoro." How was

it possible that in spite of the fact that no law had

authorized any further issuance of letras, 12,000,000
were now needed to replace

$

9,380,000? The explanation

given by the government was that in addition to this
amount, there were

$

2,586,982 held under the custody of

the Public Credit, amounting to a total of

$

11,967,686.^'^

The situation in Mendoza by now was such that

national currency, for all practical purposes, was like
a foreign currency. The pesos disappeared from local

^^

Ibid ., August 10, 1923.

^'^Public Credit was the provincial agency
exclusively engaged in handling public debt, both
internal and external, letras, and any other negotiable
papers.
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day-to-day transactions, while
businessmen sought to
protect themselves by raising the
prices of goods when they
were paid in letras. The vanishing
coins were replaced by
small substitutes—pieces of cardboard
stating their

equivalency-which the merchants used as exchange
when they
were paid in letras. Los Andes sadly
referred to the "bad"
currency, the letras, and the "worst" currency,
the small
cartoncitos, which brought to Mendoza a variation
of the

abusive system applied to the laborers in the workshops
at
Chaco.^^

In these circumstances, the national government seemed
to be the only agency capable of putting an end to the

dubious provincial money. Already in July 1923, the Acting

Attorney General recommended that the national government
demanded the immediate withdrawal of the letras. Thereupon,

President Alvear proposed legislation to Congress to avoid
further violations of the constitution in this matter. As
a result of this pressure, Lencinas issued a decree on

October 27, calling for a full count of the letras in
circulation, and suggesting that the Mendozan government

was at last determined to solve the problem. But the

required action did not follow with the speed demanded by
the situation.

The disarray provoked by the letras

^^Los Andes

,

February

2,

1924.

^^The further devaluation of the letras added more
pressure to the beleaguered provincial government. By

reverberated in National Congress,
where the prospects for
a federal intervention grew
with every day. Paced by
this
somber perspective, Lencinas
hastily obtained legislative
approval for a bill by which the
letras would be
gradually withdrawn.
The unlawful position of the
government was put in
evidence by a decree of September
11, which sought ex
facto to legalize the unauthorized
issues made during
Carlos Washington's administration. This
decree approved
the exchange of $ 5,209,000, in addition
to
the

12,000,000 of the Law 871. This action was taken at
the
time when the National Chamber of Deputies was
about
$

to

decide on federal intervention. As the situation
in

Congress still allowed some flicker of hope that the

intervention could be averted, Lencinas attempted an
eleventh-hour solution, sending another bill on September
24 to the legislature, asking now for the immediate

withdrawal of the letras, to be financed by a special
tax on wine and grapes. This was the first serious step

taken by the government in almost three years, to correct
a situation which, besides being unconstitutional,
eaco\iraged speculation, reduced the real wage of the

worker, and provided Lencinas' opponents with their most

July 1924 the discount reached 12 per cent, and the
authorities tried a stopgap measure decreeing that all
taxes could be payable again with letras.
^^It was Law 871, promulgated on July 31, 1924. It
authorized the issue of "bonos" for 12 million pesos.
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effective issue for toppling him
from office. The bill was
hastily approved by the provincial
Chamber of Deputies,
but by that time the ax had already
fallen in Buenos
Aires on Lencinas' government.
The lack of diligence with which
Lencinas handled the
issue of the letras seemed to indicate
a confidence on his
part that Alvear and the anti-Personalists
in Congress

would provide a shield against any
intervention. But
apart from this group, all other parties
represented

in

Congress, by now extremely critical of Lencinism,
pushed
for intervention. It was the Federal Commissioner
who

investigated the status of the letras and took the steps
for their eventual elimination. As it turned out,
the
total amount of letras withdrawn from circulation was
$ 16,638,920.

Since Governor Lencinas had declared the

total to be

11,967,686, at least

$

S

4,671,234 in letras,

issued without any legal authorization, were in
circulation. Early in 1926, just at the end of the

federal intervention, two series of letras amounting to
$

1,707,000 were discovered to be forgeries. The

Lencinas' administration should not be blamed for this

but it was responsible for at least

$

2,964,234 in

illegally issued letras. -^"^

^"^Clarification of the report issued by the
Federal Interventor, Enrique M. Mosca, in Senadores
1929, II, 499-502.

,
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The intense rivalry among
national political groups
gave Lencinas' enemies an opportunity
to press for the end
of his rule in Mendoza. The letras
scandal was a prime
issue for mounting a campaign for
intervention. Why did
Lencinas not take firm steps to eliminate
this issue
before the storm became unavoidable? Why
did he tolerate
the speculation that grew around the
provincial money?

In theory, the letras were one of the best
means to
finance public works of general interest. When
some

special program required additional financing, the

solution was to issue letras and to set up a regular
timetable for their gradual withdrawal. As such, the
letras yielded the same benefits, and played the same
role, as municipal bonds. In practice, however, a number
of transgressions violated the principles on which the

letras were issued. They were not always applied to the

purposes for which they were authorized; there were
issuances of letras without the approval of the
legislature; and instead of being issued for large amounts
as was customary with bonds, they were printed in small

values, with a format and size resembling that of the

national currency. What is more, they were not withdrawn
on schedule;

or when they were, new ones were put in

circulation in lieu of the old, thus maintaining the same
quantity in the market when in fact they should have been
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diminishing.
The bodegueros and businessmen
in general tolerated
and even accepted the issuance
of letras. They found
that
by pumping money into the
economy, more was to be
gained
than lost. They had supported
such a policy on the part
of the governments of the
Regimen because they

benefited
from the artificial stimulus it
gave to the economy. The
bodegueros were always in the strongest
position, since

they traded the provincial wealth
mostly in pesos. But
the responsibility for this type of
currency rested
exclusively in the hands of the provincial
governments.
If the letras were devalued to the extent
of being

referred to as the "Mendozan Marks, "^^ it was
the
provincial authorities who were responsible, and
it was
their decisions which had the effect of driving the
national currency, the only legal tender, out of
circulation.
Was the Lencinist government too weak or simply

negligent in solving the chaos of the letras? Jose

Hipolito Lencinas asserts that some of Carlos Washington's
collaborators were not seriously interested in finding a

Los Andes July 21, 1923, noted that the
government was like the magicians, on one side they burned
the letras being withdrawn, with showy publicity, but on
the other side, new letras were turned over to the public
to replace those burned.
,

^^Ibid.

,

August

3,

1923.
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prompt and lasting solution. ^4
Beyond this speculation,
however, it appears that Governor
Lencinas and his
financial Ministers Soto and Moyano,
failed to measure the
power of the weapon they were placing
in the hands of
their political rivals. They vainly
tried to cover up a
fraudulent situation for which they were
directly
responsible.

Buenos Aires: The Final Test for Regional
Populism
The iron-fist political methods of the
Lencinists, the
"packing" of the Judiciary through the Review Board,
the

problem of the letras, and the populist nature of the
government in general— resembling that of Federico Cantoni
in San Juan

—had

transformed the apparently rosy picture

of Mendoza of February 1922. The relative political

harmony existing at that time all but disappeared.

Relations between the Lencinists and the opposition were
in a state of collapse. By mid-1924, moreover, the

political opponents

— conservatives

and popular parties

(Personalist Radicals and Socialists)

—had

grown stronger

in number and aggressiveness, encouraged by the misguided

policies of the Lencinists.
The March 1924 election for National Deputies

vividly displayed this growing antagonism. Although no

opposition party could overcome the Lencinist majority in

^^Personal interview, June 23f 1972.
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Mendoza, the relations among the
political rivals b.)ecame
increasingly hostile. It was a prelude
to the vindictive
encounter which lencinas and his
enemies, especially
the

Yrigoyenists, would hold in Congress
toward the end of the
decade.
The Lencinists appealed to the
populist rhetoric they
had been displaying ever since Jose Nestor
Lencinas

campaigned for governor in 1917. But what made
the 1924
election different from previous contests, was
that now
the opposition openly accused the government
of corruption,

While in the elections for the governorship, in
January

1918 and December 1921, Lencinism had portrayed itself as
a distinctive alternative to the Regimen, in 1924 its

traditional anti-oligarchical position was challenged by
its opponents. They claimed that lencinism had taken on
the attributes of their alleged enemies. The Socialists,

applying their customary moralistic approach, depicted
the Lencinists in blunt terms:

"Each country has the

government it deserves; Mendoza has a government of
thieves. ...

"-^^

With the same critical tone, the Liberal

Party spokesmen also denounced the climate of corruption
and complained chiefly about the massive personalist

propaganda of Lencinism. They contended that "people
wants less turbulence, less 'gauchitos,' less pictures.

^^El Socialista, January

3,

1924.
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and a bit more public honesty. "^^
These defiant attitudes were
also reflected in Buenos
Aires, where national politics
played an increasingly
Significant role in the Mendozan
situation. This province
and San Juan, were the only ones
in the country ruled by
populist governments that were at the
same time strongly

anti-Yrigoyenist. In a complex mosaic of
political
interests, the two Cuyo governments
shared with the
conservatives a hostility toward the
Personalist Radicals,
although there existed a profound aversion
between them.

But the Lencinists were accepted within the
antiPersonalist faction, together with San Juan's
Bloquism,
not so much because of their own merits as
branches
of

National Radicalism, but mainly for the contribution
they
made to the struggle against the Personalist faction.
Lencinas' popularity allowed his party to win handily
the national and provincial elections in Mendoza. But it

was in the National Congress that he had to face the

implacable attacks of his old adversaries
and Socialists

— and

— conservatives

his new enemy, the Yrigoyenists. The

examination of the credentials of the representatives

from Mendoza in the National Chamber of Deputies, provided
the opponents of Lencinism with the occasion to discredit

•^^El Censor (Mendoza), January 12, 1924. The
Lencinists distributed, among other things, thousands of
calendars, pictures of both Lencinas, porcelain cups and
alpargatas. In their rallies they played the hymn to Jose
Nestor Lencinas.

the Mendozan government.

The selection of national
senators had always
generated intense interest, both
at provincial and
national levels. During the years
of Lencinist rule, only
one Senator had been chosen, Jorge
Cespedes, an old
Radical and personal friend of Yrigoyen,
whose credentials
were accepted in June 1922. But when
the Lencinists sided
with the anti-Personalists, Cespedes
remained loyal to
Yrigoyen. Ironically, the only Mendozan
Senator chosen by
the Lencinists became openly anti-Lencinist.
The second Mendozan seat had become vacant
on May 1,
1922, at the end of Benito Villanueva's term, but was

never filled. The legislature elected Jose M. Puebla,
the
former Minister of Government under both Lencinases, but
his credentials were rejected by the National Senate,

supposedly because he was born in Chile.

^'^

The local

press speculated over the extensive delay in filling

Villanueva's vacancy, which left Mendoza only half

represented in the National Senate. One intriguing
interpretation was that the choice of Puebla had been made
deliberately with the idea that he would be rejected by
the Senate. This would buy time until Carlos Washington

ended his governorship and thus be available to fill the
empty seat. At any rate, the Lencinists had a very weak

1924, I, 73-93. Puebla contended that
he was born in Mendoza but baptized in Chile.
•^'^Senadores,
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voice in Congress, where their
representatives, restricted
to the Chamber of Deputies, poorly
served the interests of
-^^
their province.
The credentials debate over the
National Deputies
elected in 1924 provided the forum for
the Radical
Yrigoyenists, conservatives, Socialists and
Progressive
Democrats, to launch a searing indictment
of Lencinism.^5

No facet of the Mendozan government was free
from the
Their legislative initiatives were extremely
few.
^\}^PJ^^^^onal Deputy Jose Hipolito Lencinas introduced
a bill to remove the tracks of the Pacific Railway
crossing through the city of Mendoza. Jose A. Nunez
re-introduced the bill on guidelines for the wine industry,
which had been already reproduced by Carlos Washington
Lencinas in July 1920, when he was National Deputy. In
1924 none of the three Lencinists deputies, Jose Hipolito
Lencinas, Jos6 A. Nunez and Luis Olraedo Cortes, introduced
a single bill. Their participation in the debates was nil,
except those concerning the political situation of Mendoza.
As noted earlier, in 1925 Nunez and Olmedo Cortes were
expelled from the Chamber because of the Provincial Bank
affair.
^^^^

^^

Diputados 1924, II, 289-310; 341-371. June 9, and
10. According to the national constitution, it is the
exclusive right of each Chamber of Congress to be the judge
of the credentials of its members. The Chamber can reject
any of them if it is proven that the election was not
properly conducted at the ballot box. But the Chamber is
not entitled to base its judgment on the local political
conditions of the campaign, or any other situation not
specifically related to the act of casting the ballot. This
had been a traditional procedure of both Chambers of
Congress. But the enactment of the Saenz Peha Law and the
changes it provoked in voting procedures, made this
.

requirement almost worthless. Por a new factor began taking
shape in the political habits of the parties and the
electorate, which consisted of transferring the vices of
the old days fraud at the ballot box to more
sophisticated means, equally objectionable, of pre-electoral
manipulation.

—

—

s
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criticism of the representatives
from those sectors.
Mendozan Deputy Prank Romero Day,
independent but antiLencinist, asserted that the two
pillars of Lencinism were
money and the abuse of power-two
corruptive
elements.

Enrique Bordabehere, a Progressive
Democrat for Santa Pe,
referred to a situation in the Department
of la Paz, in

Mendoza, in which policemen and "dead"
persons had voted,
as proof of the fraudulent nature of
Lencinism. For what
was most disturbing, Bordabehere observed, was
that they

had resorted to transgressing the law exclusively
for the
sake of transgression, since their electoral success
was

never in jeopardy. And the deputy for Santa Fe added
these concepts of universal weight:
The amorality that characterizes the governments
that subvert all norms of administrative and
political decency, leads to this conclusion:
that corruption, fraud, and wrongdoings, are
traits that become ingrained in them and are
practiced under the pretension of adding luster
to these governments. 40

Socialists and conservatives repeatedly emphasized
that their approval of the credentials of the Lencinists

followed the specific rules of the Chamber, but did not
represent, under any circumstances, an acceptance of

Lencinas' government. "We will approve Mendoza'

credentials, not because we want to," said the Socialist

Deputy Adolf 0 Dickmann,
^^

Diputados 1924, II, 359. Benito Marianetti
believes that Carlos Washington could have been a more
law-abiding ruler without risking the large majority he
enjoyed. Personal interview. June 21, 1972.
,
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Of '^he Itunflt

^^"^^

political reality

related to the casting of the b^in nt

The Lencinists'

s

+o1t"^^

credentials were accepted, but it
was

a lackluster victory, for by
June 1924 the pressure

against Carlos Washington's rule kept
mounting in Buenos
Aires. La Epoca claimed the "moral
necessity to intervene
in Mendoza, calling the situation there,
as in San
Juan,

an "infectious case of political pathology "^2
in June
.

1924, a one time notorious lencinist, Roberto J.
Rincci,

now a zealous Yrigoyenist, introduced a bill
to place
Mendoza under federal control again. The originality
his bill was its Article

3,

of

which called for 30 per cent

of the provincial revenue to be allocated to withdrawing

the letras.

The Alvear government, anxious to avoid the fall of
a friendly governor, tried to block congressional

approval of this bill. The Minister of the Interior,

Vicente

C.

Chambers'

Gallo, in a very brief appearance before the

Committee on Constitutional Affairs, insisted

that there were no grounds for the intervention. Unable,

however, to prevent approval of the bill by the Committee,
the anti-Personalists tried to delay the debate in the

^•^

Diputados

^^La Epoca

,

,

1924, II,

364.

June 17, 1924.
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Chamber. This strate^ took into
consideration the fact
that it was already mid-September
and that Congress would
adjourn at the end of the month.
Moreover, Lencinas- t era
would end in February 1925, before
the legislator 3 were
to convene again.
The other political parties, however,
were firmly

detemined

to end the Lencinist rule.

The Personalists,

especially, hated Lencinism not only
because it had
departed from Yrigoyen's hegemony, but also
because of
its close affinity with San Juan's Bloquism—now
the most
irreconcilable enemy of the Yrigoyenists. The

conservatives in the Chamber sided with their party
colleagues from Mendoza and supported the intervention.

But here too there was a labyrinth of interests, because
a group from the province of Buenos Aires, headed by

Rodolfo Moreno, was not in favor of conceding any indirect
help to the Yrigoyenists. The bonaerense conservatives

had received support from the Lencinists when their own
credentials were under fire in the Chamber, and the

Lencinists had also sided with the conservatives in
opposing the Yrigoyenist drive to intervene in Cordoba in
1923. The Socialists were in a special situation. Although
on principle they were opposed to federal interventions in

the provinces, the party had taken an official stand

against any provincial government issuing provincial
currency. In accordance with this policy, the Socialists
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were committed to vote favorably
on any intervention in a
province engaged in such a practice.

During the two-day debate in the
Chamber the
opponents of the intervention attacked

the measure in its

financial provisions, alleging that it
was unconstitutional
to alter a provincial law by congressional
decision/^
They

also argued that it would be practically
impossible to
attend the normal bureaucratic needs of the
province with
only 70 per cent of its regular income. To counter
the

government's strategy of delay, the Personalist deputies
threatened not to attend any sessions if the intervention
in Mendoza was not dealt with in the Chamber. The

lencinists' hope began to vanish when on September 24, by
a close vote of 60 to 52, the deputies decided to debate

Mendoza'

s

case.'^^ Later,

the Chamber approved the

intervention by 77 votes to 22.^^
^^ Diputados

,

1924, IV, 449-517; 530-606. September

23 and 24.
44

The affirmative vote of five Socialists was
decisive in determining Lencinas' fate. Joaquin Coca,
then a Socialist National Deputy, referred to this
situation in El contubernio Memorias de un diputado
obrero (Buenos Aires, n.d.), pp. 116-120.
.

45

During the debates, the climate in the Chamber
of Deputies was highly antagonistic, to the point that

Deputies Rincci and Jose Hipolito Lencinas exchanged
very offensive terms. In a m.ove to delay the last
session, the meeting was adjourned close to midnight of
September 23, in what appeared to be an irregular
procedure of the anti-Personalists, who presided over
the session. This touched off a major scandal, with
fist-fights and guns dominating the Chamber, and
involving also the numerous public in the galleries.
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Alvear now tried to persuade a
majority of the Senate
to block approval of the bill,
pointing out that if the
intervention were sanctioned, it would
represent a triumph
for the Yrigoyenists, at the expense
of the
government.

But his efforts proved fruitless.
During the debate in the
Senate, Francisco Vergara, a Personalist
for Buenos Aires,
restated the position of his sector that
Mendoza's case
was not only a political question, but
also
one of

"social hygiene and national decency.

""^^

The real battle-line lay between the
Yrigoyenists

and the anti-Yrigoyenists. Mendoza provided the
stage

for their new confrontation, and the decision to

intervene or not in that province reflected basically
the positions of the different groups in national

politics. The government of Carlos Washington was

almost a bystander in the debate. There was not even a

Lencinist Senator to speak in its behalf. San Juan
Senator Aldo Cantoni, tried a mild defense of Lencinism,
but he was not convincing. Quite different had been the

proposed intervention in Buenos Aires, sought by the
anti-Yrigoyenists, and the proposed intervention in
Cordoba, pushed by the Personalists. In these two

instances there was a balance of forces in Congress

which precluded either projects from materializing. But

Amidst the chaos, the Yrigoyenist Deputy Romeo Saccone
demanded the continuation of the session and shouted
that "If the police are against it, we will expell them
with our guns:" La Prensa, September 25, 1924.
46

Senadores, 1924, II, 767-793 (September 29).
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Meadoza could only rely on the
numerically-insufficient
anti-Personalist faction.
The senate approved the
intervention by 16 votes to 9.
Alvear could have vetoed the law on
the grounds of the

alleged unconstitutionality of Article
3~allocating 30
per cent of the budget to withdraw
the

letras— but he

decided not to do so/'^ Enrique M.
Mosca, a former
National Deputy and a prominent Radical
leader for Santa
Pe, was appointed Federal Commissioner.
Carlos Washington Lencinas and Lencinism.
An Evaluation

Federal intervention had been associated with

Lencinism from its inception to its end. Both Lencinas'
governments

— lasting

a total of four and a half years

were interspersed with four federal interventions. These

interludes did not affect the continuity in the style of

government of Jose Nestor Lencinas or his son. Both

represented a special type of popular caudillo, in the
sense that both had experienced the distinction of a

university education. It was common for the well-to-do
families of the province to train their sons in the leading
professions, but it was unusual to have the doctores

The provincial Lencinist Senators appealed to the
National Senate contending that the National Supreme Court
in Anvaria v. Buenos Aires in 1918, considered that
federal interventions were actions of political nature,
their scope limited by the constitution and the laws. Los
Andes, September 27, 1924.
,

"
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leading the crusade in defense of the
"chusma de
alpargata.
As had also been his father's
policy, Carlos
Washington frankly rewarded his political
friends to the
extreme of sheltering elements which
eventually

discredited his government. He adhered
rigorously to the
principle that to the victors belong the
spoils, and he

was given to nepotism, assigning posts to his
brothers

Jose Hipolito and Rafael Nestor, and other members
of
the family. Both of these practices were to cause
him
trouble. In the case of his brothers, their political

actions reflected directly upon the governor, and

whatever they did that was questionable or controversial
inevitably affected his reputation.
The general mediocrity of his collaborators in the

government indicates perhaps the paucity of talent

within lencinist ranks. There was a good number of
lawyers among them, but they were not able to provide
the movement with the efficiency and ethical spirit that

would have improved the quality of the government. If
some men were simply mediocre or not qualified to fill

positions of responsibility, others engaged in illegal
or controversial activities, placing on the government
a stigma of corruption that exceeded by far anything

that was ascribed to the regime of Jose Nestor Lencinas.
Carlos Washington himself complained about the questionable
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schemes brought up to his desk at
the government house,
which he called "solicitations of
the most dubious and
"48
complex nature.
^^^^.^^ ^^^^ ^^^^
^^^^^
period, Jose Hipolito Lencinas
acknowledges

that as the

exercise of power often paves the way
of corruption, so
it was with Lencinism.^^
At a time when the only means of mass
communication
was the newspapers, and their impact was
limited by the

high rate of illiteracy and semi-illiteracy
in the adult
population, regional caudillos had to resort to
other

measures to maintain ties with the people. Lencinas
travelled constantly all over the province, mending

political fences and approaching people on a personal
basis, as if he were also a member of the family. In
this connection, it is said that he used to tour the

departments carrying in his car a good number of coats.
On occasion, when greeting or visiting some humble

supporters, he would take off his coat to offer it as a

personal gift to a man who warmly welcomed such a

needed present. Then, as Lencinas moved to another
place he would repeat the same action, thus

establishing his image as a man of noble instincts and
A

ft

Mensaje del Gobernador

,

June 1923.

n.

p.

"El cambio fue muy grande para no marearse,"
he said. Interview with Jose Hipolito Lencinas.
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open heart,

Another popular story about
Carlos Washington relates
to his well known capacity to get
acquainted with peopl,.e
and to his receptivity to the
numerous invitations and
toasts which were offered him
everywhere
he went. On th(le

frequent occasions on which Carlos
Washington had to cope
with a succession of invitations
involving food and wine,
he is said to have resorted to voluntary
regurgitation in
between engagements. In this way he was able
to keep his
physical and mental abilities unimpaired by the
excessive
food and alcohol, without having to refuse an
invitation,
which would have been inappropriate on any occasion,
and

especially so for a man permanently under the people's
eyes. Other anecdotal references seem to have evolved

more from what his popular appeal suggested than from
the real facts.

Whatever the credibility of these stories, the fact
is that Lencinas was extremely well-liked by the common
50

This is a widespread story which had been
repeated to me endlessly. The earliest instance in
which I found such reference printed was in Jose Maria
Rosa, Resurgimiento de un pueblo Kend[oza, setiembre
1930 a f ebrero 1932 Documentaci5n complementaria
.

.

(Mendoza, 1932), pp. 21-22. Rosa was the i^'ederal
facto government after

Interventor appointed by the
the September 1930 revolution.
51

For example, in trying to add to Carlos
Washington's stature as a populist leader, Dardo Olguin
stated that he was "a fair singer and guitar player,"
"...y en el medio de mi pecho....," p. 30. But some
contemporary observers affirm that Lencinas did not
play guitar.

—
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maa. Ironically, in an administration
discredited by
charges of corruption, emanating
from different political
quarters, Carlos Washington was
considered an honest
leader. His inefficiency as an
administrator may be
attributed in part to a spirit always
receptive to

fiestas and warmly accepted by the feminine
segments.
These may have distracted him from
fulfilling his duties
more throughly and from setting a better
example for his
subordinates. But this could be only part of
the
explanation. Either he was deceived by people he

appointed to high public positions, or he was been
very

neglectful in demanding observance of the law by those
responsible for watching over the public interests, or
he himself was the source and bad example of corruption.

Without discarding the other two, the second alternative
seems to be most plausible. The common men, many of them

illiterates, did not comprehend the complexities of

government and could not have understood that many of
those purporting to represent the people

— el

"pueblo"

were in fact engaged in self-serving activities.
As to his political strategy, Carlos Washington

only had to remind his followers that the Lencinist

governments had implemented the minimum wage, the 8-hour

maximum and the old-age pension, to undermine the
charges made against him by the opposition. His political

propaganda centered on these three basic accomplishments,
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and they were appealing enough to
retain the loyalty of
his supporters.
The confrontation between
Lencinism and its criti..cs
symbolized the class conflict existing
in Mendozan society,
since the political alliances were mostly
determined by the

economic status of the citizens, and the
social values to
which they conformed. Lencinism under
Carlos Washington
continued to represent, at least symbolically,
the values
of the lower segments, in opposition to those
of the wellto-do. The hard core conservative element always

considered the Lencinist movement as

a

distortion of

traditional values, and rejected with contempt the "chusma
de alpargata." "The Mendozan society does not exist any

longer," claimed a typical representative of the creole

upper class, "the depraved indigenous element [creole]
fraternizes admirably with the corrupt and exotic sector
[jforeign inmigrantsj,

to undermine the foundations of

society and degrade the provincial ambience.

"^-^

52

Moreover, they enjoyed recalling that Carlos
Washington has vetoed a bill in March 1922, which granted
his mother the salaries which would have been collected
by Jose Nestor Lencinas until the completion of his term.
If he was so concerned with money, the Lencinists
contended, there he had an open opportunity to accept a
sizeable figure, which after all was given to his mother
through a legal, customary procedure.

^^Severo Gutierrez del Castillo, £1 Dr. Severe
Gutierrez del Castillo al pueblo culto de Mendoza
(Mendoza, 1922), p. 3.
,
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The opposition against Carlos
Washington

wai
IS as

aggressive as it had been against
his father. The dogmatic
Socialists fought tooth and nail
against what
they

considered the political vices and social
ills of some
Lencinist groups, whom they also depicted
as servile
adulators of the "gauchito." Moreover, the
position of the
Socialists in regard to the letras placed them
in total

opposition to the Lencinist view on this matter.
The
conservatives, although electorally diminished
in

the

province, were able to agitate the political sectors
in

Buenos Aires, where rested their only chance to get rid
of Lencinism through a federal intervention. The

Yrigoyenists regarded the Lencinist support for the anti-

Personalist cause as a shameful abjuration of the noble
Radical principles and their proclaimed interest for the

underdog as simply demagoguery. As one Yrigoyenist stated
in the National Chamber of Deputies,

"I

am a true worker,

not one of those who profit at the expense of the
54
worker. "^^ But the fact is that the Yrigoyenists were

unable to make serious inroads into the provincial
political scene, and for this reason they vigorously
Joined the pro-intervention forces in Congress,

Regardless of their respective political orientations,
the opposition groups within the province looked more

^^Words expressed by National Deputy for Mendoza,
Prancisco Rubilar, Diputados 1921, IV, p. 155.
,
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toward Buenos Aires than to
the legal resources
available
at home, to redress their
grievances against the
government.
Countless telegrams poured
into the Federal
Capital, addressed to Congress,
the Minister of the
Interior, the President, and the
so-called "prensa
seria."55
^^^^^ ^^^^
opposition felt
undefended by the provincial
institutions and sought the
protection of the Federal Government,
especially when
the letras became the major issue.
But it also seems
clear that the opposition was compelled
to appeal to
Buenos Aires because of their permanent
minority
political status, and the fact that the Lencinists

appeared to be unbeatable at the polls.
Since freedom of the press was absolute at this
time, it was the best forum for all the groups
and

political parties to present their views and to
criticize their opponents. It seems certain that the
endless political documents, manifestos and telegrams

issued by the different sectors reached a newspaper
office before that of its addressee. In this respect,
the appeals to La Nacion and La Prensa played a most

significant role in shaping the image of Lencinism
55

This expression was used for La Nacion and
La Prensa,
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outside Mendoza.^^
There is no doubt that the weight
of these two porteho
dailies was very important in
influencing public opinion,
especially among conservative, well-to-do
elements. Their
criticism of Lencinism was based many
times on

constitutional grounds, and the objections
they raised were
in line with the orthodox viewpoint which
guided their
political philosophy.
The unfavorable comments of these two newspapers

intensified as reports of corruption grew and as
Lencinism
imposed a climate of political intolerance in Mendoza.
At

one time La Prensa stated that in that province it was
not

possible to dissent with the Executive without risking

freedom or life itself. ^'^ Unfortunately, their
correspondents in Mendoza were local people directly

associated with the conservative sectors, and as such,
they reported one-sided versions most of the time. Because
of the great influence they exerted, it is regrettable
56

The following evaluation of Lencinism serves to
illustrate this fact.: "...este circulo demagogico y
regresivo odia cordialmente a la ilustracion, especula con
la ignorancia de las masas, las incita a vilipendiar a la
sociedad culta y a burlarse de la gente que viste con
decoro y se comporta con correccion, simboliza sus ideales
y su concepto de la evolucion mental en la alpargata;
administra los dineros publicos con la mas absoluta falta
de escrupulos y abre las puertas de las carceles a los
procesados por delitos vergonzosos. " La Prensa March 14,
,

1926.
^'^La

Prensa, August 13, 1924.

—
259

that while condemning the excesses
of lenolnlsm, la Nacion
and La Prensa did not envision
the social transformation
that this populist movement
symbolized.
There was a noticeable change in
the position of the
Yrigoyenist La E^oca as a result of the
definitive
alliance of the Lencinists with the
anti-Peronists. During
the years when Jose Nestor Lencinas
was governor of
Mendoza, he was constantly assailed by
La Prensa and La
Nacion. On the other hand, because he had
been
a

traditional supporter and political friend of
Yrigoyen,
La Epoca openly defended Lencinas in the early
part

of his

administration, but refrained from attacking him when
his

relationship with Yrigoyen began to cool. At the same time.
La Epoca rancorously attacked La Nacion and La Prensa with
a language highly indicative of its hatred for the two

well-established newspapers.
Conversely, during the governorship of Carlos

Washington, as he openly embraced the anti-Personalist
forces. La Epoca gradually became more hostile to his rule

and his miovement. But as La Nacion and La Prensa were also

opposed to Lencinism

— as

well as to San Juan's Bloquism

La Epoca found itself sharing with the two former
"villains" the same feelings on both governments of Cuyo,
and therefore ceased to attack La Nacion and La Prensa

almost completely.
The conservatives resented Lencinism, as they would

o
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have resented any political
force that took a pro-worker
stand, regulated their business
and
taxed thei.r

operations. However, prosperity
returned to thle
mercantile sectors, and the bodegueros
especially
profited from the lencinist decisions.
Carlos V/ashington
followed the recommendations of the
industrialists in
implementing changes that served the
interests of the
bodegueros more than the general interests.
But the
businessmen and industrialists in general
could not
absolve Lencinas for his pro-worker position
and the
heavy taxation imposed upon them by the
populist and
costly administration. It was estimated that
70 per cent
of the production costs of wine were taxes.
It turns
out that under lencinas' rule, the wine sectors
improved

their business. During the not too distant past, they had

appealed to the provincial government for its support,
and millions had been spent in destroying grapes and

disposing of wine, just to protect the industrial
interests. During the government of Carlos Washington
they did not have to raise their cries for help, as in
the past, but were intensely committed to let supply and

demand rule the market. What better sign than this to

prove that they were enjoying a period of

Ovidio V. Schiopetto, "La doble imposicion
Interna en la Republica Argentina. Estudio del sistema
impositivo de la Provincia de Mendoza. " Facultad de
V
Ciencias Economicas. Investigaci ones de Seminari
(Buenos Aires, 1927), 362.
,

261

prosper! ty?^^

Beyond economic considerations,
however, the upper
segments could not approve either
the Lenoinist
philosophy or its methods. Political
rivalry, with strong
social overtones, was a fact of
life, be it called
"Causa versus Regimen," "poor versus
rich," "bodeguero
versus peon," "Jockey Club versus
C£roulo de Armas,"
59

-

" ''^^'^ ^^^^^-^
Lencinist''period:''
1922
407,065,000 liters
1923
428,061,000
1924
472,084,000
Provinoia de Mendoza, Sintesis de la Direccion
~
General de Estadlstica 1930 ~ 1931 p. i6qT
.

—

,

likewise, wine consumption per capita reached
its peak for the decade in 1924:
,

1920
50 liters
1925
59 liters
1921
55
1926
62
1922
64
1927
50
1923
62
1928
56
1924
66
1929
57
Provincia de Mendoza, Ministerio de Industrias
y Ohras Publicas, El prohlema vinicola Memorial _de la
intervencion nacional en. Mendoza a la Comision Asesora
para la industria vltivini cola (Mendoza, 1931), p. 110.
.

The prosperity of the wealthier sectors was
also indicated by the growing number of cars:

1919
827
1920
946
1921
1,407
1922
1,582
2,294
1923
1924
3,409
Provincia de Mendoza, Sintesis de la Direccion
General de Estadistica, 1930-1931 p. 142.
,
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"gansos versus pericotes. "^O The
rivalry became more acute
toward the middle of 1924, when
political abuses,
administrative corruption and the
debacle of the letras,
cornered the provincial government
in an untenable
position.
The fact is that in spite of the
populist glamour of
Lencinism under the guidance of Carlos
Washington, its
real achievements were less significant
than its failures.
Its promises went unfulfilled in every major
field.

Financially, not only was it unable to restore
the value
of the letras, but the government was seriously
involved

in illicit activities. The gross mishandling of
the

provincial money provided a measure of the inability of
the Lencinas' administration to deal seriously with a

complex and vital problem. Without diminishing the

responsibility of the provincial authorities, the Federal
Government was also to be blamed for not taking the

proper action when it was needed. For years the central
governments "conveniently" ignored these constitutional
violations. Would they have had the same tolerance if any

province had set up its own custom house or created a

parallel army? With respect to social legislation

Lencinism deserves credit for the old-age pension law.^^

Pericote was a popular name, despectively given
to the Lencinists by their opponents. A pericote is a
rodent.
^''Provincial Deputy Luis Olmedo Cortes expressed
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But this solitary achievement
shows the neglect in which
the glowing promises of Carlos
Washington
were left.

In his relations with other
branches of government,
Lencinas resorted to the highhanded
methods

of his fathe r
in "punishing" opposition members,
and tampering with the
Judiciary in a most arbitrary manner.
Administratively,
the corruption in the Provincial Bank,
the failure to

make it a semi-private institution, and
the lack of
responsibility in other agencies of government,
meant
that the situation inherited from the oligarchy,
as the
Radicals denounced it in 1917, had not improved.
Perhaps
there is no better example of unfortunate
negligence

than

the School Board's administration: no massive effort
was

made to reduce the lack of attendance at schools;
literacy was far from universal; no real interest was
shown in making the school administration more reliable
and efficient, and the teachers continued to be the

pariahs of the provincial budget.
To what extent was Carlos Washington a demagogue in

that it was a "Lencinist Law," adding, "y digo asi,
veinte veces lencinista." Legislatura de Mendoza,
Diputados 1922, II, 1558. February 16, 1923.
,
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In 1926 Governor Orfila intervened in the School
Board. He appointed Leopoldo Suarez as interventor. In
Suarez' critical report of the school system, he noted
that the teachers' salaries were in arrears as follows:
87,601
1923
1920
t
89,752
$
328,568
1924
1921
31,050
142,665
1922
Los Andes, February 3, 1927.

his quest for social justice?
Every man can be his
own
historian in this matter, but
a sound Judgment must
take
into consideration both the
inner motivations of the
leader and the external expressions
in which his
purposes were carried out. A
sympathetic writer would
view Lencinas as a sincere reformer
and a man aware of
his tremendous popular attraction,
who thought of
himself as a positive leader, without
properly realizing
the magnitude of his shortcomings.
A critical view would
note that rhetoric replaced substance,
since the

positive accomplishments were meager in
comparison to
the professed purposes of protecting and
improving the
lot of the popular sectors. Under Carlos
Washington's
rule,

only one major piece of social legislation was

enacted. Here, moreover, is a good example of demagogic

techniques, for Lencinists placed posters on the walls
of Buenos Aires, praising the old-age pension law as an

example of advanced social legislation, just for the

self-aggrandizement of Lencinas' political stature in
the national circles, because the law was only

applicable 600 miles away.
Lencinas' ascendancy was conclusively proved by
the electoral returns from 1922 to 1924. Apparently he

saw in the people's support the best indication that
he was following in the right path, when in fact his

tremendous popularity blinded him to the real nature
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of the problems he was facing.
He said in his 1923
annual message that everything
was satisfactory, without
a single cloud in sight; and in
1924 he repeated that
concept with the same naivete. His
movement was victim
of the endemic problem which affects
all personalist

regimes: it did not exercise self-criticism
and seemed
to be mostly immune from the criticism
of its opponents.
Did Lencinas government fail to carry out
its promises
because its very nature was a contradiction
of

"efficient" government? Or did he fail because
under a
populist facade, his rule degenerated into one of

"populachera" nature?
But in spite of his numerous failings, it is hard
to close this evaluation of Carlos Washington without

pointing out his most redeeming value. Por he was a
true popular leader who enlightened the lives of

thousands of humble people Just by being a symbol of
a better life for them.

Although he fell from power by his own wrongdoings,
he also became a casualty of the strange alliance of

Yrigoyenists, conservatives and Socialists, who had
their own special reasons for seeking the political

destruction of Lencinism. Pictured against the higher
designs and intrigues of national politics, it seems
as if Carlos Washington's role was bigger than the man

himself.
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But the Mendozan leader was
in October 1924 as
popular as he had been in February
1922. At 35 years of
age, he still had a great
political future
to explore,

and from his first minute out of
office he began an
aggressive campaign to regain power.
His departure from
the government marked the start of
a new political
trail which eventually led him into a
direct

confrontation with Yrigoyen.
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CHAPTER

VIII

THE ErmGENCE OP POPULISM IN SAN
JUAN.
THE CANTONI CLAN
The thrust for political regeneration
that led to the

prominence of Jose Nestor Lencinas in Mendoza during
Yrigoyen's first term was also experienced in San Juan.
Before the Radical wind swept the land of Sarmiento, this
province was poorly developed economically and ruled by an

entrenched oligarchy, socially and politically backward.
Furthermore, the provincial Radical Party was not infused

with the reformist spirit of the Mendozan Radicals under
the leadership of Jose Nestor Lencinas. Although it

represented a somewhat different voice from that of the
conservatives, its leaders were also a part of the

traditional provincial structure.
The changes experienced in the 1920*3, which greatly

modified this general setting, were mostly due to the
energy and strong personality of Pederico Cantoni, a

young Radical who had no reservations about alienating
the more moderate members of the party. This paved the

way for the clash of the divergent Radical elements and,

more importantly, shaped San Juan's destiny for a
tumultuous decade.

^
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The two Radical factions were
the Intransigents and
the Nationalists. The former group
represented the nonconformist branch of the party, while
the latter was

more traditionally-oriented and loyal
to President
Yrigoyen. The Intransigents considered
the other faction
to be a virtual representative of the
Regimen, while the
Nationalists, and those of the conservative
Concentracion
Civica as well, viewed Cantonism as a leftist
movement
whose pro-populist position was close to International

Socialism, a force which in their minds represented
social anarchy.
The prominent leaders of the two factions were

Cantoni, of the Intransigents, and Napoleon Rosellot and

Ventura Lloveras, of the Nationalists. Cantoni was born
in San Juan in April 1890. His father, a man of pleasant

manners, came from Italy and devoted his efforts in San

Juan to his profession of engineer. His mother, also an
Italian, had a very strong character and was very

domineering. It has been generally pointed out that

Federico inherited and absorbed from her his tough
personality. He graduated from the Medical School of the

University of Buenos Aires in 1913» and practiced in his
native province. In 1917 he was elected to the Municipal
Council and became provincial deputy a year later.

Rosellot was the traditional Radical leader of
San Juan, so closely related to the provincial elite
that he had been in 1911 the president of the Social
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Following in the steps of Jose
Nestor lencinas, to
whom Cantoni looked for political
inspiration, the

Intransigent Radicals were committed
to the longings of
the popular sectors. In contrast
with the traditional
stance of the Radical Nationalists,
they adopted
the

alpargata as their political symbol.
Thus, the Intransigents
pursued the social objectives of the
Lencinists, and

shared with them the symbol which best
illustrated the
nature of their followers, the "chusma de
alpargata."
The reform of the provincial governments was,
as

noted earlier, a fundamental priority in Yrigoyen's

program of national political reparation. Accordingly,
the
conservative government of San Juan became the target of
the Radicals, who regarded the Sanjuanino administration as
a fraudulent one. Submitting its complaints to the Minister
of the Interior, the Radical Party stated that the

republican system of government was not functioning in San

Juan because of repeated electoral frauds and the shameful
arrangements of the conservatives aimed at perpetuating
themselves in office. The Executive Power granted full
credence to these partisans accusations. Indeed, they
Club, an institution harboring exclusively the well-to-do.
In 1917 he was the party candidate for the governorship,
but was defeated by the conservative Amador Isaza. Since
that time, Rosellot and his political friends had
quarrelled almost constantly with the young Cantoni,
although all of them pledged their allegiance to national
Radicalism. Rosellot died in November 1919.
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constituted the legal foundation
on which it justified
its action, for on October
17,

1919, less than three

weeks after Congress had
adjourned, President Yrigoyen
issued a decree placing the
three governmental branches
of
San Juan under federal
jurisdiction. Manuel P. Escobar,
then President of the Supreme
Court of Buenos Aires
Province, was appointed commissioner
with ample powers to
carry out his duties.^

Naturally, the conservatives considered
this action
another manifestation of Yrigoyen's
authoritarian rule.
But the Radicals, who were the sole
beneficiaries of this
situation, found themselves deeply troubled
by their
internal dispute. If the intervention were to
succeed, it
was imperative for them to achieve some kind
of workable
unity. Thus, from the outset of Escobar's rule,
it became

evident that it had been easier for Yrigoyen to tumble
the provincial government than to unite the members of

his party.

When efforts undertaken by delegates from the

National Committee of the Union Civica Radical failed,
the Yrigoyenists blamed the "Maximalist Cantonist ferment"

for the lack of success in forging party unity. Moreover,
2

Yrigoyen, Pueblo y gobierno VI, pp. 402-420.
Illustrative of the local conservative reaction against
the presidential decision was the fact that several
statues in the city of San Juan appeared covered with
crape the following morning.
,
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they argued that there was no
possibility of uniting with
the Intransigents because the
two factions represented

positions as divergent as "light and
darkness, treason and
loyalty, honesty and perfidy."^ However,
the results of
the elections held for National Deputies
on March
7, 1920,

were a warning that a divided party
couldn't capture
political control of the province/

Although the two Radical factions together
obtained
more votes than the conservatives, by presenting
candidates independently they had to accept a minority
status. Until this election the Radicals had been

confident that the conservatives would have no possibility
of preserving their majority. After that contest, however,

they strove to unify the party at any cost. Even so their

negotiations reached a stalemate, and Interventor Escobar
chose to postpone the elections for a new governor for a

few more weeks. Escobar's action was blatantly partisan,
since his official obligation was to set up the legal

conditions by which San Juan could be restored to its

institutional powers, not to pursue the amalgamation of
the officialist party.

•^

la Prensa, February 19

1

1920.

^The conservative Concentracion Civica got 7»712
votes against 4,929 of the Intransigent Radicals (Cantoni)
and 4,275 of the Radical Nationalists. The Socialists
March 15, 1920.
polled 1,741 votes. Ibid
.

,
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To break the impasse, the
selection of the Radical
candidate for governor had to be
maneuvered from Buenos
Aires. Yrigoyen believed that a
figure removed from the
local scene might best guarantee the
support of
the

Sanjuaninos. Other provincial leaders,
especially National
Deputy Marcial Quiroga, agreed that
this action was
the

only means to rescue the party from
irreparable

fragmentation. 5 Accordingly, with presidencial
advice and
consent, San Juan's Radicals proclaimed the
candidacy of
Amable Jones for the governorship of San Juan.^
The

Cantonists were dissatisfied with this arrangement for

although they were the strongest faction electorally
speaking, they had no representation on the ticket.

Nevertheless, they accepted Yrigoyen 's decision in order
to maintain a united front.

^

Diputados

.

1922, I, 132.

^Jones was born in San Juan but had not lived in
the province for many years. He was a distinguished
psychiatrist who had participated in professional
meetings in Europe and the United States, authored a
good number of works, taught at the University of
Buenos Aires, and was director of the main mental
hospital in Argentina. Politically, he was a Radical of
"the first hour" and a trusted friend of Yrigoyen. He
had been a delegate from San Juan to the National
Committee and a member of the Radical Convention which
nominated Yrigoyen as a presidential candidate in 1916.
Aquiles Castro was chosen as the candidate for deputy
governor. Castro, representing a small, traditional
wing of the party, commanded little political
significance but, by the same token, was a noncontroversial figure in the dissention-ridden domestic
Radical scene.
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Jones was highly respected
because of his professional
qualifications, but his debut in
provincial politics had a
touch Of arrogance. After having
been away from San Juan
for many years, he returned to
his native province
only

nine days before the elections to
declare that although
the history of the Radicals of
San Juan was written with
a "blurred pencil," he would mark
it with "indelible

characters.

""^

As expected, Jones triumphed although
by a narrow
margin, in the elections held on May
16, 1920. On July 9
he was installed in office, becoming the
first Radical

in history to serve as governor of San Juan.^
Political

regeneration thus finally reached the province but only
after extremely laborious party maneuvers. The problem
ahead for the Radicals was how to avoid the desintegration
of their "patch-quilt" unity.

Whatever the expectations and anxieties of the
Radical groups about the performance of the newly elected
governor, the authoritarian way in which he initiated his

rule deepened their antagonism. The Sanjuanino historian

Hector D. Arias has stated that Jones created a sui
generis Radicalism, which can not be properly called
"Yrigoyenismo,

Q
"

but "Jonismo."

^La Prensa, May

8,

Jones was quoted in a

1920.

o

The electoral returns were: UCR 8,997; Concentracion
April 1, 1922.
Clvica 8,272. Ibid
.

,

^Arias and Varese, Historia de San Juan

,

p.

434.

t
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congressional report as having
asserted that he would
govern "with the party, without
the party and against the
party. ••'^
The political situation thus
seriously deteriorated

within a few months after Jones took
office. The police,
implementing the governor's policy,
arbitrarily curtailed
the activities of his opponents; the
non-of f icialis
press became subject to growing harassment.
The governor
was also criticized for having recruited
from outside
the

province most of the high level staff of his
administration
and the Judiciary. In the unpretentious provincial
environment of San Juan, the higher bureaucratic positions
were closely connected to social standing. Hence, Jones'

appointments ran counter to the interests of many local
people, and offended their ever prevalent pride in the

"patria chica."
The legislature took a decisive stand to check Jones'

affronts, and especially the arbitrariness of his Supreme

Court nominations. Jose Flores Perramon, president of the

three-man Provincial Supreme Court, was the only member
of this tribunal who was properly appointed, for the other

two judges proposed by the governor were denied

confirmation by the Senate. Jones then appointed two other
judges but without seeking the consent of the Senate, he

^^Ministerio del Interior, Intervene! on naci onal en
la provincia de San Juan (Buenos Aires, 1921), p. lib.
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proceeded, with assistance
from the police, to
expel
Plores Perramon from his
office and install his
new
appointees. Other judicial
positions were filled in a
Similar fashion. These arbitrary
manipulations by the
governor ruptured the fragile
Radical
unity.

Under the leadership of Cantoni,
then a provincial
Senator, the Radical Intransigents
and the conservatives
decided to confront the governor
squarely in the
legislature by resorting to the
drastic legal solution of
impeachment. The governor had already
convened the

legislature for a special meeting of
January 29, 192I,
the sole purpose of which was to
approve the

1921 budget.

With this as grounds he insisted that he
would not
recognize any other motions made by the
legislative
power. A few days later, however, realizing

that in spite

of his warning the Chamber of Deputies was
still seriously

considering his impeachment, Jones adjourned the

legislature by decree on December 24. This dramatic
action stirred up even more criticism and, contrary to
Jones'

wishes, failed to prevent the confrontation between

the two powers.

Following this action, each side tried to anticipate
the other's move. Their inflexibility made any compromise

almost impossible. Since the legislative building was
guarded by the police, the anti-Jonist legislators met

secretly at the home of one of the members on February 26,
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1921. At this secret meeting,
they approved the
initiation
Of impeachment procedures
against the governor, and
suspended him. On this occasion,
and to express their
solidarity against Jones, they
formed a legislative bloclc

-a

bloaue-and it is from this that

the name Bloquista.

thereafter associated with
Cantoni's movement, was
derived.
Jones reacted angrily to the
action of these
legislators, ordering their arrest
and charging them with
conspiracy and rebellion. Almost all
of them were arrested,
including Cantoni. The press, however,
except the

officialist, was critical of Jones'
autocratic rule, and
reacted with indignation. The massive
arrest of legislators
was such a flagrant violation of their
prerrogatives that
the Minister of the Interior ordered Jones
to release them
immediately. The echoes of these serious discords
reached
the halls of Congress, and at the end of January
1921 the

National Chamber of Deputies appointed an investigating
committee to study the political situation in San

Juan."'--^

Naturally, Yrigoyen was opposed to this congressional

initiative and informed the Chamber that it did not have the
legal power to appoint such a committee; if the Chamber

wished to have some information concerning San Juan, the
normal procedure was to request it of the Executive Power.
•^^

Diputados

,

1920, VI, 131-183 (January 27, 1921)
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Moreover, asserting his authority,
the President affirmed
that the provincial conflict had
to be resolved by
observing the provincial legislation. ^2
^^.^ ^^^^^
between the President and a branch
of Congress
was a

confrontation over whose decision was
to prevail in
solving San Juan's dilemma. Prom the
institutional

viewpoint the provincial situation was a
chaos. The
governor was facing an attempt by the
provincial Chamber
of Deputies to impeach him and he had
been suspended by
a process which did not follow the proper
legal
steps.

At the same time, Jones was taking the legislators
to
court, another unconstitutional act, before judges
who

could not legally perform in this capacity because they

had been appointed by the governor but without the
consent of the Senate. The hope for an institutional

solution within the province was totally unrealistic.

Forced by the circumstances in San Juan, which
could not be modified locally, Yrigoyen finally acceded
to the request of the National Chamber of Deputies and

introduced a bill on March

4,

1921, intervening in San

Juan. Understandably, Yrigoyen'

s

bill was very short

on words. The need for the intervention was stated in

generalities. The official verbosity of seventeen

255-256. The request of the antiIbid
Yrigoyenist Radicals to intervene in San Juan and the
report of the investigating committee are on pp.
441-537 (February 25, 1921).
.

,
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months ago when conservative Governor
Isaza was displaced
from office in the name of "political
regeneration" was
altered now in typical Yrigoyen-style
Justification, that

that the intervention would
"restablish the functional
regularity of the government .^^ congress,
however, did
not accept these hollow words and modified
the text of
the law specifically stating that the
intervention should
guarantee the proper constitutional functioning
of the
is,

legislative and judicial powers, as well as municipal

self-government.^^

Yrigoyen needed this law in order to rescue a
friendly governor in serious distress. On the other hand,
he was most reluctant to comply with it in view of the

terms in which it was passed. To indicate his displeasure
to Congress, Yrigoyen did not sign the bill and it was

automatically promulgated ten days after he received it.
Even so, he let four more weeks elapse before appointing
the commissioner, Rayraundo M. Sal vat, another member of
IS

the Federal Judiciary.^

^^Yrigoyen, Pueblo y gobierno VI, pp. 421-445.
Yrigoyen' s message to Congress is on pp. 436-437.
,

^^This was Law No. 11,112, dated March

9,

1921.

^^Salvat' s arrival v/as warmly greeted by the
Cantonists, who displayed their antagonism against
Cantoni si, otro
Jones chanting enthusiastically,
no'." La Prensa, April 22, 1921.
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In a few weeks Salvat completed
the analysis of the
provincial situation. Like Interventor
de Veyga in
Mendoza in 1919, he based his
actions on constitutional
law. Therefore, on the first of
June he ordered the
withdrawal of all troops guarding
the legislature,
declared null and void all appointments
to the Judiciary
made without the consent of the Senate,
ordered the
reinstatement of all the judges dismissed
by the

governor and invalidated the municipal
elections held in
November 1920. The Bloquists were joyful about
Sal vat's

decision, but their euphoria was short-lived.
On June

3,

abruptly, Yrigoyen decreed the end of Salvat 's
mission,

stating that he had fulfilled the purpose for which he
had
been sent to San Juan."^^ The fact was that whereas

Yrigoyen considered Salvat'

s

mission to be finished when

he was ready to uphold the suspension of Governor Jones,

Salvat had not even intimated that he considered his work
completed,

17
'

Ironically, on the same day of Yrigoyen' s decree.
,
La Epoca expressed editorially that the measures taken
by Salvat, forcing Jones to rectify his highhanded
decisions, proved that the President had never
interferred with the situation in San Juan.
17

Shortly thereafter, the Minister of the Interior
published all the documents pertaining to this
intervention, but omitted Salvat' s report of Kay 6, in
which he outlined the steps he was contemplating and the
reasons for them. Noting this intentional omission in the
official publication, La Prensa, warned the President not
to ignore Salvat' s report as it had Commissioner's
Saavedra on Mendoza in 1917. August 4, 1921.
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Pressed by Congress to explain
the premature
termination of Salvafs intervention,
Yrigoyen simply
reported on July 7 that the conflict
between
the

executive and the legislature of San
Juan had been
resolved by the commissioner. The
President was more
specific in criticizing the provincial
legislature for
resorting to an illegal procedure in
trying to impeach a
duly elected governor. However, he added,
if
Congress

considered that the forthcoming elections for the
new
legislature ought to be held under federal supervision,
he would approve a bill declaring a new intervention
in

San Juan. 18 This in itself demonstrated the weakness
of
Yrigoyen'

s

defense for ending Salvat's commission. In

Congress a bill was immediately introduced authorizing
a further intervention, but it was stalled in a

committee for almost three months.

In San Juan, meanwhile, the situation was the same
as it had been before Salvat: a virtual impasse. The

bitter animosities were as pronounced as ever, but now
there were further complications. Since the legislature

had suspended Governor Jones, the provincial Senate
appointed its president, Juan Estrella, as the Chief
Executive. Thus, each side in the dispute now had its
own governor, although in reality, Jones* rule was

^^La Prensa, July 8, 1921.
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uncontested because Yrigoyen had authorized the
15th
Infantry Regiment to provide the governor with
all
necessary protection.
But in mid-September 1921 Congress was renewing
its
interest in San Juan's affairs and approved a new
intervention, the second in only six months, in order
to normalize the Chamber of Deputies and the municipal

governments.^^

Appraising the provincial situation, Sergio

W.

Bates, a contemporary journalist, thought that in spite
of his errors, Jones was a sincere man. But as a

psychiatrist practicing his profession among unbalanced
patients for thirty years, Bates suggested that Jones

believed San Juan to be a huge asylum where the "insane"
opposition could be domesticated with cold showers. 20
Jones himself had made a depressing psychological

appraisal of the province and the people he was ruling.
He described it as a dormant environment, devoid of

patriotism and dominated by obscure and inferior groups,
obsessed with political ambitions. Jones believed it was
the consequence of the biological heritage, the lack of
a large, beneficial immigration, the influence of a very

This was Law No. 11,168, dated September 24, 1921.

Sergio W. Bates, Muerte de Jones (La tra^edia
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low-quality press and the general absence of
cultural
21
values.
The heated controversy of "Jones versus
anti-Jones"

gradually reached a crescendo. Acts were countered
by
others, words of condemnation were repudiated with
others

more aggressive. Political tolerance had evaporated to
the point where the only possible solution appeared
to

be the total exclusion of one side and the absolute
supremacy of the other. For several months serious warnings
were raised suggesting that such political intransigence
could only result in a total struggle. The grave and gloomy
tone of the admonitions became a constant theme in the
press. In November 1920, La Prensa pointed out that the

road chosen by Jones forecast the barrenness of his
government. When he arbitrarily suspended the provincial

elections scheduled for January 1921, it was predicted that
only regrettable consequences could be expected from such

overbearing procedures by the governor. In despair that
Jones would never soften his arrogant stand, Los Andes
stated that he was approaching "the abyss where he will
be irremissibly buried." A few days later a manifesto of
the Concentracion Civica suggested that those who opposed

^^Provincia de San Juan, Libro bianco. Documentos
of iciales de los hechos producidos en San Juan ^ el
procedimiento empleado por el gobernador Dr Amable J ones
(San Juan, 1921), pp. 4-5.
.
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the governor should get together "to
overthrow as soon as
possible the sacrilegious standard-bearer
of the anarchy."

In June, La Prensa reiterated that by exerting
uncontrolled power, Jones would lead San Juan to
lamentable extremes. The same day Los Andes resignedly
concluded that perhaps the only way to bring a solution
to the crisis was "the sacrifice, the immolation [of
the

governor] by his own will in his place of duty."^^ In
fact, Jones was conscious of the danger to which he was

exposed and in order to prevent a probable attempt on his
life he protected himself by spending nights at

different places.
The pugnacity of Jones' enemies in San Juan and

Buenos Aires, who were Yrigoyen's enemies too, the

deliberate inertia of the President in forcing a change
in the governor's course of action, and the overweening

attitude assumed by Jones, combined to create a situation
which could only be modified if one of both sides would
adopt a sincerely conciliatory attitude toward the other.
But political hatred was not appeased and the situation
continued to follow a hopeless downhill path.
Early in October Cantoni was assaulted by the

police in his home in Jachal, the second city in the

^^La Prensa January 3, 1921; Los Andes March
Prensa March 14, 1921; ibid . June 12, 1921;
La
1921;
Los Andes, June 12, 1921.
,

,

,

,

2,

284

province, and was wounded in the foot. His
political
adversaries, however, claimed that it was in fact
a selfinflicted wound. Back in the capital, in a gathering
at

the Plaza 25 de Mayo, in front of the government
house,

Cantoni pronounced on October 25, these menacing words:
The tyrant Jones has to be thrown out of the
government house, dead or alive. Every man must
have ready a Kauser, and if he does not have it,
a Winchester, and if he does not have a
Winchester, a shotgun, and if he does not have
it, a gun, and if he does not have any firearm,
he must seek a club, a hoe, a pocketknife or a
suncho. But we have to thrown him out, dead or
alive. 23

It was not by chance than, that early in the

afternoon of Sunday, November 20, 1921, when Jones, Juan
Maglioli, a well-known bodeguero, and Luis J. Colombo,

President of the Supreme Court of San Juan, were
entering the little town of Rinconada in Jones' car, a
hail of bullets struck them, killing Jones and Maglioli
instantly. As if to make sure, a handbomb was also thrown

partially disfiguring Jones

'

body.^^

Critica, January 9, 1923.

^^The town of Rinconada is located twelve miles
south of the capital, in the Department of Pocito. Jones
was not the first provincial prominent figure to die
because of violence. San Juan had a long and bloody
history of political passion. In 1858 former Governor
Nazario Benavidez was killed while he was in jail; two
years later Governor Jose Antonio Virasoro died leading
an armed movement; in 1861 former Governor Antonino
Aberastain was shot after being defeated by the federal
forces at the battle of La Rinconada, the^same place
where Jones fell; in 1872 Governor Valentin Videla was
assassinated, and in 1884 National Senator Agustin
Gomez suffered the same fate.
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Within a few hours the police began arresting
suspects
and in a few days most of those implicated
were
in jail.

Among the arrested were Federico Cantoni and
his brother
Elio, also a physician, although they were not
present at
the Rinconada when Jones was killed.

Federico Cantoni refused to make any statement on the
grounds that he was protected by legislative immunity. The
other defendants, however, contended that the Cantoni

brothers had planned the whole attack. They explained that
their intention was not to assassinate the governor, but

rather to kidnap him in order to force him out of office.
They stated that they believed it was the only means

available to break the provincial stalemate. In
justification, the Bloquists claimed that when the plan

was carried out some of the men were not too sober and
others were unable to control themselves, and so,

unfortunately, the situation got entirely out of hand.

Considering the state of political hatred existing in
San Juan, it seems more plausible that the real motive of

the Cantonists was to eliminate Jones. The mere kidnapping
of the governor did not promise an effective change in the

None of the accused were professional troublemakers, none had a police record and some were even
members of well-known families in the province. One of the
arrested, Vicente Miranda Jameson, who was accused by the
Jonists of having mutilated the governor's right ear,
had his left ear cut off in retaliation.
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political situation. Did the Bloquists believe
that
Yrigoyen would keep his hands in his pockets? From
a
strictly political viewpoint, the episode of the
Rinconada
appears almost useless when it is considered that
Yrigoyen
could appoint a new commissioner to pursue the same

political action which Jones had been following, as in
fact he did. But the Bloquists were ready to pay the price

for getting rid of what they believed was a tyrant. This
priority, apparently, overshadowed any other consideration.
Thus, Jones was removed from the scene, but not the system

that supported him, for Yrigoyenism was, after all, the

root of the problem for the Bloquists.

Understandably, after the Rinconada there was a

recrudescence of the animosities between the two opposing
groups, Aldo Cantoni, another brother of Federico who was

living in Buenos Aires, went immediately to San Juan to
rally the Bloquists in a campaign of public agitation in

behalf of the men arrested.
26

Aldo was 29 years old and was practicing medicine
in the Federal Capital, where he also had gained the fame
of being the "doctor of the poor." Politically, he was a
member of the International Socialist Party and had
openly defended the Maximalist principles, both in San
Juan where in 1916 he was the candidate of his party for
National Deputy, and in 1917 the candidate for deputy
governor and Buenos Aires. He also took part in the
Comite de Agitacion Cordoba Libre, in favor of the
university reform. To assist Aldo Cantoni some of his
political friends like Cesar A. Moya, Graciliano Recai and
Aldo Pecchini, also came to San Juan from Buenos Aires
and joined the UCR Bloquista.

—

—

s
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The situation in San Juan excited
national concern.
Within the political parties and in the
press, the comments
and criticisms focused intensively on the
behavior of the

President. In general, his foes contended
that his guilty
tolerance of Jones' excesses had been the
fundamental
cause for the tragedy. The Yrigoyenists

on the other hand,

,

blamed the event of the Rinconada on their
opponentsspirit of revenge. La Epoca

,

for example, specifically

accused La Prensa and La Nacion in numerous heated
editorials of being the real instigators of the crime.
As noted earlier. Congress had approved a limited

intervention in San Juan, two months before Jones'
assassination. But Yrigoyen did nothing to implement it

until early in December, almost three weeks after the
governor's death, when he appointed Julio Bello as

Federal Commissioner. 28 Bello did not carry an olive
27

Aquiles Damianovich, a prosecutor during Jones'
governorship, wrote his own account of the intrigues
which led to the governor's assassination. He blamed
most of the local politicians for their selfish
political ambitions, and asserted that former Minister
of Interior Rosendo Gomez, in connivence with the
Bloquists and acting as a fifth column within Yrigoyen'
cabinet, masterminded Jones' elimination, so Gomez could
outbid him as the party candidate for vicepresident in
the 1922 elections. El crimen ^ el poder La lucha por
la vicepresidencia ^ _el asesinato de Jones (Buenos Aires,
1922), p. 258.
.

Bello was a loyal Yrigoyenist political leader
in Santa Fe province. Yrigoyen, Pueblo ^ gobierno
,

pp. 4-46-455.
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branch when he arrived in San Juan in
mid-December, for it
was intended that the Bloquists pay
dearly for every drop
of blood of the Rinconada. The
Yrigoyenists had had enough
of Cantoni. Jones' death was the final
straw, and they

confronted the Bloquists with vehement rage.
Neither mercy
nor forgetfulness would be granted to the
assassins of
Jones. The clash between Yrigoyenists and
Cantonists

during the 1920'

s

would mark one of the unfortunate

political events of the decade.
San Juan was then ruled by Deputy Governor Aquiles

Castro, a hesitant and timorous man who had spent most of

his time away from the province. But at the end of

February 1922, Bello took control of the Executive Power
in spite of the fact that the intervention law did not

confer upon him the right to assume executive office.

Commenting on Bello'

s

abuse of power. La Prensa stated

that San Juan was not under a federal intervention but

under "an arbitrary proconsulate at the service of the
supreme personalism.

pq
"

This comment was typical of the

Buenos Aires' press opposed to Yrigoyen. Although they
had condemned the crime of the Rinconada, from a

political viewpoint they were cautious about

criticizing Cantoni'

s

action. This attitude underscored

the fact that Yrigoyen was the axis of national politics.

Provincial affairs as well as provincial caudillos were

^^La Prensa, March 21, 1922.
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simply dependent clauses of the two major
currents: for
Yrigoyen or against Yrigoyen. This rationale
determined
basically what was principal and what was accessory
in
the political game. It explains why at this time
Federico

Cantoni received such benevolent treatment from the

powerful anti-Yrigoyenist press.

Another paradox was that while Cantoni was
recognized as the image of Jose Nestor Lencinas in San
Juan, his evaluation by the national press was quite

distinct. The anti-Yrigoyenist newspapers had bitterly

criticized Lencinas for his political methods and
"populist deraagoguery.

Thus, if it were agreed that

Cantoni was Lencinas' alter ego, why did he receive such

different consideration in the "prensa seria" than his

mendocino preceptor? Their respective relations with

Yrigoyen seem to be the logical explanation. Although
during his administration Lencinas had severed his
former warm ties with the President, he was regarded by
the press as a fervent supporter of the "Causa" and an

old-time friend of the President. The Yrigoyen-Cantoni

relationship, however, had never been so close and, in
fact, Cantoni had been at odds with the traditional

wing of the UCR in San Juan which professed total
loyalty to Yrigoyen.
Cantoni, therefore, was not treated in the press as
an "Yrigoyenist" as Lencinas had been, but quite the
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opposite for he had faced the President
head on by openly
confronting Jones' rule in San Juan. Accordingly,
the

conservative and liberal papers in Buenos Aires
and the
Cuyo softened the rough edges of Cantoni's
behavior,

because in spite of his excesses, his actions
served the
important purpose of condemning Yrigoyen's rule.
Los

^^^Qs provided an example of this attitude when

referring to the April 1922 elections which took place
after the events of the Rinconada, it praised the

Bloquist electoral success as a proof that the people
were against the absolutism exerted from above.

-^^

And a

few months later, La Prensa referred to Bloquism as a
"democratic force.

"^"^

Meanwhile, Interventor Bello successfully blocked
any judicial action intended to obtain the release of

Federico Cantoni. When a judge ordered it on the grounds
that Cantoni was protected by legislative
was not caught

in.

i'lhmunity and

f raganti in any wrongdoing,

as stated

in the constitution, Bello ordered the police not to

obey the judicial ruling. When the same judge complained

about this to the Provincial Supreme Court, its president,
who had been appointed without the approval of the Senate,

^^Los Andes, April 11, 1922.
^•^La

Prensa, September 4, 1922.

.
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ordered the complaint to be filed.

Undiscouraged by these official actions, Aldo
Cantoni
kept the Bloquists throughout the province
constantly

agitating for the release of the prisoners. At
the same
time he took care of the medical duties of his
brothers

Federico and Elio. It was not difficult for Aldo to
rally

popular support for his two imprisoned brothers. Both
Pederico and Elio enjoyed considerable prestige with the
people, for their profession had put them in daily

contact with the less fortunate segments of the population,
and as a general rule they had not charged any fees to

indigent people, but provided them with medicine and even
with money.

A special correspondent of Los Andes stated

that in San Juan there were countless followers of Cantoni

who would offer their lives to defend him.^^ There seems

little doubt that the people whom the Cantoni brothers
had assisted professionally felt obligated to them, and
that their sense of gratitude far outweighed any

reservations they might have had for their part in the
Rinconada.
The first test of the popularity of the Bloquists

^^Ibid., June

2,

1922.

^^Ibid. , December 2, 1921. See the special comment
on the professional activities of both Federico and Elio

Cantoni
•^"^Los

Andes, November 29, 1921.
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after Joqgs' death, took place a the
elections held in
April 1922. Revealing their growing political
alliance

with the masses, they were able to defeat
both the
Yrigoyenists and the conservatives.^^ The counting

of

the ballots, however, did not resolve the
controversy

for in Congress Yrigoyenist members, whether in

discussions of Bloquist credentials or in other debates,

permanently reminded the latter of their shortcomings.
Indeed, down until 1930 the assassination of Jones was a

constant note in the polemic and the Yrigoyenists labeled
their rivals, in the words of one deputy, as a mafia

devoid of humanitarian feelings.

-^^

Meanwhile, the judicial process of the Rinconada, in
the hands of the Yrigoyenist court, was moving forward.

On October 10, 1922, two days before Yrigoyen ended his
term, the prosecutor demanded a sentence of life

imprisonment for Federico Cantoni, as the "moral author"
of the crime, for having planned it, selected the men to

do it, supplied the weapons and "having exerted spiritual
75

^^The electoral returns were as follows: UCR
Bloquista 7,240 votes; UCR 5,685, and Concentracion Civica
5,461. Diario Nuevo (San Juan), January 4, 1923. The
personal nature of this civic confrontation between
Bloquists and Yrigoyenists was also evident in the ballots
themselves, in what can be termed "the battle of the
pictures." The former showed the pictures of Leandro N.
Alem and Pederico Cantoni and a five-point star, their
symbolic mark. The latter' s ballot carried the picture of
Alem, Yrigoyen and Jones.
36 Diputados

,

1922, I, 121 (May 12).

s
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influence over the weak minds of other people."
The
prosecutor demanded a 20-year sentence for
Elio
^'^
Cantoni .
The inauguration of Marcelo T. de Alvear
as

President introduced a new factor in the relations
between the national government and the political
situation in San Juan. From the time Bello became

commissioner in December 1921, he had merely perpetuated
the Personalist rule in San Juan and President Yrigoyen

did not have any visible intention to normalize the
TO

situation.

Bello returned to San Juan after Alvear'

inauguration, and this led La Epoca to affirm that the

commissioner's trip proved the continuity between the
previous and the present administration, for Alvear was

following in Yrigoyen'

s

steps.

But La Epoca was

entertaining a wrong notion. The Minister of the
Interior, Jose Nicolas Matienzo, provided the new

administration with quite a different political
approach. As a strict believer in the supremacy of the

^'''La

Prensa, October 11, 1922.

^^In this respect, the province of San Luis
provided the most ominous example of Yrigoyen' s intent,
Although federal intervention began in April 1919, at
the end of Yrigoyen' s term, three years and a half
later, San Luis still continued under the federal
tutelage.

^^La Epoca

,

November

4,

1922.
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constitution, Matienzo, nine days after
Alvear took office,
instructed Bello in firm and unmistakeable
terms that San

Juan had to regain at the earliest possible
time its full
constitutional control.
The drastic change in the attitude of the
national

government was also reflected in the decision of Minister

Matienzo that the coming elections for governor of San
Juan, finally scheduled for January 14, 1923, should be

held under the control of a Federal Electoral Board. Bello
had argued that the intervention law required that the

provincial norms should be applied and that the board
should be a provincial one. The significance of this issue
was that if Bello*

s

contention was accepted, the electoral

judges would be those appointed by the Yrigoyenists. Vexed
by Matienzo'

s

decision, Bello resigned on December 8, and,

without waiting for his replacement, hurriedly left the
province. His rule as Federal Commissioner had begun under

painful conditions; it ended as badly as it had begun.
Soon thereafter Alvear appointed Manuel Carlos to replace
Bello, and finally the electoral phase began in earnest.
The first experiment with a Radical government in San

Juan had ended tragically because of the profound division
in the party ranks. Now, for the first time, one of the
factions, the Union Civica Radical Bloquista, emerged as a

strong political force with extensive grass roots support,

^^La Prensa, October 22, 1922.
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trying to assert electorally the power of
its numerical
strength.
By the end of December each party had
determined its
course of action. The Yrigoyenists decided
to abstain from
the election since they were left with few
friends once

Bello had been swept from power. The conservatives
proclaimed Duilio Graffigna and Alberto Vidart as their
candidates. Graffigna has been the most prominent name in
the industrial circles of the province. Thus, the fact

that the most powerful bodeguero headed the conservative

ticket helped to imprint Bloquist propaganda with a heavy

anti-oligarchical overtone.
On December 26, the convention of the UCR Bloquista

proclaimed the candidacies of Federico Cantoni and Juan
Estrella.^"'' The electoral campaign in San Juan had a

strong populist flavor, similar to that in Mendoza in
1918 when Jose Nestor Lencinas was running for governor.

But unlike that campaign, in which there was a clear-cut

Cantoni had been regarded as a candidate for a
long time. In fact, even in the April 1922 elections, when
Cantoni was in jail, there were posters bearing his face
throughout San Juan stating: "The eyes of the martyr
contemplate you. Vote for the UCR Bloquista." La Epoca
March 22, 1922.
,

^^A special report by a Los Andes correspondent,
stated that Dr. Cantoni "es hoy lo^que fue el Dr. Jose
Nestor Lencinas antes de su eleccion, un idolo lleno de
es el
sugestiones de bien; una promesa acariciante.
representante mas genuine de la masa popular...."
January 16, 1923.
. .
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alteraative between the candidates
of the Regimen and the
Causa, in San Juan the Bloquists
not only
had to face the

traditional provincial oligarchy, but
also the vindictive
Yrigoyenists Radicals, who were now
more than ever ready

to make a pact with the devil himself
if it meant the

destruction of Federico Cantoni.
The candidacy of Cantoni, a man who
was facing the

possibility of spending his life in prison
for Jonesassassination, inflamed the Yrigoyenists. La
Epoca
criticized Cantoni stating that it was a disgrace
to

allow the moral author of such a crime to become a
candidate for the highest provincial office/^ What La

SpQca termed

a

criminal act, however, was for the

Bloquists an act of patriotism. Irreconcilable
viewpoints'.

The Yrigoyenists recommended that their supporters

vote for Graffigna, because he offered "order, security
and tranquility" in contrast to the hecatomb they feared

would certainly occur under Cantoni. In view of the

political agitation he was directing from his cell, they
wondered how Commissioner Carles could allow Cantoni to
convert his jail into the party headquarters. This was
not an overstatement on the part of the Yrigoyenists,

for Cantoni was engaged in intense political activity.

^^La Epoca , January

6,

1923.
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in fact, he issued the party-

s

program-manifesto from the

jail.

This document, despite its
origins or perhaps
because of them, set forth the most
advanced ideas

expressed by any Radical group anywhere
in the country
to that time. It offered an innovative
program in all

aspects of provincial life, assigning to
the State a very
prominent role, especially as concerned
social legislation
and public works. The more important
principles
were:

amnesty for political prisoners; proportional

representation for legislative and municipal bodies;
the
direct election of National Senators; political rights
for women; 8-hour maximum workday and minimum wage;

protection for pregnant women; free medical attention in
the capital and the departments; a campaign against

gambling, vagrancy and alcoholism; reform of the tax
system; priority for irrigation works and for worker

housing; transformation of the Provincial Bank into a

semi-private institution; extensive public works and
simplification of the bureaucratic apparatus.

These

principles were quite a departure from what was the
traditional role of the government in the provinces, and
the nation as well. This program is evidence that

Provincia de San Juan, Mensaje de S.E. el Sr
Gobernador de la Provincia Dr Federico Cantoni TSan
Juan, 1923), pp. 5-9.
.

.
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Bloquism, at least in theory, was
oriented toward reforms
far more advanced than those advocated
by national
Radicalism.
The electoral campaign was virtually
monopolized by
the Bloquists/^ Their speakers proclaimed
in every

corner of the province that it was imperative
that they
win the election so that Cantoni could be

liberated. This

made a great impact on many people who viewed Cantoni
as
a doctor of the poor and helper of the needy and
not as

a

political criminal. Indeed, the profession of the three
Cantoni brothers was very useful to them in a popular
campaign. More than mere political leaders, they were

considered by the masses as "humanitarian saviors." The

authority which was theirs as doctors was transferred to
the political situation, and they won as politicians the

aura of confidence and respect which they had as doctors.

Moreover, as the election day approached there was a

growing rumor that even if Cantoni did not win the
election, the "people" of San Juan would prove its

strength of character and energy by liberating the

political prisoners.

^They introduced popular entertainment as part
of their political campaign, shov/ing movies between
speeches. Jose P. Gallardo, Definicion doctrinaria del
bloquismo san.juanino (Rosario, 1932; pp. 17-1^.
,

46

Critica, January 9, 1923.

299

The electoral battle in
San Juan echoed in
Buenos
Aires. The porteno press
devoted .uch space and
attention
to the events in that province.
Under normal
circumstances, political and
economic interest in the
affairs of San Juan would be very
modest in comparison
with other provinces, but Jones'
assassination and the

dramatic popular rise of Federico
Cantoni gave to the
Sanjuanino dilemma an extraordinary
relevance.

The positions taken by the leading
newspapers

projected their views of the provincial
situation on the
wider screen of national politics. La
Nacion and
La

Prensa, always moderate, indicated a somewhat
benevolent
opinion toward Cantoni because of his singular
resistance
to the personalist policy of former President
Yrigoyen.

Both papers refrained from referring directly to the
affair of the Rinconada, but blamed the "political
regeneration" policy of Yrigoyen for the abuses
committed in San Juan by Governor Jones.
Critica, an anti-Irigoyen newspaper, widely read by
the popular sectors, became the supporter of Bloquism in
the Pederal Capital. Critica

'

s

special correspondent in

San Juan, Jose P. Barreiro, wrote juicy notes strongly

tinted with populist overtones, which served to stir up

fervor in Buenos Aires for Cantoni

's

candidacy. The

prominent attention given by Critica to the election in
San Juan brought the campaign to the concern of thousands
in Buenos Aires. In one of his reports from San Juan,

s
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Barreiro termed Bloquism a "party for
capitalistic above anything else."'^'^

a class,

anti-

Graff igna, the

conservative candidate was characterized
as the
representative of 360,000 casks of wine,

but not as the

representative of the people. This could only
result,
Critica claimed, in a government of bodegueros

for the

bodegueros. In this black-and-white type evaluation,
the
provincial alternative was presented as one of choosing

between the oligarchy and the people, with the
connotations that each term conveyed to the masses.
Critica stated in brief, if in uncritical and simplistic
words:

"the struggle is polarized between the bordalesas

and the Bloquism."^

Moreover, seeking to grant

respectability to the incident that ended Jones' days,
Cantoni was referred to as "the chief of the events of
the Rinconada. "^^
The people who gathered at the Cantonist rallies in

San Juan were overv/helmingly of humble extraction. The

fact that they frequently came from far away indicates
the attraction exerted among the masses by Cantoni'

aura as defender of the poor. Barreiro wrote in Cri ti ca
that the wishes of the Bloquist leader were a

47 Ibid.

,

December 23, 1922.

"^^Ibid.

,

January

3,

1923.

49 Ibid.

,

January

6,

1923.
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commanding order to his followers,
for they felt for him
almost an idolatry, "to the extreme
that many religious

women placed Cantoni's picture together
with those of
the saints of their devotion." Barreiro
added that it

was frequent to find "in the ranches
of the interior of
the province the picture of Federico
Cantoni side by

side with that of Saint Anthony or San Vicente
de

Paul."^^
The vigorous campaig-n waged by Critica in behalf
of the Bloquism emphasized that more than an ordinary

election was involved; it would be a revolution in the

ballot boxes. The newspaper recalled in its columns
some of the traditional methods which the patrones had

used for years to influence the way their peons voted.

But the Bloquists seemed assured that although nothing
appeared changed on the surface, the people this time

would know how to behave when casting their votes. As
Critica noted:

—

On election day the peasants chinada will
have money, will eat and drink well and will
get a ride to the voting place at the expense
of the charitable Concentracion Civica...the
chinada is too wise as to allow itself to be
bribed with fifteen pesos, a liter of cheap
wine and two or three meat pies empanadas .
The chinada will accept all that, but in the
dark room they will remember Cantoni... Pl

50ibid.
^^

January 7, 1923. The term chino and
Ibid
chinada refers to the lower class citizen of nonurban areas.
.

,

^
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Judging the campaign from another
facet of the
political prism, La ^oca considered

Cantoni's exaltation

to be the glorification of crime.
It felt it was
appalling to see the Bloquist candidate
did not show any

repentance after the event of the Rinconada
and, in fact,
that his electoral success could result
in his getting
out of jail with impunity. La Epoca wrote
that it was
inconceivable that such a criminal might not only
be
spared the legal punishment he deserved, but had
already
been elevated to the dignity of a candidate to the

governorship .
Cantoni had represented the Radicals of San Juan

when the Lencinists held important meetings in Mendoza.
He acknowledged with pride that Jose Nestor Lencinas was
his political guide. This close ideological association

between Lencinists and Bloquists provoked fear among
those in San Juan who were opposed to the Mendozan

regime and its populist political style. They were afraid
that the administrative and financial disorder of the

governments of Jose Nestor and Carlos Washington Lencinas

might be duplicated in San Juan.

^^La Epoca

,

Hence, the opposition

December 29, 1922.

of the anti-Bloquists,
Juan, with provocative
San
to
travelled
many Lencinists
campaign. But
the
in
participate
intentions, to
Mendoza, at once.
to
back
them
sent
Interventor Carles

^heightening the fears
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to the Bloquists was very strong among the
propertied

elements, especially those of the wine industry.
The propaganda of the Concentracion Civica was

mostly devoted to raising an alarm about the possibility
of a Bloquist government.

They recalled to the electorate

the excesses of Lencinism, and especially those

committed against the workers who had disagreed with
Lencinas. The conservatives added, with candor or malice,
that Lencinism was the enemy of the working class and
that following in its steps, the Bloquists were really

wolves disguised in sheep's clothing.

Diario Nuevo

the leading voice of the conservatives

,

in San Juan, claimed that the Bloquist program was

deceitful because the workers did not owe anything to
Cantoni, and that poor people had always earned good

salaries and found enough jobs.-^^ They were especially
critical of the massive propaganda energetically directed

among the v/orkers and campesinos by Aldo Cantoni. They
considered a substantial raise in all taxes, which they

would bear almost exclusively, as the major threat from
Cantoni 's program. They viewed Aide's unremittingly

campaign as machinations of a dissolvent propagandist of

International Communism. Expressing the fears and

^"^La

Prensa

,

January 9, 1923.

^^Diario Nuevo, January 11, 1923.
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anxieties of the propertied groups, Dlar^o Nuevo
commented
that the Bloquists intentionally sought to
pit
one class

against another, trying to break the harmony between
capital and labor, because by

fostering the low passions of the vile elements,
they seek to conciliate the Utopias of a
senseless Communism with the coarse ambitions of
people from the coraites, which look at the
government as spoils of war..., 56
The conservatives believed that if the Cantonists

attained power, this would constitute a threat to social
peace in the province. To prevent this calamity, Diario

Nuevo alerted its readers as would a commander in the
battlefield, reminding them that the Marseillaise had
always been a "hymn on the lips of the oppressed," and

exhorted them:
Aux armes, citoyens To the good Sanjuaninos,
to those who sincerely wish their land free
and prosper, to the workingmen who have civic
dignity and a moral conscience, and aspire to
extol their material well-being by their own
intelligent effort. ... 57
I

This, in a nutshell, was the prevalent political

philosophy of the conservatives. In their view, the
electoral process was pitting noble men against ignoble
men, as if on the one side were decent people imbued

with the ethical values of self-discipline and masters
of their own effort, and on the other, social agitators.

^^

.

,

January 13, 1923.

^'^Ibid.

,

January 14, 1923.

Ibid

"
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depraved and ignorant men, who aspired to
live in a
society mediocrely leveled from below
rather
than

judiciously improved from above. The predicament
for the
electorate, as it was posed by the conservatives,
was

one of the utmost significance, because the
crux of the

matter was to choose between justice or crime, order
or
anarchy. Moreover, to protect the interests of the

class

it represented, the Goncentracion Civica proclaimed

itself "the traditional party of our democracy," which
raised "the flag of law and order.... "^^
To counterattack the conservative version of what

Bloquism represented, the Cantonists tried to enhance
their image by reiterating that theirs was an organic

movement, based on sound political and institutional
principles. In a declaration issued at the close of the
campaign, they asserted that victory was in their hands

"because we sustain principles of sound government and

civilized ideals," and they affirmed that they would

redeem the province with "respeto y orden."-^^
The Bloquists flooded the province with

^^Ibid.

^^La Prensa January 14, 1923. A few days before
the election the independent newspaper of San Juan
Debates (January 10, 1923), interviewed Cantoni in jail,
where the candidate stated his confidence in the outcome
of the elections, especially because it would not be
"el resultado de la dadiva que deprime ni del hartazgo
de bestializar, ni de la inconsecuencia de la
borrachera.
,
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propaganda and posters eulogizing.
Cantoni
was a large red heart with the words

.

One of them

"In the heart of the

people there is only one man: Cantoni."
Another showed
him, with an inquisitorial look,
stating: "The eyes

of

the martyr of the democracy are looking
at you from
jail." Another poster prepared by Ramon
Columba displayed

Cantoni behind bars with this epigraph: "The
people who
love Federico Cantoni, defender of the freedom of
San
Juan, won't allow him to remain in jail and will
place

him in the government house. "^^ Meanwhile, in contrast
to this display of confidence, the candidate of the

Concentracion Civica admitted that, at best, his party
could win in three or four departments, out of a total
of eighteen.

On election day, Sunday, January 14, 1923, the

ballot boxes amply ratified the great popularity of
Federico Cantoni. The Bloquists won all over the
province, except Jachal and Valle Fertil.

6?

What many

^^Critica, January 9, 1923.
^•^La

Prensa

,

January 13

»

1923.

The UCR Bloquista received 12,042 votes against
January 18,
8,119 for the Concentracion Civica. Ibid
the little
Rinconada,
the
at
return
1923. The election
had
been
Jones
before
months
tovm where fourteen
assassinated, gave the Bloquistas 218 votes against 96
January 17, 1923. Once
for the conservatives. Ibid
Interventor Carles
completed,
the electoral phase was
in temporary
province
the
ended his mission and placed
charge of Deputy Governor Castro.
.

.

,

,
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had hoped and what many had feared had
finally happened:
Federico Cantoni, the rebel politician who
one day led
his men against Governor Jones, was now
ready to change
his status from that of a man almost ready
to he

sentenced to imprisonment for life to that of the
newlyelected governor of the province. The distance of
a
single block between the jail house and the government

house had never had such a strange symbolismi A little
over three years before, when Yrigoyen intervened in
San Juan for the first time, Cantoni had been greeted

upon his arrival from Mendoza with hails for the
"radicales de alpargata," and for the "gaucho
Lencinas.

"^-^

Now, San Juan's "chusma de alpargata"

had elevated Cantoni to the height once attained by
his revered Mendozan leader. More than a year in jail

had created for Cantoni a new public image. He was now
not only the good doctor in the minds of the easily

suggesti enable masses, but to most of his followers he
was also a martyr, a man who had risked his life

fighting against Jones' tyranny.
Four days after the election, the only member of
the Supreme Court who had been duly elected, ordered
the release of Federico Cantoni. The emotion of his

followers was already noticeable in the jail and the

^^La Prensa, November 26, 1919.
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popular joy spread into the street. He
had to seek
refuge in the legislature to avoid the

effusion of the

masses. Later, when he addressed the
people gathered in
the Plaza 25 de Mayo, Cantoni stated that
his government
would be one of open doors. He asked the
people to keep
a vigilant eye upon the Bloquists and
warned that
he

would be inflexible with dishonest officials.
Expanding
his views beyond matters of local concern, and
entering

into what might be called his political thoughts,
Cantoni referred to what he considered the true

meaning of fatherland. Por him, "the fatherland of
showy little flags" was a vain word. Instead, its real

meaning was the welfare of its people, its good health,
hard and honest work properly remunerated; in sum, he
said,

the happiness of the person who works, not the

spirit of the drone. As for his political enemies, he
stated harshly that they were "sick people who must be

secluded in asylums."

Thus, while Cantoni appealed to

work as a creative source of the well-being of the

individual as well as the society and assigned a sense
of responsibility and duty to the concept of fatherland,

he was unequivocally scornful of his opponents, and

showed his reluctance to abide by the rules of any

political compromise.

^^Los Andes, January 20, 1923; La Prensa

January 20, 1923.

,
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Cantoni's words did not ease -the fears
of his
adversaries. On the contrary, only a few
days later
Cantoni deepened the apprehensions of
the industrial and
commercial sectors of the province. At a
meeting held at
the legislature, attended by bodegueros,
virlateros,

workers and bureaucrats, among others, Cantoni
accused
the industrialists of laying off many workers
in revenge

for his electoral success. The bodegueros rejected
the

charge but touched off a kind of verbal warfare between
them and the workers, with the laborers noisily and

enthusiastically supporting the fiery warnings made by
Cantoni. 65 Hardly a conciliatory beginning. Then, as if

further evidence were needed to demonstrate Bloquist
political power, at the end of January the legislature
elected Aldo Cantoni National Senator.

But more was in the making by the provincial
lawmakers. In the already tropical summer of San Juan,
the Bloquist-controlled legislature added more heat to
the political situation. On February 22, in accordance

with the promises made during the campaign, it
approved an Amnesty Law for all those involved in the

incident that caused the death of Governor Jones, on
the grounds that it had been an act of sedition,

^^La Prensa, January 27, 1923.
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strictly political.
It was time of vindication for the
Bloquists, who
praised the men of the Rinconada as heroes.
Aldo Cantoni
stated in the Provincial Senate that they
were seeking
the amnesty

not as an act of pardon or grace toward
political prisoners, but as an act of perfect
justice for those who have sacrificed their
tranquility and personal freedom, and even
risked their own lives to free San Juan from
the evils of tyranny. 67
Castro, the acting Governor, vetoed the Amnesty

Bill stating that the case was under consideration by
the Judiciary and that it alone had the authority to

pass a judgment. His veto had only the value of a

protest however, for the legislature easily overrode it. 68
66

Eventually, the Bloquists initiated a new
judicial expendiente totally justifying their action at
the Rinconada. Fearing its future "disappearance," the
original expediente was copied by Interventor Bello and
placed in the hands of the national Radical authorities.
Today, neither expediente exist in San Juan archives.
,

67

'

La Epoca March 14, 1923. A few days earlier
Pederioo Cantoni expressed the same viev/s to his
supporters, thanking them for believing that the
Rinconada was "something other than a repulsive crime."
La Prensa, March 8, 1923.
,

6ft

Castro had replied to the legislature on March
12 that because of the uniqueness of the case, he could
not sign the Amnesty Bill until the National Government
and Congress had resolved what to do. The Minister of
the Interior quickly and properly informed Castro that
his view was a judicial nonsense.
On March 7, when the Provincial Chamber of
Deputies rejected Castro's veto, the Bloquist Carlos
Valenzuela praised Federico Cantoni for being the only
politician in Argentina "que habla quebrado la prepotencia de Yrigoyen." Legislatura de San Juan, Camara de
Diputados, Actas, libro No. 376, p. 23.
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The enactment of the Amnesty Law was
the final blow.
The Jones' case was completely closed
before any judicial
decision had been rendered. Whether
assassins or political
revolutionaries, those who had planned and
participated
in the Rinconada did not have to fear any
further legal
action. Cantoni had spoken grave words before
Jones was
assassinated, and he spoke with the same severity
after

being released from jail. The Yrigoyenist Radicals
predicted the proximity of the storm and demanded early
in March a new intervention by the Federal Government.
This request was an extraordinary one in a situation

marked all along by unusual events. The Yrigoyenists

,

in

theory, were asking something very strange: that the

Federal Government declare that it did not consent that
the duly elected authorities of San Juan assume power.

This may well be the only case in Argentine institutional

history in which intervention was demanded in the
affairs of a province before its new officials were
installed. However, there was a rationale for this

attitude no matter how strange it might have been. The

anti-Cantonists had a great fear of Cantoni and the
Bloquists, fear of what they called the "gauchocracia
go

atropelladora.

"

The resoluteness shown by Cantoni in

^

previous incidents had proven that he was not a paper

^^La Epoca

,

March 11, 1923.
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tiger. What would come next, the
anti-Cantonists

wondered, once Cantoni was sworn in as
governor?
In an interview held in Buenos Aires
on March 18,
Cantoni justified his position once again
and outlined
the role and philosophy of the Union Civica
Radical

Bloquista. He pointed out that the electoral
plank had
specifically listed as its first priority amnesty for
all

political prisoners involved at the Rinconada. If the
people of San Juan, well aware of this fundamental

principle of the Bloquist program, had voted
overwhelmingly for him, then it was reasonable to

interpret that the people also voted for an amnesty law.

Turning to his own interpretation of the role of

Bloquism and its ideological position as a branch of
national Radicalism, Cantoni observed that
our Radicalism is not like any other Radicalism
in the nation, which does not have any program
or a specific political goal. Neither is our
party the leftist movement which provoked so
many comments from easily frightened
individuals. To ask that the workers of the
wine industry in San Juan earn a salary of 3
pesos per day instead of 1,50 is not a
demonstration of a Bolshevik tendency, much
less when it is considered that an hectare of
vineyard yields from 3»000 to 4,000 pesos.

Cantoni stressed that the UCR Bloquista had clearly

defined its principles and goals, and that to implement
them he was committed to being the governor of the
70
^
province and not the boss of a party.

'^^La Nacion,

March 19, 1923.
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But before beco.iag the ruler
of all the Sanjuaainos,
Cantoni had to surmount still
another challenge. Acting
Governor Castro declared that the
date for the
installation of the new government
should be July 9, that
is, exactly three years after
Jones began his term in
1920, and not May 12, as the Bloquist
legislature
contended. This became a major issue
sparking once again
high emotions in the opposing sectors.
The date as such
did not have a great significance, but each
side tried to
demonstrate its power by forcing the other to
accept its

installation

date.'^-^

On May 12, the day on which the government should
have changed hands, Castro remained in control of the
capital. Cantoni had moved to the neighboring town of

Concepcion, a few miles from the capital, where in its
City Hall he was sworn in as governor before the

legislators. He then stated that he was ready to enter
San Juan with 3,000 men and take it by force, if

necessary. On the brink of such an encounter. President

Alvear declared that Cantoni was the legal ruler of the
province, thereby bringing the threatened conflict to
71

'

La Epoca advised Castro not to let the new
government be installed in May, no matter what
consequences followed. Whether it provoked a federal
intervention, as the Yrigoyenists wished, or a major
commotion, the important fact was not to surrender power
before July 9. furthermore, the Yrigoyenist paper labeled
Cantoni an anti-governor and termed his ascendancy to
pov/er the triumph of barbarism over civilization. May
12, 13, 1923.
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an end.

Upon entering San Juan to
start his government,
Cantoni, in a conciliatory mood,
declared that all should
"put the past away... Trying
to dispel the growing
fears
of the traditional sectors,
he affirmed that he would
prove how a government can legislate
for the working
Class without being Communistic.
He recommended
to all

the people that they go back to
work, each with his own
tools, a hoe, a plow, or a pen, so
that all together
could transform San Juan from being a
province exploited
by bad governments into a prosperous
land."^^

But although both sides had apparently
lowered
their arms and the threat of warfare dissipated
after
the presidential order, the deep and bitter
animosities
between Bloquists and anti-Bloquists remained as intense
as before.

Before turning to examine the first Bloquist

government it might be well to assess the political and
moral climate that led to Cantoni'

s

election, as well as

the responsibility for the violence displayed.

Halfway through his presidential term, Yrigoyen had
decreed the "political regeneration" of San Juan. But
three federal interventions in as many years proved the

sterility of his policy and his efforts. Contrary to

^^La Prensa, May 14, 1923.
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what happened in Mendoza as
result of Yrigoyen- s I917
intervention, the Sanjuanino
Radicals were badly split
and Jones' nomination as a
compromise gubernatorial
candidate reflected this division.
Unfortunately, Jone.
understood little of what political
compromise meant.
But the fact that he failed to carry
out
some of his

duties in accordance with the law and
was unable to
achieve a workable harmony among the local
Radical
groups was not entirely his own fault. He
was
not a

politician and his profession had not trained him
in
the artful maneuvering of give and take. Indeed,
those
who erred most were Yrigoyen and the Radicals of
San

Juan who selected Jones, for although the governor

behaved in an authoritarian fashion, he believed in his
righteousness up until the very moment of his
assassination.
It seems reasonable to conclude that when Jones
took the grave actions which raised general protest,

Yrigoyen shrank from squarely facing the problems
created by the man for whose selection he was mostly

responsible. He had a unique opportunity to clip the

wings of the controversial governor through two federal
interventions. In both instances the President

preferred to adhere to the principles of party loyalty,
first by suddenly terminating the Escobar intervention,

whose decrees aimed at restraining the excesses of
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Govertior Jones, and secondly, by
procrastination in not
implementing the second intervention
voted by Congress.
At any rate, Yrigoyen's position
did not allow for any

fact other than that Jones was entirely
right and his
opponents entirely wrong.
Apparently, Yrigoyen took any criticism
against
Jones as criticism leveled against himself,
and

thus he

defended the authority of the governor as he
defended his
own. His adversaries argued that he could
have avoided
Jones'

death if he had complied within a reasonable

time in instituting the intervention voted by
Congress
in September 1921, for the unnecessary delay caused
more

exacerbation in Jones'

opponents. Although this seems a

plausible argument, this action might only have

postponed Jones' fall because both sides were frantically
intransigent.
The governor considered himself to be not only a

good governor, but an exceptional one, and rejected any

compromise. But Jones'

opponents were not blameless.

Professing to correct the wrongdoings of the other side,
both parties acted illegally. Both considered their
actions as defensive in nature, neither side ever

admitted to being wrong. In the process, justice was
ill-served, federalism continued to be a dead principle,

political accommodation was unknown, and tolerance was

viewed as cowardice. Since Jones had the upper hand
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because of the protection he received
from the federal
army, the Bloquists, although they
were the
largest

faction of the Radical Party, felt
irremissibly left out
and reacted like desperados.

Whatever they had planned, the kidnapping
or the
assassination of the governor, they shouldered
the burden
of a deplorable act. It can be speculated
that time
was

on the side of the Bloquists. Jones could not be

reelected, his term would have ended on July

9,

1923.

More importantly yet, Yrigoyen could not have reelected
either, and his successor would have been installed in
the Casa Rosada by October 12, 1922. These dates did not

mean an instant solution to the grievances of the
Bloquists, but certainly they offered hope for an end
to the authoritarian rule of Governor Jones and the

political hassles he provoked. Why did not they await
the outcome of these timed events and avoid the blemish
of a despicable human sacrifice?

It appears that political hatred was too deeply

ingrained to be effectively controlled. The high emotions
of the Cantonists who had decided to face any risk

provided that Jones was removed from the political scene,
left no room for alternatives. Thus, inevitably, Jones'

elimination became the original sin of Bloquism.

Reviewing the history of those turbulent times
leading up to the beginning of Cantoni's government, the

.
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most significant achievement of
the Bloquist movement
was
the inspiration of a new sense
of class solidarity among
the lower segments. The poor,
illiterate campesino could
not understand the meaning of "Aux
armes, CitoyensV" but
he could follow every word from Cantoni
when he promised
a minimum wage, an 8-hour day, and
the taxation of the

wealthy few to alleviate the necessities of
the deprived
73
many

Because of the political conditions in San Juan,
where the conservatives had ruled for so long,
Cantoni 's

personality and program galvanized the poor and frightened
the well-to-do. He polarized the politics of this hitherto

quite province by kindling the hopes of the common man

which in turn frightened the local elite. As it was under
the Lencinas in Mendoza, the involvement of the masses

with Cantoni was emotional, not ideological, folkloric,
not doctrinaire, as if imbued with the fervor of

a

Bible

belt revivalism. Although Cantoni did not promise to
convert San Juan into a Socialist province, but only to

balance the existing inequalities, he could not avoid

provoking a political confrontation because of the strong
class overtones of his social program. For in January

^^According to the 1912 provincial census, there
was in San Juan 43.2 per cent illiteracy, ranging from
32.5 per cent in the capital to 75.7 per cent in the remote
department of Iglesia, in the northwest corner of the
province. San Juan, Segundo censo general de la provincia
de San Juan (Buenos Aires, 1910-1912), p. TT. Alejandro £.
Bunge stated that according to the electoral records,
empadronados in 1916 there was in San Juan 45.6 per cent
illiterates. La Nacion, July 13, 1939.
,
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1923, revealed the forcefulness and
determination of
Federico Cantoni. They attested to his
temperamental,
obdurate, and redoubtable personality.
Such was the

image the "gringo- Cantoni had in the eyes
of thousands
of Sanjuaninos when he moved from the
jail to the
government house to begin the first populist

experiment in San Juan. His political ascendancy has
no parallel in the history of the provincial caudillos
in twentieth century Argentina.
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CHAPTER

IX

PELERICO CANTONI

AND THE PIRST BLOQUIST GOVERNT.:eNT

Pederico Cantoni, in the best tradition
of the
provincial caudillos, embodied the soul of

Bioquism. He

was the leader who had taken the major
steps in

consolidating the movement: he had severed its
ties with
the established UCR in the province, he was
responsible
for the event of the Rinconada, and he provided
the

party with an unprecedented socially-oriented reformist
program. However, Cantoni tried to portray his movement
as being one dependent upon principles. In consonance

with this view, his basic instruments for action were
the party, the UCR Bloquist, and its program, which he

had outlined when he was in Jail. In spite of his outand-out command over the Bloquist conglomerate, he

persistently alluded to the goals of the party, for he
believed that an institutionalized Bioquism could
achieve its reformist objectives without falling into
the excessive personalism he had condemned in former

President Yrigoyen.
Despite Cantoni'

s

pretense of subordination to an

impersonal organization, he was in reality the symbol
and substance of his regional movement. He not only
set the tempo of its populist drive, but by his own

conduct set the example to be observed by all his
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followers. As a logical corollary
of this personalist
vertical structure, those who challenged
his leadership

from within found themselves out of
the movement. Thus,
notwithstanding Cantoni's efforts to

"institutionalize"

it, Bloquism and Cantonism shared the
same political

identity and ideological foundation.
The social question awakened by the
Bloquists in

the popular sectors of the dormant environment
of San
Juan, provoked in the masses a feeling of confidence
and

hastened their desire for social advancement. The
1923
election had proved that the impoverished and mostly
illiterate people were ready to follow a leader who had
shown a sincere understanding of their social

degradation and an earnest preoccupation to find the

means to improve their living conditions.
Cantoni's crusade for the underdogs, as that of

Lencinas in Mendoza, was

a grass roots movement,

with

emotional overtones. He championed specific, down-toearth goals for social justice which were written into
the program of the party. But his ideals were not

infused with an intellectually-developed ideological
content. The only doctrinaire influence reached

Bloquism through Aldo Cantoni and his friends from
Buenos Aires, all militants of the political left. But

primitive San Juan was more receptive to a pragmatic
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leader than to advanced social
theoreticians. A man who
served with him many years in the
political field
recalls that for Cantoni there was
little significan(ice
in the stereotypes of left, right,
or center, for
Cantoni was a doer par excellence, who
applied

his own

yardstick to appraise the needs of the
Sanjuaninos.^
Therefore, political doctrines or mere
lucubrations

on

the social conditions were to a large extent
irrelevant
to him, although,

of course, his actions and his

movement represented a practical application of
innovative social theories.
Besides being a doctor-politician, Cantoni was also
a farmer at heart. As such, he was constantly advising

people to devote their energies to agricultural labor
and to bringing new land under irrigation. like a

Physiocrat, he thought that tilling the soil was the

most noble activity in life. Moreover, Cantoni set an
example for his people by rejecting gambling and
drinking, and he impressed upon the movement the quasi

Puritanism of his personal habits and the inflexibility
of his character.

Cantoni spoke to the people in simple words, in a

language dressed with popular, and sometimes, coarse

Personal interview with Dr. Eudoro Rodriguez,
who v/as a very close political friend of Federico
Cantoni during the 1930' s. July 6, 1972, San Juan.
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terms. He adorned it with acute
and ingenious sent,fences
so typical of the men of the
interior.^ Besides hi,.s
distinctive verbal way of communicating
with people,
Cantoni had a very peculiar
characteristic, for which he
also became well known later outside
his province: he
dressed in a very sloppy manner, wearing
slovenly suits
and filthy shirts.^ Those who collaborated
with Cantoni,
of course, accepted him as he was. One
of his more
severe critics in our time, however, asserted
that

Cantoni deliberately "did not use either the comb
or the

soap," in order to appear more like the rabble he

protected, or perhaps his slovenliness was merely a result
of his low-quality Italian style upbringing."^

This was the man who many believed would bring

social justice to San Juan by narrowing the gap between
2

Personal interview with Jose P. Barreiro, who was
Undersecretary of Government during the governorship of
Pederico Cantoni and Secretary of Government during the
governorship of Aldo Cantoni (1926-1928). Buenos Aires,
May 16, 1972. Barreiro was a young correspondent for
Critica the Buenos Aires newspaper, when he joined
the Bloquists. He fulfilled the intellectual side of
Bloquism, not only for his editorial v/riting in San Juan's
La Reforraa, the voice of Bloquism, but for the writing
of documents and statements.
,

^In a humorous way, one of Cantoni' s friends once
stated that the caudillo bought his new suits with stains
already on them. Personal interview with Jose P. Barreiro.

^Personal interview with the Sanjuanino historian
Emilio Ivlaurin Navarro, son of one of the bitter foes of
Cantoni. San Juan, July 3> 1972.
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the rich and the poor, while others
thought that he would
transform the province into Dante's
hell with his Con>munist
ideas.
Cantoni, like Carlos Washington
Lencinas in Mendoza,
was 33 years old when he assumed power.
His figure was
tall and imposing. Strong and solidly built,
he had a

round, stolid-looking face; small, almost beady
eyes, and
a walrus mustache. Judging him by his contemporary

photographs, his expression impresses as stern and rather

unsympathetic.
His political baptism as governor of San Juan did
not portend tranquil days. The event of the Rinconada had

shaken the provincial scene so intensely that from his first
day in office he had to face not mere political

adversaries, but unwavering enemies. These were the

Yrigoyenist Radicals and the conservatives, who neither
asked nor offered a single day's truce to the Bloquist

governments in the 1920'

under Cantoni was

s.

In Yrigoyenist eyes, San Juan

a land of barbarians,

La ^Ipoca simply

5
termed that province "the country of the extraordinary.""^

The tenuous harmony betv/een the Bloquists and

conservatives when both were aligned against Jones' rule,

evanesced as soon as Cantoni became the governor-elect.
Thus, by May 1923 the province was deeply polarized, with

most of the Sanjuaninos engulfed in the political rancor

^La Epoca

,

July 18, 1923.
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between the Bloquists and anti-Bloquists.
Social Reformer,

"Grite Quien Grite."

The election returns had clearly revealed that
most

of the citizenry supported Cantoni and his well publicize

program of government. So, with characteristic personal

determination and aggressiveness, he began to carry out
the party's platform. Among the more important laws

enacted by the legislature were the 8-hour workday and
the minimum wage, a pioneer landmark in San Juan's social

legislation.
To reinforce the workers'

support on this matter and

to indoctrinate them about its importance and proper

observance, the government sponsored the creation of the

Centre de Accion Obrera, a non-official labor branch of

Bloquism. The result of these measures was a sharper

To this effect the province was divided into two
areas, with a set minimum salary of % 3»00 per day in
the capital and surrounding departments, and S 2,50 in
the more remote areas. Cantoni by decree expanded the
schedule of the provincial employees, including working
on Saturdays. "No somos ingleses," he said, "somos
criollos, el sabado es para trabajar." La Prensa, I.'ay 20
1923.
These laws were published in a pamphlet which
distributed. It informed the workers that
widely
was
need any kind of outside assistance in
not
they did
the Department of Labor. Thereupon, the
contact
order to
that in case these laws were
advised
were
workers
they should simply notify the
employers,
the
violated by
authorities. Provincia
police
the
or
Labor
Department of
e Instruccion Publica,
Gobierno
de
I.linisterio
de San Juan,
Estadistica
Trabajo,
del
Departamento
y ^Archive, Las
minimo (San Juan,
salario
horas
8
de
^
leyes de .jornada
1924).
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confrontation between patrones and workers with
the
governor determinedly taking a pro-worker position.

The

reaction of the employers was as militant as that of
the
governor. They threatened to close their business in

protest against the "Communist" Bloquist legislation,
and many did so. Cantoni, in turn, retaliated with the
same uncompromising attitude. At a special rally of the

Centre de Accion Obrera, in February 1924, he reiterated
that the first priority of the government was to satisfy
the needs of the workers, even if it meant colliding

with the interests of the capitalists. He asked the mass
of wage-earners to boycott the business which laid off

personnel, and to those out of work he announced that
the government would provide them with jobs. Leaving no

doubt as to his intentions, he restated that he would
carry out his social policy no matter "grite quien

grite." 7 The governor's pro-v/orker position was

reaffirmed in 1924 when he declared May 1st a provincial
holiday. The decree associated the international

celebration of the day of the workers with the success
of Bloquism in implementing social benefits for the

Sanjuanino laborers.
This stern stand of the Bloquist leader was

consistent with his avowed posture in favor of the

'^La

Nacion, February 11, 1924.

"
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workers. His principle was illustrated by what
he often
stated as his guiding rule on the subject: If
the peon
is a Bloquist, the peon is right; if the patron
is a

Bloquist, the peon is right; if both the peon and the

patron are Bloquists, the peon is right. ^ Corroborating
the firmness of Cantoni's policy and actions, a

contemporary observer expressed that in general, "all
"the

descamisados

— shirtless — improved

their living

conditions, upgrading the social situation of the

province. Since Cantoni ruled San Juan, the poor were

always considered right, even at the expense of the

rich men.

Q

Because of the critical attitude of the government
toward the business groups, the main anti-Cantonist

force was not organized under party leadership in

traditional political fashion, but rather in a

heterogeneous association of property owners and

mercantile sectors. V/ithin the context of Sanjuanino
politics this

v/as

a logical alignment because the

businessmen and industrialists were forced to become
the financial pillars of the Bloquist "social

revolution." This association was established in

December 1923, under the name of League for the Defense

^Personal interview with Jose P. Barreiro.
^Jose Palermo Riviello, Filipicas argentinas
(Buenos Aires, 1939), P- 524.
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of Property, Industry and Commerce of
San Juan, and its

declared purpose was to protect the economic
interests
of the province. Although the League claimed
to be non-

partisan, its president was Juan Maurin, one of the

more influential landowners and bodegueros and a
prominent member of the conservative Liberal Party, the
former Concentracion Civica. Among the other leaders
were the Yrigoyenist National Deputy Ventura Lloveras;
the provincial Senator Eudolio Lopez, who had been

expelled from the Bloquism; the former conservative

National Deputy Juan P. Tierney, the leader of the
Progressive Democratic Party in San Juan, Ventura
Larrosa, and Domingo Elizondo, one of the directors of

Diario Nuevo. The League was in fact a political block
composed of all the segments of the anti-Bloquist
spectrum. It was as passionately anti-Cantonist as
the Cantonists were fiercely anti-Leaguers. Their

viewpoints

v/ere

totally uncongenial, the men of the

League believed that Bloquism represented evil
Communism, while the Cantonists considered those who

formed this mercantile-political melange as "exploiters
of the people."
The disciple of Jose Nestor Lencinas was opening

in San Juan a new and risk-filled path. His frank

and fiery verbal tirades against the capitalists often

provoked irate comments from the traditional sectors
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inside the province and elsewhere.
The Kendozan los Andes
asserted that the country had never
experienced a rul<.er

so audacious and desorbitado, adding
that Cantoni-

s

mentality was the epitome of the suburban
agitator or the
demagogic caudille^-jo of long agc^^
^^^^^^ accused
him of dividing the people into antagonistic

^

camps,

workers against capitalists, thus encouraging
a class
struggle in the same fashion as was predicted by
the

believers of the dangerous theories emanating from
Moscow. -^-^ The business and industrial sectors of
San

Juan regarded Cantoni'

s

position as that of an extremist.

They resented the seeds of hatred he planted in the

labor groups by portraying the patrones as "enemies and
exploiters of the working class.

""^^

Cantoni was neither a follower nor an ideologist
of the Soviet regime, but by his words and actions he

brought to the forefront of the social scene the
problem of the disparity between the "haves" and the
"have-nots." This new approach weakened the traditional

authority of the well-to-do and led the lower sectors to
abandon their previous subservient social and political
role. What the anti-Cant onists viewed as a foreign

•^^Los Andes

,

February 12, 1924.

Prensa

,

February 12, 1924.

•^•^La

-•^bid.

)
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ideological influence was in reality
only
mass rights led hy a reformer, not
a

a crusade for

revolutionary, one

whose ideas and endeavors were rooted
in the region and
who had a first hand knowledge of the
living conditions
of the lower groups and of their more
pressing needs.
The Bloquist lahor policy stripped the
conservative

class of its dominant status to the extent
of placing
it in a defensive situation. La Reforma, the semi-

official newspaper in San Juan, referred to the

provincial "aristocracy" as "reactionary, religious and
traditionalist," and deplored the fact that in the past,

merely bearing a certain name entitled

a person to a

special consideration, while the poor people had to
acquiesce submissively to their inferior position. To
the "respectable" families, la Reforma added, the

"chinaje" were almost non-existent, they were just like
serfs.

"^"^

Not surprisingly, anti-Cantonist phobia was at the

highest level in the Club Social, the provincial refuge
of the prominent and the well-to-do. The church was

also under the influence of these sectors, not because

^"Se diviniza la alpargata," disdainfully stated
a prominent Mendozan conservative. In fact, he summed up
in these four words the whole dimension of the social
change brought by the Bloquists. Los Andes September
16, 1923 (Article by Lucio Punes, "El drama de la
,

Rinconada.

"

^^La Reforma, August 27, 1924.
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of a direct involvement
of its hierarchy
against the
government, but due to the
resistance of the religiouslyminded upper sectors, who
viewed with apprehension
the
anti-clerical overtones of the
Bloquist program and
propaganda.

Cantoni attempted to tear down
the social barriers
which until then had separated the
rich elements and the
poor ones into two totally separated
worlds, by castigating
what he believed to be the arrogant
social position of the
upper groups. Soon after he assumed
office, Cantoni had
the opportunity to assail the ceremonial
apparatus of the
elitist elements. He decided that on Hay
25, the new
anniversary of the revolution for independence,
the

traditional Tedeum would not be financially supported
by
15
the State.
Cantoni, an egalitarian at heart, contended
that it was not proper to place a national celebration

under the mantle of a Catholic ceremony

,

when, precisely

because of the freedom of worship guaranteed by the
constitution, the province should refrain from officially

favoring any specific religious creed.
The governor's anti-church position was seized on

by his foes as a basis by which to berate the "foreign,"
15

The Tedeum is a religious service, traditionally
performed nationwide to commemorate important patriotic
events. It provided some pomp for the authorities and the
church, but it never had any real meaning for the people

at large.
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"exotic-, mentality of his
movement and to rally
politioal

opposition against Bloquism. This
was especially evident
on the occasion of the same
celebration in the following
year, 1924. Since at that time the
struggle between the
government and its opponents was at
its peak,

the anti-

Bloquists took advantage of the patriotic
celebration to
rebuff strongly the social policy of
the
government on

behalf of the "chusma de alpargata. "^^
In a backward
province like San Juan, where the religious

tradition

carried a weight among the upper sectors,
Cantoni's

attitude may be considered truly revolutionary.
The only
precedent for an attempt to separate the business of
the

State from that of the church was in the province of

Santa Fe in 1921, when

a

new provincial charter embodying

that principle failed to be approved.

Besides challenging the role of the church as a
vehicle for upper class preeminence, Bloquism also

questioned the meaning generally assigned to the concept
of patria . Here too the Cantonist approach clashed head-

on with the conventional concepts of the higher social

1

ft

Debates Kay 26, 1924, reported that the Tedeum
was attended by the most "selected and distinguished"
people of San Juan, "as in the good old times," openly
rebuffing the "absurd pretension of the governor of
eliminating a traditional act." That was the occasion,
it added, to see with full splendor again "el ele£ante
traje de gala, el guante bianco y el zapato de charol,
prendas que raira con horror el oficialismo, que en un
acto de ridicule concepto personal ha trocado por el
chambergo polvoriento, el chiripa y la alpargata."
,
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ity-filled ritual, holding a sumptuous ball
for the
well-to-do or in attending a useless Ted eum. 18
The

Cantonist views were striking at the heart of the
banal,
revered traditions of provincial life.

Perhaps the most significant social reform of the

Bloquists lay in utilizing the provincial budget as a
tool to effect a better distribution of wealth. The

magnitude of the change, when compared with previous
budgets, is illustrated by the figxires themselves: the

expenses for 1923 had been

$

2,420,000 while those for

1924, the first Bloquist budget, amounted to
$

7,249,000. A 300 per cent increase'. "^^

Through the 1924 provincial budget the Bloquists
put in motion their program aiming at bettering the

social and economic equilibrium in the provincial
17

18

La Reforma

Ibid

,

July

May 19, 1924.
4,

1924.

San Juan, Presupuesto general para 1924 (San
Juan, 1923), n.p.
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society. The new budgetary policy
of San Juan, which
placed responsibility for the
welfare of its inhabitants
on the shoulders of the State,
represented a pioneer
application of a system that through
the decades was to
become a universal feature of modern
States.
The significance of the budget was
that it

substantially raised all the lower salaries
while it
left almost untouched the higher ones, that
it

created

and extended the existing primary social
services, and
planned an extensive program of public works. The
monthly

salaries of the lower positions were changed as follows:
Prom

To

S

Ordenanzas (blue collar)
Supervisors (blue collar)
Office workers
Poli cemen
Firefighters
Ordenanzas (departments)
Policemen (departments)

S

70-80

100
120
130
95
95
95
95

90

100
65
75
50
50

Source: Presupuesto general para 1924

,

n.p,

20

San Luis, another province of the Cuyo region,
offered a marked contrast with San Juan regarding the use
of the budget as a social leveler. V/hen the conservative
governor of San Luis, Alberto Arancibia Rodriguez, ended
his term in 1930, he remarked with satisfaction and as a
sign of his austerity as a ruler, that he had governed
his province with budgets always below Z 3»000,000.
Moreover, he added that he had always allocated lower
amounts than those that were authorized. Reynaldo A.
Pastor, San Luis su gloriosa ^ callada gesta 1810 - 1967
(Buenos Aires, 1970T, p. 324. In 1928 the San Juan
budget was S 12,174,000, four times larger than San Luis
budget, although its population was only 60 per cent
larger. Thus, both Cuyano provinces illustrated the
obverse and reverse on the vital issue of the degree of
State participation through fiscal policy, in the
economic and social development of the provinces.
,

,
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The public health services
were tremendously
improved. In the capital, the only
existing hospital
increased its personnel from 42 to
69, and its annual

budget from

36,000 to 369,000. Por the first
time it
provided odontological service, and
free prescriptions at
an annual budget of $ 180,000. Also
for the first time
nine medical centers were created in
the departments to
$

minister directly to the poor people living
far away from
the capital in a province where means
of transportation
were almost non-existent.^^ Moreover, these
measures
were

an effective attack against the widespread
number of
quacks.

New blood was pumped into the Provincial Department
of Labor by more than doubling its personnel and by

increasing its budget from

S

10,000 to

$

25,000. Public

works also received prominent attention, in line with the

job-oriented objectives of the budget, with the allocation
of

S

2,718,000, an amount larger than any total budget in

the past.

Although the 1924 figures promised to transform the

living conditions of the lower segments and the economy
of the region in general, the burning questions were: who
21

Presupuesto general para 1924 n.p. The significance of these measures is illustrated by the fact that
the trip from the capital to Jachal, 120 miles to the
north, demanded eight hours by car. La Prensa, T.larch 2,
1925. There was no railway line connecting these two
cities. Likewise, to the distant Valle Fertil department
the mail was delivered by mule, once a week. La Rcforma,
February 4, 1926.
,
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would bear the burden of financing
such mammoth figures,
and how. The business and
industrial sectors,

already at
odds with the government because
of the obrerista policy
of the Bloquists, realized that
their fears about
the

"Communist" regime were becoming a
reality. A compa rison
of the revenues collected during
1923 and 1924 reveal s
the reason for the somber mood of
the business community
and the propertied class:
Tax

j;^^^

^
General, Franchise
Property
Additional on Property
Sales

1923

1924

1,011,000
294,000
355,000

1,134,000

1,685,000
392,000
1,247,000
212 000
248|oOO
1,424,000
1,598,000

2,842,000

6,806,000

-

48,000
-

^If-"^^^

0-ther

Total;

Difference over 1923:

3,964,000

Source: San Juan, Kensa.je del Excmo Sr Gobernador
Dr. Federico Cantoni (San Juan, 1925)
p. 25.
.

.

,

Cantoni believed that these sectors were capable of

absorbing a significant increase in taxation because the
provincial wealth was practically in their hands,

especially in those of the landowners and bodegueros.
The governor repeatedly affirmed that as a consequence
of the protective policies of the Regimen in the past,

they enjoyed an undeserved privilege and were in fact

undertaxed.
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The governor was determined
to carry out his policy,
and there was no way for the
opposition to block it.

Their only recourse was to issue
one protest after
another, but no one in the provincial
government lent
them a benevolent ear. Furthermore,
the
income of the

bodeg^eros was made almost entirely in
pesos because they
sold most of their production outside
the province. As

letras were also circulating in San Juan,
this allowed
the industrialists to profit by their
devaluation,
as

had their Mendozan counterparts. Cantoni was
dead-set
against speculation with the letras and tried to end

it

by heavy taxes on those engaged in the exchange of
currency and through direct police repression.
As was the case in Mendoza, the letras had to be

fully accepted as means of payment for all the provincial
taxes. Disregarding the law, in October 1923 Cantoni

ordered the bodegueros to pay all taxes and the salaries
of their personnel in pesos. But in contrast to the

vacillating attitude adopted by Carlos Washington Lencinas
in Mendoza, where the bodegueros were never seriously

pressed by the government, Cantoni resorted to expeditious
22

The most striking case involved Aldo Galletti,
general manager of a private bank in San Juan. He was
accused by the government of speculating with letras and
he was very heavily fined. As Galletti was an Italian, his
appeals involved the Italian Minister in Argentina and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Eventually, the legal dispute
had to be resolved by the National Supreme Court.
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methods to enforce his decree:
he allowed the bodegueros
48 hours to Obey his ruling and in case
they attempted
to resist his order, he threatened
to set up a new

five-cent tax on wine, with the
exclusive purpose of
calling in the letras in circulation.
The forceful
attitude of the governor allowed him

to impose his will,

but the devaluation of the letras
persisted because they
could not be applied for tax payment
purposes.
The business and industrial sectors,
however, did

not remain passive. In February 1924, when the

legislature enacted a new tax on grapes, the bodegueros
decided to take a firm stand and suspended all shipments
of wine in protest. This paralyzed the collection of

taxes, and almost 80 per cent of the bodegas closed

their doors. 23 But Cantoni was not a man to remain idle

while facing such a challenge. In an officiallysponsored rally in front of the government house, he

accused the bodegueros of exploiting the working people
and warned them that it was useless to protest because
the more they protested, the higher would be the taxes

that they would have to pay. Moreover, Cantoni

threatened to have the State take over the administration
of their business in case they declared a lockout, and

On this occasion the bodegueros decided to pay
half of the salary to their personnel during the
lockout.
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to produce wine and sell it
at cost price.
The mercantile interests
became extremely concerned
and once more, responded by crying
out to Buenos Aires.
They condemned Gantoni's "Bolshevikpolicy and his
professed purpose of destroying the
productive forces of
the province. In response to their
request for a federal

intervention Cantoni stated that he was not
preoccupied
at all about the situation because he
would be
elected

again by the people.
The unflexible position of the governor
increased

the number of protests sent to Buenos Aires
and hardened

their tone. The nature and extent of the complaints

finally became so serious that Cantoni had to go to the

Pederal Capital to counteract the pressure of his
enemies. There, he said that the position of the

bodegueros was merely revengeful, because he had forced
them to become honest industrialists.

Cantoni also

cast doubts on the motives of the bodegueros in closing

their business. Since it was harvest time, he accused
them of speculating on the delay in purchasing the
grapes, in order to exact a lower price from the

^^JjB.

Nacion , February 29, 1924.

^^La Prensa

,

I.iarch

3,

1924.

^^Ibid. , March 12, 1924. To avoid the adulteration
of wine Cantoni had imposed an exorbitant tax on brown
sugar, a vital element needed to adulterate wine.
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vlnateros. In general Justification
of his tax policy,
Cantoni asserted that high taxes
could only be applied
when the industry and business were
experiencing
a

prosperous situation. High taxes could
not be imposed if
they were affected by unfavorable
^7
circumstances

.

si^^e

the government did not back off an
inch from its

original position, finally there was no
alternative for
the bodegueros and vinateros but to return
to their
normal activities. They grudgingly paid their taxes
but
under protest.
When the harvest ended, however, a large number of

workers were laid off placing a social burden upon the
government. Cantoni knew by direct observation the

backwardness in which the peasants and unskilled v/orkers
were permanently living. Believing that it was a primary
duty of the State to pro\ade Jobs and security for the

humble sectors, Cantoni started a number of projects to
develop the means of transportation in the province,

^'^la

Prensa, March 12, 1924.

The largest business concern in San Juan,
Santiago Graffigna S.A., a vineyard-bodega complex,
reported very good profits during the Cantoni years, as
605,170, and 1925:
follows: 1923: ^ 413,120; 1924:
of
Accounts and
State
the
yearly
(From
% 229,932
General Report furnished by the Graffigna Corporation
to the author). The 1925 report, however, referred to
the "difficult financial situation" being experienced
in San Juan. Doubtless, other less important mercantile
sectors were hard-hit by the tax increases sanctioned
by the Bloquists.
"l^

.
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while helping the jobless men.
His policy, however, was
not to institute the government
as a big hearted
distributor of the spoils of office,
for there was in

Cantoni an inveterate belief in the
work ethic, which
he preached by his own example.
Although he was the

first ruler in his province to alter the
traditional
governmental policy of non-involvement in
sociallyrelated matters, Cantoni was a stalwart against

handing out government jobs,

a custom deeply

rooted in

provincial life. He always rejected the view that
the
budget should serve as an umbrella to protect
parasites, for he believed in the innate virtues of
the "self-help" philosophy, and he clearly disdained
the evils associated with a bureaucratic-plagued

administration.

Besides the heavy taxation on grapes and wine,
the Bloquists greatly modified property taxes. Not

only was the tax rate increased, but more significantly,
the assessments of the properties, especially those

valued above

6,000, were adjusted to values ranging

from three to fifteen times higher than before. This
was in fact an undisguised attack against the opposition

since most of the men of property were ragingly antiCantonists
The franchise tax on business in general was also

substantially raised, and

a new and very heavy

one was
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applied to those dealing with
the exchange of currency.
This tax was aimed at preventing
speculation on the
letras. The highest taxation,
S 30,000 per annun was
imposed on those institutions where
gambling was
allowed, a tax mainly leveled at
the Social Club,

the

exclusive gathering place for the more
wealthy men of
San Juan and a bastion of the opposition.
In defense of the new taxes, Cantoni
stated in his
usual amusing but pungently verbal style,
that before
he assumed power only three groups paid
taxes,
"the

poor, the gringos, and the fools," and he added
that it

was time that the rest also paid them.^^ Regardless
of
the seriousness of such an assertion, it is

understandable why such draconian tax legislation raised
a clamor and even provoked the political rebellion of

the taxpayers.

With regard to the role of the letras in the local
economy, Cantoni shared the long-held belief of many

Cuyano leaders, both conservatives and Radicals,

favoring their use. Therefore, in June 1923, the
legislature authorized the issuance of

4,000,000, the

main purpose being to reinforce the capital of the
Provincial Bank and to finance public works. Following
the pattern of similar currency in the provinces of

^^La Prensa, May 23, 1924.
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Mendoza and Jujuy, within a few
months the Sanjuanine
letras began depreciating. In

view of the limited
amount

of currency handled by the
campesinos and the workers,
Cantoni always contended that they
could not be a faci or
in the deterioration of the
value of the letras. H e

specifically accused "capitalist
speculation in
connivence with the political
Kachiavellism

of the

opposition" of being responsible for
their devaluation.
Regardless of the veracity of this charge,

the fact was

that the root of the problem was not the
lust of the
opposition but the existence of illegal provincial
money
in circulation. At the retail level the national
currency

practically disappeared. Consumer goods were given one
price in pesos and another, higher, in letras, and the
cartoncitos replaced the coins for small-scale
transactions.

But Cantoni learned from the example of neighboring

Mendoza that the letras could become an issue which could
topple his government. Therefore, he allowed the payment
of taxes to be made in letras again. But this was not

enough to preclude the danger of a federal action,
especially since Congress had eagerly and almost

unanimously voted in December 1924 to discuss the
provincial situation. Realizing his diminishing chances

Mensa.je del Gobernador

,

Kay 12, 1925, n.p.
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to maneuver, Cantoni decided
in February 1925 to get
rid
of the letras once and for all.
Most of them were
publicly burned within a few months,
and by Kay 12, when
Cantoni completed his second year
in office, the letras
had practically become a thing of the
past. In contrast
to the inefficiency of the government
of Carlos

Washington lencinas in dealing with the
letras, Cantoni
did not hesitate to severely tax the

mercantile sectors

in order to get the funds with which to
replace the

provincial money. Only by firm determination could
he
end a situation upon which the political future
of his

government was hanging.

Another manifestation of Cantoni'

s

strong grip on

provincial affairs was his manipulation of the municipal
system. Since the intervention into the government of

Isaza by the federal authorities in October 1919, there
had been no self-rule in the departments. Cantoni kept
them under his direct control, to the point where by

mid-1924 more than half of the districts in which San

Juan was politically divided were under the total
command of the governor. In a few departments where the
local authorities disputed with Cantoni, they were

easily removed from office by the Bloquist legislature.
The importance of this issue was basically political

because from the economic viewpoint the departments had
a very modest role. In fact, the services to the

.
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inhabitants of many departments
improved when the
provincial government took all
matters concerning
public health and public works
into

its hands. One

serious problem arose, however,
in the municipality of the
Capital. The electorate for municipal
elections was
restricted to property owners and those
who paid a
business tax. A large number of them were
anti-Cantonists
Therefore, at the municipal elections
held on December
1924, Dr. Indalecio Carmona Rlos, a physician,
was elected
mayor of San Juan as a candidate of the League
for the

Defense of Property

.

-^-^

Cantoni did not have much patience with his political

adversaries and soon

a serious conflict developed

between

the provincial and the municipal government allegedly

involving a refusal of the neighboring departments to
admit the refuse disposal of the Capital. Since Carmona
Rios gave one order and the police gave a different one,
this resulted in a colossal headache for the mayor. As the

police were under the command of the governor, Carmona

Rios had no other recourse but to complain to the Kinister
of the Interior demanding a federal intervention because

^^The restrictive nature of the municipal elections
is well illustrated by the figures themselves. Carmona
Rios got 383 votes against 176 for the Bloquist candidate,
both totalling 559 votes. La Frensa December 8, 1924. But
in the national election held in April 1922 in the city of
San Juan 5,797 citizens voted, almost ten times the number
which participated in the municipal election of 1924.
,
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Of governmeatal violatioa
of the principle of
municipal

autonomy. Minister Gallo replied
to the Mayor after
Carmona Rios wired his complaint
for the fourth time,
stating that it was purely a local
matter.

This

domestic incident, however, greatly
inflamed the desires
of the anti-Cantonists to get
Congress to abolish the
Bloquist government.
The partisan zeal of the Bloquists
was also evident
in the field of popular education. Pollowing
political

tradition, as soon as Cantoni assumed office, a
large

number of teachers were laid off for clearly political
reasons. On the positive side, however, the 1924 budget
significantly, raised the teachers'

salaries from 100 to

150 pesos monthly for those in the elementary schools,

and from 150 to 200 pesos for those in the secondary
schools. In line with Cantoni'

s

wishes to redress the

failures of previous governments, he kept the salaries of
the teachers almost up to date, but he did not pay the

fourteen months which were in arrears when he assumed
office. Furthermore, the educational system was placed

under a new, non-traditional orientation. Although the

number of schools remained virtually the

same,-^"^

there

^^La Prensa, March 31, 1925.
^•^There were 55 public provincial schools in San
Juan in 1923 and 1924, and 56 in 1925, Consejo Nacional
provincias
de Educacion, Educacion comun en la capital
,

y territories naci onales renorts for those years
(Buenos Aires, 1924, 1925 and 1926).
,
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we re some beginnings on the
teaching of practical
subjects, such as agricultural
techniques and sewing for
girls. Moreover, special classes
were devoted to
educating the pupils in personal
hygiene and the

prevention of contagious diseases.
Political Scene: Room for Bloquism
Only
These social changes made an impact
in the daily

lives of the lower classes by upgrading
the quality of
life in their sedentary lethargic communities.
But
heightened political hatred obscured the advantages
derived from the progressive ideas implemented by the

Bloquists. They used their tremendous political strength
to divide and stereotype the citizenry between
"good

guys" and "bad guys." This led the Bloquists to accuse

the dissidents in their movement of being traitors and
to regard criticism by members as misbehavior

— "incon-

ducta partidaria." Such was the fate of a few Bloquist

legislators who openly rebelled against what they
considered the tyranny of the party, asserting that they
were, above all, representatives of the people rather

than servants of the comite. This attitude fostered a

climate of fear and distrust because being an active

opponent of Bloquism meant risking official harassment,
if not open persecution.

Their complete control of the legislature enabled
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the Bloquists to Justify
their actions on legal
bases.
The opposition claimed that
Cantoni's actions, regardless of their formal legality,
were the arbitrary acts
of a despot. The Bloquists, of
course, always stated
that they were faithful observers
of the law.^^ Thus, the
weight of the law represented at
times a tyranny against
the opposition, and an instrument
of the capricious will
of the governor. The Bloquists
applied the "theory of

virtual and immanent infallibility," contended
La Prensa,
derived from a popular support which the
Cantonists
regarded not as a temporary electoral preference,
but as

a historic mandate, a real plebiscite in
the Yrigoyenist

connotation of the term.-^^
In the political atmosphere of San Juan, where the

will of the governor prevailed so ostensibly and where
the program of the party was the backbone of governmental

action, the legislature, naturally, played a secondary
role. But to say that it was a rubber-stamp body, which
in fact it was, does not reflect its real character. The

task of the legislature was to enact laws based on party

Jose P. Barreiro recalled the tenacity of the
Provincial Department of Labor against Juan luaurin, a
leading landowner and bodeguero of San Juan, and an
unbending opponent of Bloquism. Kaurin was fined
several times by the Department, some of them on
flimsy allegations. But he paid all the fines punctually
and never appealed to the governor or asked for any
clemency. Personal interview.
^^La Prensa, November 18, 1923.
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guidelines which had heen established
in advance. Hence,
it did not function as a
deliberative body independent
of
the Executive, but rather as
a complementary branch
of
government. This enabled Cantoni
to present his
views as

if they were the rule of the entire
party, and not of
one person.
He met periodically with the deputy
governor, the
ministers and the Bloquist legislators to
deal with the
agenda of the legislature.^^ Thereupon, when
the lawmakers
met in formal sessions, they simply ratified
what had
already heen decided in the general party meeting.
There
was no discussion of the proposed legislation
in both

branches of the legislature because the objections of
the
few opponents were easily overruled. ^'^ Although in theory
^^In May 1925, a book was stolen from the
Cantonists which contained the proceedings of the meetings
held by Cantoni with the other high officials of the
administration and the legislators. Its content was v/idely
publicized in San Juan and in Buenos Aires. It was
emphasized that one of the points approved in the meeting
of June 13, 1924, stated that any Bloquist Deputy or
Senator who did not vote according to the instructions of
the party would be fined 400 pesos. The opposition to
Bloquism tried to stir up public opinion in light of such
irrefutable proof of subordination of the legislative power
to the executive,
yr

Perhaps there is no better example of abusive
legislative behavior than the way in which the 1924 budget
was approved by the provincial Senate. In order to
overcome the opposition of some members, the Cantonists
met on a Sunday at 8:00 in the morning, without notifying
those Senators they knew were questioning the enormous
size of the budget. But as more Senators were needed to
obtain quorum, two from the opposition were brought to
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this system denied the
principle of separation of
powers,
the government defended this
procedure alleging that its

major responsibility was to enact
the legislation
promised to the electorate before

they were elected by

the people. According to the
Cantonist theory, the

electoral support for Bloquism had
endorsed the view that
it was unnecessary to have a major
argument on projects
which were already backed by the majority
of the
people.

What was needed, they asserted, was to
implement the
principles outlined in the program, fulfilling in

this

way what had been promised to the citizens when
the

Bloquists had sought their vote. To enhance their
viewpoint, the Bloquists repeatedly pointed to the

regrettable spectacle of the National Congress, which had

been transformed into a sterile body because of the
spirit of obstruction prevalent among the congressmen,

and the lack of definitive guidelines on which course to
follow.
The legislators not aligned with the Bloquists faced

steadfast official hostility in the legislature. This was
extended to the point where those members opposed to the

government were unable to collect their salaries, while
the Bloquists cashed their dietas regularly. The

the Senate by the police. Then the budget was approved
"a libro cerrado," that is, without any discussion in
the Senate. La Prensa, February 25, 1924.
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credentials of newly elected
opposition legislators
were routinely sent to a committee

and simply left to

die there.

it seems that the Bloquist
attitude was in

part a reaction to that of the National
Senate where the
members elected by the Bloquists were
left waiting for
months for a decision as to whether they
would be

accepted by that body.
The political climate of San Juan was
one of

growing intolerance with each sector reserving
cutting
words for its opponent. In his annual messages
to the

legislature Cantoni referred to his adversaries with
typical aggressiveness. In his view, his opponents were
the representatives of reactionary interests who blocked
the government merely for the sake of obstructing it and

maliciously ignoring the progress achieved by the
Bloquists.

-^-^

In May 1925 he referred to the League as

the symbol of a greedy and sordid capitalism.

Conversely, for the opposition a Bloquist represented a

kind of barbarian under the evil influence of Marxism
•5

o

The most publicized case was in the provincial
election held in January 1924, in which Sergio V/. Bates,
a former independent supporter of Cantoni and director
Debates was elected Senator for the Capital by a
split hair margin over the Bloquist candidate. Kis
credentials, however, were never approved.
,

^^Kensaj_e del Gobernador
"^^Ibid.

,

,

Kay 12, 1924, n.p.

May 12, 1925, n.p.
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whose sole aim was to destroy the
moral and material
well-being of the Sanjuanino society.
If the legislative power appeared
submissive to the
desires of the executive, the Judiciary
as a whole played
a similar role. The majority of the
judges who had been
appointed by the Bloquists did not challenge
the

decisions of the provincial administration. In
general,
the Judiciary observed a very cautious attitude
and

never presented to Cantoni the defiant challenges
which
the Mendozan Judiciary had to Jose Nestor Lencinas.
There

was one important case, however, in which Cantoni had to

face an adverse judge. The directors of the leading

opposition newspaper, Diario Nuevo, Domingo Elizondo and

Hector Conte Grand, charged in mid~1923 that illegally
issued letras were in circulation. The government denied
the allegation and jailed both men. The ensuing

investigation proved that the letras the two men
presented as evidence had been adulterated to make them

appear to have been illegally issued.
The government, then, seized the occasion and

accused Elizondo and Conte Grand, two of its major
political enemies, of being responsible for having
altered the letras. In August 1923, Judge Augusto
Castellanos ordered Elizondo released from jail

— Conte

Grand was ill and therefore allowed to be out of prison

but the governor ignored this decision. Cantoni believed

s
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that Castellanos, a judge appointed
to the bench by the
Bloquists, was unfaithful to the
party, and, in
consequence, from that month on his
salary was not paid.
This situation raised the protests
of the opposition

against Cantoni, in San Juan as well as
in Buenos Aires,
but to no avail. Even the Provincial
Supreme Court

remained silent on the issue. As the Judge
Castellanos
did not show signs of giving up and resigning,
in
June

1924 the government eliminated his post from the judicial

system and, accordingly, from the budget. Thus,
through
an apparently legal administrative arrangement,

Castellanos was purged for confronting the governor.

Another instance of Cantoni'

s

authoritarian

behavior involved a Bloquist provincial legislator under
indictment in the federal court in San Juan. Cantoni
ignored the federal legal action alleging that the

legislator was protected by immunity, and denied the
assistance of the police to arrest

him.^"''

As only national

lawmakers were free from federal prosecution, Cantoni'

position was in fact a contempt for national authorities.

President Alvear had to order the 15th Infantry Regiment,

^Furthermore the semi-official newspaper La
Ref orma alerted Sohar Ruiz, the federal judge, that
"patience is running thinner" in the government and
vmrned him that the day vail come in which he will be
punished for his "canallesca conducta." La Prensa April
25, 1925. Sohar Ruiz suffered a "financial" punishment
from the Bloquist government. His properties, which were
615,000. La
assessed at v 192,000 were re-assessed to
Prensa, Fiay 13, 1925.
,

,

si;
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stationed in Saa Juan, to enforce
the ruling of the
federal judge. Only then did
Cantoni acquiesce.

The opposition press, through
artificially-created
conflicts, was subjected to similar
rough treatment by
the Bloquists. Sometimes the
distribution of newspapers
was impeded, at other times there
was physical

intimidation of non-Bloquist newsmen. On
another
occasion, the independent Debates urged

journalists

toward Bloquism to stay away from San Juan
in order to
be spared the government's ire.'^^
official pressure
against Diario Nuevo was such that the paper
finally

suspended publication in June 1925, hoping that
eventually a federal commissioner would repress the
"forajidos erabravecidos" Bloquists.
These grievances had been voiced by the press

before. Bates' newspaper Debates had stated that Cantoni
42

Debates

December 21, 1923, warned its colleagues

,

Tu que das en el diario
al gobierno que ves que
vas a cobrar el milagro
por un palo que des, te

cuatro palos
no anda bien
de las mieses,
daran diez.

comprende lo que di^o,
compadece a los pobres que alia van
no te vendan halagos ni promesas,
companero, no vayas a San Juan.
Compafiero,

In June 1925, the distribution of Diari o Nuevo
was prohibited because it had printed the full speech of
National Deputy Llarcelo Sanchez Sorondo urging federal
intervention in San Juan. la Prensa, June 27, 1925.
^^La Prensa

,

June 28, 1925.
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was a trampler, an atro^ellado,
as a .an, and a trampler
as a ruler. Still more antagonistic
to Cantoni's actions,
La libertad from Mendoza, claimed
that it was time to
think about Cantoni as a "morally
insane" as had been
the cases of the Parag-uayan dictators
Francia and
,

Prancisco Solano Lopez.
In reality, by 1925 the opposition in
San Juan was
forced into a corner. Bloquism enjoyed such
sizeable
popular support that it rendered its adversaries

politically impotent; it was hopeless to try to
defeat
Cantoni electorally. To liquidate the "provincial
Communism," the League had no recourse but to knock at
the doors of Congress. They flooded Buenos Aires with

aggrieved telegrams and manifestos protesting the

draconian taxes imposed by Cantoni upon their properties,
grapes, wine, and business in general. They clamored

for federal intervention*.
Buenos Aires Stops Bloquism
The two most important newdpapers in Argentina, La

Nacion and La Prensa

,

played a major role in giving

Bloquism national focus. Both were highly critical of
Cantoni and his movement once he became governor. Very
often they exposed in their columns what appeared to be

"^

1924.

Debates

,

June 11, 1924; La Libertad

,

March 20,
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the arbitrariness of the
Bloquist re,i,e, and publicized
the afflictions denounced by the
League.

As happened in Kendoza, the
permanent correspondents
of La Nacion and La Prensa in San
Juan were active

opponents of the government. La Nacion
was especially
linked with the anti-Cantonists because
its correspondent
was Domingo Elizondo, one of the directors
of Diario
Nuevo. In consequence, the information
published by both
Buenos Aires newspapers was typically one-sided
and the

editorial comments reflected the same political views.
For example, for the liberal, legalistic-minded La Prensa,

Cantoni's rule was a mixture of autocracy and demagogy.
As for La Nacion

,

it pointed out that the Bloquists

controlled the judge, the policeman and the journalists,
what else was needed to impose their absolutism?^^
The Bloquists assailed both papers for neglecting
to report what was significant in the provinces while

providing a wide coverage of foreign affairs. La Ref orma
ridiculed La Naci on and La Prensa for ignoring the fact
that they were Argentine, not foreign papers. For while
they informed their readers about the industrial

situation in Vladivostok or that in Shanghai three
Chinese had died of a dreadful plague, they only

^^La Prensa

,

May

5,

1925.

^^La Nacion, September 27, 1924.

.
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reported political news out of the
Argentine provinces,
without properly analyzing other
spheres of general
interest. It was more imperative
and relevant,
.

added La

Reforma, to write about the economic
and social
developments in Salta, San Juan or
Catamarca provinces,
than to write a detailed report about
the
cost of

living in New Zealand.

^'^

The anti-Cantoni forces had two powerful
allies in
Congress: conservatives and Yrigoyenists and
from the
,

outset of the Bloquist government they attempted
to

crush it. The first major confrontation took place

during 1923 when approval of Senator-elect Aldo
Cantoni's
credentials was deliberately delayed, almost to the end
of the session. The National Senate was already

entangled in the partisan intrigues which rendered that

body so ineffective during the 1920'

s,

and the Cantoni's

credential issue became one more factor added to the

political machinations taking place in that branch of
Congress
4-7

La Reforma

,

September 22, 1924. Meanwhile, the

biting attacks on Cantoni in La J^lpoca continued
undiminished. Their fierceness v/as exemplified by the
terms it constantly used v/hen referring to him and his
movement: "desborde de barbarie," "iracundia salvaje,"
"personaje de tolderfa," "satrapa," "gobierno barbaro
y barbarizante, " "comunismo semigaucho," "oficialismo
mazorquero." July 3, 1923; January 11, 1924; January
21, 1924; April 1, 1924; August 20, 1924, and March 26,
1925.

358

Aldo Cantoni was admitted as
a Senator in September
1923, but when another Bloquist, Carlos
R. Porto,

was

appointed National Senator by the
provincial legislat ure
in February 1925, he had to
resign

before his credentials

were discussed. The majority of the
National Senators
were not only interested in rejecting
Porto as their
peer, but were also ready at that time
to approve a
federal intervention in San Juan.
The Bloquist predicament in Congress
was the result
of two insuperable barriers:

the Yrigoyenists could never

forgive the event of the Rinconada, and the
conservatives
could not swallow the "Communist system" by which
they

believed the Bloquists were dispossessing the productive
sectors of San Juan of their wealth.
In January 1924, the League presented to Congress a

statement highly critical of the Bloquist rule. They
claimed that the Provincial Bank was basically serving
those in the official circle in open disregard of the
rules of the institution. They blamed the "famosas

leyes obreristas," the 8-hour daywork and the minimum
wage, for the existing unemployment. Furthermore, the

League stated that the property tax was merely an act of
revenge against the well-to-do, and that the fines set
up for violating the labor laws

v;ere

so high "as to make

any infringement of its regulations impossible." A candid
comraent,

to say the least. The extensive document of the
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league coacluded that the unruly
Bloquist administration
not only had suppressed the
right to work, freedom
of
the press and of trade, but
even
the freedom to thinkl

There was no other place to turn,
it claimed, except t 0
the Federal Government because
all the provincial d oors
were closed to their appeals.
Every time they complained
to the Bloquist government, it
responded with more
stringent laws. Justice, they added, was
submissively at
the mercy of the oppresive Executive
Power.

In mid-1924 a bill calling for federal
intervention
in San Juan was introduced in the National
Chamber
of

Deputies by the Yrigoyenists. The reactions in the
press
reflected the three basic views on the matter that

characterized the political sectors. La Epoca was
jubilant at the prospect of intervention. It stated that
San Juan was under the tyranny of a government

varnished with a university-prestige facade
which disguises its real appearance. But the
clothing and the university front are its only
civilized features. Its mentality, its
passions, its procedures, identifies it with
the most irresponsible and barbarian
government during the sad era of the national
organi zati on ^9
.

The Bloquists, scornful of the intervention bill,

reaffirmed the class overtones of their political stand.
/ o

Liga de Defensa de la Propiedad, la Industria y
el Comercio de San Juan, L'emorial presentado al Poder
E j ecutivo de la Nacion, January 19 1924.
»

49 La Epoca

,

June 28, 1924.

.
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They claimed that they had
successfully defeated the
representatives of capitalism, the
bode^^uoros, the large
landowners, and the aristocratic
sectors. Proudly, they
stressed the fact that Cantoni was
not an "illustrious
name," that he had never set a
foot in the Club Social,
and that his family was not one of
those boasting a
noble descent. They claimed it was
the "chusma," as the

conservatives had called them, who had
attained power
by their own right.

Between these two opposed viewpoints, there
was
another, mildly critical of Cantoni. It reproached

the

governor for not controlling his primitives impulses
and his intolerance, which had led him to rule the

province as if it were his personal property with no

feeling of obligation to account to the people for his
acti ons 51
The National Congress now became the arbiter of

Bloquism's fate. In December 1924 the National Chamber
of Deputies debated a conservative-sponsored request to

the Executive Power to include the intervention in

San Juan on the agenda for the coming special

congressional period. 52 Among the stream of invectives

^^La Reforma
^ -^

Debates

,

^^ Diputados

,

July

5,

1924.

July 7, 1924.
,

1924, VII, 82-111 (December 4).
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against Bloquism, no words were more biting
than those of
Deputy Matias Sanchez Sorondo. He referred
to San Juan
as

if it were a strange land, totally alien
to Argentina,

located "in the center of wildest Africa or in the
depths
of the barbarian Polynesia." He recited the Cantonist

faults with sordid overtones; persecution of capital, of
the Judiciary and the opposition; absolute control over
the legislature, and a Soviet mentality of government.

Sanchez Sorondo referred to the similarities between the
regimes of Cantoni and Lencinas, calling them a "holy

brotherhood." Moreover, he termed the Bloquists

a "horde,"

an adjective which since then was often used by the

critics of the Bloquists. The fiery deputy for Buenos

Aires completed his diatribe by inserting into the
congressional record the large number of suits leveled

against Cantoni before he assumed the governorship. 5 ^

Belisario Albarracin, a deputy for San Juan, had to

bear the burden of defending and justifying the Bloquist
government. The essence of his position was that

although it could be admitted that Cantoni was somewhat

violent in the expression of his political views, no
person could claim to be more honest than Cantoni. But
the heated debate proved to be a mere formality since
the conservative request was approved by the Chamber

almost unanimously. Later, when it was discussed in the
^^Ibid., 83, 90. The insertion is on pp. 112-114.
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National Senate, Aldo Cantoni
placed special e.phasis
on the social accomplishments
of
the Bloquists and

their efforts in behalf of the
needy sectors of San
Juan. Stressing the populist
nature of the Sanjuanino
government, Senator Cantoni stated
that the political
problems of the province were no
longer solved at
the

Club Social or decided by a clique
of "half a dozen
of big names." The anti-Cantonists
repeated
the

familiar charges and the Senate approved
the resolution
overwhelmingly.
But this emotional congressional encounter
only
served as a wide display of anti-Bloquist sentiment,
for President Alvear not only did not include the

intervention in San Juan on the parliamentary agenda,
but he cancelled the whole special congressional
period.

55
^

54
^

Senadores, 1924, II, 63-101 (December 18). The
quotation is on p. 73.
55

Besides the problem of San Juan, Alvear wanted
to prevent that Congress discussed other disputed issues,
especially once he had secured the extension of the
budget for 1925.
The political adversity affecting both I.'endoza
and San Juan led to a reinforcement of their political
ties. The lencinist convention held in I.lendoza in
December 1924 voted its solidarity with the Bloquist
government. Cantoni replied to Carlos Washington Lencinas
that "conoces demasiado mi temperamento, vigorizado
civicamente al lado de tu austere padre, Jose Nestor
Lencinas, para que esa amenaza pueda llegar a preocuparme
La Prensa, December 19» 1924.
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Nevertheless, the anti-Bloquist
aaimosities grew
steadily as Federico Cantoni
solidified his one-man rule
in San Juan. The new congressional
drive against Cantoni
began soon after Congress convened
for the ordinary
1925

period. The Yrigoyenists sponsored
another intervention
bill and mounted an implacable attack
against the

Cantonists.56

Radical Personalist Deputy Vergara led

the push to liquidate Cantoni. He retold
all the economic
and financial grievances as they were reported
by the

conservative Leag-ue for the Defense of Property. He
sneered at the pro-worker stand of the Bloquists,

believing it a fraud against the workers and a vehicle
for class hate. 57 Striking a theme which had been burning
the Yrigoyenists since 1921, Vergara condemned again the

fact that all those who participated in the attack

against Jones at the Rinconada had become provincial

legislators or had been rewarded with jobs in the
administration. Vergara summed up the Bloquist program as
one of "violence, dissolution, anarchy and class struggle,"

and asserted that San Juan had fallen into the clutches

^^Di putad os, 1925, II, 67-100 (June 10); 169-198
(June 18); 212-228 (June 19), and 289-336 (June 24).
^'^The same view was expressed thirty years later
by a Radical author who referred to both Eloquism and
Lencinism as devoid of ethical principles, and as
movements v/hich dealt with the social question in a
demagogic fashion. Gabriel del I.'azo, El radicalismo
Notas sob re su historia ^ doctrina 1922 - 1952 (Buenos
Aires, 1955), p. 131.
.

,
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of Bolshevism.

The Bloquist representative,
Albarracin, tried a^ain
to justify the rough spots of
Cantoni's behavior. He
practically left unanswered, however,
the serious charges
made in the Chamber that the leading
Bloquist officials
from Cantoni down had benefited with
extremely generous
credits from the Provincial Bank. 59
^he Sanjuanino Deputy
Ventura Lloveras, an Yrigoyenist, made
another explosive
accusation. By resorting to mathematical
computations

which remained both unproved and unchallenged
in Congress,
he affirmed that according to the taxes in
force,
the

government was not collecting just over seven million
pesos annually as it declared, but more than four times
that amount. This simply meant that either the difference

was netted by people in the government or that there was a
58

Diputados 1925, II, 78. The ':>ocialist Jacinto
Oddone also joined the anti-Bloquist chorus. However, he
did not see any reason to criticize the meetings held by
the governor with the legislators to coordinate in
advance the labor of the legislature. In the Socialist
Party, he said, they not only would fine the dissidents,
but they would expel them. Ibid
89.
The list of those implicated in the Rinconada
and the public positions held by them afterwards is in
Juan Alberto Bracamonte, Una verguenza nacional El
Cantonismo en documentos (Buenos Aires, 1927
pp. 57-59.
,

.

,

.

)

50

,

However, it is fair to state that during the
extensive congressional debates, the anti-Bloquists
never mentioned what type of guarantees were backing
the munificent loans granted to the Bloquists by the
official bank.
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giant slovealiness in accountine,
or perhaps both at the
same time.

Sanchez Sorondo, who had
spearheaded the attack
against the government of San Juan
in December 1924,
reiterated with impassioned words
that that province was
a "real cancer of democracy.- He
insisted that th e

intervention in San Juan was not like any
other federal
intervention, but a real expedition against
an Indian
incursion. By a vote of 84 to 3 the Chamber
of Deputies
left no doubts that the anti-Bloquist
sentiment was

riding at high crest.
The National Senate witnessed a new and
extensive

parade of arguments pro and con Cantoni. Vices and

virtues were analyzed again through the partisan light
of each sector. That cataract of words seemed

unnecessary. Cantoni 's fate was decided before the
debate began. Out of nineteen Senators only three voted

against the intervention, Pedro Larlus, for Cordoba,

Leopoldo Melo and Aldo Cantoni.

A few days later

Alvear appointed General Eduardo Broquen as interventor.
Meanwhile, in San Juan, Cantoni defended his

battered administration by opening to the public two
new buildings of the Rawson Hospital, the only one in
the Capital. His improvised speech on that occasion

^^Senadores, 1925, I, 346-358 (June 27); 401-410
(July 2): 425-429 (July 16); 469-489 (July 23); 490-530
(July 24), and 532-602 (July 25).
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alluded to the fact that while
the sterile opposition
in Buenos Aires was ready to
conquer San Juan as if it
were a malon, he provided the
poor with another
humanitarian roof to assist them and
to give

them comfort

and hope.^*^

Using all possibilities on hand, the
Cantoni
government tried to clog San Juan administrative

wheels

in order to reduce to a minimum the
financial resources
at the disposal of the intervention.
All possible

allocations were made, fines were condoned or
dismissed,
a general moratorium on the paying of taxes
was granted

and a very slow process to collect taxes through the
courts was established.^^
A last stand was attempted by Governor Cantoni, who

wanted to read before Commissioner Broquen the last
decree of his administration. It expressed a protest at
the intrusion of the central government and its violation
of the federalist spirit of the national constitution.^-^

But Broquen did not allow Cantoni to voice this last
minute piece of his mind. Though the federal intervention

^^La Ref orma June 30, 1925. A malon was a
devastating Indian incursion on a white settlement.
,

6?

Reacting against this unusual move. La Prensa
sadly commented that it was as if the end of the Bloquist
government meant that the province ought to disappear.
July 9, 1925.
^^Ibid.

,

August 9, 1925.

,
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did not ena Bloquis.,
it closed the fi.st
and .ost
important chapter in the
history of the movement.
The literature on Cantoni
and Bloquism is scant.
Naturally, the pro-Yri,oyenist
writers have strongly
criticized the Sanjuanino leaders.
Manuel Galvez stated
that Pederico Cantoni resembled
a "Stalin abur^uesado
with talent but without scruples,
who granted benefits
to the lower classes and was
blindly admired by them.
But Galvez believes his methods
were so violent that his
regime surpassed anything known in
Argentina; not to
side with him, was to be against him.^^
Felix Luna

asserted that the Cantonis transformed
San Juan in
land where only the best armed man, the
most

a

resolute,

the most macho could survive. In the Par
West, in Sierra

Morena or in Sicilian lands, added Luna, they would
have
been celebrated highwaymen for their propensity to
loot
for their loyal followers and for the downtrodden who
considered them their caciques

.

Analyzing Cantoni and Bloquism from

a different

angle, the Sanjuanino historian Juan Romulo Fernandez

gives a brief account of the Cantonist era, concluding
that Federico Cantoni was the politician "que mas altos

puntos calza en todo el pais argentine." This may be

^^Galvez, Vida de Hipolito Yrigoyen
65

Luna, Yrigoyen

,

p.

348.

,

p.

395.
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understood as a complimentary
remark on Cantoni, but
the real meaning of this
evaluation
is not clear.

Pernandez' account, however, does
not mention
specifically the social legislation
enacted by the
Bloquists, and his short reference
to the 1927 provincial
constitution does not mention granting
suffrage rights
to women.
The local historian Hector D.
Arias had
treated the subject in a balanced, although

traditionally narrative way.^'^
Judgments of Cantoni'

s

rule reflect the controversial

and still emotional involvement provoked by his
personality
and his actions. The three following views project
a range
of opinions held by observers who v/ere directly or

indirectly close to the contemporary scene. The Sanjuanino

historian Emilio Maurin Navarro, son of Juan Kaurin,
believes that Cantoni was an "atropellador

,

"

a

characteristic he links with the "Italian impulses" of an
Al Capone, and that Cantoni'

s

personality resembled that

Fernandez, "San Juan, 1862-1930," Historia
argentina contemporanea IV, pp. 534-537. Quotation is on
,

p.

537.

Arias and Varese, Plistoria de San Juan, pp. 440The only biography of i'ederico Cantoni is an
unpublished doctoral dissertation by Robert R, Smith
(University of California, 1970), This is a researched
work, narrative in nature, which handles evenly the
virtues and failures of Pederico Cantoni. Noticeable
among its conclusions is that Smith finds somewhat
difficult to understand in 1970 "the furor, heated
controversy and even class hatred" generated by Bloquisra,
p. 288. "Radicalism in the Province of San Juan. The Saga
of Pederico Cantoni (1916-1934)."
455.

369

of the Louisianian Huey Long.
Maurin Navarro can not see
anything positive in Bloquism, which
he believes was a

"permanent illegal association."^^

C.

Another Sanjuanino, the competent
historian Horacio
Videla, whose father was bitterly
opposed
to Cantoni,

thinks that although the reforms carried
out by the
Bloquism were progressive, it would have been
preferable
if they had been implemented through more
orthodox

means,

free from the violence which permeated the
actions of the

Bloquists. Videla contends that Cantoni was a man
sincere
in his beliefs and acknowledges that Bloquism represented
a new experiment oriented to benefit the popular
sectors

which until then had been neglected in San Juan.^^
Jose P. Barreiro, the intellectual force in the

Bloquism of the 1920'

s,

presents the most sympathetic

view toward Cantoni. He agrees with his critics that
Cantoni was an arbitrary ruler, but firmly points out
that his first government was "an exemplary one."

Barreiro rejects the view that Cantoni was a demagogue,
but recognizes that he lacked the self-restraint to curb
his arbitrariness and to smooth the rough edges of his
personality.'^'^

^^Personal interview with Erailio Maurin Navarro.
^^Personal interview with Horacio
Juan, July 6, 1972.

C.

Videla, San

"^^Personal interview with Jose P. Barreiro.
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These three dissimilar views
are, in general,
representative of the diverse
opinions expressed about
Cantoni and Bloquism. The
historian will find that they

contain some grains of truth,
because Cantoni- s real
image is somewhat reflected in
all of them. Certainly,
the personal nature of the
Sanjuanino leader
and the

extent of his accomplishments and
failures are so
controversial that to judge him and the
movement he led
would be a task permanently subject
to challenge and
revision. '^^ Already in the 1920- s there
was almost a
traumatic preoccupation on both sides with
what history
would say about them. Cantonists and anti-Cantonists

elevated their vision above their daily acrimonious
disputes, and placed themselves on a moral, superior
level, beyond their generation, when presumably the

"final truth" would emerge. "The day of judgment for
this historical government," asserted La Reforma, will
71

Political legend had weaved around Cantoni a
very widespread story, that of "giving away" coats or
overcoats to the poor people, and thus, posing as a
"benefactor" when in reality he would be a plain
demagognJ-e* The same attitude, as noted before, was
attributed to Carlos Washington Lencinas, and so, both
Cuyano leaders share the anecdote. Most of the persons
who have been witness, directly or indirectly, of
Cantoni' s times, seldom fail to mention the story of
the coats. However, two persons closely associated
with Cantoni, Jose P. Barreiro and Eudoro Rodriguez,
f lately denied that this v/as ever true.
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show

nhe

titanic material and spiritual
aoccnplishments
achieved by Cantoni
La
on the contrary, appealed
to that time "when in the future
the people will learn
about the atrocities committed by the
gangsters who today
dominate San Juan.. .."72 ^^^^^^
^^^^^^
^^^^^.^
that both sides were mistaken believing
that history
could speak with one voice or that it could
render a
.

e^,

"final" verdict. Bloquism, as any other
personalist-rooted

enterprise— as attested in the major examples

of Rosism

and Peronism— would be always subject to a historical

inquiry in which opinions will surely differ far and
wide.

Both sides seemed to have played the dual role of
exploiters and exploited, both lacked moderation in

attacking and defending themselves. Political polarization
clouded the issues in dispute and passion replaced reason
in the daily exercise of their antagonism, where even

minor events or disagreements were enlarged out of
proportion.
The first Bloquist government achieved most of its

social goals and these accomplishments constitute a

watershed for

v/hich Gantoni

deserves full credit. He

represented the first tangible hope for the humble people,
with better working conditions, better salaries and

spreading health services into far corners of the province.

'^^La

1924.

Reforma, August

1,

1924; La ]^poca

,

July 10,
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Where it still was almost aa
adventure to live. Bloquism
however, failed to enact the
political reforms it
promised, such as proportional
representation in the

legislature, or to insure full municipal
autonomy.
Economically, its fiscal program for a
better balanced
distribution of wealth was another landmark
in an era

in which any scheme smacking of Socialism
or even

advocating a mild welfare State was generally
rejected
as "exotic." But in the process, the financial
torniquet
was applied too drastically to the business sectors.
This

inflamed the opposition to seek the political annihilation
of Bloquism. Defending their position,

the Cantonists

disregarded civil liberties, basic freedoms were curtailed
or placed under a permanent siege and the judicial system

lost its most precious foundation: its independence.

But a further appraisal of the historical role of

Federico Cantoni and Bloquism will be developed in

following chapters, after the results of the last federal
intervention in San Juan, the fourth in only four years,
are discussed. Cantoni, like Lencinas in lucndoza, was

enjoying large popular support when the federal
intervention brought to an end his populist experiment.
Its political enemies were able to stop Bloquism in 1925,

but it was too strong to admit defeat.
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CHAPTER

X

LENCINISM AND BLOQUISM PROVE THEIR
RESILIENCE
Federal interventions, in Mendoza
since September
1924 and in San Juan since August 1925, had
placed these
provinces again under the control of the
national
authorities. And once again the two Cuyan
populist

movements were confronted with the need to
re-establish
themselves as the strongest political force in their

respective provinces. To regain their leadership they
had
to overcome a barrage of criticism and taunting
reproaches

from their opponents, both in Mendoza and San Juan, and in
Buenos Aires.
Unlike the previous interventions during Yrigoyen's

presidency the anti-Lencinist and anti-Bloquist forces
hoped that this time the Federal Government would not
thwart their aspirations for a definite change in the

provincial scene. In theory, at least, the federal
commissioners were not only to probe into scandal-tainted

administrative proceedings and abuses of political power,
but to restore some kind of harmony in both western
provinces.
Lencinism: Prom the Llano to Power Again

Lencinas' opponents pressed the federal interventor
to try in earnest to bring into court all the Lencinists
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accused of corruption. "jA la
carcel los ladronesl"
-to jail With the thieves-a phrase

coined at the giant

rally of anti-Lencinists
held in November 1924 in the
capital of the province, became

their permanent war cry.

The non-Lencinist press, in Mendoza
as well as in Buenos
Aires, began reporting details of
the dubious dealings
in which many Lencinists had been
involved while serving
as government officials. The charges
of corruption

ranged from the alleged appointment of
large numbers of
aviadores ,^ to the more serious accusations
of fraudulent
operations within public institutions, especially the

Provincial Bank. However, most of the cases aired in the
press were never brought to trial. These cases, mostly
involving low-level hirelings, became lost in a labyrinth
of charges and denials, without ever reaching the courts.^
Thus,

only a few months after Kosca began the intervention,

it became clear to the frustrated anti-lencinist sectors

that the intervention was not aimed at destroying their

political adversaries.
On the contrary, the political activities of the

Lencinists were neither forbidden nor curtailed, and they

"^"No show" employees and workers who cashed their
salaries without ever working.
2

The most important Lencinist officials, of the
few who were prosecuted and found guilty, were the
director of the Provincial Bank and the Superintendent
of Irrigation.
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were able, therefore, to maintain
active political support
throughout the province. The
instructions of Minister of
Interior Gallo to Mosca clearly reveal
the "white glovepolicy with which the central government
handled
the

situation:
The federal commissioners are sent
to the
provinces neither to turn its files upside
down,
nor to make inquiries and investigations
searching for guilty men and criminals, which
will be processed before judges appointed by
the commissioner himself. Your duty is not to
render verdicts in favor of or against friends
or political adversaries. Your mission is to
guarantee the free expression of opinions and
to insure the impartiality of the Federal
Government in reorganizing the public life of
the province.-^

Because of this attitude emanating from Buenos Aires,
the focus of political concern in Mendoza turned from

possible judicial prosecution of the Lencinists, to the

new challenge of electing a constitutional government.^
The beginning of a new electoral cycle inevitable renewed

political hostilities, but now they seemed even more

bitter than in December 1921 when Carlos Washington was
elected governor. For the Lencinists now had an additional

hostile public opinion to confront because of the charges
of corruption against many of their leaders.

^inisterio del Interior, Memoria del Ministerio
del Interior, 1924 - 1925 (Buenos Aires, 1925T7 pp. 119-120

^The intervention set the date of the election
for August 1925, after it had been twice postponed.

^
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At the end of May the Liberal
Party selected Mario
Arenas as its candidate for the
governorship,
the
Lencinist camp, with Carlos
Washington barred from running
because the constitution prohibited
a man from serving
two consecutive terms, there was
a struggle among other
prominent Lencinists, especially between
Leopoldo Suarez
and Alejandro Orfila. Finally Orfila
managed to get the
support of the majority.^

m

Because of the Interventor'

s

reluctance to

investigate former Lencinist officials or curb
their
political activities after Lencinas' ouster from
power in
September 1924, the Lencinist chances for returning
to

office were extremely favorable. The great personal

popularity of Carlos Washington continued to be the

backbone of his movement. Most of his supporters remained
unaffected by the charges of corruption leveled against
party leaders and persisted in their loyalty to the
caudillo.

5

The Lencinists completed their ticket with Carlos
Saa Zarandon, who had been the provincial Police
Commissioner under Jose Nestor Lencinas.

Very often the Lencinists expressed in popular
verses their feelings of admiration for their two
undisputed leaders, Jose Nestor and Carlos Washington
Lencinas. A book could be compiled of all the laudatory
popular poetry written in their praise, and against the
conservatives, during most of the 1920 's. In general, it
extolled the gaucho-qualities of the two leaders,
imitating on many occasions the criollo language and
metrical style of Jose Hernandez' Martin Fierro The
.

I
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This phenomenon from a conservative
viewpoint, was
evidence of a deplorable demagoguery
that existed at both
regional and national levels. The
metropolitan daily La
Prensa maintained its criticism of the
Lencinists,

insisting that they were exploiting the
feelings of the
simple people much as the Bloquists were
doing in San

Juan, and contending that both movements were
offsprings
of the personalist model set up by Yrigoyen
from the Casa

following verses illustrate the indomitable spirit of the
modest Lencinist troubadours:
Es el gaucho verdadero
es la tradicion, la raza,
es el buen criollo que pasa
arriscandose el sombrero

Es el sagrado heredero
de la patria tradicion
es la chusma en redencion
que en estas tierras andinas
Don Jose Nestor Lencinas
salvo de la humillacion

Las obras de esos cretinos
a todo gaucho lo espanta
(Secar la uva en la planta
producto del suelo andinol

the conservatives
~^

jTirar al canal los vinosl
|no darle trabajo al pobrel
^que hay con que a ustedes les sobre,
ganzotes camanduleros?
si en ese tierapo el obrero
no podia ganar un cobre

Estan rotas las cadenas
en la tierra mendocina
aba jo gansos de Arenas',
jviva Washington Lencinas
;

La Palabra

January 29, 1925.

,

December 28, 1925; December 18, 1924;
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Rosada.

La Prensa's criticism
focused in fact, on a very
significant political paradox. Both
the Bloquists and the
lencinists were not only branches
of the old Radical
trunk, but both were, in general,
pursuing the same

fundamental goals as the Personalist
Radicals. From this
hypothesis, lencinism, Cantonism and
Yrigoyenism constituted
a vanguard of the "Causa" against the
"Regimen." These

three sectors appealed to the popular
segments and all
represented the side of reform in politics.
Nevertheless,
the Cuyano movements proved to be far more
committed to

social reform than were the Yrigoyenists. Moreover, the

clashes first in Kendoza between Jose Nestor Lencinas and
Yrigoyen, and then in San Juan over the Jones' affair,

opened such an irreparable breach between the regional

parties and the national Radicals under Yrigoyen, that
their great affinity of principles was destroyed by the

personalist ingredients which rule everyday politics.
The electoral campaign in Mendoza contributed once

again to a charged political atmosphere as Lencinists and
anti-Lencinists gave vent to a political rhetoric and
style that was permeated by strong class overtones.

Society ladies (the damas mendocinas) threw flowers

fr(
'om

the balconies of the Jockey Club at the Liberal Party

candidates marching together with the legion of old
conservatives, the living symbol of the "Mendozan

"^La

Prensa, July 18, 1925.
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patricians."

Their sense of upper class
superiority was
also reflected in the slogan
directed against the

Lencinists:

A la carcel los ladronesl"
The response of
the Lencinists was a mixture of
pride and arrogance:
"

"

;Viva el gauchito ladron!" (Hail the
"little gaucho"

thief:).
The Bloquists came from San Juan
to campaign once
more on behalf of their neighbors. Lencinism
and Bloquism,
as the Mendozan La Palabra put it,
constituted liberal,

advances forces in support of the lower classes,
and a
curb to the haughtiness of the "aristocrat,
capitalist,
and conservative elements. "^ Such a categorization
of the

anti-Lencinists, regardless of its accuracy, served the

Lencinist purposes of advertising the socio-political

situation in terms of rich versus poor. The Lencinists,
moreover, answered their opponents' accusations of

corruption by affirming that those who had violated the
ordinary procedures while in office, did so to return to
the people the pillage they had sufiered under the

governments of the "Regimen."
Climaxing the populist stance of the Lencinist
campaign,

Palabra referred to their opponents on the

eve of the election as the "young idlers who show off

^Ibid.

,

July 27, 1925.

^La Palabra, January

4,

1926.
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the established prestige of their
illustrious aaoestry,'.
comfort-loving and parasitic people,
who had never

experienced adversities in life, lived
in permanent
slothfulness, looked down on the
humble people,

and were

anxious to gain power in order "to
enslave those who live
chained to the heavy capitalist machine."
In contrast,

noted La Palabra,
The Lencinist Radicalism symbolizes
democracy,
evolution and revolution
Will they fthe
conservativesj understand tomorrow ["election
dayj and forever that it is the shirtless
people, the rabble, rejected and cursed... who
will impose their principles and willpower to
bring new conceptions, new horizons and new men
to the polity, marching straightforwardly to
achieve truth and justice.
The Lencinist newspaper added, "let them j^their

opponents^ call us the rabble, the shirtless. .let those
.

dirty souls discharge all kind of adjectives upon us...
let them wallow in their political impotence and their

orphanage of popular support...." Nothing, it concluded,

would prevent the Lencinist victory. "^^

Ibid., January 2, 1926. The editorial stated in
Spanish: "El radicalisrao Lencinista, que es democracia,
evolucion y revolucion, les hara comprender mahana y para
siempre, que es el pueblo descamisado, ^ue es la chusma'
despreciada y maldecida. quien impondra su pensamiento y
voluntad para dar al Estado politico nuevas formas, nuevos
horizontes y nuevos hombres y marchar camino recto al
triunfo de la verdad y la justicia." "...que se nos moteje
de chusma, de descaraisados. .que gasten los ronosos de
alma y corazon todos los adjetivos. .que se revuelquen en
su impotencia de vencidos y huerfanos de simpatias
populares. ..."
'

.

.

.

.
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The Socialists of Kendoza,
reacting to both the
Lencinist and anti-Lencinist campaign
were appalled by
what they called the "Mendozan chaos."
They viewed the
masses as perennial victims, earlier
under the rule of
an oligarchy which simply ignored them,
and now under
a Lencinist tutelage, which perverted
and degraded
them. The Socialists referred to the
Lencinist leaders
as common criminals, assassins if they needed
to be,

"coimeros" by their own recognition, corrupted and
corruptors."^^
As was usual during elections, especially at the

national level in twentieth century Argentine politics,
each party proclaimed itself to be the only one able
to promote general prosperity in Mendoza. If the

political propaganda were to be believed, depending on

which party won the province would either become a

paradise or would disappear off the face of the earth
after the election. The Liberals, professing to

represent the feelings of all the social groups "from

August 1, 1925. The
•'--^El Socialista (Mendoza),
Socialists watched with dismay during the electoral
campaign "the parade of cars and trucks filled with
reckless men, drunkards and roughnecks, yelling,
insulting and provoking pacific people by shouting
•;Viva el gauchito Lencinas, borracho y ladron!'"
Stressing the fact that these were not isolated
incidents, the Socialists added that all the Lencinist
posters bore the inscription: ";Yiva la chusma de
alpargatal" Ibid
.
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the palace of the fortunate to
the shack of the humble
peon," stated that they were "the
only hope to save the
province.
j,,,,^^^^ ^525, the Lencinist
convention

which chose the party candidates,
proclaimed that "only
Radicalism could save the future of the
province."!^
Another sector, the Yrigoyenists, before
they decided to
withdraw their candidates in November, issued
a statement
rejecting all compromise with other political
forces. In

their view, the choices at stake were "freedom or
servitude, truth or deceit, a free election or a

fraudulent one, justice or iniquity." The Yrigoyenists
felt these fundamental principles should not be

compromised by entering into any sort of political
alliance. 1^

In a last effort to stop what appeared to be a
certain return of Lencinism to power, the Yrigoyenists

requested a new postponement of the election. They posed
this dilemma to the Minister of Interior;

hov/

was it

possible, they argued, that men who had engaged in

illegal activities could now be able, "by an aberration

l^La Prensa, June
l^

Ibid

. ,

l^Ibid.

,

1,

1925.

December 7, 1925.
November 24, 1925.
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of the popular mind" to serve
again as the representatives
of the people?15
federal Government preferred to

let the issue be decided at the
ballot boxes.
On Sunday, January

3,

1926, Lencinism received

overwhelming support at the polls.

Many anti-Lencinists

felt, now more than ever, that the Mosca
intervention had
been a useless, ineffective interlude. But some
Liberals

took confort in the fact that the new governor would
be

Orfila and not Carlos Washington. Their hope was that the
powers of office placed in the hands of the former would
serve to offset the preeminence exerted by Carlos

Washington. The novelty of this political situation was
that for the first time the Union Civica Radical

Lencinista had voted in

a

governor who was not a Lencinas.

This broke the monopoly of a prominent popular name, a

personalist characteristic which was even present in the
name of the party itself. But the lencinists had no doubt
that despite the fact that Orfila would be the new
15

Ministerio del Interior, Memoria del Ministerio
1925-1926 (Buenos Aires, 192^ p. 116.

del Interior
T

,

6

'

f

The election returns were: Union Civica Radical
Lencinista 20,405 votes; Liberal Party 14,308; Socialist
Party 4,381. La Prensa January 10, 1926. The Lencinists
also obtained a majority in both houses of the
legislature as well as in the municipal contests,
except in the capital and two departments, where the
Liberals won.
,
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governor, power had really reverted back
to the "gaucho
17
Lencinas."
'

Por the coQservatives and the anti-Lencinists
in
general, it was a sad reality to have to accept
Lencinism
in power again. In their opinion, its victory
constituted
the triumph of corruption and opened the door to a

repetition of the excesses of the "inorganic populacheria"
of the Lencinists. la Libertad, the fierce voice of

the conservatives, even urged Mosca to remain as

commissioner until public opinion, the "sana y decente"
one,

could see confidence in government restored. "^^

La Prensa attributed the electoral success of the

Lencinists to their manipulations with the emotional
feelings of the masses,

v;ho

tended to attach a character

of martyr to any leader who was under the accusing finger

of the law and surrounded himself with an aura of

"persecution.""^^ In reality, the angry criticism by the

anti-Lencinists during Mosca'

s

intervention did not

This situation may be considered somewhat as a
historical antecedent to the event of almost half a
century later at the national level. In the presidential
election of March 1973, the major slogan of the
Justicialista Liberation Front was: "Campora to the
government, power to Peron." As in Peron's case, lencinas
continued to be the undisputed leader of his movement.
18
^

La Prensa, January 29, 1926.

%bid

.

,

January 7, 1926
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permeate the simple mentality of the
common man. By using
honest or despicable means, depending
on the
views of

each side, the "gauchito Lencinas"
continued to be the
patron saint of the lower groups.
The Lencinists celebrated with fervor
their return
to the government, revelling in their
own familiar way.

The Lencinist La Palabra expressed its views
in a scornful
way calling the conservatives of the Jockey
Club "a caste
of usurers and exploiters. "^^ Even the inmates at
the city

jail collectively expressed their exultation at the

victory of the "noble y valiente chusma de alpargata.

"^-^

The joy displayed by the Lencinists, however, was observed

by the opposition as further evidence of the revengeful

attitude of primitive people. In the words of the Mendozan

correspondent of La Prensa, the Lencinists provoked
"populacheros" episodes, of intolerable "gangsterism" whose

pleasure was to parade drunk in front of the Jockey Club,
in the heart of the city, "shouting insults impossible to

be reproduced."

22

These events and the style and language used by the

opposing sides indicate that the electoral decision was
based fundamentally on emotional feelings. The majority

Palabra
^"Ibid.

,

,

January 7, 1926.

January 18, 1926.

^^La Prensa, February

6,

1926.
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was committed to a caudillo,
more by sentiment than
ideology. The opposition was
also temperamentally

committed to reject the values
and social standing
represented by this caudillo and

his followers. Class

differences, however, continued to
be a vital factor in
deciding the behavior of the electorate
and in

subordinating every other issue to a single
one: are
you for or against the populist cause.
The return of Lencinism to power also
served to

frustrate the hopes that the opposition had placed
in
the federal intervention. If it was a fundamental

principle that the people must govern themselves,
commented La Prensa, the I^endozan experience indicated
that interventions were nothing but arbitrary measures

taken against the provinces by a stronger power that

abused its constitutional authority

.

^-^

For Carlos Washington the electoral victory of his

movement gave him the opportunity to move onto the larger
stage of national politics. Following a practice that
they had condemned in the Regimen of appointing former

governors to Senate seats, the Lencinist-dominated

legislature named their hero to the post vacated by Benito
Villanueva.

24.

^^ Ibid

.

,

January 10, 1926.

^^Lencinas had also been elected provincial Senator
in the January 1926 election and held this position and
that of National Senator-elect concurrently.

"
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In spite of Lencinas' commanding role
within the
party, he did not exert a very strict

control over the

Orfila government. 25 The new administration,
reflecting
the different personality and interests
of the

governor,

had its own characteristic, more attuned to
what could
be considered a traditional provincial rule

than to the

populist-oriented style of Jose Nestor Lencinas or
Carlos Washington. From a political viewpoint it was a

Lencinist government, but Orfila relied to some extent on
his own men and his own ideas. Moreover, his modus
operandi had to be different for he did not have the

appeal associated with the name Lencinas.

Orfila was one of the most prominent bodegueros of
Mendoza. Understandably then in his first message he

promised not to damage the interests of the capitalists
and warned the legislators that it would not be prudent

for the government to transform itself into the tutor of
the wine industry.

26

But Orfila also improved the existing

2^

Lencinas was regarded as the supreme caudillo,
never losing the power with which he kept his movement
alive. In truly paternalistic fashion most of the
correspondence from his partisans and political friends
addressed him as "jefe unico," "soldados disciplinados ,
"jefe espiritual y unico," "unico y genuine jefe." From
the correspondence in the hands of Antulio Horacio
Lencinas.

^^Provincia de Mendoza, Mensaje de S.E. el
Gobernador de Mendoza D. Alejandro ^ri'ila TMendoza, 1926),
p.

13.
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social legislation, increasing
substantially the mini,.mum
wage, which had remained at the
same level for the private
sector since enacted by Jose Nestor
Lencinas in 1918. He
also extended the minimum wage provision
to domestic
service, and granted it also the Sunday
holiday. Orfila,
however, plunged the province into major
financial

difficulties, which included a sizeable loan
from the
United States that greatly increased the provincial
debt.

Worse yet, this large indebtedness did not correct
the
ills which the huge loans were supposed to cure,

especially the perennial deficit of the School Board.

^'^

Lencinism received a very serious political setback
in 1927, on the occasion of the April

3

provincial

elections. The political campaign had been very heated,

but the Lencinists were confident of another victory.
However, when the votes began to be counted, the support

for the Yrigoyenist candidates proved to be stronger than
the Lencinists had anticipated. Facing the possibility of
an electoral defeat, on the night of the 6th a Lencinist

group invaded the electoral office and violated several

ballot boxes. Civic life in Mendoza was still primitive
and personalist-oriented, but that night it was set back
to the dark ages of caudillismo. Eventually the April

^Orfila' 3 government was referred as "the alleged
reign of extortion" by the weekly The Review of the River
Plate, LXVI, December 14, 1928, p.~J^.
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elections were declared void, but the
wrong step had
already been taken. By this pitiful
action the Lencinists
contradicted the noble efforts of Jose Nestor
Lencinas in
his life-long pursuit of a true political
democracy.
Curiously, most of the tarnish affecting
Orfila's

rule and the unfortunate events of April
1927, did not
diminish Carlos Washington's prestige. He was able
to

preserve the immense popularity he enjoyed with the
common man, both in the city and throughout the
departments. Moreover, his personal charisma was so strong
that it seemed an impossible task for the opposition to

eclipse his fame among the masses of Mendoza. In fact, the

political change in the governorship seemed just a tactical
step within the Lencinist strategy; nothing could restrict
the future moves of Carlos Washington if he wished to

return to rule the province after Orfila's

terra.

If within their respective provincial borders

Lencinism and Cantonism were so powerful that they could
cope with a federal intervention and later attempt to

return to power, the situation outside the patria chica
was totally different. In Congress, conservatives and

Yrigoyenists were gathering the strength to challenge the
ambitions of the men from Mendoza and San Juan.

Although Carlos Washington had been elected early in
1926 to a vacancy in the National Senate, that body

allowed eighteen months to pass before taking up his
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credentials. In the meantime the
Senator-elect could not
participate in its deliberations
or do much besides
denouncing the chamber as a docile
body that was
subordinated to the aims of "politiqueria"
and insensitive
to popular feelings.
Finally, by the end of Augxist 1927
the Senate's
Credentials Committee got around to recommending
that
Carlos Washington's diploma be rejected.
Almost certain
that the Senate would endorse its committee's

recommendation, Lencinas decided to spare himself the
defeat and resigned his post to the Mendozan legislature.
This move left the Senate empty-handed, without credentials
to reject. In marked contrast to its premeditated idleness

in taking up Carlos Washington's credentials, the Senate

urged the provincial legislature to appoint a new Senator,
presumably with the objective of reviewing his credentials
and rejecting them before adjourning on September 30. The

Mendozan legislature deliberately ignored the Senate
request, but on October

1,

the day after Congress recessed

for the year, the legislature also rejected Lencinas'
resignation, thus, allowing Carlos Washington to enjoy his

status of Senator-elect.
Bloquism: A Second Popular Mandate

As with Mosca in Mendoza, General Broquen, the Federal
28

La Prensa, August 16, 1927.
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Commissioner in San Juan, did not
intend to "liquidate"
Bloquism. In fact, during the fifteen
months he ruled
the province, Broquen maintained
a policy of tolerance
toward the Cantonists.29 They too
retained their

partisan fervor, as had the Lencinists
under similar
circumstances. The anti-Bloquists raised
protests against
what they felt was a too lenient attitude on
the part of

the Federal Government, and because the authorities
had

not conducted a full investigation into the Cantonist
rule. The Yrigoyenists in particular, urged the post-

ponement of the elections until justice was done with
regard to Jones' assassination.
In disapproval of Broquen'

s

policy, both

conservatives and Yrigoyenists abstained from

participating in the national elections for National
Deputies held in March 1926. The statement in which the

Yrigoyenists announced their abstention was indicative of
their extreme dislike of the Cantonists. They called the

Bloquists "an army of fanatics. .spreading the seeds of
.

class hate, social dissolution, violence and bloodshed
in simple-minded humble people. ...

"-^^

In spite of these

dreadful invectives, the Bloquists again proved at the

^Felix Luna refers to Alvear's policy toward the
Cantonis as one of "tacita proteccion." Alvear (Buenos
Aires, 1958), p. 71.
30

La Prensa, March

2,

1926.
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polls the large popular support they
enjoyed.
The Cantonists took advantage of
the non-punitive

attitude of the intervention to promote
their political
comeback. To this end they selected Senator
Aldo Cantoni
as their candidate for governor. The
Yrigoyenists, as

they had since Jones' assassination, proclaimed
their

electoral abstention. The conservative Liberal Party

adopted the same position, alleging that Cantonism
continued to be at war with the civilized values of
order, stability and respect for the law. In this way,

the political field was again left open for the election

of a Bloquist government. Regardless of the benefit
v/hich they could gain from their enemies'

abstention,

the Cantonist newspaper asked the anti-Bloquists to

reconsider their attitude; to give up the "Jockey Club
mentality" and the stupid prejudice of "believing they
were different from and above the workingmen."

Kore

significant yet, La Prensa lashed the anti-Cantonists

for their negligent inertia. The ills affecting the
provinces of Mendoza and San Juan, it said, were a
result of "the lack of preoccupation of the well-to-do
and cultured class with public affairs, having devoted

themselves to the pleasures of the material well-being

^-^The Bloquists polled 13t 333 votes against
2,563 for a group of "Independents." Canton, Mat eri ales
para el estudio , II, p. 96.
•^^La

Reforma, July 13, 1926.

.
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they were en joying. ... "^^

Meanwhile, the Bloquists stressed
that historical
experience strongly suggested that
what the province needed
was a government with an iron grip,
energetic and
firm,

like that which Aldo Cantoni could
provide. They appealed
again to their followers for order and
discipline
in

exercising their civic duties. With a moralistic
tone, the
Union Civica Radical Bloquista warned its rank
and file
that they did not wish any citizen to be drinking
or

provoking the opposition, to prove that they represented
a movement of responsible men.^^ As expected, in the

elections held on October 31, 1926, Aldo Cantoni was

elected Governor of San Juan by a decisive vote.^^

Broquen's report of his rule as Federal Commissioner
justified his refusal to become engaged in the investigative

process demanded by the opponents of Bloquism, into the
financial situation of former government officials and to

•^^La

Prensa

July 16, 1926.

,

^^La Reforma

,

October 29, 1926.

^^Aldo Cantoni received 17,125 votes, against 7,069
for the candidate of the Concentracion Civica. Senadores,
1929, I, 204. The Bloquist success was a reward for their
unabated political activism. They were only defeated in a
few municipal elections, where a restricted franchise to
vote still existed. The opposition won in the municipal
election in the Capital again, as well as in two
departments
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reopen the judicial process of the
Rinconada. No antiBloquist, explained Broquen, was
willing to understand
that the intervention could not and
should not perform
any acts but those specifically aimed
at reestablishing
constitutional rule. On the contrary, he stated

that some

groups had entertained the erroneous belief
that the
Federal Commissioner had gone to San Juan to
deliver the
government to them on a silver platter.

From Buenos Aires La Prensa observed with deep

pessimism the political reality of the two Cuyano
provinces. It felt that both the Mosca and the Broquen

interventions had not brought any changes, but had
simply marked time until the return of the Lencinists
and Bloquists. In its frustration, la Prensa concluded
that the Saenz Pena Law had failed, for in reality the

mere superiority of the number had only satisfied the

will of the populacherla.
When Governor Aldo Cantoni began his term early in

December 1926, he inherited the same political climate of
intense loyalties and hatreds which had existed under his

brother's rule. Even the sporadic flashes of violence

Ministerio del Interior, Memoria del Ministerio
del Interi or 1926-1927 (Buenos Aires, 1927T7 PP- 145-147.
Broquen also pointed out that the opposition to the
Bloquists could only organize a weak propaganda apparatus,
for in the March 1926 elections the Bloquists had opened
47 comites, in contrast to only 13 Yrigoyenists and 4
Liberals.
,

^"^La

Prensa, November 17, 1926.
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returned to the Sanjuaaino land.
On November
only a week before inauguration,

30,

1926,

an attempt was made on

the life of Aldo Cantoni. He
escaped death only

accidentally by having exchanged seats
in his car with
his chauffeur, who died instantly.
Thus, by a whim of
fate, San Juan was spared another
political
tragedy.

Federico Cantoni had begun his populist
government in
1923 with the events of the Rinconada in the immediate
background. Three years later, only a miracle
allowed
Aldo Cantoni to reassume the populist crusade from
the

government house. Hatred and political violence in San

Juan took no respite.
The second Bloquist administration constituted a

harmonious extension of the previous government of
Pederico Cantoni. Such continuity had not been present in

Mendoza when Orfila succeeded Carlos Washington. However,
although to a large extent the governments of Federico
and Aldo Cantoni in the 1920 's can be considered a unit
in their policies and their actions. Aide's administration

made evident the personality differences between the two
Cantoni brothers. For Aldo was less tempered and a better

organizer than Federico, Despite Aide's long indoctrination
in the ideals of the political left, his government did not

convert San Juan into a Socialist model. Basically, he

The assailants fled to the mountains, but they
were caught by the Bloquists. The man who had shot
Cantoni 's chauffeur was killed. This led the opposition
to charge that the Cantonists had taken justice into their
own hands.
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accentuated the characteristics
that had provoked the
fierce opposition against Pederico's
rule, especially its
financial aspects. Business and
property taxes, which had
been substantially raised by the
first Bloquist
government, were now heavily increased
again. This
renewed the adamant opposition of the
mercantile sectors
against the Cantonists. Aldo also carried
out an

ambitious program of public works, which
remain to his
everlasting credit.

Paralleling Carlos Washington's steps, Federico had

been elected provincial Senator and soon thereafter the
legislature of San Juan appointed him National Senator.
As with the Mendozan caudillo, Federico also continued to

be the undisputed leader of Bloquism. Under his guidance,
the populist seal of the government, as well as the

innovative, reformist spirit which so especially

characterized Bloquism, was kept alive.
The rhetoric of class conflict continued to be

present in the Bloquist literature, which viewed the
province as divided between exploiters and exploited, and

between "pueblo" and "anti-pueblo." The Sanjuanino
patricians, said La Ref orma in one of its many editorials
critical of the opposition, represent the old castes,

parasitarians and useless, who lecture on "civic action"

•^^The Sanjuanino historian Horacio C. Videla
summed up the rule of the Cantonis as "grandes vientos de
ref orma." Retablo san.juanino (Buenos Aires, 1956), p. 96.
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in front of the poker tables.
Federioo Caatoni, on the
other hand, was portrayed in the
official press as a man
who knew the sufferings of the poor
people and who was
engaged in a permanent struggle against
the privileged
and the exploiters.^*^

Two special illustrations serve to
reveal the

intensity and determination of Federico and Aldo
Cantoni
and their movement to effect an integral reform
of the

Sanjuanino society. One was a license tax imposed upon
the medical profession; the other, of far reaching

importance, was an amendment to the provincial
constitution.

Early in 1927, in line with the Bloquists'

traditional approach to revenue raising, the government
of San Juan greatly increased all business and

professional franchise taxes. Of particular interest,
it established an extremely high tax of

$

5,000 per

year on doctors, but exempted them from paying it if
they agreed to work two hours daily, without pay, in
the Asistencia Publica, the Public Health Agency.

According to the Bloquists, this severe action was
taken in order to control what they considered the

abuses and lack of humanity of the medical profession.
They specifically assailed the medical association
40 La Refqrma, January 26, 1927.

.
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for setting up guidelines, which,
in the Cantonist view,
constituted a cynical commercialization
of a most
important social service.

Beyond the technical or administrative
conflict
which resulted from these guidelines,
the affair had a
clear political dimension. Most of the
doctors
were

opposed to the Bloquists and they interpreted
the
imposition of the tax as a hateful political

tourniquet,

inspired not with an eye to the provincial coffer, but
engineered by the government to reap political benefits
by offering free medical service to the population,

without costing a cent to the province. Since the large

majority of the people who attended the Public Health
Agency were from the poorer classes, who constituted
the political following of Bloquism the anti-Cantonist

doctors would be forced to cooperate, indirectly, with
the policy of their adversary

41

The bylaws of the doctors' mutual association
stated that they would not accept employment at any
hospital unless they were paid $ 200 a month, and that
they would not assist patients in consultation v/ith
other physicians without a payment of 50 pesos and
previous approval of the deal by the association.

^^It also seems that the doctors feared an
outright Socialism, as can be inferred from the
conservative-sponsored bill to approve another
intervention in San Juan, which was introduced in the
National Chamber of Deputies in 1927. It stated that if
all doctors were to cooperate with the government,
there would be no patients left to be assisted
privately, because all the people would be entitled to
free medical assistance. Diputados 1927, It 769
(June 22).
,
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Enraged by this, the doctors of
San Juan with the
cooperation of the medical profession
in other provi.nces,
launched a campaign to repeal the
tax/^ A war of wordIs
broke out between the doctors and
the supporters of thle
regime. With his typical bluntness
Federico
Cantoni

stated that if a butcher paid over

$

1,000 annually in

municipal taxes, it was only fair to demand
a doctor who earned ten times as

much."^"^-

$

5,000 from

The Bloquist

press, for its part, denounced the doctors as
insensitive
to need, and depicted them as mercenary members
of a

privileged caste.
The fiscal and social aspects of the tax issue soon

became entangled in politics, providing one more
battleground for continuing the permanent struggle

between Bloquists and anti-Bloquists.^^ The issue
43

According to Dr. Indalecio Carmona Rlos, a
Socialist leader and a medical doctor himself, of the 56
doctors registered in the city of San Juan, only 12
agreed to pay the tax. Personal interview. July 6, 1972.
San Juan.
4.4

M Reforma

45

,

December 30, 1926.

The Sanjuanino doctors appealed to the courts
to void such a high tax. A year later, the National
Supreme Court ruled on this thorny and highly emotional
issue, asserting that this license tax was
unconstitutional because it had been levied with the
purpose of penalizing a special class of persons.
Rizzotti V. San Juan (1928). Araadeo, Argentine
Constitutional Law pp. 211-212.
,
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demonstrates, in a capsule, the
combative nature of their
relations. The populist stand of the
former and their
position in behalf of the humble sectors
irked the
traditional segments of the provincial
society. Besides,
the fiscal policy of the second Bloquist
government

alienated the business and land-owning sectors
to the
point of total irreconciliation.^^
The second illustration, symbolic of the
reformist

nature and resoluteness of the Sanjuanino movement,
refers to the amendment of the provincial constitution

which took place early in 1927. This was one of the most
important and least known achievements of Bloquism. The
plans for a constitutional reform had been expressed by
the Cantonists in the early stages of their movement,

and the reformist impetus was mainly engineered by the

leftist intellectual mentors of Bloquism.

^'^
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The provincial budget for 1927 surpassed
10,000,000 pesos, an exceedingly high figure for an
underdeveloped province. Therefore, all levels of
taxation were raised again. A sizeable amount of the
budget was allocated for public works, especially for
highway construction. The Bloquists built a road to the
west, to Calingasta, which was heralded as a model.
However, as the f inca of Aldo Cantoni was located there,
the opposition contended that this monumental work
through mountaneous terrain was intended to serve the
personal economic interest of the governor. A significant
step was the enactment in April 1928 of an old-age
pension, financed through an additional tax on wine. The
pension, on paper at least, granted financial assistance
to persons 60 years old and older.
^"^Three days after assuming office, Aldo Cantoni
sent a message to the legislature proposing constitutional
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The 1927 reform constituted a
pioneer experiment in
light of the new principles it embodied.
Some of its
provisions were so innovative that they
invited challenge
as unconstitutional. But most of its
clauses revealed the

advanced nature of the document. In fact,
some of its
principles were not incorporated into the national
constitution until two decades later. The populist
spirit
which guided this reform, as well as the new sociopolitical principles it comprised, could be a theme for a
special work in itself. Only the thrust of the most

salient reforms and the Bloquist justification for them
will be given here.^^
In the political field the principal innovations
were:

(1)

it granted universal suffrage for women, both

in municipal and provincial elections. Until then only

reform. It acted very promptly and early in January the
delegates to the constitutional convention were elected.
The Bloquists obtained 13,245 votes; the Socialists
1,863 and the Progressive Democrats 1,208. Fourteen
Bloquists were elected along with two Socialists and one
Progressive Democrat. The new charter became effective
on February 11, 1927. La Prensa, January 12, 1927.

^^Provincia de San Juan, Diario de sesiones de la
Honorable Convencion Ref ormadora de la Uonstitucion
(San Juan, 1927). Graciano Recca, a leftist politician
who came to San Juan with Aldo Cantoni, was the
factotum behind the constitutional amendment. Grecca
stated that the fundamental reform they could
accomplish would be to grant constitutional status to
the rights of the workingmen. La Prensa January 9t
1927.
,
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men voted and even in municipal
elections there was a
restricted franchise; (2) it declared
the total separati on
of church and State; (3) it
established the single-member
district electoral system instead of the
two-thirds

majority system, sanctioned for the nation
by the Saenz
Pena Law. In this way only the winner of
every district
was elected, without any representation
assigned
to the

minority in any district;

(4)

in case of a federal

intervention the provincial budget would have no legal
force; thus the "intruding" federal authorities would
not

be able to handle any provincial funds, and (5) it set up
a unicameral legislature by abolishing the Senate.

In the social field, the new constitution established
the right of every person to a minimum of economic

security, a minimum wage, labor protection and safe working

conditions. It reaffirmed the principles of National Law

1420 that public education should be lay, compulsory and
free of charge. It also provided direct assistance to

pupils whose parents could not afford to acquire school
materials.

Pederico Cantoni, who had been elected delegate to
the convention, was the leading Bloquist spokesman. There

were no extensive debates at the convention partly because
of the small non-Bloquist representation, and partly

because the Cantonists had prepared and discussed the
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constitution in advance. They
therefore, believed that it
was not necessary to delve
extensively
into matt<;ers on

which the majority had clearly
made up their mind,Is as
indicated by their having voted for
the Bloquists. In
this respect, the Bloquists applied
in the constitutional
convention the same procedures as they
had in the

legislature.

Because of the strong social accent of the
proposed
reforms Cantoni made precise references throughout
the
debates to the social situation in San Juan. He

emphasized time and again the populist principles with

which Bloquism was identified, and by referring to the
unfortunate condition of the lower sectors, he underscored
the basic class differences afflicting the Sanjuanino

society. Justifying the need for setting up welfare

legislation for rural workers, Cantoni recalled that the
patrones always reserved for the peons the storage area,
or the worst room of the house. He asserted that the

solution to these problems lay in promoting the right of
the workers to demand social justice based on principles
of social solidarity and not as a handout or an act of

charity,

Cantoni agreed that the workers should have the right
to strike, but only through pacific means. This thought

Epoca which had never printed a single word
of criticism of Yrigoyen, referred to the Bloquist delegates
as a "conciliabulo de serviles." January 30, 1927.
liSi

,
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suggests that in addition to
Cantoni's concern for social
justice, he also believed, in line
with his paternalistic
style, that the labor movement
should be somewhat

controlled or regulated by the State.
At the same time
the Bloquist caudillo reaffirmed his
known opposition to
transforming the State into an employment
agency. Thus,

in justification of his exclusion of
government personnel
from the constitutional minimum wage provision,
Cantoni
stated that people should not be encouraged to
seek

government jobs, a practiced so rooted in the minds of
the individuals. On the contrary, he asserted that
people

should invest their savings in the creation of small
industries and other business. Cantoni dreamed of

transforming the laggard provincial economy into an
active center composed of independent shopkeepers and

industrious small-size landowners.
The Socialists agreed with most of the reforms

introduced by the Bloquists, but they expressed their
total opposition to the election of the legislature by

districts. The Socialists argued that one party could

obtain the majority in all of the districts, as actually

happened with Bloquisra, even if it was a split-hair
margin, and the new legislation would not allow any

representation for the minority.
^^This system had been applied briefly in Argentina early in the century and it was established in
Great Britain and France.
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But what provoked the rage of
the anti-Bloquists
was Cantoni's open statement that
the representation of
minorities was useless. This scorn
for minority
representation, anti-democratic as it
appeared, has to
he analyzed in conjunction with
his view of grass roots
government. Cantoni thought of a representative
of
the

people as one who was closely identified with
the needs
of the district he represented. At the
same time, on
a

larger scale, Cantoni felt the role of the
representatives
as a group was to fulfill the program outlined by
their

party. Therefore, there was no need for a politician to

act independently of the norms and principles set up by

his political organization. This fundamental assumption
led Cantoni to state at the constitutional assembly that

"caudillismo" was dead in San Juan because Bloquisra was
an organic party, at the service of an official program
of action and not men's own ambitions.

The Majority-only system so enthusiastically

defended by Cantoni elicited cutting criticism from

almost all national sectors. In their eyes, it confirmed
the opinion about the authoritarian nature of Cantonism.

The Socialists strongly objected to including the single-

member electoral provision in the constitution and pointed
out that the Bloquists were following in Mussolini's

steps, for the Italian leader also believed that the

minorities were worthless.

^^La Vanguardia

,

Apparently, Cantoni refused

February

8,

1927
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recognize that although the majority
should in fact have
the right to rule and dictate
policy,
any majority,

regardless of its size, represented
majority but not
absolute power. Aside from this
major objection,
the

Socialists gave their support to most
of the Bloquist
reforms, especially to the provision
granting universal

suffrage for women.
The Socialist La Vanguardia, which had
always been

critical of Bloquism, recognized that "there are
many

innovations which are badly needed in the national
constitution, in order to bring it up to the times we

live in." 53 In fact, the Sanjuanino charter incorporated

many features which were very close to the Socialists'
heart: a non-religious stand, popular education under the

principles of law 1420, universal vote for women, and

bringing down the barriers of a restricted electorate for
municipal elections. In comparison to the provincial
constitution, noted La Vanguardia

,

the national one "is

an anacronism, something very inferior."

54

52

The Progressive Democrat Ventura Larrosa was the
only delegate who was opposed to this step, believing
that women's right to vote should be granted gradually.
The first priority, Larrosa said, was to improve the
procedures and habits of the males voting before
allowing women to vote.
^•^La

Vanguardia

^^ Ibid .

,

February 15, 1927.

In his 1927 annual message to the
Aldo Cantoni proudly pointed out
Governor
legislature
had until then looked at the
who
that those scholars
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The anti-Bloquist sectors,
however, believed that
such a reform was less than an
asset for San Juan. Thus,
when the reforms were proposed by
Governor Aldo Cantoni,
they were scorned as an attempt to
intrude one-sided

partisan views into the fundamental law
of the
province, in order to please "populachero"

desires.

Another major criticism of the opposition
focused on the
right to a minimum of economic security, a
principle

which they considered would pave the way for a
guaranteed "salary for loafing. "^^
As for universal suffrage for women, Juan Antonio

Gonzalez Calderon, an expert on constitutional law,

believed it to be a legal provision, but questioned
whether it would not cause a deterioration in family
life. Furthermore, Gonzalez Calderon declared that the

principle of universal suffrage would transform democracy

into demagogy, as had been the case in the municipal
elections. He felt that if the electoral system were to
be entirely democratized, it would end up being
corrupted.

56

Another criticism pointed out that there

social legislation of Uruguay as the most advanced or at
the Mexican constitution as a model, now had in the
constitution of San Juan a testimony of progressive,
modern constitutional law. Kensaje del Gobernador de la
Provincia Dr. Aldo Cantoni, May 12, 1927 (San Juan,
1927), p. 11.
,

^^Diario Nuevo

,

February 10, 1927.

^^La Prensa, January

3,

1927.

.
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would be nothing evil in a federal
intervention-whioh
Bloquism attempted to quash through
financial

strangulation-if it aimed at restoring
law and order in
the province.

What was perhaps one of the most
significant
achievements of the constitution became a
reality in the
elections held on April 8, 1928. On that day
women

throughout San Juan exercised the right to vote
for the
first time, without any restrictions. It was a
harbinger
of the more significant day in November 1951, when
women

all over Argentina were able to vote under the same

unrestricted conditions for the first time. Thus San

Juan had the privilege of being the first province in

Argentina where women exercised the right of universal
suffrage, and hence the leader in the crusade for

equality
This achievement was especially remarkable because
it was implemented at a time when there was generally

strong sentiment against granting women a right
(57

Diario Nuevo, February 19, 1927. Experts in
constitutional law who examined the 1927 San Juan
constitution contended that the provision declaring
that the provincial budget was unappli cable under a
federal intervention, was unconstitutional. Arturo M.
Bas, El derecho federal argentine Nacion ^ provincias
(Buenos Aires, 1927), p. i-ix; Octavio Gil, Autonomia
provincial Historia ^ concepto constitucional (Buenos
Aires, 1928), p. 186; Eaustino J. Legon, Cornentario de
la nueva constituci5n de San Juan (Buenos Aires, 1927),
.

.

p. 69.

o
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traditionally reserved for men. This
sentiment was due in
part to the fact that women were
not considered politically
prepared to exercise their right to
vote, and in part

because of the desire, especially of
the upper classes, to
protect women from the abuses generally
associated with
politics and voting practices.
The April 1928 provincial
election proved, at least, that women could
exercise voting
rights without giving up their values and their
way
of

life as many widespread critics had feared.
58

^he Bloquists also led the way in promoting female
participation in the activities of the party to the extent
of setting up special women's organizations. With
women
voting, citizen participation in the electoral process
in
San Juan improved significantly to 36.6 per cent of the
total population (56,000 voters on a provincial population
of 153,000 inhabitants). In comparison, the figures for
national elections, vdth only men voting, were:
.

Population
1926
1928

147,097
161,592

Voters
20,473
28,918

^
13.91
17.89

Ministerio del Interior, Memoria del Minis tori
Interior 1927 - 1928 p. 73.

del

.

,

59

'^^The Bloquists were as successful with the feminine
side of the electorate as they had been with males. The
returns of the April 8, 1928, provincial election were as

f ollov/s:

U.C.R. Bloquista
Socialist Party
Blank
Total

Male

Female

Total

21,363
2,933
2,146

24,771
2,130
2,665

46,134
5,063
4,811

26,442

29,566

56,008

Provincia de San Juan, Junta Electoral de la Provincia,
Libro de Actas No. 6, pp. 233-258.
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After the federal interregnum,
Lencinism and
Bloquisrn had proven their strength
by returning

to

office, largely because of the unabated
support of the
"chusma de alpargata." While the second
Bloquist

government honored its promises for social
and political
reform, and continued exerting an authoritarian
rule,

Lencinism was much less effective in making a reality
of its avowed populist stand. But now the solid

leadership earned by Carlos Washington and Federico
Cantoni in their Cuyo provinces, had to confront in

Buenos Aires the opposition from hostile and powerful
political forces. For in Congress they had to become
engaged in an of ensive-def ensive operation, that is,

projecting a positive view of the principles and
procedures of their regional movements and staving off
the attacks and challenges of their embittered political

adversaries.
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CHAPTER

XI

LENCINISM MID BLOQUISM. FROM CUYO TO
BUENOS AIRES:
NEW CHALLENGES AHEAD

Bloquism Encounters the National Senate

With the designation of Carlos Washington
Lencinas
and Federico Cantoni as National Senators by
their
respective provincial legislatures in Mendoza and San
Juan, the National Senate became the scene of a direct

confrontation between Cuyano populism and Yrigoyenist
Radicalism. The conflict took the form of a debate over
credentials. In the case of Cantoni, and of his fellow

Senator-elect Carlos

R. Porto,

the issue seemed simple."^

Carlos R. Porto, who had been Minister of
Government under Federico Cantoni, had also being
appointed National Senator and his credentials were
considered together with Cantoni 's.
To emphasize the special nature of their
movements, the Lencinists and Bloquists in Congress
organized a parliamentary group called the "leftist block."
Their aim was to adopt a "uniform policy" in Congress,
molded in "liberal, progressive, reformist and humanist
principles, for the benefit of Argentine democracy." This
political cluster constituted in theory an ideological
force aspiring to project into national level policy the
creed of their provincial movements. Their Radicalism, they
stated, was leftist-oriented and eminently liberal. They
offered guarantees to a "sano" capitalism and pledged to
protect the lower class sectors "so neglected by the
Regimen and some Radical governments." La Hcf orma April
22, 1926. This parliamentary scheme, however, have no
effect because the lencinists and Bloquists congressmen,
small in number even under normal circumstances, were
practically excluded from Congress by the rejection of
their credentials. Regardless of its ephemeral existence,
the creation of this self-serving block served to
demonstrate the special ideological ties between the two
populist Cuyano movements.
,

412

Under the constitution the Senate
only had to determine
whether their election by the legislature
was made in

accordance with the law. In reality,
however, national
political interests as well as personal
rivalries entered
into the picture. Besides the sharp
animosities aroused
by Cantoni's personality, a complicating
factor
was the

detenrdnation of the Yrigoyenists to seek revenge
for
Jones' martyrdom.
Yrigoyenist hatred for Cantoni extended to anyone

sympathetic to him and his movement. Thus, the association
of Carlos Washington with the Bloquists hurt the former's

chances of having his own credentials accepted by the
Senate. Jorge Calle, the Lencinist National Deputy, noted
this when he wrote to Carlos V/ashington that many

congressmen were unhappy with the brutality of Cantonism
and warned that "it is very unwise to be aligned with the

political situation in San Juan. This is the least

I

can

tell you."^

The opening of the debate over Cantoni's credentials

aroused wide public interest; all the halls and corridors
of the Senate building hummed with people avid to attend

the meetings; the visitors gallery, the barra, was filled
to capacity; an air of expectancy settled over the

Chamber.

^Jorge Calle to Carlos Washington Lencinas, May 18,
1927. Correspondence in the hands of Antulio Lencinas.

s
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Senator Mora Olmedo, of San Luis,
spoke for the
madority of the Credentials Committee
in urging rejection
of the credentials. Mora Olmedo in
his address critically

reviewed the performance of the Bloquist
governments, and
based the Committee's negative recommendation
on the
contention that Bloquism represented a system of
immorality and tyranny, in open defiance of the
national
constitution. Cantoni and Porto responded to Mora Olmedo'

stinging remarks by mounting a counterattack, pointing
out the underdeveloped and elitist conditions that

prevailed in Mora Olmedo own province, San Luis, and citing
numerous examples of its inadequate social organization,
its backwardness and the parasitical nature of its

bureaucracy. Porto, for example, contrasted San Juan with
San Luis in the fields of public works, education and

finances, amply demonstrating the deplorable conditions in
the latter province.^

When it was Cantoni

's

turn to defend his credentials,

he proved to be the attraction of the debates. His

picturesque language and the unusual frankness with which
he spoke to the Senators aroused general attention.

Cantoni

's

main contribution during the several days of

debate was an impassioned defense of the workingmen of
San Juan. In a blunt reference to the very Senators who

would decide his seat, Cantoni proclaimed
^Senadores, 1927, I, 472-481 (August 18).

4
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the more I know the most important
men of m.v
country, the more I love the chinos of
my
patria chica. They have a greater sould
deeper 1 eelings. . .and I am convinced thatand
their
sentiments are superior and nobler than those
of the men sitting in this hall.

He also warned the leaders of the country
not to
neglect paying attention to the stomachs of the

poor, and

he justified on moral grounds the license tax
set up for

doctors in San Juan. Cantoni also reiterated his views

against the State functioning as an employment agency,

deploring the fact that many people in Argentina were

begging to enter the bureaucracy, while the poor farmer,
his wife and children, had to work hard from sunrise to
sunset. The Senator-elect told his attentive audience

that he always advised the Sanjuaninos to increase their

personal wealth, to avoid vices in order to be thrifty,
and to work harder to produce more goods, because the

Ibid
506. Cantoni expanded this views in an
outspoken and direct way:
El senor presidente Qof the Senate^ habra oido
hablar de esos chinos rohosos, y yo digo sehores
senadores: la roha del trabajo es una rori'a
superior y tiene mas merito y mas prestigio por
su virtud y menos mal olor que esta rona inteligente y cerebral que cree que se puede servir al
pais solo con discursos , ,y hace tambien perder
el tiempo en discusiones como estas, en la que
no se hace mas que gastar papel impreso y muchos
miles de pesos para la impresion del diario de
sesiones, que en realidad no sirve sino para
demostrar que algunos hablan mas o menos bien,
otros mas o menos regular, o mas o menos
brutalmente como lo hace el que habla.
512.
Ibid.
.

,

.

,
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better off they became economically, the
more independent
they would be. Thus, all the citizens
would
have more

freedom to vote for whomever they wanted,
instead of being
compelled to follow the choice of the patron.
As in every occasion in which Yrigoyenists
and

Bloquists confronted each other, the events of the
Rinconada, which had been hotly disputed since
1921, were

discussed again, but now neither group was able to
convince the other. At issue in the debate, however, was
a conflict over political style as well as philosophy.

This was well revealed in the following exchange between

Cantoni and Senator Luis Linares, for Salta:
- Linares: In San Juan the Senators-elect are very popular.

How could it be different if they, by

a well conceived

and coldly executed system dispossess a minority to give
to a majority?

- Cantoni: That is democracy! to rule for the majority'.
- Linares: That is demagogy

I

It is a shame, a despoilment'.

Such was the strength of the Cantonist arguments,
however, that La Prensa

,

certainly no friend of the

Bloquists, asserted that the decisive stand of Federico
and Porto had pulverized a number of adverse viewpoints
and had won wide support for the Sanjuanino Senators-elect.

Commenting on the frankness of speech which was habitual to
^Ibid., 626. The full debates are in 448-491 (Aug. 18);
498-507~TAug. 20); 508-548 (Aug. 22); 549-593 (Aug. 23);
594-648 (Aug. 24).

.

416

Cantoni, La Prensa stated that he had
"called by their
proper names things which were usually
referred to by

euphemisms." The porteno paper also praised
Porto for his
description "in master strokes," of the pitiable
working
conditions of the laboring sectors in San Luis,
and

concluded that "until now never had anyone spoken
in the
Senate with such frankness and fairness."^
But the oratory of the Upper House did not change
the minds of any Senator, for the vote followed well

defined positions; the credentials of Cantoni and Porto
were rejected 14 to

5.'^

The Bloquists, however, took the

view that they had lost only a battle and not the war,
for less than two weeks after the rejection of the
credentials, San Juan's legislature again elected Cantoni
and Porto as National Senators.

Lencinism and Bloquism. Bulwarks of anti-Yrigoyenism
The importance of these two Cuyo movements as part of
the sector nationally opposed to Yrigoyen, was emphasized

by the upcoming presidential election, scheduled for April
1,

1928. The political climate in Argentina heated up well

in advance of that date. The strong possibility that

Yrigoyen could be elected for a second presidential term
had already in 1927 provoked euphoria among the Yrigoyenis ts

^La Prensa, August 22, 1927.

Yrigoyenists and the conservatives voted for
rejection; four anti-Personalists and two Socialist
Senators, Juan B. Justo and Mario Bravo voted for approval.
"^The

.

As for their oppoaents, early
that year and after entangled
maneuvers, the anti-Personalists
proclaimed the
candidacies of National Senators
Lepoldo Melo and Vicente
G. Gallo for the presidency
and vicepresidency

Because Mendoza and San Juan were
important antiYrigoyenist bastions, a very peculiar
situation developed.
The conservatives were adamant against
Yrigoyen. But at
the same time they cherished the same
feelings against

lencinism and Bloquism, which they considered to
be as
demagogic and pernicious as Yrigoyenism. On the other
hand, the political reality was such that they needed
the

support of the Cuyo movements in order to attempt the
defeat of the Personalists in 1928. The conservative-

oriented Melo-Gallo ticket created problems in Mendoza

for both the conservatives and the lencinists. The

Liberals of Mendoza considered it impossible for them to
enter into any kind of political partnership with the

Lencinists in support of the same presidential ticket.
The Mendozan conservatives were torn by the decision they

had to make and they debated heatedly over the proper
course for them to follow. In December 1927 the majority
of the Liberal Party decided to reject any common cause

with the Lencinists, and therefore, to endorse their own
presidential candidates. "We never could join in a
presidential ticket supported by Lencinism," declared
the conservative Raffo de la Rata on this occasion. "Not
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even if it is only the presidential
candidate," added
Gilberto Suarez Lago, another liberal
leader.^
Since they were committed to
preventing the return
of Yrigoyen to power, the
anti-Personalist sectors

outside Mendoza harshly criticized the
attitude taken by
the conservatives of that province. What
was necessary,
sadly commented la Prensa, was to think of
national

interest first and local interests later. ^ But
most of
the Mendozan conservatives remained totally
intransigent.

For them the first priority was "to destroy Lencinism. "^^
While the conservatives thus found themselves in a
crossfire, the Lencinists fortheir part viewed the return
of Yrigoyen to the presidency as a sure sign of a new

federal intervention in Kendoza. Thus, the presidential

election was a fundamental matter of political survival
for them. It seemed terribly awkward that a populist

caudillo like Lencinas should be supporting a "galerita"
like Melo, but Carlos Washington did not have any other

alternative in his drive to prevent Yrigoyen'

s

victory.

The Yrigoyenists, both in Mendoza and Buenos Aires,

revived the memory of Jose Nestor Lencinas from the
oblivion in which they had buried him since 1919. They

recalled his letter to Kelo of that year in which he

^La Prensa

%bid

.

,

,

December 17, 1927.

December 22, 1927.

^^Ibid., December 17, 1927.
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told him "you will never be
president." Thus, one strong
weapon against Melo's candidacy,
which Carlos Washington
openly supported, was, ironically,
Carlos Washington's
father letter. The Yrigoyenist emphasized
the duplicity
of the son in comparison with the
integrity of the
father, to the point of affirming that
Jose Nestor

Lencinas "never was a Lencinist "that he had
nothing to
do with his descendents, whom the Personalists
referred
,

as a "generation of cockroaches."^^ Ten years
after his

heralded assumption of power in Mendoza, Jose Nestor
Lencinas' memory was revived in the turbulent presidential

campaign of 1928, but this time as a banner of the

Yrigoyenistsi

12

In San Juan Bloquism also constituted one of the
supporters of the anti-Yrigoyenist camp. The same anomaly
evident in Mendoza was present here, where a populist

leader like Cantoni was supporting Melo for president.
But the anti-Yrigoyenist fervor they shared forged a link

•^Ha Epoca
12

,

March 10, 1928.

Since both sides had high stakes at issue,

Mendoza witnessed a political campaign of abuse and
intolerance. As an illustration, a few days before the
election, Walter Rittrcan, a young iiinglishman who had
arrived recently in Mendoza to work for the Banco Anglo
Sudamericano, was stopped one night in the street by a
group of roughs who ordered hira to cheer for the gaucho
Lencinas. Rittman was unable to understand what he was
asked to do, but his silence was taken as a provocation
and he was fatally shot. The Review of the River Plate
LXVI, April 6, 1928, pp. 7, 9.
,
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between Cantoni and the anti-Personalist
national leaders.
The participation of Federico Cantoni
in political
rallies in the Federal Capital was one of
the most
colorful characteristics of the 1928 campaign.
In contrast
to Melo's dull and unattractive style, Cantoni
spoke to

the people in plain words, highly flavored with
popular,

vulgar terms, which La Reforma defined as "unkempt
oratory,""'-^ but which always created an impact on the

audiences. Cantoni

presence at political rallies was in

's

permanent demand. Night after night when he announced
that he was ending his speech, the people asked him not
to end it but to go on. The familiar and aggressive tone

of his attacks against the Personalists stirred up the

Yrigoyenist aversion for him more and more. Partisan
fervor thus led to street violence and one night Cantoni
saved his skin only miraculously after his car was fired

upon several

times."'"''''

The 1928 presidential campaign clearly placed

Pederico Cantoni on the national stage. His case was
practically unique in Argentina's political history after

•^^La

Reforma

,

March 14, 1928.

"^^Violence, of course, was not exclusive with one
sector. But when a few days before the election a new and
serious armed confrontation took place between the
Yrigoyenists and their opponents after a rally at which
Cantoni had spoken, the Personalists abruptly decided to
end their political campaign, they said, in order to

avoid more bloodshed.
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1862, for Cantoni was a provinciano
who had gained fame
in his native land, not in Buenos
Aires. In 1928 his
personal style and commanding rhetoric
produced an

impact on the portefios, a fact which
becomes more
significant when it is realized that Cantoni

was from a

backward province far away from the
influential and richer
littoral. Whether Cantoni was hated or applauded,
the fact

is that his name became a household word in the
very heart

of the nation's capital. Domingo P. Sarraiento,
another

Sanjuanino, had also been "a bull in his ring and a super-

bull in other people's ring,"— "toro en su rodeo
y torazo
en rodeo ajeno"— as he put it, but he had not built up
his
national stature in his native province. On the contrary,
Cantoni was attractive in Buenos Aires because of the

qualities he had already shown as a popular caudillo in
San Juan; and, equally significant, while he was in Buenos

Aires, he retained his native Sanjuanino spirit and

mentality.
Yrigoyen's Political Regeneration Revived
Despite the efforts of the anti-Yrigoyen forces, the

presidential election of April 1928 constituted a sweeping
personal triumph for the ex-president. Yrigoyen popular
vote was twice as large as that received by his leading
opponent, Melo. In Mendoza, where the Lencinists and

conservatives supported rival slates, Yrigoyen won by a
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much smaller margin than his national
percentage. Even so,
this marked the first electoral defeat
for Lencinism

since

1918. San Juan, on the other hand, gave a
clear majority
to Melo, the only province to do so,
but here of course,
the Yrigoyenists, aware of their disadvantage
had abstained

from the election. "^^
As feared by the Lencinists and Bloquists, the

Personalist victory meant that their days in power were
numbered. The fate of the governments of Alejandro Orfila

and Aldo Cantoni was as certain as the sun which rose

everyday in the east. The Yrigoyenists had been pressing
since 192? for Congress to vote a federal intervention in

San Juan, but without result.

With the support of the

conservatives they had been successful in blocking

acceptance of the credentials of Cantoni and Porto as
Senators-elect. But the election of April

1

opened the

door of political opportunity for which the Personalists
15

The election returns in Mendoza were: UCR
Personalist 27,323 votes; UCR Lencinist 20,166. Canton,
Materiales para el estudio II, p. 114. In San Juan
the returns were: UCR Bloquist 19,594; Socialist Party
6,001. Pablo Alberto del Carril Quiroga, Antecedentes
electorales nacionales Distrito San Juan 1927 - 1943
(Cordoba, 1948), n.p. For this election the Bloquists
formed two other political organizations, called Comite
Pro-Ferrocarril a Calingasta and Comite Pro-Perrocarril
a Jachal. The Socialists impugned this maneuver, for its
purpose was to give the Cantonists both the majority and
the minority seats. Therefore, the electoral judge
pp. 233-243.
declared the election void. Ibid
,

.

,

.

^ Siputados

,

,

1927, I, 752-779 (June 22).

•
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had been waiting since

1922.-^'^

The new Congress, where the
Yrigoyenists enjoyed a
larger voice in 1928, especially in
the Chamber
of

Deputies, proceeded to debate the
sending of an
intervention to San Juan, even before
Yrigoyen's

inauguration. These debates constituted
another chapter
in the continuing three-way struggle between
the Cuyano
populist movements on the one hand and their
enemies, the

Yrigoyenists and the conservatives. The terms used by the
anti-Cantonists in Congress to characterize the Bloquists
and their leaders, marked a special chapter in Argentine

congressional annals. A collection of all the words

expressed to denigrate the Sanjuanino movement would
comprise an anthology of hatred very seldom, if ever,

leveled at a provincial political force and a provincial
caudillo. Cantoni was depicted, among other things, as a
despot, madman and a monster, the ruler of a "sinister

mafia," who was only satisfied with the blood of his
enemies
17

Jorge Calle wrote to Carlos V/ashington that
Yrigoyen had decided that no Senator from the opposition
coming from a province won by the Personalists would be
accepted in the Upper House. Calle also told Lencinas
that Diego Luis Molinari had said informally, but for
everybody inside Congress to hear, that Yrigoyen would
dissolve the Senate if this body accepted the credentials
of Cantoni and Porto. Jorge Calle to Carlos Washington
Lencinas, April 21, 1928. Correspondence in the hands of
Antulio Lencinas.
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The Yrigoyenist position was
based on the uncompromising
principle that after the assassination
of Governor Jones
nothing legal had occurred in San Juan.
They repeated this
point over and over; after November
20, 1921, nothing

legal happened in San Juan, absolutely nothing.
The

Yrigoyenists were committed to the view that Bloquism
and
the Cantonis had done nothing in accordance
with the
law.

Thus, the representatives of the Radical Personalists
who

proclaimed themselves to be defending the rights of lower
segments, the "causa," ignored whatever positive action

might have taken place socially in San Juan under Bloquism.
The Rinconada affair marked for them a fundamental dividing
line. Since Jones'
A.

death, stated the Yrigoyenist Deputy

Gonzalez Zimmerman, "all the political life of San Juan,

all the rights and guarantees of the people, all the

institutions, have been under the sole jurisdiction of the

federal government and National Congress." Hence, from the

Personalist perspective, San Juan had been in theory, and
was now placed in fact, under a kind of "super-intervention."

Dissenting from the Personalist view, the Socialist
Adolfo Dickmann contended that not all the blame should be
placed upon the Cantonis' shoulders, for the real enemy of
San Juan was the abject condition and misery of the poor.

More responsible for the conditions in San Juan than the
Cantonis, Dickmann added, were
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the spurious capitalists of
San Juan, who during
the long years they ruled
that province

^

never
the'lower
seS?o?s.
Whaf did th^r.'
the wealthy class of
San Tu^n
^^^i^^^^a^sing a fortune thanks to
the i^l%r
tariff protection? When the
federal
commissioner [BroquenJ went to San
Juan, the
was to demand the
i^'L^^^^'^^''^''^^^'^
minimum wage act; they wanted
w^Si
P^^^^^
peso
'^^^
and a half,
LlT'^as during
the "Regimen"

2

f

In the National Senate the Yrigoyenists
emphasized that
the election of April 1928 had constituted
a plebiscite
,

and as such, nothing contrary to the will
of the majority
could prevail any longer. Therefore, the
anti-Cantonist

rhetoric was tinted with grave epithets. The Cantonists
were branded "pigmeos morales," "gangsters," "
zaparrastrosos
turned wealthy," "criminals." For Senator Molinari, of the

Federal Capital, Cantoni's rule represented the "most dismal,
ominous and darkest era of any civilized nation." The fiery

Yrigoyenist Senator also predicted that Federico Cantoni,
"Jones'

assassin," would never rule San Juan again. "^^

President Alvear approved the intervention law a few
days before ending his term, but it was left to President

Yrigoyen to appoint the federal commissioner. His choice
was Modestino Pizarro, a former Radical member of the Buenos

The intervention bill passed in the House with the
support of the Yrigoyenists and the conservatives against
the anti-Personalists and the Socialists. The only
Socialist in the Senate, Mario Bravo, did not cast his
vote. Diputados 1928, II, 264-334 (July 13); 384-448 (July
,

24-36 (Sept. 24 and 25); 804 (Sept. 30).
Senadores , 1928, I, 583-649 (Sept. 20). Deputy Dickmann's
18); III,

quotation is on

p.

302.
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Aires province legislature. The
instructions issued to
Pizarro stated that he should perform
his duties

providing "the most complete freedom and
political
guarantees," as well as with "absolute
impartiality "^^
But words aside, the political climate of
San Juan was
especially tense. Now for the first time
Cantoni's
.

enemies

had both control of the provincial government
and the
support of the federal power to offset the numerical
superiority enjoyed by the Bloquists. Any hopes that the

intervention could bring peace and stability to the
province was illusory.
The arbitrariness of the Pizarro intervention,

exemplified in the persecution and harassment of Yrigoyen's
opponents, opened a new cycle of repression and political

intolerance in San Juan. Furthermore, the economic
situation took a turn for the worse in 1929. The wine
industry was severely affected an unemployment, which had

been non-existent during the Cantoni governments, added
another somber note to the deteriorating provincial scene.
Violence only encouraged more arbitrariness as evidenced
in the primitive way in which domestic political quarrels

were settled.
The mad rush of the intervention and the tenacious

opposition against Yrigoyen lowered a temporary mantle of

^%inisterio del Interior, Memoria del Ministerio
del Interior, 1928-1929 (Buenos Aires, 192^77 P. 21.
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forgetfulness over the reproaches
made against the
Cantonists ia the past by the
non-Personalists adversaries
Of Bloquism. Before they had
been assailed as executioners,
now they were becoming martyrs. ^0
But in spite of the
growing tribulations, Pederico Cantoni
continued enjoying
the fervor of his supporters as
firmly as
ever.

"The

chinos know three things that are essential
for them,"
reported a special correspondent sent by La
Prensa to

analyze the situation in San Juan,
that their salaries have been raised, that
their
working hours have been shortened, and that the
chief of the party takes care of them in his
medical office, free of charge, and that if they
need it, he gives them the medicine, also
without charge. 21
The province of Mendoza, sharing San Juan's fate, was

also placed under the federal intervention.^^ Yrigoyen

appointed Carlos A. Borzani, a trusted aide and long-time

Yrigoyenist from Buenos Aires province, as commissioner.
20

In February 1929, while Aldo Cantoni was brought
from the jail to the court house, there was an attempt
against his life, but it failed. Later on, the
assassination of Manuel Ignacio Castellanos, a lawyer for
the Bloquist leaders in jail, including Aldo Cantoni; in
February 1930, strained even more the antagonistic
relationship between the intervention and its opponents.
^•^La

Prensa

,

February 6,1929.

22

The congressional debates brought to light the
old familiar charges against lencinism. And it vms almost
defenseless, in the Chamber of Deputies there was only
one Lencinist member, none in the Senate. Diputados
1928, II, 649-720 (July 26); 738-757 (July 27). Sonadores
1928, I, 654-678 (Sept. 22).
,

,
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This marked the first time that
Mendoza fell properly into
Yrigoyen's hands since in his first
administration Jose
Nestor Lencinas had run the provincial
Radical Party and
the government with considerable
independence from Buenos
Aires. The federal intervention meant
hard times for the
Lencinists, for they, like the Bloquists,
became the open
target of police repression. Although in
theory the

federal commissioner was instructed to guarantee
all

liberties and to fulfill his duties in the shortest
possible time, 2

his unwritten purpose was to achieve the

political destruction of Lencinism. This was evidenced by
the constant harassment of its leaders, a fact acknowledged

by a sympathetic Yrigoyen's biographer, who stated that
"the decent Radicals are repugnant to the atrocities

which were committed and are committed in San Juan and
Mendoza.

24.

The popularity of the Lencinist movement had in fact

been diminishing largely as a result of the unfortunate

administration of Alejandro Orfila. However, it now began
to experience a political revival as a reaction to the

cruel position in which it was cornered by the Yrigoyenists.
The repressive nature of the intervention and the growing

economic crisis helped to lift the fallen image of the

^^Yrigoyen, Pueblo y gobierno

,

VI,

^^Galvez, Vida de Hipolito Yrigoyen

p.

,

491.
p.

427.
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Lencinists.
A few months after Borzani was
in power, Carlos
Washington complained to the Minister
of the Interior
about the persecution against his
party carried
out

throughout Mendoza. The continuation
of such a policy,
warned the Mendozan caudillo, "could
degenerate into
deplorable events, and might eventually
affect the social
and political peace of Argentina. "^^
The National Senate Rebuffs Regional Populism

While the main assault against the Cuyano populist

bastions was being carried out by the interventors within
the provincial borders, the National Senate once again

provided the stage for a public confrontation between the

Yrigoyenist national spokesmen and the defiant popular
leaders. The issue was again the credentials of the Senators-

elect of Mendoza and San Juan, Carlos Washington Lencinas,

Federico Cantoni and Carlos Porto, As noted before, they
had been named Senators again by the respective provincial

legislatures in 1927, but during 1928 no action had been
taken on their credentials. Only in July 1929 did the

Senate begin to study them in earnest. The resulting

political debates greatly contributed to the gradual
March 7, 1929. Lencinas also regretted
La. Prensa
that Mendoza v/as again absorbed by the portenismo a direct
allusion to the large number of public officials from the
Federal Capital, and some from La Plata, brought in by the
intervention. There was widespread resentment among the
Mendozans at being governed by "f orasteros " people from
,

,

,

.
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paralysis which was taking hold of
the executive and
legislative branches of the Federal
Government
The great excitement aroused
in 192? when Cantoni's
credentials were first considered and
rejected, was minor

compared to what now was taking place.
Several weeks were
devoted to the discussion of the
credentials of Cantoni
and Porto. On the days when the Senate
met, a large
crowd congregated around the entrance of the
building, on
Victoria Street (later renamed Hipolito Yrigoyen).
The

President's supporters comprised a large majority of
the
spectators. From an improvised tribune set up just

across the Senate entrance, their heated words helped
create a climate of anxiety and expectation, and

demonstrated an open hostility against the anti-Personalist
Senators, especially Leopoldo Kelo. Indeed, the first

scheduled session to discuss the credentials had to be
called off because the anti-Personalist Senators refused
to walk through this hostile gathering to reach the Congress

In contrast with the usual empty galleries for the public,
all the tickets available to people wishing to attend the

meetings had been given away well in advance, and, once

another region, a situation which even led a small group of
Yrigoyenists of Mendoza to take an anti-J3orzani position.
^^Ramon Columba, a direct observer of such barren
political performance, as a member of the staff, recalled
that the senatorial hall looked like "el patio de un
inquilinato con ocupantes desunidos que se sacan los
trapitos al sol." El congreso que yo he visto II, p. 197.
,
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more,

the entire building was invaded
by curious spectators
filling halls and corridors. Congress
was

placed under

strict security and even the newspaper
correspondents were
frisked. La Nacion, a severe critic
of Bloquism, explained
that such popular commotion was due to
the fact
that

"people who had never attended a legislative
debate were
anxious to watch the great congressional
"^'^
scandal.
The unusual show outside Congress had its
counterpart

in the Senate hall itself. The traditional three
warning
bells at the disposal of the President of the Senate
to

keep the sessions in order, but which still allowed
journalists to hear the tempestuous arguments on the floor,
were reinforced with three additional bells. They deafened
all voices and were used several times at the peak of the

most heated debates. Cantoni displayed the same oratorical
characteristics that he had in 1927, but now the words

exchanged by the two opposing sides were more cutting than
ever. In contrast to the stereotyped language of protocol

usual to the Senate, Cantoni

's

rhetorical style was

distinguished by its blatant sincerity; it seemed as if he
were talking informally around the table in a bar. At
times, his picturesque phrases even prompted the laughter
of the Yrigoyenists themselves. La Razon referred to his
28
unorthodox language as a "cult of vulgarity."

^'^La

Nacion, July 19, 1929.

July 23, 1929. A correspondent from the
pro-conservative newspaper El Pais of Cordoba, reported
^^La Razon

,

,
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The newspaper Critica, which
had been the loyal

spokesman of Cantoni in the Federal
Capital since he had
been jailed in 1921, maintained
all out support for the
Bloquists. This enhanced very
significantly the

personality of the Sanjuanino caudillo
in Buenos Aires. ^9
In response to the criticisms made of
Cantoni 's style

during the debates, Critica asked since
when had being
frank and honest, and calling things by their
proper
names become anti-parlamentarian.
There was nothing
strange in Cantoni 's language, argued Critica on
another
occasion, because this was the way he always talked with
the workers and farmers. The real anomaly, it added,

would have been if Cantoni had made academic speeches.
The Vice President of the nation, Enrique Martinez,

who chaired all the Senate meetings on the San Juan
credentials, reprimanded Cantoni on several occasions

—

about Cantoni: "if this man governs as he speaks and it
is the most probable we realize why he has so many
adversaries." But the correspondent also added that
Cantoni referred to matters known to all members in
Congress but never mentioned before. David Paredes, La
demagogia en accion Fisonomla del confireso argentine
1929-1930 (Buenos Aires, 1937), p. 139.

—

.

,

OQ

The impact of the role played by Critica on
this occasion can be measured by its large circulation.
On June 29, 1929, this paper issued a record 529,669
copies. Moreover, Critica published in full Cantoni 's
speeches in the Senate.

Critica
^^Ibid.

,

,

July 24, 1929.

July 27, 1929.
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for using such unparliamentary
language, "el viejo
Irigoyen" in referring to the
President of Argentina, or
calling the Personalist wing of the
Radical Party the
"Partido Peludista," or "Peludismo, "
and for alluding
to the famous presidential "amansadora, "
the waiting room
at the government house, as "Juntando
orines."^^
The Yrigoyenists, however, were well
on the way to

getting even with the Cantonists. They had
disposed of
them in San Juan through the federal intervention,
and

now they felt was the time to liquidate them in the
Senate. 33 The most severe clash of the long debates took

place between Diego Luis Molinari and Cantoni. Prom the
outset Molinari had voiced the Personalist position with

impressive clarity: "Never, never will Cantoni and
32

After one of the most tumultuous meetings. La
Nacion reported that in the number and caliber of
insults exchanged between the two sides, it could be
compared with nothing in the past. July 24, 1929. La
Vanguardia July 29, 1929, called the debates "la
payada a singers* duel parlamentaria. " Interest in
the meetings was so great that the Chamber of Deputies
could not meet on several occasions for lack of a
quorum because so many members had gone to the Senate to
follow the debates.

—

,

—

-^•^In May 1929 the Personalists had requested,
without success, that Cantoni and Porto's credentials be
filed because theirs were "dirty credentials," and as
such, non-existent. Senadores 1929, I, 17-28 (May 13).
Manuel Galvez stated that before the credentials were
discussed in Congress in 1929, President Yrigoyen told
some friends that "the people should go to the Senate
to prevent Cantoni 's admission." The President, said
Galvez, could not think anyone being indifferent in this
matter. Vida _de Hip5lito Yrigoyen p. 415.
,

,
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Lencinas be seated in the Senate

"adding

straightforwardly that "there is not one
single Argentine
who can deny that Lencinas is a thief
and that Cantoni is

a murderer." As the Yrigoyenists
had repeatedly pointed
out, their fundamental objection to
accepting the

Bloquists was the Rinconada murder in 1921.
Neither peace
nor pardon would be possible, Molinari asserted,
until

the guilty men were duly punished. His extreme
antagonism
to Cantoni was illustrated in the somber image he
painted
of the Sanjuanino caudillo, at the time he assumed power
in

1923:

"...thirsty for revenge, he looked like an

exacerbated wild animal, with his reddish mouth and

blood-filled eyes.... At his side, corpses were lying, but
this was not important...."

Cantoni spoke at a great length in defense of his own

credentials. For four and a half consecutive sessions his

speech monopolized the attention. His words, sometimes
caustic and impassioned, at other times candid and

unruffled, filled hundreds of pages of the congressional

record as he offered a justification of his actions, and
explained the tenets of his pragmatic political principles.
He began his extensive defense by recalling his early steps
in the Radical Party, and the influence exerted upon him

by Jose Nestor Lencinas. Cantoni stressed the firm attitude

taken by the Mendozan leader, who had not hesitated to
confront Yrigoyen when the President attempted to usurp for
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hiw own advantage the political
priaciples of Radicalism.
As for his rule in San Juan,
Cantoni reiterated the
norms which guided his government
at the
grass roots

level, such as his permanent advice
to his comprovincianoa
to work the land instead of seeking
non-remunerative and

unchallenging jobs in the government. More
poignantly,
Cantoni leveled severe criticism against
negative
characteristics of the provincial society. Why,
for
instance, did the Bloquists allow most doctors
in

the

interior of the province to be foreigners practicing
without Argentine certification? Because the cri olios
were leisure-lovers, comedos

,

affirmed Cantoni, and they

were unwilling to make the sacrifice of living in the
countryside. Moreover, the criollo population seemed

content with being cured with herbs, but the gringos

wanted to have a doctor and proper medicine, otherwise
they would not go to live in the interior.
The Bloquist leader pointed out how he had introduced

courses in the provincial schools dealing with practical
activities. Likewise, Cantoni emphasized his preoccupation

with providing jobs for every person in San Juan. But at
the same time he questioned the usefulness of having a

growing number of idle doctors, lawyers and engineers when,
by working the land, anyone could improve his economic

position and therefore, be politically independent.
When Cantoni referred to the masses, he specifically
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included women. He was concerned with
the practical means
to promote their social and
economic advancement, such as
training them to work in factories
that processed
agricultural products. Through economic
independence a
woman would have a catalytic effect
on her family life
because
'^'^''^^ instill in her husband
their home, helping him in
giving up the habit of getting drunk in a
when he finds his rancho in a miserable co ^ulperla,
ndition,
where even the bare essentials for life are
unavailable.

^ r?''^^
li^i'tf
an attachment
toward

Such were the shameful conditions, added Cantoni,

prevalent in the Argentine provinces. The solution, as he
saw it, was to promote the role of the State as a social

protector under special circumstances, like assisting the
needy in general, and the elderly in particular,
because if the Yrigoyenists believe it is necessary
to give retirement pay to bank personnel and those
in the armed forces after thirty years of service,
besides granting them other important benefits, the
Sanjuaninos also believe that the government has
the obligation to avoid a situation where the
unfortunate people have to beg to survive.

Recognizing that certain habits were deeply rooted
at all social levels, Cantoni defended the high licence tax

imposed by the Bloquists on gambling activities. We cannot
stop people from gambling "even if we jail them," he said,
"they will bet to see who spits farther or whose spittle

dries sooner." Therefore, Cantoni believed it reasonable
that the State should have an important share of the

gambling revenue, to use for the general welfare.

437

The Sanjuanino caudillo also
underscored the importance

of having established in San Juan
a school-home for unwed
mothers and abandoned children, so they
could learn how to
protect themselves in life. "Because in
our country,"
Cantoni stated, "when a woman gets into
trouble, the first

thing her family does is to throw her out
of the house."
Delving into political matters Cantoni replied

to the

Personalists assertion that the 1928 electoral landslide
gave Yrigoyen a free hand to "regenerate" the provincial

governments, by demanding that Buenos Aires observe a fair

play rule. If the Yrigoyenists had been elected to govern
the nation, it was their right to do it. For the same

reason, however, since the Bloquists had been elected by
the majority of the people to rule San Juan, the popular

will had to be respected. If the people were really

sovereign in selecting who would govern them, this

principle had to be applied at the provincial level as
well as the national level, "because there is no difference

between a Yrigoyen for the nation and a Perico de los
Palotes in the provinces."
Trying to dispel the charges that he ruled his party
autocratically, Cantoni explained to the Senate the

organic structure of the Union Civica Radical Bloquista. In
contrast to the procedures followed by the Personalist
Radicals, Cantoni stated that

^^Perico de los Palotes is an expression meaning
any undetermined person.
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We wrote a party platform,
because we believe
that in order to ask a citizen
for his vote it
IS imperative to inform him
what we hoplto'
government. We believe that a
^res?de?if oi
nf\J^'
president
the nation, that a governor of a
province, is not an individual without
obligations toward his supporters,
who must introduce himself to the but a man
people with a
program in his hand; because the people
l^''
are tired of only listening to rhetorical
"^^^ constitution, the
fatherland
I^f^^S^^!-,^^^^^
ana the flag.

m

Close to the end of the long debate Cantoni
added a

note of caution, warning the Yrigoyenists not
to lead

Argentina into a dead end:
$he friends of the president, jubilant in their
victory, do not realize that they are pushing the
country— more by the actions of the
incondicionales that surround the President than
by his ov/n lack of capacity towards a collapse
which unfortunately, may set the country back
for many years to come.

—

While the main debate lay between Cantoni and the
Yrigoyenists, other sectors had a chance to express their
viewpoints. The position of the Socialist Party on the

credentials issue was voiced by its lone Senator, Mario
Bravo, who represented the Federal Capital. Like Cantoni,

Bravo noted the wide gap which had separated the patron
from the worker in San Juan, the latter being economically

impoverished by meager wages and politically subordinated
to the will of his employer. Bravo recognized the major

accomplishments of the Bloquists, especially women's
suffrage, the minimum wage, the 8-hour maximum and the

pension for the aged. But Bravo did question the value of
these social benefits when accompanied by a general
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curtailment of political freedom
and basic civil rights,
and the establishment of a rigid,
autocratic government!
In his final analysis Bravo
considered that the mockery
which Cantoni and his men had made
of law and order in
San Juan, was a strong and sufficient
enough reason to
persuade him against accepting the
Senators-elect
credentials.
The great expectation about the final
outcome of

the debates ended when the Socialist Mario
Bravo

expressed his opinion supporting the rejection of
the
credentials. Critica appealed to Bravo to sustain the

position he and Juan B. Justo

— who

had died in 1928

had

taken during the credentials debate of 192? in favor of

accepting the Senators-elect from San Juan. But it was in
vain, for by a vote of 13 to 12 the Senate rejected a

motion to postpone the discussion of the credentials until
San Juan returned to a constitutional rule. This vote

sealed the fate of Cantoni and Porto's senatorial hopes.
15

-^^

A sepulchral silence was observed while the
Senators voiced their crucial vote. V/hen it ended, the
people jamming the gallery exploded with wild enthusiasm.
Later that night, the Yrigoyenist followers improvised a
parade through the popular Avenida de Llayo in celebration
of the Senate decision. La Prensa August 3» 1929. The
debates for Cantoni 's credentials were S enadores 1929, I,
59-63 (June 25); 107-110 (July 4); 117-127 (July 11);
129-191 (July 16); 193-220 (July 18); 287-309 (July 20);
315-342 (July 23); 345-388 (July 25); 423-461 (July 27);
466-496 July 30); 497-548 (July 31); 549-616 (Aug. 1);
617-692 (Aug. 2).
,

,
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Certainly, Bravo-

vote would have reversed the
final

s

result. The Socialist Senator
consequently became the
target of bitter criticism from the
Bloquists for his
attitude. La Vanguardia on the other hand,
carried a
campaign in defense of Bravo' s position, and
labeled as
,

"a misguided interpretation" the Bloquist
charges that

Bravo had "sold" Cantoni. The Socialist newspaper
claimed
that the Bloquist view blurred the real issue in
dispute,

because under the pretext of raising a banner against
Yrigoyen, the country was taking the risk of creating a

national figure out of a caudillo far more dangerous than
Yrigoyen.
The Senate decision on Cantoni

's

credentials made

clear the outcome of Lencinas' diploma. Carlos Washington
made an extensive and detailed defense of his government

during the Senate debates. But he had to face grave
accusations of administrative corruption during his term
as governor and for the huge fees he collected while being
a lawyer for the Provincial Bank.

Given the mood of the

Yrigoyenists and conservatives, there was nothing the
"gauchito" could do to offset the adverse decision of the

Upper House.
36

^7

La Vanguardia, August

6,

1929.

Senadores, 1929, I, 139-190 (Sept. 10); 300-325
(Sept. 19); 351-390 (Sept. 20); 398-402 (Sept. 23);
499-585 (Sept. 25).
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After the distressing Senate
experience, Lencinism
and Bloquism had to travel the road
of adversity. Unlike
1927, the rejection of their leaders'
credentials left
them without any official base. In
1927 the
two

caudillos had the support of their respective
provincial
governments, and their legislatures could
insist on

appointing them National Senators. Now, both
provinces
were in the hands of their foremost enemy. Making
the

situation even gloomier, their followers were the target
of constant harassment by the intervention authorities.

Left powerless in the patria chica as well as in Buenos
Aires, they had to resume the uphill road from the llano.

lencinism: On the Road to Nowhere
The Personalists, at last, had avenged the old wounds

inflicted by the Cuyano movements. But the ills of the

year-old interventions in Mendoza and San Juan were
seriously damaging the Yrigoyenist image. This raised anew
the hopes of Lencinism and Bloquism that they might regain

power in a future electoral confrontation. The gross
abuses of both interventions were especially helpful to
the Lencinists, for in terms of prestige they were in a
30

much weaker position than a few years before.
Carlos Washington seemed to be aware of his more

^ Edmundo Correas stated in his reference to this
the procedures of the intervention were
that
period
"retrogrades y barbaros." "Historia de Mendoza," p. 502.
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exposed position, for his views
oa the way to handle public
affairs underwent a dramatic
change. In theory, at least,

he diassociated himself from many
of the policies he had
observed while in office. "Ten years
of active political
action and many bitter experiences,"
Carlos Washington
said in an interview with La Nacion,
"have changed

many of

my old beliefs." Among other things, he
was critical of
the previous Lencinist policy toward the
Judiciary, which
curtailed its basic independence to perform
justice.
He

advocated that the Judiciary Review Board should seat
representatives from the opposition, a view which the
three Lencinist governments had flatly rejected when
they

were in power. Carlos Washington also stressed the need
to create the Tribunal de Cuentas, to check handling of

public funds

— as

required by the 1916 provincial

constitution, but never implemented. He urged the

transformation of the Provincial Bank into a semi-private
institution, a pledge voiced by him and his father many
times in the past, without practical results. Lencinas
also stated that his party was the friend of the worker,

but added that it was equally the friend of capital, thus,
greatly softening the tone of the old propaganda tirades

which helped so much to shape the Lencinist image in
earlier times. Finally, Carlos Washington asserted that
he had already shown that he had the personal qualities
to serve as leader of a party. Now, he said, as youth
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paved the way for a mature mind,
his ambition was to become,
above all, a statesman.
Meanwhile, in Llendoza, Judge Alberto
Gomez Cabrerathe executioner arm of the
Borzani intervention-had issued
a warrant charging Carlos
Washington with political

corruption and maladministration during
his governorship.
Without the shield of congressional immunity,
the Lencinist
leader faced the certainty of arrest once
he returned to
his province.

After the Senate rejected his credentials,
Carlos
Washington's mood continued very sour against Yrigoyen.

But

he was confident that the deteriorating national
political

situation was brewing the possibility of a change. "It is
simple to predict the future of the government," he wrote
to a political friend and leader of the party,

"for it is

losing prestige day by day." The signs of corruption could
be seen everywhere; rumblings of protest filled the air,

sometimes soft as a rumor, sometimes openly shouted.

According to Lencinas, the old timers recalled that the
same symptoms had been present in 1890, just before the
crisis. There was a general malaise then, sometimes felt

very strongly, sometimes mildly, but alv/ays in crescendo.
Carlos Washington expressed in his letter that he

was planning his return to Kendoza once he had settled a
39 La Nacion, April 25, 1929.

"

444

suit against him/^ 3^,

concerned about the attitude

the commissioner would assume,
as well as about the

uncertainties ahead for his movement.

"I

don't know if the

miserable people of the intervention
will arrest me later
hijunagranput_a Gomez Cabrera will be
anxious to
lay his hands on me." Anyhow, asserted
Lencinas, "we will
have the pleasure of attending the funeral
of this rotten

government, for the people are getting sick
of it, more
and more every day."^"^
On October 17, 1929, Carlos Washington sent a

telegram to Yrigoyen complaining of new arrests of party

members in Mendoza. He indicated to the President his
pessimism about a possible change in the policy of the
intervention. But he wanted public opinion to know about
his unanswered appeals to the Federal Government, in order
"to defend myself and my party against the 'barbarism'
the provincial police."

of

AO

In Mendoza the Lencinists began to plan for the

forthcoming return of Carlos Washington. The Yrigoyenists
were incredulous that Lencinas would risk a return to his

Francisco Benavidez, President Yrigoyen' s secretary
had sued Lencinas for libel based on the terms he had used
in the Senate.
^"^Carlos Washington Lencinas to Jorge Albarracin
Godoy, Buenos Aires, October 15, 1929. Lencinas considered
that the years ending with zero had witnessed grave
developments in Argentine history, and he looked to 1930
with the expectation that it would mark the end of
"peludism.
"^^La

Prensa, October 18, 1929.
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province. A vitriolic Yrigoyenist
paper predicted that
Lencinas would not be able to return
for twenty years,
until all his judicial troubles had
ended.

On November

8,

a federal judge in Buenos
Aires

ruled in favor of Lencinas with regard
to Benavidez'
accusation, thus clearing the last legal

obstacle to his

immediate return. However, as the proximity
of Carlos
Washington's trip increased, so did tension and
anxiety in Mendoza. In an effort to avoid public

demonstration by the Lencinists, the police prohibited
any rally welcoming the caudillo. Applauding this

decision, La Voz Provincial urged that any violation of
that order be crushed by whatever means were

necessary. 44
Lencinas'

concern for his homecoming trip was

heightened by an anonymous phone call he received in
Buenos Aires warning him that an attempt on his life
would be made upon his arrival in Mendoza. In response
to this threat Lencinas at once sent a telegram to the

President, alerting him to the potential disturbance he

might encounter and placing all responsibility squarely on

Yrigoyen's conscience. "Before

I

depart for Mendoza,"

Lencinas said,

Voz Provincial (Mendoza), October 24, 1929
This partisan publication referred to the Mendozan
caudillo as Carlos "Chicago" Lencinas, connecting him
with the style of the mafia in that American city.
Zi^

44 La Voz Provincial, November 9, 1929.
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to

some accounts,
Lthoritiernf
authorities of the ^^^J^^i^g
intervention, under your

the

^^nounced that

my arrival in
raenaoza will be prevented, even
Mendoza'wJ??^^'''
if to do so thev

violence. I do not knowrof
oir.y
course, the extreme measures the
may take.... Perhaps these rumors intervention
are only an
intimidation plan.... But if instead of
expression of a churlish policy, they arebeinp the
in fact
"'^'^
repression
prevalent
nT^Pn^'"^""
l^'t
in Mendoza, which
has voided all rights and
Ireedoms, it is Your Excellency who must
take all
the required steps to prevent any excess,
if you
do not wish to assume before the nation
the
responsibility for whatever might happen upon my
arrival in Mendoza, in case there is an attempt
^
against my life.... 45
The President did not take the situation lightly.

Through the Minister of the Interior he ordered the
intervention authorities in Mendoza^^ to revoke the
prohibition against a rally welcoming Lencinas, and to
take all necessary precautions to avoid any disturbance,

no matter which kind of provocation was given by the

Lencinists.
On Sunday, November 10, La Nacion reported the

observations of its Kendozan correspondent written the day
before. He indicated that there was widespread belief that

Lencinas would be arrested when the train entered the
province, and that a number of Lencinists were to board
the train in the city of San Luis in order to prevent the

arrest of their caudillo. The dispatch from Mendoza
45 La Prensa, November 10, 1929.

^^Commissioner Borzani was outside Mendoza, and
Alfredo Sosa was replacing him.
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concluded that "this
oiiib accenxuates
aofpntnc+oo the aimpression
that
tomorrow grave events would occur. ••'^'^
Lencinas and his entourage arrived
at Kendoza on the
afternoon of November 10. In traditional
fashion, he was

warmly greeted by the multitude, although
some provocative
Yrigoyenist groups were also in the vicinity.
With Carlos
Washington in front of the people, as was
their custom,
the Lencinists marched in civic procession
the ten blocks
separating the Pacific Railroad station from the
Circulo
de Armas. From a balcony of the Circulo party
leaders

addressed the people gathered in the street and in the
adjacent San Martin Plaza. Then, in a split second, while
the orator preceding him was winding up his speech,

Lencinas was shot from a short distance. A tremendous
confusion ensued

v/ith

more guns being displayed and more

shots terrorizing the area. In a few seconds the peaceful

welcome home rally had turned into a nightmare. Carlos

Washington was hurried to a hospital but he was already
dead. Jose Caceres, the person who shot Lencinas, died

the following day, victim of the shots fired at him in

the aftermath.

Suddenly, the threats and warnings of the last few

days and the nervous exchange of telegrams gained dramatic

relevance. Mendoza and the whole nation were shocked into

disbelief and engulfed in consternation at the

^'^La

Nacion, November 10, 1929.
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assassination of Carlos Washington.
Who was responsible for what
happened? The heavy
burden of responsibility for the death
of the popular
Mendozan caudillo fell inevitably upon
the intervention
authorities and on President Yrigoyen. The
reports from
acting-Commissioner Sosa to the national government

provided the official explanation for Lencinas'
ill-fated
return. According to the investigation of the
Mendozan
police, Lencinas had had relations with Caceres'
wife,

and Caceres had sworn to take revenge. Thus, the

intervention concluded, Lencinas' assassination had

nothing to do with politics, but was merely the act of an
aggrieved and desperate individual who tried to take
justice into his own hands against a man who had violated

his honor.

4.R

The Yrigoyenist press, both in Mendoza and Buenos

Aires, adhered to this interpretation of the event.

However, the non-Yrigoyenist publications throughout the

country granted this view very little credence. Dismayed

by Lencinas' tragic end, the more important newspapers in
the Federal Capital and the interior attributed the crime
to the growing mood of intolerance which, late in 1929,
49
was undermining the political life of the nation.

^^Ministerio del Interior, Memoria del Ministerio
del Interior, 1929 - 1930 (Buenos Aires, 193077 pp. 44-4b.
49 Jose Hipolito Lencinas stated that Yrigoyen was
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President Yrigoyea ordered a special
inquiry into
the assassination, and appointed
the Minister of Public
Education and Justice, Juan de la Campa,
to take

charge.

A few days later, de la Campa
concluded his analysis of
the situation and reported to the
President that the cause
for Lencinas' death was that previously
reported by the

intervention authorities. The government had
gathered
testimonial support from people who asserted they
had

heard Caceres promising to take revenge against
Carlos
Washington. Prom the Judicial viewpoint, since both

Lencinas and Caceres were dead, the investigation led to
no other conclusion and, accordingly, the case was

officially closed. Justice had been evaded once again.
The case was not closed, however, in political

circles or for a large part of the public. Except for the
core, ultra-partisan Yrigoyenist newspapers, there was

general revulsion over the crime. Most of the press
the moral author of his brother's death. Carlos Washin/^ton
Lencinas Realidad, mision ^ future de una epoea p. 149,
.

,

50

Minister de la Campa' s report is in Ministerio del
Interior, Memoria 1929-1930, pp. 49-55.
An Argentine author lends support to the view that
the assassins of Lencinas were the "gansos," the
conservatives. But he does not indicate any evidence
thereof. Roberto Juarez, Atentados poll ticos en la
Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1970), pp. 285-286. This
author' s account of the assassination of Amable Jones
(pp. 252-257), and Carlos V/ashington Lencinas (pp. 279286), contains several factual errors.
,
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concurred in the view that
Lencinas' political
assassination was a step back into
the past era of
caudillism. They also agreed that
despite the criticism
Lencinas deserved, he was the
standardbearer
of the

popular sectors of Mendoza and because
he was a politician
of tremendous popular persuasion,
he still would have had
much to offer in public life.^^
The Mendozan movement had been built
around the all-

encompassing personalities of Jose Nestor
and Carlos
Washington Lencinas. Reflecting on the political
significance
Of the tragedy befalling the UGH Lencinista,
their followers
asserted that the movement already had its apostle
in Jose
Nestor Lencinas and now it had its martyr in Carlos
Washington. "Two are now," they proclaimed, "los muertos
que raandanl"

51

Lencinas was killed three days before his 41st
birthday. His brother Jose Hipolito made public the
maneuvers by which the federal intervention was promising
freedom for all Lencinists in jail if the three Lencinas
brothers were away from Mendoza until after an election
was held. La Prensa, November 12, 1929.
52

La Accion (General Alvear, Mendoza), November 23,
1929. This Lencinist newspaper of southern Mendoza
published a verse, among the many from Lencinist inspiration,
entitled "The dead who lives," which partially said:

Noble gaucho que ya has muerto
de cuerpo, pero no de alma;
hoy la provincia te llama
porque fuiste el defensor
del pueblo trabajador
en esta tierra cuyana
Padre fuiste para el pobre
y noble para el obrero

,
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The repercussions of the
Mendozan event on national
politics were felt in the deepening
of the breach between

Yrigoyenists and anti-Yrigoyenists.
The possibility of
any kind of accommodation between
the opposing sides now
appeared remote. After the enactment
of the Saenz Pena
law, Argentina had entered into a
period of reform
politics. Although slowly, the electorate
had been moving
forward in making political tolerance a
fact of civic
life. The return of Yrigoyen to power in
1928, however,
had awakened old animosities and generated new
tensions.

These were evidenced in the growing want of
forbearance
as reflected in street riots in Buenos Aires in October

1929. But Lencinas' assassination evoked the fear that
the worst evils of caudillism

support by followers

— were

— personalism

and blind

becoming entrenched in the

dominant political forces in Argentina.
y ahora, el pecho lleno
de tus memorias divinas
te vivan, por ser soldados
del batallon de lencinas.

Para nosotros no has muerto
noble Guasinton Lencinas
porque tu alma querida
palpita entre los cuyanos
fuiste generoso y bravo
y p'al obrero, un hermano
Ya termino esta versada
y una plegaria te envio,
porque fuiste un noble amigo
en estas tierras andinas
mis lagrimas son tu sangre
porque muero por Lencinas.
The name "Guasinton," for Washington, was the way
in which his name was popularly pronounced. Ibid .
January 11, 1930.
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How did various sectors of opinion
view the episode?
Critica placed Lencinas- fate within

the larger framework

of national politics.

"We are going through a civic

depression," it noted, "that could lead
us into the hands of
tyranny or crime." Future historians,
Critica warned, would
have to analyze in depth the pathological
crisis of the
Argentine democracy ^-^
.

Focusing on the general depression gripping
Argentina,
Benito Marianetti stated that the idea that
Lencinas'

assassination was the work of an enraged individual was
not
acceptable. He recalled that when the train passed through
Gutierrez, a town near the capital of the province, someone

shouted from the platform of the railway station: "you are

accompanying a corpse!" The Socialists interpreted this

new outburst of political violence as a result of the
"politica criolla." In their view the "matones Lencinistas"
and "matones Yrigoyenistas" were all products of the same

regressive political school.
la Epoca

,

54.

which did not publish a single word about

Lencinas' funeral, pressed the official interpretation
that Lencinas' death was due to personal revenge, but

soon thereafter switched its emphasis to demonstrating
the humanitarian values for which President Yrigoyen

stood. To that effect, it filled its columns day after

day with documents, letters and manifestos issued years

^^ Critica , November 13, 1929.

^^La Vanguardia, November 19, 1929.
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before, stressing the fact that
Yrigoyen had always being
a messenger of peace toward
his political opponents. ^5
Perhaps National Deputy Nicolas
Repetto, a Socialist,
stated the correct views. He did
not believe President
Yrigoyen had any advance knowledge
of the attempt to
assassinate Carlos Washington. But Repetto
thought that
in committing such a crime "someone
had wished to

interpret the political conveniences of
President
Yrigoyen in Mendoza."^^

The untimely death of Carlos Washington
Lencinas

marked the virtual end of Lencinism. Since 1918 the
Mendozan movement had enjoyed the warm support of the
masses, but its image had also been tarnished by its own

excesses while in power. At the end of 1929 Lencinism
55

Spoca reproduced notes sent by Yrigoyen to
the President of the Conservative Party of Kendoza in 1918,
in v/hich he painted the principles of the Radical Party with
glowing colors, as well as the note the President sent to
the Mendozan damas, also early in ^1918, conveying his deep
concern for all human rights. La Epoca also stirred up
support for Yrigoyen by reprinting his decree of November
1921 condemning Governor Jones' assassination. The paper
reproduced the instructions given to the interventors
Borzani and Pizarro to illustrate the political honesty
observed by the Federal Government. The assassination of
Jones suddenly became a very important defensive tool to
stave off the anti-Yrigoyenist sentiment created by
Lencinas' death. In Mendoza, the Yrigoyenist La Voz
Provincial headed its issue of November 20, 1929: "Today
is the 8th anniversary of the assassination of Dr. Jones
by the Cantoni brothers."
,

56 Diputados

,

1929, lY, 209 (Nov. 20).
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was in the process of regaining
its strength in IVlendoza
while Yrigoyenism, all over
Argentina, was becoming more
and more a political prisoner
of its own growing
shortcomings. But on that fateful
November 1929
afternoon, Lencinism was left stranded
in a political
limbo from which it never escaped. The
leadership of the
Union Civica Radical fell into the hands
of Carlos
Washington's brothers, Jose Hipolito and Rafael
Nestor.
But they could not duplicate the emotional
rapport their
late brother had enjoyed with his followers, and
were

unable to cement the movement at a time of acute
political confusion and duress.
The federal interventions in Mendoza and San Juan

continued on their reckless paths, performing their
duties in effect as militant branches of the officialist
party. The words of Interventor Pizarro in San Juan

provide an illustration. Bloquism, he said, "has
inculcated hatred for the people well-dressed," and had
instilled in its supporters the glorification of
57
^

The split which took place in the Lencinist
camp is evident in the candidacies for the governorship
of Mendoza in the February 1946 election. Jose Hipolito
Lencinas headed the Union Civica Radical Lencinista
ticket; Bautista Gargantini, who had been Deputy Governor
during Carlos Washington Lencinas' rule, was the
candidate of the Union Civica Radical; and Faustino
Picallo, who had been a Lencinist leader in the 1920 's
was the candidate of the Peronist coalition.
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barbarism, as exemplified in their
war cry "|Vivan los
macho Cantoai!" As during Rosas'
times, with the "Hail to
the Restorer of the Laws," added
Pizarro, "it chilled the
spine of the gente de Men'."58 la
Prensa which had so
often criticized the Cantonists in the
not too distant
past, now castigated with the same
vehemence the repressive
tactics of the federal authorities in San
Juan. It was,
said that newspaper, as if everything in
Bloquism was evil
•

,

simply for being Bloquist, and as if the virtues
of

honorable behavior were at the exclusive domain of the

Personalists.^^
In fact, the national elections held in March 1930

indicated that in Cuyo the political wounds were not

healing but deepening. In Mendoza the lencinists were able
to improve their electoral standing in comparison to the

1928 national election, but the Yrigoyenists polled the

majority of the votes in an election plagued with gross
irregularities. The election in San Juan was an

unbelievable story, for the figures were the reverse of
1928: UCR Personalist 22,672 votes; UCR Bloquista 2,885;

Socialist Party 2,332. These figures are clear evidence
of the incredible electoral farce perpetrated by the

^^Modestino Pizarro, La verdad sobre la intervenci on
en San Juan ( 23 de diciembre de 1928 -6 de setiembre do 1930 )
(Buenos Aires, 1930), pp. 61-62.
59 La Prensa, November 4, 1929.
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federal intervention in San Juan.^°
Thus, the electoral
frauds which were the ominous
trademark of the decada

infame—the era

of conservative dominance
over most of

Argentina from 1932 to the advent of
Peronism— were
masterfully foreshadowed in San Juan
in March I930, under
Yrigoyenist authorities.
At last, after almost two years under
federal

control, the election of the new provincial
authorities
was scheduled for Sunday, September
7, 1930.^^ But this

test never took place, for a day before, on September
6,
Yrigoyen was toppled from office. With his ouster an
era
in Argentine history came to a close.

Carril Quiroga, Antecedentes electorales n.p.
La Prensa March 9, 1930, asked if there were only 2,885
Bloquists in San Juan, why so much blood and persecution?
A sympathetic biographer of Yrigoyen stated that
the comparison between tne March 1930 and the April 1928
elections "no ofrecio mayores novedades," except for the
Federal Capital, where the previous Yrigoyenist strength
weakened. Luna, Yrigoyen p. 444.
,

,

ft")

Rafael Nestor Lencinas headed the Lencinist
ticket in Mendoza; Rufino Ortega that of the Yrigoyenists.
In San Juan, Federico Cantoni v/as the Bloquist candidate,
while Carlos Conforti was the Yrigoyenist one.

457

CHAPTER
THE POPULIST

MOVEl^ffiNTS

XII

OF MENDOZA AND SAW JUAN.

AN OVERALL VIEW

For Mendoza and San Juan the Radical
interlude had
brought in many respects a social and
political
transformation, which through hindsight appears
even more
historically meaningful today than in the 1920' s.
Beyond
the impact exercised by Lencinism and Bloquism
on
the

provincial societies and at the national level during
their own times, their importance must also be considered
in a long-range perspective. For both movements

anticipated some of the significant changes which took
place throughout Argentina during the 1940

's

and 1950' s.

Peronism was not patterned after Lencinism and Bloquism,
but in many ways, its nature, structure and performance
paralleled those of the popular regimes of Mendoza and
San Juan in the 1920'

s.

Let us attempt a comprehensive view and further

generalizations on the historical significance of the
two Cuyo movements.

Lencinism and Bloquism symbolized a practical
regional effort to bring about new social conditions for
the common man and to implement a new style in provincial

politics and citizen participation. In the process,
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successes and frustrations intermingled,
for although
Lencinism and Bloquism were prominent
regional, sociallyoriented movements in the 1920s, politics became
extremely personalized, federalism a
largely ignored
principle and even reform an evasive goal.
The socio-economic conditions in the
two Cuyo

provinces late in the second decade of the
century
favored the development of the incipient populism,
especially in San Juan, where a more primitive
physical
and cultural environment prevailed. Its geographical

isolation contributed to economic stagnation and to the

preservation of a rigidly stratified society. By and large,
the impoverished and disorganized masses were subject to

difficult, sedentary living and working conditions. Against
this background, the significant social and political

reforms which took place in Cuyo appear all the more
remarkable considering the obstacles the Lencinas and
Cantonis had to face at a time of prevalent elitism and a

generalized lack of protection for the poor sectors. For as
a social,

political and economic class, the upper segments

resisted the cultural evolution put in motion by Lencinism
and Bloquism, labeling them at times as simply "Communist"
inspired. Social equality did not convey the same meaning

for the upper and lower sectors, and dignity was a concept

reserved almost entirely for the well-to-do.^

'"This elitist frame of

mind is well illustrated by
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Under such conditions, the
emergence of the regional
popular movements provoked a social
collision by

challenging the traditional dominant
forces. Among the
symbolic expressions of class
differentiation, few will
exemplify this point better than the
role of clothing.

Its significance has been directly and
indirectly stressed
throughout this study. Clothing was an
indicator of
hierarchy for all the groups. Socio-economic
status and
party identification were adscribed to an
individual

according to the way that person dressed. The
alpargata
was perhaps the best exponent of a definite
political
affiliation, being an unmi stake able sign of lower class.
As such, it became a symbol of pride to the humble sectors,

while the non-populist groups associated the alpargata

with the rabble who constituted the vertebral column of

Lencinism and Bloquism.

an editorial comment of La Prensa when Orfila's
government in Mendoza enacted the Sunday holiday and the
minimum wage for the domestic service. Heading its
comment as "Violent reforms," this paper believed that
the families with some status would be forced to experience
a period of discomfort when they did not have on their day
of leisure a cook to prepare their meals or maids to clean
up their houses. April 20, 1926,
,

2

The Argentine Socialist leader Americo Ghioldi, in
truly Socialist fashion, has equated the alpargata with
the traditional vices of the comites of a bygone era, the
taba, the asado and the wine, all of which had formerly
been used to buy votes on election day. Alparyatas ^ libros
en la historia argentina (Buenos Aires, 1946), p. 37.
,

•
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In view of the irreconcilable,
viewpoints held by the
clashing political forces, it might
be asked whether the
social reforms achieved in Mendoza
and San Juan could had
been accomplished by less severe
fiscal and political

procedures. Any answer would certainly
be speculati^re. What
is certain, however, is that both
Cuyano movements became
engaged, albeit to different degrees,
in unjustifiable

practices that neither institutionally nor
morally were
proper to impose upon an ideologically pluralist

society.

For in spite of their public assertions, the
Lencinas and
Cantonis were above all caudillos of a party rather
than

rulers for all their comprovincianos

.

In their efforts for

improving the daily life of the common man, which they
certainly did, their actions did not always respect

reasonable limitations to their power; their leaders many
times forced their will upon the provincial scene as if

instead of being the choices of a majority, they were the

absolute masters of their states.
The influential factor which greatly contributed to
the promotion of Lencinism and Bloquism outside Cuyo, was

the role they played within the anti-Personalist sectors
due to their implacable hatred for Yrigoyen. Ironically,

this represented a tremendous contradiction because

ideologically there was closer affinity between the
Lencinists and Cantonists and the Yrigoyenist Radicals,
than between the former and the so-called "galeritas,

"

the Radical anti-Personalists who were more conservative-
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oriented.
In fact, the Cuyano leaders
championed the cause of
reform in their regional sphere of
influence to an extent
that the Yrigoyenist Radicals did not
even attempt
to

match at the national level. If Yrigoyen
presumed to be a
reformer, Jose Nestor Lencinas was a
pioneer in implementing
social reforms and Federico Cantoni even
surpassed the
achievements of his Mendozan mentor. If Yrigoyen
fought

strenuously for a fundamental political reform, the
secret
ballot, Cantoni extended it to women. The country
as a

whole had to wait almost a quarter of a century to enjoy
the same right.

But the intra-party differences, created to a large

extent by the independent leadership exerted by Jose Nestor

Lencinas in Mendoza and by Jones' assassination in San Juan
were crucial in provoking an irreparable breach between the

populist movements of Cuyo and the Yrigoyenist Radicals. As
old conflicts bred new ones, a significant incongruity

resulted in which Yrigoyenists on one side, and Lencinists
and Bloquists on the other, both groups in theory

representing advanced social movements, sided with
conservative political sectors or groups less progressive
than theirs, for the exclusive purpose of attacking and

destroying each other.
Writers with pro-Radical Yrigoyenist inclinations have

contended that the Cuyo movements were not in fact truly
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Radical. Certainly, although both stemmed
from the same
trunk and shared some essential
characteristics, Yrigoyen
was neither involved in the excesses which
were part of
the actions of Lencinism and Cantonism,
nor
he was a

reformer of the caliber of Jose Nestor Lencinas or
Pederico Cantoni. Furthermore, after the 1930 revolution,
neither Lencinism nor Bloquism returned to be a part of
the Union Civica Radical.

Unlike Lencinism, the Union Civica Radical Bloquista

re-emerged in 1932 as the foremost political force in San
Juan.-^ But if in some respects this movement represented

in 1932 a continuation of the popular force it was in the
1920

's,

it was besieged again by the fury of its local

adversaries. National politics had changed significantly
also. Argentina's president was now conservative General

Agustfn P. Justo, not Yrigoyen; hence, Bloquism more than
ever, found its influence confined to the provincial

sphere. In fact, from an ideological standpoint, Cantonism

became an anomaly in a country where the conservatives
were rigorously imposing their

v/ill.

Such was the weakness

besetting the third Bloquist government that in February
1934 it was violently ousted from power in a fashion

resembling nineteenth century caudillism, by the same
^Contrary to what Senator Diego Luis Kolinari had
predicted in 1929, in the provincial election held on
November 1931, Federico Cantoni was overwhelmingly elected
governor of San Juan for the second time.
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elements which fought against it in the
1920's/

Lencinism and Bloquism were rooted in the
same
populist principles and followed a similar
pattern of

authoritarian politics. Both were pioneers in placing
in
the hands of the State the responsibility for
altering the
inflexible social determinism imposed by the traditional
sectors, which an author has referred to with a sentence

which epitomizes the principle of the privilege: "we are

born either gentlemen or sans-culottes.
Nevertheless, Lencinism and Bloquism also presented

basic differences resulting from the disparities in the
personalities of their leaders. In general, Lencinism was
more austere and reform-minded under Jose Nestor Lencinas,
4

Vvhen Pederico Cantoni died in July 1956, he was no
longer regarded as a "dangerous Communist," for age and
moderation had softened his early implacable political
zeal. Nobody wanted to assassinate him any more, and he
even was on speaking terms with some of his former bitter
enemies. His brother Aldo had served as National Senator
again from 1932 to 1941, and died in September 1948.
Bloquism is still a strong provincial party, but today it
represents a political entity with a somewhat different
orientation from its original one.

^Ricardo Saenz Hayes, Ramon J. Carcano En las
letras, el gobierno ^ la diplomacia 166Q - 194"6 TBuenos
Aires, I960'), p. 355. A Mendozan writer who was extremely
critical of Lencinas and Lencinism, stated that the
masses were not "un conjunto de hombres libres y
.
depresiva en su
" but "una entidad muerta,
concientes.
de todo
.anulativa
.
abandono.
su
en
laxitud, cobarde
"La
Castillo,
del
P.
Severe
virilidad."
espiritu de
populares
raasas
las
en
y en
servilisrao
servidumbre y el
Arpentina
Revista
publicos,"
funcionarios
los empleados y
de Ciencias Politicas, XXXIV, 1927, 483.
.

,

.

.
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but reached its peak of popularity
under Carlos
Washington. Bloquism in the 1920 's presented

a more

coherent line under the rule of Federico
and Aldo Cantoni,
although Federico's role appears to have been the
most

significant of the four caudillos. Moreover, besides

personal variances, the Bloquist performance seems to
have
been more determined and effective. It successfully
ended
the problem with the letras, maintained a firm position
in

forcing the business groups to accept its social and
fiscal reforms, and used the provincial budget as a social

and economic leveler to an extent previously unknown in
Argentina. But although Bloquism appears to have been more

responsible than lencinism in handling the public purse,
in general the Sanjuanino movement ruled in a harsher

fashion than Lencinism.
Because of their special situation vis-a-vis Buenos
Aires, Lencinism and Bloquism also championed the cause of

federalism. It is somewhat difficult, however, to judge
the real dimension of their avowed federalism because

during the Yrigoyen's presidencies, Buenos Aires
represented a major center of opposition to them. Therefore,
for Lencinism and Bloquism their defense of federalism

meant their own survival. As a general rule those who
advocated the supremacy of the federalist principle were
those sectors who were in control of the provincial power.
The opposition continually demanded the assistance of

^
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Buenos Aires in redressing their
grievances. Although the
provincianos are federalist at heart because
of their

natural revulsion against the all-absorbing
dominance of
Buenos Aires, in reality the social, economic,
and

political structure of Argentina made them,
almost in a
fatalistic way, heavily dependent on Buenos Aires.

Whether sincere, feigned or simply the result of
political
circumstances, Lencinism and Bloquism thought of

themselves as truly defenders of federalism.
Eventually, the encroachment of partisan political

interests in the relationships between the central

government and the provinces of Mendoza and San Juan, made
their defense of the federalist principle seem a sham. For

during the Radical era, from 1916 to 1930, both provinces
were intervened five times each, which is a record even

for a period noticeable for the large number of federal
interventions. Referring to this natural weakness of the

provincial governments in relation to the federal
authorities, Federico Cantoni, in a 1925 letter to Carlos

Washington Lencinas, in which he rejected the overtures of
some Yrigoyenists to regain the support of Bloquism and

Writing in 1933, Ezequiel Martinez Estrada
referred to the biased and neglectful attitude of the man
from Buenos Aires: "for the inhabitant of Buenos Aires, to
look toward the interior is to look outside, abroad. Eor
him the interior is Europe.... The interior. .. signifies
work, illness, ignorance and oblivion. Nothing there
interests us." X-Ray of the Pampa (Austin, 1971), p. 232.
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Lencinism, wrote that the two Cuyano
parties should be
united to avoid "playing the sad role of
squeezed lemons;
they lose the juice and then they are discarded
in the

garbage."

But even such a special regional unwritten

alliance as the one constituted by Bloquists and
Lencinists, was rendered useless when confronting the

more powerful central government.
Furthermore, the National Congress in the 1920

's

conclusively proved the necessity that National Senators
should be elected by direct vote of the electorate, not by
the provincial legislators. This reform was achieved in
1949. But a reform still waiting to become a reality is

that the admission of congressional members be made

automatic, and thus, not be left subject to the potentially

dangerous procedure of leaving in the hands of a

politically-minded majority the pov/er to accept or reject
the credentials of the newly-elected representatives.

Because this type of manipulation prevailed in the 1920 's,

Mendoza and San Juan were denied the constitutional right
of proper representation in Congress. For years, Mendoza

had only one Senator instead of two, and there were none
for San Juan. Argentines had adopted many foreign

constitutional models, but as stated by Jose Nicolas

'^Letter dated May 18, 1925.
hands of Antulio Lencinas.

Correspondence in the

Matienzo, "we make them work Creole
style.
A comprehensive view of the goals,
actions and symbols
of the Cuyano popular parties clearly
reveals that they

were a harbinger of Peronism. Lencinism
and Bloquism, of
course, were regional, semi-agrarian
populist parties,
limited in scope, inorganic and unsophisticated,
in contrast
with more modern and developed political expressions
of what
Americo Ghioldi referred to as "industrial populism. "^
But
in addition to the logical variances resulting from the

changes produced by the technical and social evolution,
there is a historical continuity based on some essential

characteristics linking the provincial regimes of Mendoza
and San Juan in the 1920 's and the national Feronist

movement in the 1940 's and 1950'

s.

These three movements were basically a product of the

mentality, social characteristics and political behavior

peculiar to the Argentines. "^^ In the history of this century
o

Jose Nicolas Matienzo, Nuevos temas politicos
historicos (Buenos Aires, 1930), p. 17.

e

^Personal interview with Americo Ghioldi, July 22,
1972. Buenos Aires.
^^The ideological association between Yrigoyenist
Radicalism and Peronism has been stated by several authors.
Por example, two Argentine sociologists stated that the
distinctive feature of Peronism was its not having
absorbed "disposable masses," social and economically
marginal, migrating from the rural interior to the urban
centers, but having organized them, because the masses
had already expressed their longings for reform and social
justice. Thus, Peronism would represent "a continuation and
expansion of the characteristics already detected in

"
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strong similar facets can be detected both in the
idiosincracy and actions of many decades ago in the era
of
the "politica criolla," and in the governments freely

elected by the people. Even in more recent times, some of
these traits appeared during the interludes of what can be

called the years of the "military-cracia.
These characteristics are openly manifested in the

populist goals of Lencinism, Bloquism, and Peronism. Their

highest aspirations were to achieve the social i*edemption
of the underdogs, to eliminate the preeminence of a social

and economic elite, and to make effective a better

distribution of wealth within the established economic order.
In the quest for these goals, they also shared the

personalist structure of their movements, the immanent
authoritarianism of their political leaders, the emotional
tone in which their ideological principles were vented, the

class inferences which to a large extent constituted the

basic intrinsic content of the populist movements, their
lack of tolerance or simply, their disdain for the rights
of the opposition, their tendency to manipulate the

Radicalism." Dario Canton and Jose Luis Moreno, "Bases
sociales del voto radical en la Argentina de 1928/30,"
Revista Latinoamericana de ^ociologia VI (September and
December, 1970), 464.
Felix Luna extends the continuity of the popular
pattern to the nineteenth century, asserting that the
movements of the last fifty years, "radicales,
yrigoyenistas o peronistas," have "el mismo perlil as
those of the equestrian caudillos. Los caudillos
(Buenos Aires, 1971), p. 34.
,

1
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Judiciary, their partisan interference
with the press and
other means of political communication
with the people,

and the adoption of similar and effective
socio-political
symbols, such as language, dress, cultural
activities,
and an intense spiritual association with the
vernacular.
•^-'There is a widely known grade school
verse
Argentina which has been adapted through the years in
political purposes, and constitutes another examcle for
of the
continuity of the popular symbols. The original
strophes

En el cielo las estrellas
en el campo las espinas,
ly en el medio de mi pecho
la Republica Argentina:

Felix Luna ( Yrigoyen , p. 419, and Olguin, "...y en
el medio de mi pecho...," p. 35) cited this version
referring to Carlos Washington Lencinas:
En el cielo las estrellas
en el campo las espinas,
iy en el medio de mi pecho
Carlos Washington Lencinas

Luna and Olguin do not provide the source, but the
author found a similar verse in La Palabra April 16, 1925,
stating:
^
+
n en elt cielo
Las estrellas
en el suelo las espinas
y en todas partes Lencinas
el primero de este suelo.
,

•

The association with Peronism appeared in 1944 when
President Pedro P. Ramirez lowered the rents in the city of
Buenos Aires. Then the adaptation read as follows:
En el cielo las estrellas
en el campo los claveles
y un jvival para Ramirez
que bajo los alquileres.

And a year later, at the time of the presidential
campaign the verse was changed to:
En el cielo las estrellas
en el campo el algodon,
y en el medio de mi pecho
el retrato de Peron.

'
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All these factors combined seem to explain
to a

large extent why throughout several decades
the popular
movements in Argentina— regi onal and national— have
been

projecting themselves as an exclusive and conclusive
political solution. This rigid approach, a blessing or a
curse as the only alternatives, beclouded the proclaimed

altruism of their purposes with a dose of distortion and
dogmatism. This was illustrated by the Yrigoyenist

Radicals for whom the choice was strictly between the
"Causa" or the "Regimen"; for the Cantonists, with the

dilemma of deciding between "the Bloquists or the

bordalesas," and for the Peronists, simply the alternative
of selecting between "Peron or Braden.""^^

Lencinism and Bloquism in the early decades of the
century were mocked by their opponents as movements

reneging on Argentina's traditions. But they were, in fact,
a type of the caudillismo so rooted in Argentine life.

1

?

Because Bloquism continued its political life
independently of Peronisra, these two movements have been
regarded as two different entities. This was not the case
with Lencinism, which after practically disappearing from
the political scene in 1930, years later appeared
historically linked v/ith Peronism. When in November 1951
homage was paid to Carlos Washington Lencinas on the
anniversary of his death, one orator stated that
"yesterday's chusma de alpargata are today's dencamisados
La Palabra November 12, 1951. Likewise, popular poetry,
in true Lencinist tradition, also expressed the same view:

.

,

Fue precursor de la hora^[Carl03 V/ashington]
que hoy disfruta la nacion'
que el inclito Peron
engrandece cada dia
con honda sabiduria
de preclaro conductor.
Ibid.

"
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National Deputy

lllatias

Sanchez Sorondo was wrong when he

asserted that San Juan during the rule
of Federico
Cantoni was "in the center of wildest Africa

or in the

depths of the barbarian Polynesia. "^^ No, San
Juan under
the Cantonis, as well as Mendoza under the
Lencinas,

were in Argentina. And both movements, although at
times
rough, violent and tainted with corruption, but always

authoritarian, paternalistic and committed to the

improvement of the needy sectors, did not represent an
isolated example in Argentine history in this century.
They attest to the historical continuity, both in

principles and procedures, of the popular movements in
that country in the last sixty years, regardless whether
the masses involved were called "chusma de alpargatas"
or "descamisados.

These movements generated and nurtured themselves

with emotional, class-oriented, popular fervor, endorsed
by an unquestionable support from the majority of the
citizens at the ballot boxes. However, their governments
can not be called democratic ones. Historical evidence

seems to indicate that in the basic framework of

Argentine politics since the enactment of the Saenz Pena
Law, even if the ruler represented the popular will, it

did not necessarily mean that democracy was a reality.
The central achievements of Lencinism and Eloquism

lies in having spearheaded the trend to social equality

'^See p. 361.
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by driving deep wedges into a traditional system which

understandably resisted change. However, the Cuyano

movements became self-entrapped by the methods they
applied to achieve their goals. But this predicament
did not only plague lencinism and Bloquism. It is a

quandary that in spite of the enactment of the Saenz

Pena Law still bedevils Argentine political life.
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PRIMARY SOURCES

Unpublished Materials
For the period covered in this work the Archivo

Historic© of Mendoza was only partially organized and it
was not as rich as could be expected. The explanation for

this seems to be mostly political, for not all the

pertinent documentation was properly channeled into the
official repository. The changes of governments and the

incurable bureaucracy seem to have affected the appropriate

gathering of the documentation. The Archivo Historico of
San Juan has scant material on the Cantoni era up to 1930.
The main reason given for this situation is the January

1944 earthquake which destroyed the city. But political and

bureaucratic considerations may also partially explain the
scarcity of documentation.
The Archive of the Legislature of Mendoza has valuable

items, though unfortunately some official reports are not

available. The Archive of the Legislature of San Juan, more

modest than Mendoza'

s,

is well kept but is not as complete

as one would desire.

Other manuscript sources for this study seem to be

more limited or less accessible.

I

was kindly allowed to

consult the personal correspondence held by Horacio Antulio

lencinas and Jorge Albarracin Godoy, in Mendoza, and the
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late Jose P. Barreiro in Buenos Aires. To fill the gap

I

conducted interviews with a wide range of participants. In

addition to the interviews I was able to obtain responses

in writing from several others to a long general

questionnaire

I

submitted to them.

I

am very grateful for

their cooperation.

Interviews
Aguirre Molina, Raul (Mendozan, army officer).
Arroyo, Carlos Alberto (Mendozan, writer).

Barreiro Jose P. (Journalist, close collaborator of
Pederico and Aldo Cantoni).
Cantoni, Aldo Hermes (Son of Aldo Cantoni).
Cantoni, Graciela

C.

de (Federico Cantoni's wife).

Cantoni, Rosalina Plaza de (Aldo Cantoni's wife),

Carmona Rios, Indalecio (San Juan, Socialist leader).
Draghi Lucero, Juan (Mendozan, historian).
Ghioldi, Americo (Socialist leader).

Lanus, Adolfo (Ex-Governor of La Rioja Province,
1926-1928).

Lencinas, Horacio Antulio (Jose Nestor Lencinas' son).
Lencinas, Jose Hipolito (Jose Nestor Lencinas' son).

Lencinas, Rafael Nestor (Jose Nestor Lencinas' son).

Marianetti, Benito (Mendozan, Communist leader).

Maurln Navarro, Emilio (San Juan, historian).
Molina, Raul A. (Historian, legal representative of
the government of Mendoza in the Federal Capital,
1924).

.
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Moyano, Francisco J. (Metidozan, educator).

Palero Infante, Ruben (Mendozan, Radical leader).
Perkins, Manuel (Journalist in La Palabra, Mendoza,
*
in the 1920' s).
Rodriguez, Eudoro (Close political friend of
Federico Cantoni).
Roveda, Alberto A. (Member of the Mosca intervention
to Mendoza in 1925)
Segura, Jorge I.

(Mendozan, historian).

Trianes, Francisco J. (Lencinist leader).
Tudela, Ricardo (Writer and Lencinist leader).

Varese, Carmen Peffaloza de (San Juan, educator)

Videla, Horacio C. (San Juan, historian).

Questionnaires
Aguinaga, Carlos E. (Mendozan, National Senator, 1966).

Albarracfn Godoy, Jorge (Mendozan, Radical leader).
Correas, Edmundo (Mendozan, historian).

Gelardi, Santos (Mendozan, Lencinist leader).
Guevara, Juan Ramon (Mendozan, sociologist. Rector
of the National University of Cuyo, 1935-40).

Jofre, Emilio (Mendozan, Governor-elect, 1966).

Velasco Quiroga, Hilario (Mendozan, Radical leader).
Vicchi, Adolf 0 A. (Mendozan, Governor 1941-43; and
also Columbia University, Oral History Program.
Luis Alberto Romero, interview with Dr. Vicchi,
August 5, 1971).

Other Unpublished documents
Provincia de San Juan. Legislatura. Camara de
Diputados. Actas, 1923-1927.

477

Camara de Senadores. Actas,'

1923-1928.

Asambleas legislativas. Actas
1923-1928.

Printed Documents

Laws and Decrees

Provincia de Mendoza. Boletin Oficial

,

1918-1924.

leyes usuales ^ sua decretos reglamentarios
hasta el 31 de diciembre de 1924 Compiled by
Bernardo A. Benzoni and Basilic C. de Larrea.
2 vols. Buenos Aires, 1925.
.

Recopilaci on de leyes
Mendoza, 1938.

1926-1937

,

*

2

vols.

legislative Debates

Provincia de Mendoza. Honorable Convencion
Constituyente, 1915-1916. Diario de sesiones
2 vols. Mendoza, 1917.

——

.

Legislatura. Camara de Diputados. Diario
de sesiones 1922-1924.
,

——
sesiones

,

Camara de Senadores. Diario de
1918-1919, 1922-1924.

Provincia de San Juan. Honorable ^convencion
reformadora de la constitucion. Diario de sesiones
San Juan, 1927.

Republica Argentina. Congreso Nacional. Camara de
Diputados. Diario de sesiones 1916-1930.
,

Camara de Senadores. Diario de
sesiones, 1916-1930.

Reports of Executive and Legislative Bodies

Republica Argentina. Ministerio de Agricultura. Direccion General de Comercio e Industria. Censo
comercial e industrial de la republica Boletin
No, 22 - Mendoza. Buenos Aires, 1915.
^

.

.

.

.
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Censo comercial e
industrial de la republica Boletin No. 24. ~
San Juan Buenos Aires, 1916.

"T"""

.

.

.

~~
Memoria de la
Direccion General de Inmigraci on Bueno3""Airea.
192^:
.

Ministerio de Hacienda. Memoria del Banco
de la Nacion Argentina . 1918 Buenos Aires, 1919.
.

Memoria.

.1919. Buenos Aires y

Memoria.

.1922. Buenos Aires ^

1920.
1923.

Memoria. .1923. Buenos Aires ^
1924.

Memoria. .1924. Buenos Aires,
1925.

Memoria.

.1925. Buenos Aires,

1926.

Memoria. .1926. Buenos Aires,
1927.

Memoria. .1927. Buenos Aires,
1928.

Memoria.

.1928. Buenos Aires,

1929.

Las letras de tesoreria.
Denuncia de la Ca.ja de Conversion al Minis tro
de Hacienda, Eleodoro lobos Buenos Aires, 1907.
.

Ministerio de Justicia e Instruccion Publica.
Consejo Nacional de Educacion. Educaci on comun en
la capital provincias ^ territories nacionales
1918. Buenos Aires, 1919.
.

,

Educacion .

.

1919

Educacion .

.

1922 .

.

Buenos Aires, 1920.

Buenos Aires, 1923.

..

.

.
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Educacion
~

Bueaoa Aires, 1924.

.

.

.192^.

Educacion. . .1924.

Buenos Aires, 1925.

Educacion . . .1925
'

Buenos Aires, 1926.

Educaci on . .1926.
.

Buenos Aires, 1927.
Educacion

.

.

.1927.

Educacion .

.

1928 .

Buenos Aires, 1928.

Buenos Aires, 1929.

Ministerio del Interior. Intervencion
nacional a la Provincia de San Juan. Buenos
Aires, 1921.

Mendoza

(

Intervencion nacional en
1917 - 191^ ). Buenos Aires, 1918.

Intervencion nacional en la
Provincia de San Juan 1923/26 Informe
presentado por el General Eduardo Broquen
Buenos Aires, 1926.
.

,

.

Interior

,

Memoria del Ministerio del
1918 - 1919 Buenos Aires, 1919.
.

1919-1920

.

Buenos

Memoria. . .1920-1921

.

Buenos

Memoria .

.

Aires, 1920.
Aires, 1921.

Memoria .

.

1921 - 1922 . Buenos

Memoria

.

1922 - 1923

.

Buenos

Memoria. . .1923-1924

.

Buenos

.1924-1925

.

Buenos

Aires, 1922.
.

Aires, 1923.
Aires, 1924.

Memoria
Aires, 1925.

. .

«

,
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Aires, 1926.

Memoria ... 1923 - 1926
Memoria

. .

Memoria

. .

Aires, 1927.

.

Buenos

,1926-1027. Buenos

Aires, 1928,

Aires

1928 - 1929

»

Buenos

Memoria , .1929-1930

.

Buenos

1929.
.

Aires, 1930.

Tercer censo nacional. 12
vols. Buenos Aires, 1916-1916.

Provincia de Mendoza. Ministerio de Gobierno.
Legislacioa social de la Provincia de Mendoza
Mendoza, 1926.
-

.

—~

El problema escolar en la
Provincia de Mendoza Inf orme general del Ing
Leopoldo Suarez sobre el estado de la
instruccion primaria ^ su organizacion
elevado al P.E. por el Comisionado Interventor
al iniciarse el e.iercicio de 1927 Plan de
ref ormas ^ proyecto de presupuesto sometido a
la aprobacion del Excmo Gobierno Decretos del
P.E. concordantes con esta gesti on Buenos
.

.

,

«

,

.

.

.

Aires, 1927.

Direccion General de Escuelas.
Gesti on economica ^ f inanciera La obra del Sr
Enrique Julio al f rente del gobierno escolar
Mendoza, 1920.
.

.

.

—

Direccion General de Estadistica.
Resumen general del censo comercial e industrial
levantado exi 1921. Mendoza, 1922.
Sintesis de la
Direccion General de Estadistica , 1930 - 1931 .
Mendoza, 1932.

Sumario estadistico

z
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Salario minimo Inf orme
presentado al Poder Ejecutivo Provincial
GBy Manuel A. Zuloaga^l. Mendoza, 1927.
.

Ministerio de Hacienda. El emprestito
norteamericano de 1927 Ley 9lBT Antecedentes
de su contratacion Rea.juste del misrap en 1933.
"
Mendoza, 1934.
.

.

Banco de Mendoza. Inf orme
Bobre el estado f inanciero al 15_ de enero de
1929 Mendoza, 1929.
.

Las letras de tesoreria ante
la constitucion ^ leyes de la nacion. Mendoza,
1909.

———

Ley de presupuesto de gastos
Mendoza,
1924.
(1924).

Ano 1930

.

Memoria del Credito Publico
Mendoza, 1931.

.

Ministerio de Industrias y Obras Publicas.
Memoria presentada a la Honorable Legislatura
per el Ministro de Industrias ^ Obras Publi cas
Ing Leopoldo Suarez 1922 - 23 Buenos Aires,
.

.

,

1924.

Pension a la ve e
.j

Mensajes ^ proyectos de leyes .
e^ invalidez
Mendoza, 1922.
.

——

El problema vinl cola . Memorial
de la intervencion nacional en Mendoza a la
Comision Asesora para la industria vi ti vini cola .
Mendoza, 1931*
-

Su vida su trabaj_o, su progreso Mendoza,
c. 1910. [^Special publication in homage to
Governor Emilio Civit].
.

,

Provincia de San Juan. Ministerio de Gobierno. Censo
agricola Estadisticas _e inf ormaci ones de la
Provincia de San Juan Buenos Aires, 1934.
.

.

Departamento del Trabajo,
Estadlstica y Archive. Las leyes de .jornada de
San Juan, 1924.
8 horas ^ salario minimo
.
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I^i^ro Blanco
Documentos
oficiales de los hechos producidos en San Juan
y el procedimiento empleado por el GobernadoF"
~
Dr. Amable J ones
San Juan, IS^l'
.

.

Se^undo censo general de la
Provincia de San Juan Buenos Aires, 1910-1912.
.

Ministerio de Hacienda. Presupuesto
general para 1924. San Juan, 192^.

Other Printed Documents
Anastasi, Leonidas, and Jorge Albarracin Godoy.
Habeas Corpus interpuesto a favor del Senador
Nacional Electo Dr Carlos Washington lencinas
^ querella criminal contra los autores de la
detenci5n liendoza, 1929.
.

.

Bialet Masse, Juan. El estado de las clases obreras
argentinas a comienzos de siglo C6rdoba« 1968.
.

Originally published in 1904. A report to
the Minister of the Interior Joaquin V.
Gonzalez, under Julio A. Roca's second
presidential term.
Castillo, Severe Gutierrez del. El Dr. Severe
Gutierrez del Castillo al pueblo culto de
Mendoza Mendoza. 1922.
.

Corporacion de Tenedores de Titulos y Acciones.
Memoria del primer semestre del e.j ercicio de
1924 - 1923 Buenos Aires, n.d.
.

Liga de Defensa de la Propiedad, la Industria y el
Comercio de San Juan. Memorial presentado al
enero de
poder E.jecutivo de la Nacion, 19
1924 San Juan.
.

Municipalidad de la Capital QMendoza^]. Homena.je de
la Municipalidad de la Capital al Doctor
Jose Nestor Lencinas Mendoza, 1928.
.

Homenaje de La
La Nueva Provincia Bahia Blanca
cincuentenari
0 de la
al
Provincia
Nueva
Blanca,
1928.
cludad de Bahia Blanca Bahla
This special publication has an account
of the role of Enrique Julio as Director
of the School Board of Mendoza.
.

*

.

'

.
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Paginas argentinas. la Provlncia de Mendoza durante
el gobierno del Dr. Carlos Washington Lencinas
.
Buenos Aires, 1924.
Sociedad Anonima Bodegas y Vinedos Santiago
Graffigna Lda. Memoria y Balance General de
1920 . San Juan, 1921.
Memoria.

.1921. San Juan, 1922.

Memoria.

.1922.

San Juan, 1923.

Memoria. .1923. San Juan, 1924.
Memoria. .1924. San Juan, 1925.

Memoria, .1925. San Juan, 1926.
Memoria. .1926. San Juan, 1927.
Memoria. .1927. San Juan, 1928.

Memoria. .1928. San Juan, 1929.

Union Civica Radical Mendoza
El Comite
Departamental de San Carlos of rece a sus
correli gi onari 03 la recopilacion de algunos
documentos politicos de actualidad Mendoza,
.

.

1919.

Memoirs
Aguilar, Jose E. Mendoza en los afios 1900 a 1916
Mendoza, 1957.
The author was a member of Jose Nestor
Lencinas' government.

.

Aguirre Molina, Raul. Mendoza del 900 la ciudad
desaparecida Buenos Aires, 1966.
A personal recollection by a native
Mendozan, a retired army officer.
.

.

Coca, Joaquin. El contubernio . Memorias de un
diputado obrero Buenos Aires, n.d.
The author was a Socialist National
Deputy from 1924 to 1928. He provides
information on the congressional intraparty disputes.
.
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Columba, Ramon. El congreso que yo he
visto. ^ vols
Buenos Aires, l949-l$52T
Columba was for many years a stenographer
in Congress and later he became Chief
Stenographer. He was also a noted
caricaturist.

—

Punes,: Lucio. Anecdotas mendocinas . Mendoza,
1936.

Short stories by a conservative Mendozan
politician on the social and intellectual
atmosphere of the provincial capital.
Garcia, Eduardo Augusto. Yo fui testigo
Aires, 1971.

.

Buenos

A Mendozan conservative, a politician and
a jurist.

Ibarguren, Carlos. La historia que he vivido
Aires, 1955.

.

Buenos

Personal observations and sketches of
important figures of the past.
Marianetti, Benito. En la verde le.jania del recuerdo.
Buenos Aires, 19^7.
A delightful personal account of Mendoza
by an intelligent observer.

Vera Vallejo, Jorge. Mi magistratura

Mendoza, 2nd

.

rev. ed., 1966.

Originally published in 1953. This work
covers his entire career in the Judiciary,
from his beginnings in Mendoza to his
role as member of the National Supreme
Court in 1956.
Videla, Horacio
1956.

C.

Retablo san juanino

.

Buenos Aires,

A good general account of prominent
Sanjuaninos and the evolution of San Juan,
written by the leading local historian.

Collection of Speeches and Messages

Provincia de Mendoza. Memoria administratlva de los
cuatro meses de gobierno del Sr Ricardo Baez
Mendoza, 1920.
.

.

.
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^-^ensaje de 3.e. el Sefior Gobernador
de
la Provincia Dr. Jose Nestor Lencinas
inau^urando el periodo legislativo de
1918.
Mendoza, junio 1918.

Men3a.ie ...l91Q. Mendoza,

junio 1919.

Mensane del Gobernador Dr. Carlos
Washington Lencinas Mendoza. junio 1922.
.

Men3aj[e.

.

.1923. Mendoza,

Junio 1923.

Mensa.je .

.

.1924. Mendoza,

junio 1924.

Mensa.jes del Gobernador Dr . Alejandro
prfila, 1926-1928 . 11 booklets. Mendoza,
1928.

Provincia de San Juan. Mensa.je de S.E. el Sr
Gobernador de la Provincia Dr Tederico
Cantoni San Juan, mayo 1923.

.

.

.

Mensaje

.

. . .

San Juan, mayo 1924.

Mensaje .

. . .

San Juan, mayo 1925.

Programa de gobierno del Gobernador de
San Juan Dr. Aldo Cantoni . San Juan,
diciembre 1926.

~
Dr .

Mensaje del Gobernador de la Provincia
Aldo Cantoni San Juan, mayo 1927.

,

.

Mensaje .

. . .

San Juan, mayo 1928.

Yrigoyen, Hipolito. Pueblo ^ gobierno
12 vols. Buenos Aires, 1956

.

2d ed.,

SECONDARY SOURCES

Books
Aguirre, Julio Leonidas. Cocina criolla ^ salsa india
Mendoza, 1902.
Keen political observations by a distinguished
Mendozan sociologist.
.
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Alvarez, Agustin. Manual de patologia politica.
2d ed
Buenos Aires, 1947.

—

Originally published in 1899. A valuable
critique of Argentine political behavior.
Alvarez, Plorencio. El sud mendocino Malargue, su
pasado su presente y su porven ir. Buenos Aires.
1928.
.

~

,

Amadeo, Santos Prirao. Argentine Constitutional Law.
New York, 1943.

An excellent study of Argentina's court
decisions and a comparison with the U.S.
Supreme Court rulings. The author was
member of the faculty of the University of
Puerto Rico.

Aparicio, Prancisco de, and Horacio A, Difrieri. La
Argentina Suma de geografia 9 vols. Buenos
Aires, 1963.
.

.

Arenas, ^ario. Estudio historico ^ critico sobre las
finanzas de la Provincia de Mendoza en 1912
Buenos Aires, 1913.
.

An analysis of provincial finances. This
was Arenas' doctoral thesis.
Arias, Abelardo. Alamos talados. Buenos Aires, 1942.
A work of fiction which portrays the
frustrations of the creole elite who were
being economically displaced by hardworking immigrants.

Arroyo, Carlos Alberto. El interventor federal .
Buenos Aires, I960.
A fictional work centering on Carlos
Washington Lencinas' rule and the Mosca
intervention in Mendoza.
Bagu, Sergio. La sociedad de masas en su historia .
Cordoba, 1961.
A valuable study of the impact of the
masses on the national structure.

Barreiro, Jose P. La provincia de San Juan su
transf ormacion politica social 1923 1928
Juan, 1928.
,

,

.

San
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This work is based on the editorials
that
the author wrote in the Cantonist
newspaper La Reforma. It was published
to
present a favorable image of Bloquism when
It was under attack by the Yrigoyenists
and conservatives in Buenos Aires.
Bas, Arturo M. El derecho federal ar^entino
Nacipn
Z provincias 2 vols. Buenos Aires, 1927T
Vol. II contains a brief comment on San
Juan's constitution of 1927.
.

.

Bates, Sergio W. Muerte de Jones (la tragedia
san juanina )
Buenos Aires, 1922.
.

An anti-Yrigoyenist account of the events
of the Rinconada in November 1921 written
by a respected Sanjuanino journalist.
Bosch, Mariano P. Historia del partido radical. La
U.C.R.
I89I-I93O Buenos Aires, 1931.
A biased work by an anti-Radical author.
,

.

Bracamonte, Juan Alberto. Una verguenza nacional
El cantonismo en documentos Buenos Aires, 1927.
.

.

A documented, bitter criticism of Cantonism
and the Cantoni brothers. The author was a
journalist and politician from San Juan.

Bunge, Alejandro E. Una nueva Argentina
1940.

Buenos Aires,

.

A valuable socio-economic analysis of
Argentina.
Calle, Jorge. Los iluminados . Buenos Aires, 1922.
The author was co-director of the Mendozan
daily Los Andes. His work is a critique of
the rule of Hipolito Yrigoyen and Jose
Nestor Lencinas, whom he calls the
"enlightened" ones.

Canton, Dario, ed. Materiales para el estudio de la
sociologia politica en la Argentina 2 vols.
Buenos Aires, 1968.
Provides electoral returns for national
elections since 1912.
.
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Correas, Edmundo. "Historia de Mendoza,"
in Historia
oe las provincias ^ sus pueblos
vol. lT"oT
Historia argentina contemporanea Buenos Aires.
'
1967.
,

.

The Lencinases era is treated too briefly.
The author contends that the two Mendozan'
caudillos played a demagogic role.

Cutolo, Vicente Osvaldo. Nuevo diccionario biografico
argentine 3 vols. Buenos Aires, 1968- .
.

Damianovich, Aquiles. El crimen ^ el poder La lucha
£21 la vicepresidencia ^ el asesinato de Jones
Buenos Aires, 1922.
.

.

An account by a former member of Jones'
government on the motivations for Governor
Jones' assassination.

Del Carril Quiroga, Pablo Alberto. Antecedentes
electorales nacionales Distrito San Juan,
1927-1943 Cordoba, 1948.
.

.

An excellent work for complete electoral
information.
Edelman, Murray. The Symbolic Uses of Politics
Urbana, 111., 1961.

.

An analysis of the relevance of political
symbols.

Fernandez, Juan Romulo. "Historia de San Juan, 18621930," in Historia de las provincias ^ sus
pueblos vol. IV of Historia arpentina
contemporanea Buenos Aires, 1967.
,

.

A brief account of the Cantoni era.
Narrative and incomplete.
Galvez, Manuel. Vida de Hipolito Yrigoyen . El hombre
del misterio . Buenos Aires, 1939.
A pro-Yrigoyen account by a strong
nationalist writer.

Gallardo, Jose P. Definicion doctrinaria del bloquismo
sanjuanino Rosario, 193^^
Although it provides information about
Bloquism, this work is of limited value.
.

Guillermo Kraft Lda. Anuario Kraft 1916-1930. Yearly
volumes. Buenos Aires.
A good reference on public authorities and
business interests in general.
,

489

Ghioldi, Americo. Alpargatas y libros
en la historia
argentina Buenos Aires, V^W,
.

A Socialist viewpoint of important political
symbols in Argentine life.
Gil, Octavio. Autonomia provincial

Historia y
concepto constitucional . Buenos Aires, 1928.
A juridical examination of the relationship
between the central government and the
provinces, with comments on the 1927 San
Juan constitution,
.

Instituto^Torcuato Di Telia. Centre de Investigaciones
Economicas. Catalogo de estadisticas publicadas
en la Republica Argentina 2 vols. Buenos Aires,
•

.

1968.

Records four items for Mendoza and only two
for San Juan, none of them for the period
1916-1930.
Jorba, Josef a E.
ed. Cuarto centenario de San Juan
1362 - 1962 R ecopilacion historica y literaria
Buenos Aires, 1962.
,

.

:

.

Little information on the Cantoni era.
Juarez, Roberto. Atentados politicos en la Argentina
Buenos Aires, 1970.

.

Short chapters dealing with violent
political events from 1821 to 1955.
Lattes, Zulma L. Recchini de, and Alfredo E. Lattes.
Migraciones en la Argentina Estudio de las
migraci ones internas e^ internacionales basado
en datos censales 1869 - 1960 . Buenos Aires, 1969.
.

,

,

A basic monograph, it contains a wealth
of data on the subject.

Legon, Faustino J. Comentario de la nueva constitucion
de San Juan Buenos Aires, 1927.
A full analysis of the 1927 constitution
by a Professor of Public Law at the
University of La Plata.
.

Lencinae, Jose Hipolito. Carlos Washington Lencinas .
MisiOQ ^ future de una epoca . Mendoza, 1963.
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Although it provides useful information,
It is far from being a truly historical
account, especially considering the fact
that the author has been a first-hand
witness of Carlos Washington's times.
Luna, Felix. Alvear . Buenos Aires, 1958.
The author believes Alvear was not a truly
Radical man.

Io3 caudillos

Buenos Aires, 1971.
A revisionist view of five nineteenth
century leading regional caudillos. The
author contends that they were
representatives of the authentic federalist
tradition.
.

Yrigoyen El templario de la libertad .
Buenos Aires, 19"5S>.
.

A sympathetic biography with valuable
political information.

Maidana Diaz, Oscar. Dinastia de los lencinas Critica
de contribucion a la historia politica de Kendoza.
.

Buenos Aires, 1929.
A shameful diatribe against the Lencinases,
which in fact, denigrates its author.

Marco del Pont, Raul. Historia del sud mendocino
Buenos Aires, 194HT
Good information on the development of

.

southern Mendoza.

Marianetti, Benito. Las luchas sociales en Mendoza
Mendoza, 1970.
Highly useful review of worker agitation
in that province.

Problemas de Cuyo

.

.

Buenos Aires, 1948.

Deals with the major problems affecting the
three Cuyo provinces, Kendoza, San Juan and
San Luis, such as the wine industry, land
tenure, irrigation, public services, mining
and the decline of federalism.

«««

——

La cuestion
vitivinicola. Buenos Aires, 1965.
El racimo

^ su aventura

.

.
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A complete account of the complex
development of the wine industry in
Mendoza written by a well-recognized
authority on the subject.

Martinez Estrada, Ezequiel. X-Ray of the Pampa.
Trans, by Alain Swietlicki. Austin, 1971.
A classical work on the Argentine
dichotomy between city and country.
Marzo, Miguel, and Osvaldo Inchauspe. Geo^rafia de
Mendoza 2 vols. Mendoza, 1967.
.

An indispensable work for studying
Mendoza.

Masini Calderon, Jose Luis. Mendoza hace cien anos
Buenos Aires, 1967.

,

A well-researched monograph on all
aspects of Mendozan life in the I860's,
as well as their relation to national
events.

Matienzo, Jose Nicolas. Nuevos temas politicos
historicos Buenos Aires, 1930

e

.

Observations on Argentine political
behavior by a former Minister of Interior
of President Alvear.
Mazo, Gabriel del. El radicalismo ensayo sbbre su
historia ^ doctrina 3 vols. Buenos Aires,
1957-59.
A partisan account, only partially useful
as a historical contribution.
,

.

Moreno, Rodolfo (h). Las enf ermedades de la
politica ar^entina Buenos Aires, 1905.
A critical view of Argentine politics at
the turn of the century.
.

Nieto Riesco, Julio. J ose N. Lencinas.

2

vols. Buenos

Aires, 1926.

A pro-Lencinas, but not a hagi ographical
work, written by a former official of his
government.

—
492

Olascoaga, Laurentino. Las insti tuciones
politicas
de Mendoza. 2 vols. La Paz ( Bolivia
)7~TgT5^
An analysis of the political institutions
of Kendoza, describing how the letter
of
the law was often not observed in
practice. Published when the author was
the Argentine Ambassador to Bolivia.

Olguin, Dardo. El analfabetismo ^ sus factores.*
Mendoza, 1939.
A historical account of the struggle for
popular education in Mendoza. Olguin is
very well qualified to deal with the
subject, for he is a life-long devoted
educator. The work examines the
pedagogical and social reaons for

illiteracy.

—

Dos politicos
dos politicas Emilio
Civit 2 Jose N. Lencinas La oligarqula
liberal ^ la democracia popular . Mendoza,
1956.
.

.

A brief work on Lencinas and Civit and
their divergent ideological positions.

^ mito

Lencinas , el caudillo radical
Buenos Aires, 1961.

.

Historia

.

The most complete account available on
the Mendozan caudillo, portraying a very
favorable image of Lencinas. Neither
sources nor documents are cited, except
a few newspaper transcriptions, but a
great deal of information was taken from
Nieto Riesco's biography.

Palermo Riviello, Jose. Filipicas argentinas .
Buenos Aires, 1939.
Chapter XV deals extensively with San Juan
and its political development in the
Cantoni era.
Paredes, David. La demagogia en accion Fisonomia
del congreso argentine 1929 - 1930 Buenos Aires,
1937.
Observations from the National Congress
by a journalist from El Pais, a newspaper
from Cordoba.
.

,

.
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Pastor, Reynaldo A. San Luis su gloriosa
y callada
£esta, 1810 - 1967 B^I^s Air ls, 1970 .
A narrative, chronological account.
,

.

P^rez Guilhou, Margarita Hualde, comp. Contribucion
bibliografla historica de Mendoza
^
Mendoza, 1962.
.

An excellent monographic study, although
it deals almost entirely with the colonial
period and the nineteenth century.
Pizarro, Modestino. La verdad sobre la intervencion
en San Juan (23 de diciembre de~T928 - 6 de
setiembre de 1930 7. Buenos Aires, 1932.
A defense of his role as interventor of
San Juan and, therefore, a fiery attack
on the Cantonists.

Rabuffetti, luis Ernesto. El dogma radical. Buenos
Aires, 1943.
As the title suggests, a dogmatic work on
the virtues of the "Causa." Useful for
understanding the quasi religious fervor
of the Yrigoyenist political principles.

Ramella, Pablo A. Ref ormas a la constitucidn de
San Juan. San Juan, 1943.
A strong Catholic viewpoint, and opposed
to women's suffrage. The author is a
lawyer who in 1946 was appointed National
Senator by the Peronist coalition of his
province.

Reyna Almandos, Luis. La demagogia radical ^ la
tirania 1916-1919 Buenos Aires, 1920.
A very critical analysis of Yrigoyen's
rule by a conservative Mendozan jurist.
.

,

Rivarola, Rodolfo. La crisis politica ar£entina.
Origenes causas , soluciones Buenos Aires,
,

.

1931.

Reflections on the political affairs that
led to the crisis of the late 1920*3.
Roig, Arturo Andres. Breve historia intelectual de
Mendoza. Mendoza, 1966.
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An excellent account by a distinguished
Mendozan scholar, on the intellectual
developments in Mendoza from 1571 to
1940.
I^os

krausistas argentinos . Puebla

(Mexico), 1969.

A very well-documented study of the
influence of Krausism on politics and the
educational field in Argentina, as well
as on the polemic between Krausists and
positivists in the latter part of the
nineteenth century and the early part
of the twentieth,

—

La literatura ^ el periodismo mendocinos
entre los ahos 1915-1940, a traves de las
paginas del diario Los Andes Mendoza, 1965.
.

A complete study of the literary and
journalistic trends and developments, as
seen through the pages of the leading
newspaper of Cuyo.

Rojas, Ricardo. Las provincias in Vol. XVII of
Obras. Buenos Aires, 1927.
,

The author, a literary man and a politician,
analyzes the general conditions in the
provinces.

Romero, Luis Alberto, et. al. El radicalismo Buenos
Aires, 1968.
Seven essays on Radicalism. One of them,
"Las transf ormaciones del partido y sus
luchas publicas (1916-1930)," by Lilia Ana
Bertoni, pp. 91-124, gives information on
Mendoza and San Juan based on unreliable
sources.
.

Rosa, Jose Maria. Resurgimiento de un pueblo Mendoza ,
setiembre 1930 a f ebrero 1932 Documentacion
complementaria Mendoza, 1932.
Report of the Federal Commissioner in the
province of Mendoza after the fall of
President Yrigoyen in September 1930.
.

.

.
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Santillan, Diego Abad de, comp. Gran enciclopedia
argentina 8 vols. Buenos Aires, 1956-63.
.

A valuable reference work.

Historia argentina
1965-1971.

.

vols. Buenos Aires.

5

Vol. IV brings information on Mendoza and
San Juan, but the references to labor
legislation in the former province are
partly based on an erroneous source.

Suarez, Lepoldo. La accion del estado en la industria
vitivinicola Mendoza, 1922.
.

la industria vitivinicola en Mendoza en
1922. Mendoza, 1922.
The author was Minister of Industries in
Carlos Washington Lencinas' government.
He defends the principle that the vihatero
must be protected in order to have a stable
wine industry.

Universidad Nacional de Cuyo. Facultad de Filosofia y
Letras. Institute de Historia. Contribuci ones
para la historia de Mendoza Mendoza, 1969.
.

Brief monographic works by Mendozan
specialists providing a solid background
on the nineteenth century.
Varese, Carmen P. de, and Hector D, Arias. Historia
de San Juan . San Juan, 1966.
A good local history.

Verdaguer, Jose A. Historia de Mendoza

.

Mendoza, 1935.

Only somewhat useful as a general reference.

Articles and Other Sources
Arias, Hector D. "El ferrocarril y la transf ormacion
economica de San Juan," Trabajos ^ Comunicaci ones ,
XVII (La Plata, 1967), 51-62.
The railway line reached San Juan in 1885.
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Beltrame, Emilio J. "Mendoza y su crisis economica.
Revista de Ciencias Ecoaomicas VII (NovemberDecember, 1916), 227-277; and VIII (January^
March, 1917), 5-61.
A detailed analysis of the problems
besetting Mendoza, especially its wine
industry.
,

Campoy, Luis. "Grupo cultural criollo bajo."
Investigaciones en Sociolo^ia IV (JanuaryJune, 1965), 39-57.
,

A solid monograph on the lower Creole
sectors of Mendoza. This is a publication
of the Institute of Sociology of the
National University of Cuyo, Mendoza.
"Grupos culturales criollo y no criollo.
Disponibilidad para el cambio y niveles de
movilizacion y desarrollo." Mendoza, 1971.
Unpublished.
Canton, Darlo, and Jose Luis Moreno. "Bases sociales
del voto radical en la Argentina de 1928/30."
Revista latinoamerican.a de Sociologia VI
(September and December, 1970), 459-464.
,

The authors, two Argentine sociologists,
assert that there is a historical
continuity in the popular movements.

Castillo, Severe Gutierrez del. "La servidumbre y
el servilismo en las masas populares y en los
empleados y funcionarios publicos." Revista
Argentina de Ciencias Poll ticas XXXIV
(1927), 482-490.
The author contends that the masses
constitute a negative part of society.
,

Civit, Josefina Ortega de. "Emilio Civit. Una
vida al servicio de la nacion." Revista de
la Junta de Estudios Historicos de Mendoza,
Ida. Spoca, VI (1970), 609-624.

A brief sketch of Emilio Civit as seen
through his daughter's eyes.
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Correas, Edmundo. "Discurso del Presidente de
la
Junta de Estudios Historicos, el 22 de mayo
de 1966," Revista de la Junta de Estudios
Historicos de Mendoza, 2da. Epoca, VI (1970),

A sympathetic view of Civit by a
Mendozan historian.
Daus, Pederico A. "Poblacion de los oasis ricos
y
de los oasis pobres de la region arida
argentina." Humanidades XXIX (La Plata, 1944),
53-62.
,

The author explains why Mendoza and San
Juan belong to the area of the rich oases.

Diaz Araujo, Enrique. "Historia institucional de
Mendoza. Notas para su estudio." Revista de la
Junta de Estudios Historicos de Mendoza "?da.
.

Epoca, II (1967), 161-235.
A general view of Mendoza' s institutional
history. Diaz Araujo believes Emilio Civit
has been the leading political figure of
the province.

Escobar, Ruth Cora. "Las categorias del modelo de
Almond y la realidad del gobierno de Pederico
Cantoni (1923-1925)." Unpublished.

Study prepared for the Department of
Sociology of the Universidad Provincial
Domingo P. Sarmiento, of San Juan, June,
1972.

Gomez Rosendo A. "Intervention in Argentina, 18601930." Inter - American Economic Affairs, I
(December, 1947), 55-73.
Gives a statistical analysis of the
interventions to the provinces by the
Pederal Government during the Radical
era.

"Ley de contabilidad y contaduria
Leguiza, Jose (h)
general de la Provincia de Mendoza. Organizacion
general." Revista de Ciencias Econ5micas XXVI
(1926), 342-365.
Provides technical information on the
handling of public finances in Mendoza.
.

,
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Los Andes. ^Mendoza comparativa Album descriptivo
y
estadistico Mendoza, 1941.
.

,

A good reference source.

Olguin, Dardo. "Historia de la Vitivinicultura,
in
Mendoza , daily newspaper of the city of Mendoza,
March 7, 1971 - May 31, 1971.
"...y en el medio de mi pecho, Carlos
Washington Lencinas." Todo es Historia, II
(April, 1969), 8-35.

A journalistic- type account. Deals with
the significance of Jose Nestor and Carlos
Washington Lencinas in Mendoza' s political
and social life.
Schiopetto, Ovidio V. "La doble imposicion interna
en la Republica Argentina. Estudio del sistema
impositivo de la Frovincia de Mendoza."
Investigaciones de Seminario (Pacultad de
Ciencias Economicas, Universidad de Buenos
Aires), V (1927), 355-396.
A study advocating a unified consumer tax
to avoid the numerous levies imposed by
the provincial governments.

Segura, Jorge I. "Lanzas folkloricas y tradicionales
de Mendoza. Panorama de cuatro siglos." Mendoza,
1970. Unpublished.

"Historia de Mendoza." Mendoza, 1971.
Unpublished.
Smith, Robert T. "Radicalism in the Province of San
Juan. The Saga of Pederico Cantoni (1916-1934)."
Doctoral Dissertation, University of California,
1970. Unpublished.

Varas, Amaldo. "El Bloquismo," in Tribuna, daily
newspaper of San Juan, January 22, 1970 - March
5, 1970.

Videla, Ricardo. "Mendoza. Su geografia economica."
Revista de Economia -Argentina XVI (1926),
93-108.
,
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NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

Newspapers
Diiring the Radical era (1916-1930)

the press in

Argentina was free and newspapers could voice all
shades of political opinion. Both the General San

Martin's Library in Mendoza and the Franklin Library
in San Juan

provinces

— the

—have

main public libraries in these
excellent newspaper collections.

Naturally, it is richer in Mendoza, but both are very

well kept. An exception to this generalization concerns

Diario Nuevo

,

a conservative daily of San Juan.

Although the Franklin Library has only a few volumes
of Diario Nuevo ,

the full collection of this newspaper

is in private hands in the city of San Juan and was

made available to this researcher.
(a)

Federal Capital
Critica

1918-1919; 1921-25; 1927-30.

,

La Epoca

1917-1930.

,

La Fronda, 1919, 1921-24, 1929.
La Nacion, 1917-30.

La Prensa

,

1917-30.

La Razon, 1918-19, 1922-25, 1927-29.

La Van^uardia, 1918-19, 1921-24, 1927-29.

.
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(b)

Mendoza
La Accion (General Alvear)
Lencinist.

,

1927-28. Weekly,

Los Andes , 1917-30.
El Censor , 1924. Weekly, conservative.

El Intransig:ente
Lencinist.
El Latigo

1919-20. Radical, anti-

,

1923. Weekly, Lencinist.

,

La Libertad, 1924-29. Conservative.
La Montana

,

1918-19. Lencinist.

La Opinion , 1918-19, 1924. Voice of the
mercantile sectors, especially the
bodegueros
La Palabra, 1918-30. Lencinist.
Palanca, 1923-24. Weekly. Published by the
Provincial Federation of Teachers of
Mendoza.

Pensamiento Nuevo

,

1920. By -weekly, Anarchist.

El Regimen , 1917-18. Conservative.
El Socialista , 1918-29. Weekly, published by
the Mendozan Socialist Federation.

La Tarde

,

1918-30. Conservative.

El Trabajo , 1925. Socialist.

La Voz Provincial
(c)

,

1928-30. Yrigoyenist.

San Juan

Debates 1921-25. Independent, but antiCantonist after 1923.
,

Jiario Nuevo , 1922-25. Anti-Cantonist.
La Reforma, 1923-30. Cantonist.
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Periodicals
The Review of the River Plate (Buenos Aires)

,

1928.

Pdginas de Columba (Buenos Aires), 1922-30. By-weekly.

